The Key to the Experiento
Joseph Polanik
>I had the chance to meet in Polish Resistance hideouts Tatarkiewicz,
>the best historian of philosophy I ever met or read. Sitting in a
>cellar one has a lot of time on one's hands and he chose to spend it
>introducing me to Kant and Descartes. The train of thought leading to
>Cogito was: No perception, no image, no communication is certain - I
>permanently doubt about everything, but I'm certain that I doubt. Now,
>when I doubt, I think. Thus "I'm certain that I think" is the key to
>the cryptic "Cogito". Then Descartes looked for a short and striking
>way to express it and found the unfortunate, muddled "Cogito Ergo Sum"
>Actually the "think" is an overkill and the real key to Cogito is "I'm
>certain that I doubt".
you can't be certain that you are doubting. you may be having an anxiety
attack or a mood fluctuation.
the cogito argument: I experience; therefore, I am.
the real key to the cogito argument is that doubting is an instance of
experiencing --- thus, I can not doubt that I am experiencing without
thereby experiencing ... doubting.
hence, I am certain that I am experiencing.
however, if one tries to narrow down the claim 'I am certain that I
experience' to 'I am certain that I doubt' the claim fails.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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Joseph Polanik
[GM]: The train of thought leading to Cogito was: No perception, no
image, no communication is certain - I permanently doubt about
everything, but I'm certain that I doubt. Now, when I doubt, I think.
Thus "I'm certain that I think" is the key to the cryptic "Cogito".
Then Descartes looked for a short and striking way to express it and
found the unfortunate, muddled "Cogito Ergo Sum"
[GM]: Actually the "think" is an overkill and the real key to Cogito is
"I'm certain that I doubt".
[JP]: you can't be certain that you are doubting. you may be having an
anxiety attack or a mood fluctuation.
[GM]: That's not worth answering
[JP (new)]: Nietzsche made this road to fallacy in _Beyond Good and
Evil_ where he translated 'thinking' as experiencing; narrowed thinking
down to its cognitive aspects; and, contrasted it with feeling --- as if
both thinking as narrowly defined by Nietzsche and feeling are not both
experiencing.
[JP]: the cogito argument: I experience; therefore, I am.
[GM]: Now, our argument was that 'think" is indeed too restrictive and
is an instance of "experience". We have even coined the subsequently
famous "cogito ergo sum".
[GM]: The epistemological key to extended Cogito would be something like
"I'm certain that I experience and doubt all that I experience". In
other terms, experiencing is thematic and it's not experiencing that I
doubt, but all its possible themes.
what is it that says "I'm certain that I experience and doubt all that I
experience"? surely nothingness can not self-existentialize out of the
void to self-reference and then disappear once more.
[GM]: But, there is no "I am".
obviously, you are dancing on the cusp of choking exactly where Walter
and Jud have previously choked.
is it conceivable that, when 'I am' or 'I experience' is asserted, it
can be asserted by nothing at all?
in the absence of any reality (of any reality type whatsoever), in the
absence of any existent (of any mode of existence whatsoever), in the
absence of any being (of any mode of being whatsoever), in the absence
of any actuality, in the absence of any thing of any sort, in the
absence of any force field, in the absence of mass-energy, space and
time, in the absence of anything that is in any sense of 'is'; it is
inconceivable that 'I am' or 'I experience' is nevertheless asserted ---
by nothing that is, by nothing at all.
consequently, that which self-references by asserting 'I am' is real (in
some sense).
Joseph Polanik
jPolanik wrote:
>[GM]: But, there is no "I am".
>[JP]: obviously, you are dancing on the cusp of choking exactly where
>Walter and Jud have previously choked.
>is it conceivable that, when 'I am' or 'I experience' is asserted, it
>can be asserted by nothing at all?
>in the absence of any reality (of any reality type whatsoever), in the
>absence of any existent (of any mode of existence whatsoever), in the
>absence of any being (of any mode of being whatsoever), in the absence
>of any actuality, in the absence of any thing of any sort, in the
>absence of any force field, in the absence of mass-energy, space and
>time, in the absence of anything that is in any sense of 'is'; it is
>inconceivable that 'I am' or 'I experience' is nevertheless asserted
>--- by nothing that is, by nothing at all.
>consequently, that which self-references by asserting 'I am' is real
>(in some sense).
>[GM]: There are just two general approaches to ontology:
>1.Start with some World Out There of whatever existents - objects,
>events, etc. and derive from it a particular existent - I, awareness,
>consciousness, or whatever. It's your approach, which you share with
>overwhelming majority.
>2.Start with awareness and the postulate of relativity:
>POSTULATE OF RELATIVITY ALL ELEMENTS OF HUMAN UNIVERSE ARE RELATIVE,
>EXCEPTING AWARENESS, ITS ABSOLUTE FOUNDATION.
>Corollary: Meaningful assertions may express only the attainable
>relative elements of Universe in their interrelations. Thus, nothing
>can be asserted about the absolute, directly unattainable awareness.
>Awareness is thematic and may be only indirectly attained and expressed
>via its theme, the relative events.
>That's the view of Descartes, which moulded modern science and
>epistemology, which I happen to share.
I can't imagine what would have given you the idea that I favored
approach #1; except, possibly, for the fact that you've mangled the
statement of approach #2.
among the necessary corrections for your mistakes are:
1. self-awareness is also possible; and, is thematic;
2. a certain (small) zone of absolute philosophy centered on
self-awareness is possible.
3. meaningful statements about the relative elements of the universe
must in some cases refer to the awareness to which they are relative.
(as Wigner, for example, said: It is not possible to formulate the laws
of quantum mechanics in a fully consistent way without reference to the
consciousness.)