Re: The Uses of 'Is' are not Quantifiers
Joseph Polanik
>In a message dated 19/11/2008 _jPo...@nc.rr.com_ writes:
>[Joe]: I am the referent of 'I' whenever I say "I am". hence, I am
>self-aware. since nothing unreal is self-aware, it follows that I am
>real (in some sense).
>[Jud]: I have decided to reject the grammatical or ontological *truth*
>that *I am the referent of 'I' whenever I say "I am". Yes, it is a
>useful fiction, for the reification *I* is dialogically convenient and
>makes sense grammatically for purposes of clarity in discourse, but a
>silent finger pointing to the chest achieves the same deictic point.
[Joe (new)]:
in some cases, perhaps most cases, that might be close enough for
conversational use; after all, it worked for Lord Greystoke.
however, in any inquiry into the structure of the human individual, it
is woefully inadequate because it has not yet been established that the
human is or is not more than just a human body.
you've said you welcome an inquiry into the structure of the human
individual; but, you seem unwilling or unable to progress beyond the
most banal conclusion imaginable --- a human is a human.
for anyone who is sincere about an inquiry into the structure of the
human individual, neither the ambiguous pronouns of vernacular english
nor your chest-pounding deixis is at all adequate.
>[Jud]: ... it is completely unnecessary to believe that one is really
>self-referentially addressing *oneself* when one makes such statements
>as: I, I am, I myself, me or any other self identifier.
>[Jud]: For me *the self* has nasty overtones of *the soul, the mind,
>the memory, the consciousness, the spirit, psyche, anima, nous,* and
>other trannie hyped-up horrors.
[Joe (new)]: let's review the sequence of events.
1. I mentioned a self-verifying truth, nothing unreal is self-aware.
2. you mention your personal reactions to *the self* and various
synonyms.
hmmmmmm ...
it sounds like you are conflating the noun and pronoun uses of 'self'.
allow me to help you disambiguate yourself. I will begin with the Claim
of Partial Ignorance, CPI:
I know that I am; but, not what I am.
the first claim (I know that I am) can be stated with the pronoun use of
'self' but any denial of the second claim (that I do not know what I am)
requires using some noun ('self' as a noun or some other noun).
I disambiguate my own statements by observing the following conventions:
1. reflexive/intensifier pronouns. 'self' in single words such as
myself, himself etc are widely recognized as pronouns; but, in analogous
phrases such as 'my self', the word 'self' is a noun. without this
convention the traditional Socratic injunction, 'know thyself', is
ambiguous. does it mean know thyself (self as pronoun) or know thy self
(self as noun).
2. reflexive constructions. 'self' is a replexive/anaphoric pronoun in
constructions such as 'self-awareness' but is a noun in analogous
phrases such as 'awareness of self'.
[NOTE: you are not required to disambiguate in the same way that I do;
but, if you choose a different way, would you tell us what it is?]
the second convention is more important for the present discussion. it
means that self-awareness does not necessarily imply awareness of self
(particularly where the anaphoric link is broken).
thus, in saying I know that I am the referent of 'I' whenever I say "I
am", I am saying I am self-aware. to make the further claim 'I am aware
of self' I would have to know enough about the properties of the 'I' to
conclude that I meet the definitional criteria for a 'self'. such a
conclusion requires *additional knowledge*. thus, 'I am self-aware' does
not imply 'I am aware of self'.
this point becomes even more clear with the greater linguistic precision
of humanese pronouns.
I-2 am the referent of 'I-2' whenever I-2 say "I-2 am". hence, I-2 am
self-aware.
the conclusion 'I-2 am self-aware' means the same as 'I-2 am I-2 aware'.
it does not necessarily mean the same as 'I-2 am aware of self' because
we don't know whether 'self' refers to the I-1, the I-2 or the I-3.
the most plausible case would be the one where the anaphoric link is
preserved: I-2 am self-aware; therefore, I-2 am aware of I-2.
even in this case it is not clear that this claim is analytically true.
does 'I-2 am self-aware' claim knowledge of self-as-subject? does 'I-2
am aware of I-2' claim knowledge of self-as object? more knowledge would
be required to resolve the question.
it follows that cases in which the anaphoric link is broken (eg 'I-2 am
self-aware; therefore, I-2 am aware of I-1 and 'I-2 am self-aware;
therefore, I-2 am aware of I-3') don't even have a ghost of a chance of
being analytically true.
it follows then that in all cases more knowledge is required to say
*what* I am than is required to say *that* I am. thus, it is possible to
know the latter and not know the former.
Joe
--
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. --- H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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