The Question that Drives the Inquiry
Joseph Polanik
geva...@aol.com wrote:
>Joe Polanik wrote:
>[Joe (earlier)]: a brain-injured person might retain the ability to
>self-reference without retaining the ability to recall the biographical
>details of his life; but, it does not follow that the brain-injured
>person is a model of the philosopher pursuing an inquiry to which the
>biographical details of life are irrelevant.
>[Jud (earlier)]: ... when I speak of a person's experiential biography
>or humanness - I am not referring to the ability to remember any
>particular episodes in that life-time of events - ... I refer instead
>to the retrospective course of existing as an individual; from babyhood
>to one's present age - a remembering of the GENERALITY of our
>existence, actions and events that occur in living as the selves we are
>HOWEVER HAZY those memories may be.
>Joe: new you persist in your colorful speculations concerning the
>spectrum of injuries that brain-injured patients may have; but, you
>still haven't provided any support for the crucial assumption --- that
>the condition of a brain-injured person is a valid model for the work
>of philosophers generally or of Descartes in particular.
>Jud: My own *speculations* or *meditations* better described as a
>*investigations* or *deconstructions* and are concerned with throwing
>some light upon the veracity of actual importance of the cogito as a
>so-called milestone in *philosophical investigation,*
>In relation to the position of the person depicted in the first
>meditation, who does not know who he is, and (by implication) what he
>is
the question driving Descartes' inquiry is 'what am I' not 'who am I'.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
Joseph Polanik
>jPolanik wrote:
>>Jud: My ... investigations ... are concerned with throwing some
>>light upon the ... cogito as a so-called milestone in philosophical
>>investigation ... In relation to the position of the person depicted
>>in the first meditation, who does not know who he is, and (by
>>implication) what he is
>Joe: the question driving Descartes' inquiry is 'what am I' not 'who am
>I'.
>Jud: An irrelevancy. If we discount parrots and tropical Asian
>starlings (mynar birds,) and certain other species of mimetic birds,
>only humans can speak human languages - so the *what* bit is a foregone
>conclusion although the *who* bit may be up for recollective grabs.
on the contrary, the 'what am I' question makes the biography the
philosopher irrelevant.
we wouldn't accept an answer to the question 'what is a human' that made
the definition of human vary by demographic group; for example, a
definition that said members of one racial or ethnic group had souls but
members of another such group did not.
if the answer is the same for all humans; then, the biographical details
of any one human's life are irrelevant.
Joseph Polanik
>Joe: the question driving Descartes' inquiry is 'what am I' not 'who
>am I'.
>G: None. "What can I know with certainty", which created contemporary
>epistemology.
you are quite right to say that Descartes created modern epistemology
with that question. however, having found an answer, that "I am" is
indubitably true whenever asserted, his inquiry took a turn; and, in
the second meditation, he begins asking 'what am I?' at this point.
Joseph Polanik
>Joe old: the question driving Descartes' inquiry is 'what am I' not
>'who am I'.
>G old: None. "What can I know with certainty", which created
>contemporary epistemology.
>Joe: you are quite right to say that Descartes created modern
>epistemology with that question. however, having found an answer, that
>"I am" is indubitably true whenever asserted, his inquiry took a turn;
>and, in the second meditation, he begins asking 'what am I?' at this
>point.
>G: With that he forked to ontology. Now, his ontology is meaningless
>bullshit and paraphrasing him it's madness to lose 5 minutes on it.
>However, scraping it, we face the creator of modern science and
>epistemology, one of three pillars of modernity, with Galileo and
>Newton. So why bother what was driving his weakness, rather than what
>drove his strength?
any epistemological question presupposes the knower in pursuit of
knowing. it is then natural to ask, what do I know about the knowing I?
Joseph Polanik
>The scandal of philosophy is that it is by, for and about
>philosophers-- those who think, in the narrowest (in a certain sense)
>and most profound sense of the word.
the scandal of philosophy is that some philosophers have tried to make
philosophy about thinking "in the narrowest (in a certain sense) and
most profound sense of the word" by interpreting Descartes as follows:
>This is the thinking Descartes is talking about, the kind of thinking
>which is concerned about existence from the perspective of a particular
>question, namely, how do I know that I exist? Or better, how can I be
>certain that I exist? This question and Descartes' brilliant (but
>fatally flawed) response could not possibly matter, indeed could not
>even be understood, except by a philosopher, or a student of
>philosophy, for whom Descartes meant his method to be a crucial element
>in the survival of philosophy in the modern age. The maxim to which the
>method leads is not only meant for the thinker who must deal with the
>problem to which the method is a response, but it is also "ABOUT" about
>that thinker. In other words, the thinker who thinks the question.
>Descartes treatise is not about the cognitive capacity to which the
>term thinking usually applies, though it is about an aspect of that
>cognitive capacity, namely the capacity for philosophical thinking; and
>that's the thinking the maxim refers to--the thinking that thinks
>about, is concerned with, the problem/question to which Descartes
>treatise/maxim is a response.
the weakness of this argument is that it falls apart entirely if one
translates "cogito; ergo, sum" as "I experience; therefore, I am" as
Anscombe and Geach do in translating of Descartes' _Principles of
Philosophy_.
this translation is more in keeping with what Descartes tells us he
means by 'thinking' in the Meditations and elsewhere.
Joseph Polanik
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>gevans613@... wrote:
>>>In relation to the position of the person depicted in the first
>>>meditation, who does not know who he is, and (by implication) what he
>>>is
>>the question driving Descartes' inquiry is 'what am I' not 'who am I'.
>The question driving Descartes' inquiry (in the Meds.) is of what may
>be doubted.
>The question "What am I?" comes later.
Descartes doubted whatever could be doubted in order to discover the
indubitable. he did; when he concluded that a self-asserted 'I am' is
necessarily true whenever asserted.
however, in the moment of knowing that I am Descartes also realized that
I do not know what I am; and, thus, the inquiry begins there.
>One would be keen to note that Descartes couldn't doubt his ability to
>doubt before he began. He might have doubted that better before he
>began. And then he wouldn't have started with doubt, as Spinoza
>decidedly did not. But he knew that, of course..
the point of distinguishing the doubting from the inquiring is that the
latter does not necessarily presuppose the former. one may simply ask
'what am I' without ever, for example, doubting that there is an
external universe.
>Spinoza leaves us with a problem that is still unsolved. How do we
>account for adequate ideas given the passivity of mind, if passive it
>is given reductive physicalism, given reductive physicalism?
the passivity of the experiencer was falsified by the discovery in QM
that the experiencing I is a participating observer.
Joseph Polanik
2 days ago.]
allen scult wrote:
>jPolanik wrote:
>>allen scult wrote:
>>>The scandal of philosophy is that it is by, for and about
>>>philosophers-- those who think, in the narrowest (in a certain sense)
>>>and most profound sense of the word.
>>the weakness of this argument is that it falls apart entirely if one
>>translates "cogito; ergo, sum" as "I experience; therefore, I am" as
>>Anscombe and Geach do in translating of Descartes' _Principles of
>>Philosophy_.
>>this translation is more in keeping with what Descartes tells us he
>>means by 'thinking' in the Meditations and elsewhere.
>How about Meditation III, "On God, That he Exists," In this Meditation,
>and those immediately following, Descartes is at great pains to
>discount and discredit experience (of the senses, which is essentially
>how we "take in" world) as being illusory and therefore incapable of
>serving as the ground for proving anything. As the argument unfolds,
>experience is left behind. This leaving behind is achieved by reason, a
>process of thinking, which leaves thinking itself as the only certainty
>left standing, and thank God , capable of proving the existence of God
>to itself. A kind of Cartesian hermeneutical circle, if you will.
>Descartes begins the Meditation by leading the reader ("I close my eyes
>. . ."), who is willing to follow, to the place of thinking. Arriving
>at this place, he declares for all of us in the group, "I am a thing
>that thinks." The only way that this makes sense is as an announcement
>of arrival, having put sense experience to the side "or, as that is not
>always possible to devalue it" (devaluing irrelevant thoughts and
>images and just "watching them pass by, paying them no attention, is
>also a method of focusing the mind in Zen meditation), and so be left
>with the essence of our being. "I am a thing that thinks." For a thing
>that thinks, thinking is existence (a way some imaginative
>philosophers of my acquaintance think Descartes' "unthought thought" in
>the Cogito. I like that, for obviously biased reasons.
Descartes begins by summarizing his progress thus far; and, by inviting
the reader to follow along as a participant. having found an indubitable
truth --- that a self-asserted 'I am' is true --- Descartes begins to
look around to see what else might be true.
its true that he makes more use of his rationality in the sense of
thinking logically (as he defines logically), not as you've described:
>>This is the thinking Descartes is talking about, the kind of thinking
>>which is concerned about existence from the perspective of a
>>particular question, namely, how do I know that I exist? Or better,
>>how can I be certain that I exist? This question and Descartes'
>>brilliant (but fatally flawed) response could not possibly matter,
>>indeed could not even be understood, except by a philosopher, or a
>>student of philosophy, for whom Descartes meant his method to be a
>>crucial element in the survival of philosophy in the modern age. The
>>maxim to which the method leads is not only meant for the thinker who
>>must deal with the problem to which the method is a response, but it
>>is also "ABOUT" about that thinker. In other words, the thinker who
>>thinks the question. Descartes treatise is not about the cognitive
>>capacity to which the term thinking usually applies, though it is
>>about an aspect of that cognitive capacity, namely the capacity for
>>philosophical thinking; and that's the thinking the maxim refers
>>to--the thinking that thinks about, is concerned with, the
>>problem/question to which Descartes treatise/maxim is a response.
Descartes' thinking is guided by experience; although, not by sense
experience; rather, by the natural light. by my count, Descartes refers
to the natural light 5 times in the Third Meditation, beginning with
"whatever is revealed to me by the natural light --- for example that
from the fact that I am doubting it follows that I exist, and so on ---
cannot in any way be open to doubt. this is because there cannot be
another faculty or power for distinguishing truth from falsehood both as
trustworthy as the natural light and also capable of showing me that
such things are not true." [CSM II, 27]
I'm not advocating for or against the theory of the natural light; but,
the fact that Descartes relies on it shows that, for Descartes,
'thinking' --- even when not used as a synonym for 'experiencing' --- is
not just a specialized aspect of the cognitive capacity; "namely the
capacity for philosophical thinking".