>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>Georges Metanomski wrote:
>>>[GM]: The epistemological key to extended Cogito would be something
>>>like "I'm certain that I experience and doubt all that I experience".
>>>In other terms, experiencing is thematic and it's not experiencing
>>>that I doubt, but all its possible themes.
>>[JP]: what is it that says "I'm certain that I experience and doubt
>>all that I experience"? surely nothingness can not self-existentialize
>>out of the void to self-reference and then disappear once more.
>>>[GM]: But, there is no "I am".
>>[JP]: obviously, you are dancing on the cusp of choking exactly where
>>Walter and Jud have previously choked.
>[WH]: I can't speak for Jud, but, as usual, what follows has nothing
>whatever to do with anything I've claimed. I'm happy (as I always have
>been) quite happy to concede that If "I am" is asserted something
>asserts it.
>>[JP]: is it conceivable that, when 'I am' or 'I experience' is
>>asserted, it can be asserted by nothing at all?
>>[JP]: in the absence of any reality (of any reality type whatsoever),
>>in the absence of any existent (of any mode of existence whatsoever),
>>in the absence of any being (of any mode of being whatsoever), in the
>>absence of any actuality, in the absence of any thing of any sort, in
>>the absence of any force field, in the absence of mass-energy, space
>>and time, in the absence of anything that is in any sense of 'is'; it
>>is inconceivable that 'I am' or 'I experience' is nevertheless
>>asserted --- by nothing that is, by nothing at all.
>>[JP]: consequently, that which self-references by asserting 'I am' is
>>real (in some sense).
>[WH]: Misrepresent somebody else for awhile, please.
there's been no misrepresentation. the claim that you choked is my pithy
interpretation of Nietzsche's observation concerning the philosopher who
is unable to carry the burden he is unwilling to set aside.
perhaps you recall the thread from 2-3 months ago where we briefly
considered the following third-person version of a first person argument
I had presented
1. that there is an experiencer is a necessary condition of there being
an afterimage
2. this is an afterimage
3. (therefore) there is an experiencer of this afterimage.
you claimed that "a case has to be made for (1), since that's precisely
what's in question."
if you say that [1] is in question, you are claiming that there could be
experience without an experiencer --- that experience is not
experiencer-dependent even though (as you've recently admitted) qualia
is mind-dependent.
I challenged you the same way I challenged Georges (see above) to
explain how was conceivable that there could be experience without an
experiencer.
you declined to offer any explanation; and, yet, you declined to admit
you could not meet the challenge.
as Nietzsche might say it, you could not carry the burden you were
unwilling to set aside.
as I say it, you choked.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
>>[GM]: There are just two general approaches to ontology:
>>1.Start with some World Out There of whatever existents - objects,
>>events, etc. and derive from it a particular existent - I, awareness,
>>consciousness, or whatever. It's your approach, which you share with
>>overwhelming majority.
>>2.Start with awareness and the postulate of relativity:
>>POSTULATE OF RELATIVITY ALL ELEMENTS OF HUMAN UNIVERSE ARE RELATIVE,
>>EXCEPTING AWARENESS, ITS ABSOLUTE FOUNDATION.
>>Corollary: Meaningful assertions may express only the attainable
>>relative elements of Universe in their interrelations. Thus, nothing
>>can be asserted about the absolute, directly unattainable awareness.
>>Awareness is thematic and may be only indirectly attained and
>>expressed via its theme, the relative events.
>>That's the view of Descartes, which moulded modern science and
>>epistemology, which I happen to share.
>Joe: I can't imagine what would have given you the idea that I favored
>approach #1;
>G: All what you write, for instance:
>"I am the referent of 'I' whenever I say "I am". hence, I am
>self-aware. Since nothing unreal is self-aware, it follows that I am
>real".
I may have written just that somewhere; but, if you wish to contest it,
I'll insist on the more complete version that I usually give:
I am the referent of 'I' whenever I say "I am". hence, I am self-aware.
since nothing unreal is self-aware, it follows that I am real (in some
sense).
you've left off the parenthetical clause at the end which is crucial to
pointing out how you've misinterpreted the rest of the statement when
you say
>It clearly posits "I" as a "real object" being self(?-)aware. And a
>WOT swarming with such objects as I's being aware, or having a property
>- awareness.
I do not posit. I demonstrate that I am a reality *of some sort*.
whether the referent of 'I' is a reality of a type that you would call a
'real object' depends on whether you mean by 'real object' what I mean
by 'phenomenological reality'.
to be precise, I'll have to use pronouns subscripted by reality type
instead of the type-ambiguous pronoun, I, of vernacular english.
Experiento style arguments only demonstrate the phenomenological reality
of the I-2 (the phenomenological experiencer). further inquiry would be
needed to ascertain whether the I-2 is identical to or is generated by a
meta-phenomenal (non-experiencer dependent) reality or realities; and,
if so, which one(s).
[meta-phenomenal or non-experiencer dependent realities include type 1
(existential or physical) realities and type 3 (ontological or
non-physical) realities (if there are any).]
>Georges Metanomski wrote:
>>[GM]: There are just two general approaches to ontology: 2.Start with
>>awareness and the postulate of relativity: POSTULATE OF RELATIVITY ALL
>>ELEMENTS OF HUMAN UNIVERSE ARE RELATIVE, EXCEPTING AWARENESS, ITS
>>ABSOLUTE FOUNDATION.
>Simply inaccurate and incomplete.
>There is a consciousness (or awareness) of the 'self' and the
>'thinker', originating in the 'movement' of self-reflection and the
>postulation of the thought of the 'thinker'. (This is referred to as
>the dualistic consciousness.)
>But, prior to this, there is the non-dualistic consciousness (or
>awareness) which exists prior to the 'movement' of self-reflection;
>... rather than originating in the 'movement' of self-reflection.
>In other words, the consciousness (or the awareness) of the 'self' and
>the 'thinker' is not, in any sense, an "ABSOLUTE FOUNDATION" of human
>experience.
>>Corollary: Meaningful assertions may express only the attainable
>>relative elements of Universe in their interrelations. Thus, nothing
>>can be asserted about the absolute, directly unattainable awareness.
>>Awareness is thematic and may be only indirectly attained and
>>expressed via its theme, the relative events.
>All of which, however, originates in the dualistic consciousness of the
>'self' and the 'thinker'; that is, the consciousness of "the Fall".
Michael,
it's nice to have you posting again after a long absence.
is your 'non-dualistic awareness' the same as what some philosophers
(and, IMO, most meditators) would call 'pre-reflective awareness'; and,
if not, how do they differ?
>>>[GM]: There are just two general approaches to ontology:
>>>2.Start with awareness and the postulate of relativity:
>>>POSTULATE OF RELATIVITY ALL ELEMENTS OF HUMAN UNIVERSE ARE RELATIVE,
>>>EXCEPTING AWARENESS, ITS ABSOLUTE FOUNDATION.
>>>Corollary: Meaningful assertions may express only the attainable
>>>relative elements of Universe in their interrelations. Thus, nothing
>>>can be asserted about the absolute, directly unattainable awareness.
>>>Awareness is thematic and may be only indirectly attained and
>>>expressed via its theme, the relative events.
>case 2. ... has no referents, I's, realities, types thereof nor
>objects, real or whatever. All case 2. has at this stage are two
>axioms:
>FUNDAMENTAL EQUIVALENCE PRINCIPLE: SUBJECTIVE TIME AND AWARENESS ARE
>EQUIVALENT and
>POSTULATE OF RELATIVITY ALL ELEMENTS OF HUMAN UNIVERSE ARE RELATIVE,
>EXCEPTING AWARENESS, ITS ABSOLUTE FOUNDATION
>Now, 2. founded in part inductively in Extended Relativity (like
>Kant who derived his axioms from Newton's model), wants to be
>similarly scientific, i.e. factually falsifiable. And, all the way
>down, we find the falsifiable theorem, viz. the unique logical
>system both deductively founded in ontology and factually verified
>by several AI applications, among others diagnosis and remediation
>of malfunctions of spacecraft of the Gemini project (sending the
>man to the moon). And it represents the structure of any scientific
>model:
>"ERN LOGIC" in
>http://findgeorges.com/CORE/D_RATIONAL_VIEW/b_ern_logic.html
>Your case X would have similarly to be deductively consistent
>and inductively falsifiable by verifiable facts, not by speculations.
it seems that the type 2 approach to ontology is incomplete. if it has
no 'I', it can not account for its own construction nor can it explain
who or what might adopt it as a belief system.
I have previously mentioned several ways in which your two axioms may be
falsified.
1. it falsifies scientific history.
unless you've had an attitude adjustment in the dead of night recently,
I suspect you still reject the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM in favor
of Einstein's naive realism; but, the physicists of the world (or so it
seems to me), seem to believe that Bohr was right and Einstein was wrong
about the so-called EPR paradox; so, unless your axioms have made their
piece with CI, they are falsifying scientific history.
2. it falsifies experiential reality.
the everyday experience of reflective self-awareness falsifies at least
some of your claims about awareness.
3. it either makes a prediction contrary to fact or fails to account for
all the facts.
earlier, in one strand of this thread you made the claim: 'there is no
"I am"'. you declined to defend that claim by showing how it could
conceivably be true; and, in another strand, we discussed the reality
type of the 'I' that is demonstrated by an Experiento style argument.
now, after that clarification, do you still say that there is no 'I am'?
if so, your system is falsified by simple Experiento arguments. one
might imagine a performative version such as: I construct axiomatic
systems; a necessary condition of the fact that I construct axiomatic
systems is that I am. hence I am.
if not, your system fails to explain all the facts.
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>Walter Horn wrote:
>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>>Georges Metanomski wrote:
>>>>>[GM]: there is no "I am".
>>>>[JP]: obviously, you are dancing on the cusp of choking exactly
>>>>where Walter and Jud have previously choked.
>>>[WH]: I can't speak for Jud, but, as usual, what follows has nothing
>>>whatever to do with anything I've claimed. I'm happy (as I always
>>>have been) quite happy to concede that If "I am" is asserted
>>>something asserts it.
well, then, do you acknowledge that 'I am' is, in fact, asserted by the
referent of I whenever I say "I am"?
>>>>[JP]: is it conceivable that, when 'I am' or 'I experience' is
>>>>asserted, it can be asserted by nothing at all?
>>>[WH]: Misrepresent somebody else for awhile, please.
>>perhaps you recall the thread from 2-3 months ago where we briefly
>>considered the following third-person version of a first person
>>argument I had presented
>>1. that there is an experiencer is a necessary condition of there
>>being an afterimage
>>2. this is an afterimage
>>3. (therefore) there is an experiencer of this afterimage.
>I actually don't remember that exchange,
the argument was first presented in msg #23905. in msg #23907 you
admitted that [3] followed from [1] and [2] but that "a case has to be
made for (1), since that's precisely what's in question."
>>if you say that [1] is in question, you are claiming that there could
>>be experience without an experiencer --- that experience is not
>>experiencer-dependent.
>I don't know about experiences without experiencers. Maybe, maybe not.
let me refresh your memory.
an experience that was not experiencer-dependent would be self-existent
would it not?
[WH #23871]: According to the performative route, there can't be an
utterance without a speaker, a thought without a thinker, a doubt
without a doubter, etc. ... begs the question against the
Humean/positivist, who denies that a doubt requires a doubter (since the
latter must be quasi-continuous/unified, etc.).
[JP #23915]: I find it hard to believe that positivists ever claimed
that there were unexperienced afterimages floating around a universe
inhabited by zombies unable to experience those afterimages.
[WH #23925]: philosophers are famous for believing many initially odd
things. As Peter pointed out, probably one of the earliest and most
explicit anti-Iers was the Buddha (who was very insistent and repetitive
on the subject). And, the notion of an "unexperienced afterimage" goes
farther than anything I believe they'd say or be committed to.
if there are no unexperienced afterimages and all afterimages are
experiencer dependent; then, [1] follows: that there is an experiencer
is a necessary condition of there being an afterimage.
how could it be otherwise? how could there be an unexperienced
experience and how would we know about it if it were some self-existent
entity we had no experience of?
>The age-old question there is whether experiencers ARE --as Hume held
>-- nothing BUT compounds of experiences (intimately related somehow or
>other). If such a bundle theory is correct (and I've seen nothing in
>any of YOUR posts to refute it, in any case) there would likely be some
>fact of the matter regarding how many experiences (and of what kind)
>are needed to produce "an experiencer" (which, again would be nothing
>more than "a logical construct" of experiences).
why would I want to 'refute' the bundle theory? it fails all by itself.
the Humean version didn't explain the unity of apperception; although,
William James may have provided an ingenious solution.
in any case, as long as we may assume until someone shows us how to
conclude that the experiencer 'bundle' is capable of self-awareness and
that the experiencer 'bundle' is such as it can have experiences
dependent on it, there is no reason to rule out the 'bundle' theory a
priori.
>jPolanik wrote:
>>mec...@sbcglobal.net wrote:
>>>Georges Metanomski wrote:
>>>There is a consciousness (or awareness) of the 'self' and the
>>>'thinker', originating in the 'movement' of self-reflection and the
>>>postulation of the thought of the 'thinker'. (This is referred to as
>>>the dualistic consciousness.)
>>>But, prior to this, there is the non-dualistic consciousness (or
>>>awareness) which exists prior to the 'movement' of self-reflection;
>>>... rather than originating in the 'movement' of self-reflection.
>>>In other words, the consciousness (or the awareness) of the 'self'
>>>and the 'thinker' is not, in any sense, an "ABSOLUTE FOUNDATION" of
>>>human experience.
>>>>Corollary: Meaningful assertions may express only the attainable
>>>>relative elements of Universe in their interrelations. Thus, nothing
>>>>can be asserted about the absolute, directly unattainable awareness.
>>>>Awareness is thematic and may be only indirectly attained and
>>>>expressed via its theme, the relative events.
>>>All of which, however, originates in the dualistic consciousness of
>>>the 'self' and the 'thinker'; that is, the consciousness of "the
>>>Fall".
>>is your 'non-dualistic awareness' the same as what some philosophers
>>(and, IMO, most meditators) would call 'pre-reflective awareness';
>>and, if not, how do they differ?
>Never heard this term before, but it would appear to be equivalent to
>what I am talking about; since all dualities originate in self-
>reflection itself.
in that case, I would have a hard time seeing the movement from
non-dualistic or pre-reflective awareness to dualistic thinking
(thinker/thought) as a fall. it sounds like the opposite; more like the
reaching of a peak.
it seems likely to me that in the evolutionary sense, lower forms of
life would have pre-reflective awareness only.
>... the 'movement' of self-reflection is the origin of all dualities.
>That is, prior to the 'movement' of self-reflection, there is no
>'experience' and no 'experiencer'. Both are completely immersed in a
>merely 'potential experience'-'potential experiencer' reality. It is
>self-reflection that gives rise to ALL of these paired dualities:
>'self'/'not self', 'thinker'/thought, nouns/verbs, good/evil,
>space/time, illusion/reality, non-dualistic/dualistic.
pre-reflective awareness is prior to reflective self-awareness; but, has
a content --- whatever one is aware of. reflective self-awareness can
have the same content plus an awareness of that which is aware of ...
that content.
I 'recover' reflective self-awareness many times a day after having
gotten immersed in the flow of experience; but, it is only by noticing
some aspect of experience; so, it seems obvious that there is experience
in between moments of reflective self-awareness.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@