Kierkegaard on the Cogito
Joseph Polanik
>jPolanik writes:
>Here is another of Kierkegaard's comments on the cogito.
>[Q] The Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* has often been repeated. If the 'I'
>which is the subject of cogito means an individual human being, the
>proposition proves nothing: 'I am thinking, *ergo* I am; but if I *am*
>thinking what wonder that I *am*:' the assertion has already been made,
>and the first proposition says even more than the second. But if the
>'I' in *cogito* is interpreted as meaning a particular existing human
>being, philosophy cries: "How silly; here there is no question of your
>self or my self, but solely of the pure ego". But this pure ego cannot
>very well have any other than a purely conceptual existence; what then
>does the ergo mean? There is no conclusion here, for the proposition is
>a tautology. [/Q (Kierkegaard, Soren. 1941. Concluding Unscientific
>Postscript. trans. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton U
>Press. p. 281)]
>it seems to me that Kierkegaard is making an interesting
>logico-linguistic point: that any statement of the form 'I am
>[whatever]' is also an assertion of 'I am'. that the predicated version
>always asserts the unpredicated version.
>comments?
>Jud: Redundant predication or lack of unnecessary predication - both
>are of no consequence. The simple utterance of the agential *I* is
>sufficient for existential confirmation.
I have no idea what an agential 'I' is or how it might differ from a
non-agential 'I'; nor do I know how a simple utterance of the agential
'I' differs from a simple utterance of the word 'I'. would you kindly
explain your terminology?
meanwhile, I can only discuss the use of the word 'I'.
while I agree that utterance of the word 'I' is sufficient for some
purposes, I disagree with the suggestion that that it is sufficient to
assert that I am or to make any other assertion.
the word 'I' has no semantic meaning; so, all by itself it doesn't say
anything; and, hence, it makes no assertion.
the word 'I' is a purely syntactic device by which the language user
self-references.
thus, in the statement, 'I am', the verb 'am' together with its implicit
complement makes the assertion. the syntactic 'I' indicates who or what
the assertion is about.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
Joseph Polanik
>Indeed, and this "I" is the point from where all "reality is this or
>that" begin.
it is certainly true that all claims of the form 'I am a(n) ... X' begin
at this point. following Korzybski, I'll call statements of this form
identifications. constructing such an identification is a crucial step
in developing a philosophy from a cogito-style claim.
Descartes is looking to convert the cogito into an identification that
answers the question, 'what am I'.
in the traditional translation ('cogito ergo sum' = 'I think therefore I
am'), the identification, res cogitans, becomes 'I am a thinking thing'.
we can put these together to yield: I think; therefore, I am ... a
thinking thing.
in the Anscombe and Geach translation ('cogito ergo sum' = 'I experience
therefore I am'), the identification becomes 'I am a conscious being'.
together these yield: I experience; therefore, I am ... a conscious
being.
in my case, I would use the Anscombe and Geach translation of the
cogito but not of the identification, thus: I experience; therefore,
I am ... an experiencer.
Joe
>geva...@aol.com wrote:
>>jPolanik writes:
>>>Here is another of Kierkegaard's comments on the cogito.
>>>[Q] The Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* has often been repeated. If the
>>>'I' which is the subject of cogito means an individual human being,
>>>the proposition proves nothing: 'I am thinking, *ergo* I am; but if I
>>>*am* thinking what wonder that I *am*:' the assertion has already
>>>been made, and the first proposition says even more than the second.
>>>But if the 'I' in *cogito* is interpreted as meaning a particular
>>>existing human being, philosophy cries: "How silly; here there is no
>>>question of your self or my self, but solely of the pure ego". But
>>>this pure ego cannot very well have any other than a purely
>>>conceptual existence; what then does the ergo mean? There is no
>>>conclusion here, for the proposition is a tautology. [/Q
>>>(Kierkegaard, Soren. 1941. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. trans.
>>>by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton U Press. p. 281)]
>>>it seems to me that Kierkegaard is making an interesting
>>>logico-linguistic point: that any statement of the form 'I am
>>>[whatever]' is also an assertion of 'I am'. that the predicated
>>>version always asserts the unpredicated version.
>>Jud: Redundant predication or lack of unnecessary predication - both
>>are of no consequence. The simple utterance of the agential *I* is
>>sufficient for existential confirmation.
--
mec...@sbcglobal.net
-----Original Message-----
From: mo...@googlegroups.com [mailto:mo...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of
Joseph Polanik
Sent: Monday, August 17, 2009 10:03 AM
To: anal...@yahoogroups.com
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Subject: [MoFPP: 184] Kierkegaard on the Cogito
Manuel Delaflor wrote:
>Indeed, and this "I" is the point from where all "reality is this or
>that" begin.
it is certainly true that all claims of the form 'I am a(n) ... X' begin
at this point. following Korzybski, I'll call statements of this form
identifications. constructing such an identification is a crucial step
in developing a philosophy from a cogito-style claim.
Descartes is looking to convert the cogito into an identification that
answers the question, 'what am I'.
in the traditional translation ('cogito ergo sum' = 'I think therefore I
am'), the identification, res cogitans, becomes 'I am a thinking thing'.
we can put these together to yield: I think; therefore, I am ... a
thinking thing.
verb "to think"; and, then, something (a noun) that can perform that verb.
This is nothing more than a series of unsupported assumptions.
in the Anscombe and Geach translation ('cogito ergo sum' = 'I experience
therefore I am'), the identification becomes 'I am a conscious being'.
together these yield: I experience; therefore, I am ... a conscious
being.
the situation. What is meant by consciousness? There are other 'conscious
beings' in psychiatric wards and hospitals which cannot 'perform' these
kinds of thought processes. And there are still others who do not consider
such thought processes to be in any way helpful in the determination of
the reality in which we live; Krishnamurti, for example.
in my case, I would use the Anscombe and Geach translation of the
cogito but not of the identification, thus: I experience; therefore,
I am ... an experiencer.
a person must have engaged in self-reflection to make such a determination.
That self-reflection is prior to thought. It is a 'movement' which forms
the consciousness of the 'self'. It is only after this 'self' is in place
that the thought of the 'thinker' is then postulated.
The time-reversal of thought, as performed by Descartes through radical
doubt, seriously threatens the integrity of the 'self', as clearly
demonstrated in the opening passages of the Second Meditation.
Michael Cecil
Joseph Polanik
>jPol...@nc.rr.com writes:
>geva...@aol.com wrote:
>>jPolanik writes:
>>Here is another of Kierkegaard's comments on the cogito.
>>[Q] The Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* has often been repeated. If the
>>'I' which is the subject of cogito means an individual human being,
>>the proposition proves nothing: 'I am thinking, *ergo* I am; but if I
>>*am* thinking what wonder that I *am*:' the assertion has already been
>>made, and the first proposition says even more than the second. [/Q
>>(Kierkegaard, Soren. 1941. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. trans.
>>by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton U Press. p. 281)]
>>Joe: it seems to me that Kierkegaard is making an interesting
>>logico-linguistic point: that any statement of the form 'I am
>>[whatever]' is also an assertion of 'I am'. that the predicated
>>version always asserts the unpredicated version.
perhaps, to be more precise, I should have said that the form using the
is of predication always already asserts the form using the is of isness
(a.k.a. the is of existence).
>>Jud: The simple utterance of the agential *I* is sufficient for
>>existential confirmation.
>Joe: I have no idea what an agential 'I' is or how it might differ
>from a non-agential 'I'; nor do I know how a simple utterance of the
>agential 'I' differs from a simple utterance of the word 'I'. would you
>kindly explain your terminology?
>Jud: Think about it. Any human utterance of the word *I* requires a
>human agent to utter it.
interestingly enough, you are making a performative argument: the fact
that the word 'I' is uttered would indicate to any listener that there
is a human in the vicinity.
that argument is quite valid; but, the conclusion is totally irrelevant
to Descartes' inquiry.
Descartes is asking 'what is a human'?
how does knowing that there is a human in the room tell us what a human
is?
Joe
Trion
On Aug 17, 2:17 pm, <mece...@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>
> Manuel Delaflor wrote:
>
> >Indeed, and this "I" is the point from where all "reality is this or
> >that" begin.
>
> identifications. constructing such an identification is a crucial step
> in developing a philosophy from a cogito-style claim.
>
> Descartes is looking to convert the cogito into an identification that
> answers the question, 'what am I'.
>
> in the traditional translation ('cogito ergo sum' = 'I think therefore I
> am'), the identification, res cogitans, becomes 'I am a thinking thing'.
> we can put these together to yield: I think; therefore, I am ... a
> thinking thing.
>
> Michael Cecil: But, to say a "thinking thing" pre-supposes that there is a
> verb "to think"; and, then, something (a noun) that can perform that verb.
> This is nothing more than a series of unsupported assumptions.
> I am ... an experiencer.
>
> Michael Cecil: But, in order even to be able to make such a statement,
> a person must have engaged in self-reflection to make such a determination.
> [Michael Cecil]: That self-reflection is prior to thought.
[Joe]: that depends on what you mean by 'thought'.
the point of translating 'cogito; ergo, sum' as 'I experience;
therefore, I am' (instead of 'I think; therefore, I am') is that
experiencing includes thinking and all other subjective experiences as
well.
so, while reflection may be prior to thinking (narrow, cognitive
sense), experiencing is prior to reflection; and, indeed, experiencing
is what is reflected upon.
> [Michael Cecil]: It is a 'movement' which forms
mec...@sbcglobal.net
the point of translating 'cogito; ergo, sum' as 'I experience;
therefore, I am' (instead of 'I think; therefore, I am') is that
experiencing includes thinking and all other subjective experiences as
well.
exists prior to self-reflection. Nothing. Not space. Not time. Not
consciousness. Nothing. Not any 'experiencer' to 'experience' anything. At
that point, nothing can be experienced, felt, thought, done. There is not
even any nothing. There is not yet any word at all.
so, while reflection may be prior to thinking (narrow, cognitive
sense), experiencing is prior to reflection; and, indeed, experiencing
is what is reflected upon.
observed in order to understand the implications: You are listening to
Beethoven's 5th Symphony, completely immersed in the 'experience' to the
annihilation of any 'self' as an 'experiencer'. Then, for no reason, the
'movement' of self-reflection occurs; a 'movement' which goes in two spatial
directions simultaneously, just as it goes both backwards and forwards in
time: in the external (or exteriorizing) direction, it registers the
experience of the music as being pleasurable; and, in the internal (or
interiorizing) direction, it makes you aware of yourself as a 'locus' of an
experience. The external 'movement' has a biological survival quality to it;
but the internal 'movement' has no such value, so it is typically ignored as
a matter of course or specifically denied if its existence is asserted.
If you immediately withdraw your hand from a hot stove, that has a survival
value; but, if you become aware of yourself as someone who has just
experienced pain, that is of no biological utility whatsoever. It is utterly
useless for you even to remember such a thing or to attempt to observe the
very 'movement' of self-reflection in the first place.
An early human mesmerized by the beauty of the Serengeti plain will only
realize too late that the spot which keeps getting bigger is a hungry tiger.
He is not going to cogitate about whether he exists or not.
Pursuing the external 'movement' of self-reflection leads into the realm of
scientific truth; the ultimate goal of which is the pleasure and the
preservation of the human individual and species.
Pursuing the internal 'movement' has as its goal the determination of a
Truth beyond merely the biological survival value of the external 'movement'
of self-reflection validated by thought; which, in the Eastern esoteric
tradition, is referred to as illusion or maya.