Final Formula for Rejecting the Cartesian Cogito.
Joseph Polanik
>Descartes discounted, or was obviously ignorant of the nature of the
>reflexive role of the pronominal discourse referent *I.* Its function
>is that of self-referential specificity (the quality of particularising
>one's own self - rather than generalising the *other.*) From the
>perspective of a participant in an act of speech or writing *I* is
>anaphorically linked to and is capable of initiating and selectively
>instantiating a vast multitude of data from the immense complexity of a
>human's experiential biography and the linguistically-based,
>antecedally composed, neurological chronicle of his or her life.
as a technical aside, I think that you've conflated anaphora with
indexicality in the context of self-reference.
consider the statement 'I am self-referencing'. the word 'self-' is
being used as an anaphoric pronoun; meaning, that it takes as its own
referent the referent of another term in the discourse, 'I'.
the word 'I' is an indexical; meaning, that it's referent is specified
by application of a rule; in this case, the rule that 'I' refers to the
user of the word 'I'.
in short, 'I' is a syntactic device by which a speaker/writer
self-references.
>Thus in his illocutionary attempt to create a basic existential
>ontological proof or axiom, his choice of the pronominal referent of
>the *I* for inclusion in his spurious sentence: *I think - therefore I
>am* was probably the worst possible word he could have chosen as a head
>word in his ill judged cogito.
on the contrary, it was the correct word to use.
in my opinion, Heidegger (despite posturing as an anti-Cartesian)
supports Descartes' choice of the first person singular pronoun in
presenting his signature insight, I experience; therefore, I am. if
you'll recall, Heidegger urges daSein to self-reference in the first
person by saying 'I am' --- *precisely* the conclusion that Descartes
comes to.
>As every utterer of the *I* word is aware, *I* is a referential term
>which derives its reference from antecedency, or the thinking, flesh
>and blood state or condition of being physically and neurologically
>antecedent . Thus, in the absence of a referential antecedent the word
>*I* would be neuro-linguistically inaccessible to an entity which was
>no longer extant. The first person pronoun *I* is the most powerful
>referent in any language. *I* conveys the utmost informational recall
>as to personal identity, self knowledge and understanding of an
>individual's history, beliefs, goals, abilities and occurrent
>realisation of his or her current state of connectedness with the
>surrounding environment.
the self-referential pronoun, I, can be use to refer to or make
statements about any or all of the facts concerning one's personal
identity, including those you've mentioned.
however, the issue for philosophers is not always personal identity
(answers to the question 'who am I'). sometimes the issue posed by a
given philosopher is the question of personal ontology (answers to the
question 'what am I').
Descartes was obvious concerned with this question, since he begins
asking it shortly after concluding that a self-asserted 'I am' is true.
less obvious is that Heidegger only incompletely differentiated himself
from Descartes on this point. although he did dwell on the 'who of
daSein', much of the material he was concerned with in that section of
BaT could be used to answer the what am I question as well as the who am
I question.
>Any person who upon uttering the pronoun *I* seriously claims that they
>do not know who, or what they are, and appear bereft of the cognitive
>processes whereby their experience is remembered, or persists in
>stating that they remain incognisant of his or her identity - must be
>judged to be either temporarily or permanently brain damaged, or at
>least profoundly neurologically disturbed, or traumatised to such an
>extent that their engrammic memory traces - the biochemical changes
>encoded in their neural tissue that represent what we call memory is
>no longer accessible.
your concern with memories becoming unavailable due to forgetting or
disease or trauma indicates that you, like Heidegger, have incompletely
deconflated 'who am I' and 'what am I'.
Descartes remembered the details of his life and mentions some of them
in the Mediations. his concern, however, is with personal ontology not
personal identity. his state of knowledge just after he begins
constructing his philosophy is summed up in the CPI, the Claim of
Partial Ignorance: I know that I am; but, not what I am.
it is somewhat ironic that, despite decades of attempting to deconstruct
the Cogito, one of Heidegger's world-class philosophical insights
consists of explicating the basis for the CPI --- the is doesn't always
speak in the same voice. Descartes understood this implicitly; indeed,
this is what drives his philosophical enterprise; but, Heidegger
explicated it --- the is doesn't always speak in the same voice.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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