Kierkegaard on the Cogito

[Joseph Polanik]

Here is another of Kierkegaard's comments on the cogito.

[Q] The Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* has often been repeated. If the 'I'
which is the subject of cogito means an individual human being, the
proposition proves nothing: 'I am thinking, *ergo* I am; but if I *am*
thinking what wonder that I *am*:' the assertion has already been made,
and the first proposition says even more than the second. But if the 'I'
in *cogito* is interpreted as meaning a particular existing human being,
philosophy cries: "How silly; here there is no question of your self or
my self, but solely of the pure ego". But this pure ego cannot very well
have any other than a purely conceptual existence; what then does the
ergo mean? There is no conclusion here, for the proposition is a
tautology. [/Q (Kierkegaard, Soren. 1941. Concluding Unscientific
Postscript. trans. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton U
Press. p. 281)]

it seems to me that Kierkegaard is making an interesting
logico-linguistic point: that any statement of the form 'I am
[whatever]' is also an assertion of 'I am'. that the predicated version
always asserts the unpredicated version.

comments?

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@

[DianaT80]

Well duh, what Kierkegaard is saying pretty much is that if I make the
statement

"I am eating"

What that statement asserts is:

"I am and have the property/attribute of eating"

Just as "I think, therefore I exist" asserts

"I exist and have the property of thinking therefore I exist."

[Joseph Polanik]

DianaT80 wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>Here is another of Kierkegaard's comments on the cogito.

>>[Q] The Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* has often been repeated. If the
>>'I' which is the subject of cogito means an individual human being,
>>the proposition proves nothing: 'I am thinking, *ergo* I am; but if I
>>*am* thinking what wonder that I *am*:' the assertion has already been

>>made, and the first proposition says even more than the second. [/Q

>>(Kierkegaard, Soren. 1941. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. trans.
>>by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton U Press. p. 281)]

>>it seems to me that Kierkegaard is making an interesting
>>logico-linguistic point: that any statement of the form 'I am
>>[whatever]' is also an assertion of 'I am'. that the predicated
>>version always asserts the unpredicated version.

>Well duh, what Kierkegaard is saying pretty much is that if I make the
>statement

>"I am eating"

>What that statement asserts is:

>"I am and have the property/attribute of eating"

>Just as "I think, therefore I exist" asserts

>"I exist and have the property of thinking therefore I exist."

yes. that's what Kierkegaard is saying; but, I think that represents a
departure from traditional interpretations of english grammar.

in the OED, you'll find three distinct usages mentioned under 'be' (not
counting its use as an auxiliary verb).

something like 'I am' is traditionally called the is of existence. a
statement of this sort asserts that something is the case.

something like 'the ball is red' is traditionally called the is sof
predication. the copula complement, 'red', predicates or says something
about the subject, ball.

something like 'the cow is in the garden' doesn't have a traditional
name that I know of. it has the is of existence plus a locative
complement. the locative, 'in the garden', asserts that whatever the
rest of the statement asserts 'happens' or is true at that location.

these various usages are often thought to be distinct; and, indeed, the
first is somewhat controversial in some quarters.

so, one question for the philosophy of language in general; and, for
first person philosophy in particular, is this:

when Descartes says 'I am experiencing; therefore, I am' does the
conclusion 'I am' follow from the premise 'I am experiencing' by logical
necessity or by grammatical convention or both or neither?