Key to the Experiento
Joseph Polanik
>jpolanik wrote:
>>can nothingness experience afterimages?
>No, but that's not the proper question, which is "Can there be
>experiences (of images or anything else) without experiencers?"
these questions are intimately related; and, both are legitimate.
the moment I notice that I am experiencing something (an afterimage,
say, or whatever), I may legitimately ask 'is it possible that I who
experience this am nothing at all?' and answer 'no' just as you say
above.
>You think the answer to that is obviously, certainly NO. I, on the
>other hand, am content to say that it is evident that there are
>experiencers having these experiences, and not opine on whether it
>could or could not be otherwise. I don't know about that.
okay; you are content with third-person generalities such as "it is
evident that there are experiencers having these experiences". are you
willing to say "I am the experiencer of this experience" or some similar
first-person translation of your third-person statement? if so, what is
the first person translation you are willing to affirm?
>The answer to this question isn't obvious to me, and there have been
>some smart philosophers (like the so-called "neutral monists") who have
>allowed this possibility.
instead of giving us your vague hopes and rumors that some smart
philosopher somewhere supports your viewpoint, I suggest you take take
Manuel's advice to "stand for your own" --- present your own argument.
>>why do you keep dragging Buddhists into this? why would they care
>>one way or the other whether the bundle theory as to the nature of
>>the experiencer was true or false?
>I dragged Buddhists into it because "small raft" (Hinayana) Buddhists
>claim that there is no soul. You used to (like within the last few
>days) insist they were dead wrong about that, and seemed absolutely
>shocked that anybody could believe it. There are a lot of these
>traditional Buddhists, so I brought them into the story to indicate
>that you were saying that millions of people were crazy. Now, that the
>no-soul view one of your favorites, I don't know whether their
>existence is so relevant to the debate.
on at least one previous occasion, you've stated that, even if I were
able to prove that 'I am' is a true statement, little or nothing
followed from that. I have agreed each time; and, I've said it myself on
other occasions: from 'I am' one can not deduce 'I am a neuron' or 'I
am a soul'.
I've also made it clear many times (most recently, a few days ago in a
reply to Georges) that the Experiento argument proves that there is an
I-2, a phenomenological reality.
obviously, your attempt to drag one version of Buddhism into the debate
was a rhetorical strategy based on conflating the experiencer and the
soul --- in terms of subscripted pronouns, you are conflating the I-2
and the I-3.
I'm inclined to think that the question 'is there an I-2' is independent
of the question 'is there an I-3'.
are you now claiming that there is a necessary connection between these
two questions such that, from 'there is an I-2', something *does*
follow?
if so, what follows from 'there is an I-2'?
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
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mec...@sbcglobal.net
walterhorn wrote:
>jpolanik wrote:
>>can nothingness experience afterimages?
>No, but that's not the proper question, which is "Can there be
>experiences (of images or anything else) without experiencers?"
referred to as the series of dependent dualities. They both arise
instantaneously out of the same movement: the 'movement' of self-reflection.
Prior to that 'movement' neither of them exists at all.
both rely upon each other to affirm their existence. They consist of nothing
more than naked unsupported assertions, except by each other.
I've also made it clear many times (most recently, a few days ago in a
reply to Georges) that the Experiento argument proves that there is an
I-2, a phenomenological reality.
But that is not because it has been proven. Proof is thought. And thought is
subsequent to the phenomenological reality rather than prior. You cannot
observe your own parents being born--which is why the existence of a
phenomenological reality cannot be proven. Just like your parents, you must
accept its existence, but not out of proof. Your parents do not have to
prove to you that they were born by showing you their birth certificates.