Way to Go, Eray!
Joseph Polanik
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>Descartes' concern is to demonstrate that 'I am' is undeniably true
>>whenever asserted. as a knowledge claim this is very modest; indeed,
>>minimalistic; and, you are right to suspect that the Second Meditation
>>provides a base for Descartes' efforts in Meditations 3 thru 6 and
>>elsewhere to go beyond the minimalist claim established in Meditation
>>2.
>Well of course I read it in the distant past, but I remember that
>much. It's not a long text, could read it again.
>The problem I see with the claim is that of absolute certainty and how
>he tries to make it the basis of epistemology.
>I was thinking about that.
>Why does he think that the senses will deceive him if the results of
>perception passes statistical tests? He has no reason other than some
>subjective bias, I think.
he is looking for knowledge that is certain rather than merely probable.
>Also, I found out that my objection to the second meditation was made
>by a philosopher before, have a look at Søren Kierkegaard's critique:
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito_ergo_sum#S.C3.B8ren_Kierkegaard.27s_critique
>QUOTE
>The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard provided a critical response
>to the cogito.[3] Kierkegaard argues that the cogito already
>pre-supposes the existence of "I", and therefore concluding with
>existence is logically trivial. Kierkegaard's argument can be made
>clearer if one extracts the premise "I think" into two further
>premises:
>"x" thinks
>I am that "x"
>Therefore I think
>Therefore I am
>Where "x" is used as a placeholder in order to disambiguate the "I"
>from the thinking thing.[4]
this sounds like another attempt to cast the Experiento as a deductive
argument; but, Descartes always denied that he was perpetrating a
syllogism or a modus ponens such as
I think -> I am
I think
(therefore, I am)
I'm not saying that this is invalid. I'm just saying Descartes didn't do
that.
in my opinion, Descartes drew a forensic inference; meaning, that from a
fact one may conclude that the logical presuppositions of that fact have
been satisfied.
>Here, the cogito has already assumed the "I"'s existence as that which
>thinks. For Kierkegaard, Descartes is merely "developing the content
>of a concept", namely that the "I", which already exists, thinks.[5]
>Kierkegaard argues that the value of the cogito is not its logical
>argument, but its psychological appeal: a thinking thing must have
>something that exists to think it. It is psychologically difficult to
>think "I do not exist".
>But as Kierkegaard argues, the proper logical flow of argument is that
>existence is already assumed or pre-supposed in order for thinking to
>occur, not that existence is concluded from that thinking.
it is certainly true that a mother is presupposed in order for the child
to exist. the problem is that, if you consider a randomly picked woman,
you have no idea whether she has any children. however, if you consider
a randomly picked child you know beyond doubt that the child has or had
a mother.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
mec...@sbcglobal.net
"I think, therefore, I am"; but, rather:
"Words convey meaning."
Michael Cecil
http://science-of-consciousness.blogspot.com/