Is There an Experiencer?
Joseph Polanik
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>yes, we are discussing the fundamental nature of experience; and,
>>the claim that Stuart and I are making is that there is an experiencer
>>of experience.
>>it seems to me that you are contesting this claim.
>>am I wrong about that?
>I'm saying that any claim for the 'reality' of the first-person
>'experiencer' is a metaphysical claim.
'metaphysical' is the wrong word to use in this context. claims as to
the reality of the first-person experiencer are either phenomenal or
metaphenomenal depending on how 'reality' is used.
we have been talking about experience; its features; and, allegations
that the experiencer is or is not implied by experience.
an experience such as experiencing an afterimage is a real phenomenon;
hence, it is a phenomenological reality. all experience is this way ---
experiences are phenomenological realities.
now, to explain experience scientists and philosophers attribute
properties to metaphenomenal objects, objects that are 'real'
independent of our experience of them. consider the following argument:
I am self-aware. nothing unreal is self-aware; hence, I am real (in some
sense).
so far, this argument is about a phenomenological reality: I (this
experiencing I) experience self-awareness, a real phenomenon; hence, I
am a phenomenological reality.
however, from what we know about phenomena, it is clear that at least
one metaphenomenal reality must be postulated to account for the
phenomenological reality of the experiencer --- the experiencing I that
I am.
the problem is that we don't know whether that metaphenomenal reality is
an existential reality (something physical such as a neuron) or an
ontological reality (something that is a being such as an immaterial
mind or an immaterial soul).
>>I am saying that experience implies an experiencer. do you agree?
>I'm saying that your claim entails an epistemological problem. If this
>experiencer is conceived of as distinct from the experience that it
>'has' then the claim amounts to saying that the experiencer is "beyond
>experience"
not so. as explained above, the experiencer is a phenomenological
reality that is not beyond experience. the only epistemological claim is
that at least one metaphenomenal reality is required to explain or
account for a phenomenal reality.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
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mec...@sbcglobal.net
Cayuse wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
Joe
This whole argument appears to place all experience within the same
category. But, in fact, there seems to be one certain 'experience' which is
different from all other experiences because it is the very origin of, and
gives rise to every other experience (at least with respect to the
consciousness of the "self" and the 'thinker'): the experience (if it can be
called that) referred to as self-reflection.
Prior to self-reflection, there is neither any "experiencer" nor any
"experience" at all. 'Whatever' it is that exists at that point is, in some
way or another, a 'pre-"self" consciousness' fusion of "experience" and
"experiencer" into one "whole" (of one kind or another). It is this
"experience" (if that's what you want to call it) of self-reflection by
which any "experiencer" is first differentiated at all from any
"experience". That is, the 'experience' of self-reflection is not something
that is actually 'experienced' *by* the "self". Rather, it is something
which gives rise to the "self" itself in the first place, thus enabling that
"self" *then* to be capable of any experience *other* than the 'experience'
of self-reflection.
In that sense, the 'movement' of self-reflection appears to be more a
fundamental element of the structure of reality itself--in other words, not
something which can be easily ignored--than merely an 'experience'
'experienced' by a "self" or a 'thinker'.
Is there any place in this discussion for this observation?
Michael Cecil