Final Formula for Rejecting the Cartesian Cogito
Joseph Polanik
>>geva...@aol.com wrote:
>>>Descartes discounted, or was obviously ignorant of the nature of the
>>>reflexive role of the pronominal discourse referent *I.* Its function
>>>is that of self-referential specificity (the quality of
>>>particularising one's own self - rather than generalising the
>>>*other.*) From the perspective of a participant in an act of speech
>>>or writing *I* is anaphorically linked to and is capable of
>>>initiating and selectively instantiating a vast multitude of data
>>>from the immense complexity of a human's experiential biography and
>>>the linguistically-based, antecedally composed, neurological
>>>chronicle of his or her life.
>>the word 'I' is an indexical; meaning, that it's referent is specified
>>by application of a rule; in this case, the rule that 'I' refers to
>>the user of the word 'I'. in short, 'I' is a syntactic device by which
>>a speaker/writer self-references.
>My whole logomachy revolves around the necessity of grasping one's
>biographical antecedency in order that the pronoun *I* may even be
>lexically retrieved and uttered.
this sounds like an empirical claim. are you saying that there has
*never* been a case of amnesia or brain injury in which the subject
forgot his or her name but remembered how to use the word 'I'?
if not, then it's not clear what is the necessity of which you speak.
>The referent *I* is a word which can only be used by someone who is
>already aware of his existential state as a human equipped with a
>neuro-linguistic heritage capable of communicating the significance of
>the pronoun *I* - in that it is a function word that is used in place
>of a noun such as: *Joe, Rene, Adolf , Martin or The Mad Hatter,.
>>>As every utterer of the *I* word is aware, *I* is a referential term
>>>which derives its reference from antecedency, or the thinking, flesh
>>>and blood state or condition of being physically and neurologically
>>>antecedent . Thus, in the absence of a referential antecedent the
>>>word *I* would be neuro-linguistically inaccessible to an entity
>>>which was no longer extant. The first person pronoun *I* is the most
>>>powerful referent in any language. *I* conveys the utmost
>>>informational recall as to personal identity, self knowledge and
>>>understanding of an individual's history, beliefs, goals, abilities
>>>and occurrent realisation of his or her current state of
>>>connectedness with the surrounding environment.
>>the self-referential pronoun, I, can be use to refer to or make
>>statements about any or all of the facts concerning one's personal
>>identity, including those you've mentioned.
>Only if you remember them and remember the role of *I* in language in
>general and self-referentiality in particular.
true. you have to remember the details of life in order to talk about
them; but, having remembered those details, one is still free to talk
about ... something else
>>however, the issue for philosophers is not always personal identity
>>(answers to the question 'who am I'). sometimes the issue posed by a
>>given philosopher is the question of personal ontology (answers to the
>>question 'what am I'). your concern with memories becoming unavailable
>>due to forgetting or disease or trauma indicates that you, like
>>Heidegger, have incompletely deconflated 'who am I' and 'what am I'.
>Any person who upon uttering the pronoun *I* seriously claims that they
>do not know who, or what they are, and appear bereft of the cognitive
>processes whereby their experience is remembered, or persists in
>stating that they remain incognisant of his or her identity - must be
>judged to be either temporarily or permanently brain damaged, or at
>least profoundly neurologically disturbed, or traumatised to such an
>extent that their engrammic memory traces - the biochemical changes
>encoded in their neural tissue that represent what we call memory is no
>longer accessible.
you are still conflating personal identity with personal ontology.
the questions that drive personal ontology are 'what' questions ('what
am I' or 'what are we'). one may ask such questions and one may
recognize that one does not have an answer to these questions ---
despite having full recall of the autobiographical details of one's
life.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
Joseph Polanik
>jPolanik writes:
>snip
>Jud: My whole logomachy revolves around the necessity of grasping
>one's biographical antecedency in order that the pronoun *I* may even
>be lexically retrieved and uttered.
>Joe: are you saying that there has *never* been a case of amnesia or
>brain injury in which the subject forgot his or her name but remembered
>how to use the word 'I'? if not, then it's not clear what is the
>necessity of which you speak.
>Jud: It is quite possible that an amnesiac could employ the word *I*
>but be incapable of utilising that word in its usual role of a self-
>referencing linguistic device ... However we are not truly concerned
>with the sometimes bizarre behaviour of accident victims in a
>hospital's A & E department,
if we are not 'truly' concerned "with the sometimes bizarre behaviour of
accident victims", then why do you keep dragging them into the
discussion?
>but rather the bizarre "philosophical" behaviour and lack of any
>rigerous analytical propensity on the behalf of an *apparently* healthy
>person like Descartes, who (for the purposes of some spurious
>transcendentalist "research") pretended he didn't know who he was
>and/or what he was.
Descartes never pretended that he didn't know who he was.
it's true that he asked 'what am I?' in furtherance of his philosophical
inquiry; but, it was hardly a pretense. any number of individuals before
and after Descartes have had doubts or questions concerning the
structure of the human individual.
>Joe: the questions that drive personal ontology are 'what' questions
>('what am I' or 'what are we'). one may ask such questions and one may
>recognize that one does not have an answer to these questions ---
>despite having full recall of the autobiographical details of one's
>life.
>Jud: Wrong! Every human on earth who is neurologically capable of
>self-identification (knowing who he is) is automatically aware of his
>humanness and being a member of the order of homo sapienses - the only
>surviving hominid; a species to which modern man belongs; being a
>bipedal primate having language and ability to make and use complex
>tools. Like everybody else, you, me and Descartes and Heidegger himself
>were members of a subspecies of Homo sapiens; a classification which
>includes all modern races.
any reasonably well educated speaker of english knows that 'human' is
the name we give our species; and, therefore, ... what?
what follows from the fact that we know the name we give our species?
does knowing the name we give our species automagically tell us whether
or not consciousness is due to having an immaterial mind?
Descartes didn't think so; and, hence, tried to discover the answer to
that question --- which naturally prompted him to ask 'what am I?'.
Joseph Polanik
>jPolanik writes:
>>geva...@aol.com wrote:
>>>jPolanik writes:
>Jud: My whole logomachy revolves around the necessity of grasping
>one's biographical antecedency in order that the pronoun *I* may even
>be lexically retrieved and uttered.
>Joe: are you saying that there has *never* been a case of amnesia or
>brain injury in which the subject forgot his or her name but remembered
>how to use the word 'I'? if not, then it's not clear what is the
>necessity of which you speak.
>Jud: It is quite possible that an amnesiac could employ the word *I*
>but be incapable of utilising that word in its usual role of a self-
>referencing linguistic device ... However we are not truly concerned
>with the sometimes bizarre behaviour of accident victims
>Joe: if we are not 'truly' concerned "with the sometimes bizarre
>behaviour of accident victims", then why do you keep dragging them into
>the discussion?
>Jud: Because a neurologically traumatised person is the only paradigm
>of the human condition which could possibly provide the model for the
>existential state of self-referential ignorance and
>identity-unawareness that the imaginary protagonist in the Cartesian
>philosophical parlour-game could portray.
if the ramblings of a neurologically traumatized person is the only
model you can construct for the work of a philosopher you disagree with;
then, your modeling skills are inadequate.
one area where improvement is possible: giving an accurate description
of that which is to be modeled --- Descartes' thinking.
there is no indication that Descartes was ignorant of self-referencing.
indeed, there is every indication that the crucial turning point
involves awareness of self-referencing. early in the Second Meditation,
Descartes comments that even a malicious demon of supreme cunning and
power could "never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think
that I am something". that last 'I think that I' is inherently
self-referential.
similarly, there is no indication that Descartes was unaware of the
details of his life, what normally constitutes one's autobiographical
identity.
the question is whether you are capable of understanding that Descartes
was not investigating questions of personal or psychological identity.
>Jud: Wrong! Every human on earth who is neurologically capable of
>self-identification (knowing who he is) is automatically aware of his
>humanness and being a member of the order of homo sapienses
>Joe: any reasonably well educated speaker of english knows that
>'human' is the name we give our species; and, therefore, ... what?
>Jud: What follows is that humans don't ask what they are
another empirical question answered by the philosopher speaking 'out of
the armchair'. any number of humans have wondered whether there is or
is not an immaterial component of the human individual.
Joe
Joseph Polanik
>jPolanik wrote:
>Jud: Because a neurologically traumatised person is the only paradigm
>of the human condition which could possibly provide the model for the
>existential state of self-referential ignorance and
>identity-unawareness that the imaginary protagonist in the Cartesian
>philosophical parlour-game could portray.
>Joe: if the ramblings of a neurologically traumatized person is the
>only model you can construct for the work of a philosopher you disagree
>with; then, your modeling skills are inadequate.
>Jud: Wrong. It is the inability of the traumatised person who, whilst
>retaining the capacity to verbalise of the *I*-word, is unable to ...
>retrieve his neuro-autobiographical background. I such a case (as with
>Descartes' counterfactual amnesiac) he lacks any normal awareness of
>the self or his own identity as person considered as a unique
>individual, thus mirroring the Cartesian: *Let's Pretend I am not sure
>I exist* scenario.
Jud,
a brain-injured person might retain the ability to self-reference
without retaining the ability to recall the biographical details of his
life; but, it does not follow that the brain-injured person is a model
of the philosopher pursuing an inquiry to which the biographical details
of life are irrelevant.
you served in the British army, a fact worthy of inclusion in any
biography or autobiography of your life but irrelevant to the
philosophical issues we've been discussing.
there have been disagreements on this list about qualia. I think that
people experience qualia. others disagree. is the fact that you served
in the British army relevant to the debate(s) over qualia? would you say
"I, Jud Evans, served in the British army; and, therefore, people
experience qualia" or would you say "I, Jud Evans, served in the British
army; and, therefore, people do not experience qualia"?
if you have any sense at all you wouldn't make either of these claims
because each is a non sequitur.
is the fact that you served in the British army relevant to the issues
of personal ontology that Descartes considered? it hardly seems likely.
would you say "I, Jud Evans, served in the British army; and, therefore,
human consciousness is not the product of an immaterial mind"?
probably not.
where does that leave us? are we to conclude that the brain-injured
person is a model for your activity in pursuing your degree in
philosophy because your dissertation does not argue that your service in
the British army is evidence that analytical indicant theory is true?