Is 'I am self-aware' True?
Joseph Polanik
>jPolanik wrote:
>>I will, however, defend 'I am self-aware' as a true statement;
>>provided, that you attempt to defend 'I am not self-aware' as a true
>>statement.
>Jud: you ... have chickened out on supplying a predicate for your
>reification
>*Self-awareness is ... *
>Self-awareness (of your own individuality, etc) is an abstract noun -
>abstractions (of any type) do not exist
>HOWEVER.... if one applies the adjective from which the abstraction was
>wrongfully derived ...
focus! I do exactly that when I claim that 'I am self-aware' is a true
statement.
>In other words whilst the representation of self aware human entity in
>the utterance: "The self aware man" seems to be not much different from
>the sentence: "The man is self aware" - in terms of the property
>attributed to it.The ACTUAL difference highlights over two thousand
>years of argument between the religio-trannies pseudo-philosophical
>community and the scientifically minded philosophers and ontologists.
>The difference lies with the fact that the use of the copula *is* in
>such cases allows the quality or property of *self awareness* to be
>separable from *the man.* The mode of existence is then dualised and
>separated off in such a way that ...
the phenomenological reality that I am self-aware is separated from the
ontology that makes the phenomenology possible.
>I am ontologically quite comfortable with stating that I am the
>self-aware Jud Evans to whom your failed attempt at Jesuitical trickery
>was addressed.
good for you. now on to a relevant question: are you phenomenologically
comfortable asserting 'I am self-aware'?
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
Joseph Polanik
thus far, as I see it.
we seem to *agree* that self-awareness is not itself a matergic object.
my claim is that there *is* self-awareness --- that self-awareness *is*
--- even though self-awareness does not exist as a matergic object.
clearly, then, if there is self-awareness it must be something other
than a matergic object.
I claim that 'I am self-aware' is a true statement. obviously, it is the
fact which supports the argument, 'I am self-aware; therefore, there is
self-awareness'.
you, Jud, decline to admit that 'I am self-aware' is true; but, refuse
to assert that 'I am not self-aware' is true; and, instead, introduce
two issues whose relation to the argument in question is unclear (at
least to me).
these issues (and my replies) are:
1. your insistence that I supply a previously covert predicate to append
to the sentence 'self-awareness is'. based on your previous admission
that no one is required to predicate an 'orphanic' copula (as you call
it), I decline to do so; and, in any event, I don't see how this
sentence completion task is relevant to the question of whether 'I am
self-aware' is true.
2. you say you are comfortable with statements of the form 'I am the
self-aware Jud Evans who ... bla, bla, bla [biographical data here] bla,
bla, bla.' such a statement embeds the claim to be self-aware within
identification information; and, it is difficult to see how such
statements can be true while 'I am self-aware' is false.