The Experiencer of Experience
Joseph Polanik
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>Cayuse wrote:
>>>LW addresses this issue in the TLP section 5.6 (thru to 5.641).
>>I'm familiar with that passage; but, I do not understand how it
>>relates to your statement that the idea of the experiencer is "just
>>more of the data of experience".
>When I said that LW addresses this issue in the TLP, I was speaking
>about "what it is that 'has' this data of experience" (he concludes
>that "there is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a
>non-psychological way").
how do I think non-psychologically about *this* that I am?
>>one might say that the 'I' is the 'experience of the experiencer'
>>just as easily as one can say 'the awareness of the awarer'.
>Yes indeed -- one might easily say that.
>>in any case, I suggest that you restate your concern about "the
>>nature of what it is that 'has' this data of experience" in first
>>person language.
>My concern relates to the hypostatization of the idea of "self as the
>subject of consciousness" (or the "experiencer of experience" if you
>prefer).
can you experience worrying this worry in the first person?
I am hypostatizing. I am hypostatizing more rapidly than I thought
possible. I wonder if I am a true hypostatization. etc. etc.
do any of these or any similar statements make any sense when you say
them about yourself?
>This 'self' makes no appearance within the data of experience
>other than as the idea of a 'something' that is in some unfathomable
>sense the 'owner' of this data of experience, and is therefore distinct
>from this data (and so inhabiting some putative domain "beyond the
>data of experience").
I am the referent of 'I' whenever I say "I am self-aware"; hence, I am
self-aware.
have I made an appearance within my experience? a difficult question. I
can imagine different people giving different answers.
>Experience and experiencer are now regarded as two separate and
>distinct 'things' that must somehow be entering into relationship with
>one another. This is a metaphysical position posing as a physical
>position, thereby giving the impression that the relationship between
>experience and experiencer should be amenable to investigation using
>the same methods that are rightfully employed to investigate
>relationships between things that do make an appearance within the data
>of experience.
when I investigate the relation between I, this experiencer, and that
which I experience, am I employing a method appropriate to investigating
the relation between two things?
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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