On the Experience of Self-Awareness
Joseph Polanik
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>I'm saying that reality is a necessary condition of self-awareness.
>>hence, once I notice that I am self-aware, I may use that second
>>premise to conclude that I am real (in some sense).
>The idea of self-awareness is itself in error, and so cannot be used
>to support such a proof.
I will summarize the argument thus far before evaluating your new claim
in relation to it. the secondary issue as to whether I am an experiencer
or something else, I will leave to another thread.
the argument that I am real (in some sense) is:
I am self-aware. nothing unreal is self-aware; hence, I am real (in some
sense).
you've correctly noted that, by my definition, (what is is real), there
is nothing to which 'unreal' refers; hence, if I am self-aware I am real
(in some sense).
you are now claiming that 'the idea of self-awareness is itself in
error'. however, you've previously acknowledged (as do I) that there is
a difference between X and an idea about X (or a concept of X or a
theory about X). for example, you admit that a thought about a unicorn
is a real thought even though a unicorn is not a real animal. you also
admit that an idea of the experience arises in experience even though
(according to you) the experiencer does not arise in experience.
similarly, it does not matter, to the validity of the argument stated
above, that a given theory, concept or idea about self-awareness is true
or false --- as long as there is the experience of self-awareness.
if, on the other hand, you are claiming that there is no experience of
self-awareness; then, would you kindly present your argument and/or your
evidence for your claim?
thanks,
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
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mec...@sbcglobal.net
-----Original Message-----
From: mo...@googlegroups.com [mailto:mo...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of
Joseph Polanik
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 4:59 AM
To: witt...@freelists.org
Cc: Mo...@googlegroups.com
Subject: [MoFPP: 210] On the Experience of Self-Awareness
Cayuse wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>I'm saying that reality is a necessary condition of self-awareness.
>>hence, once I notice that I am self-aware, I may use that second
>>premise to conclude that I am real (in some sense).
>The idea of self-awareness is itself in error, and so cannot be used
>to support such a proof.
I will summarize the argument thus far before evaluating your new claim
in relation to it. the secondary issue as to whether I am an experiencer
or something else, I will leave to another thread.
the argument that I am real (in some sense) is:
I am self-aware. nothing unreal is self-aware; hence, I am real (in some
sense).
But the question I have at this point is "How can it be said that 'I am
self-aware' without simultaneously asserting that the table, for example, is
*not* self-aware?
But you can have no real *knowledge* about whether the table is self-aware
or not. If it is either self-aware or not self-aware, there would be no way
for you to know that. The "I" is not omniscient.
All that can be said here is that there is such a *thing* as self-awareness.
No evidence for any spatial dimension of that self-awareness can be
asserted. That is, for all you know, the entire physical reality may very
well be self-aware. (Or, why is the "I" so *special*?) Rather, humans are,
perhaps, just the only element or the only species which is capable of
*claiming* (or demonstrating) that it is self-aware.
Or, working from the other direction, if the table can be said to be 'real
in some sense'; why, then, should it suffer the 'discrimination' of not
being considered as at least potentially self-aware?
Michael Cecil
mec...@sbcglobal.net
Cayuse wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
Michael Cecil
On second thought, this situation is worse than I had originally assumed.
First of all, the structure of thought itself is fundamentally dualistic;
which means that any assertion that the "self" is self-aware is,
simultaneously, the assertion that there is nothing else in the entire
physical reality which is self-aware. *Nothing* else.
In other words, the "self" which says "I am self-aware" establishes, by that
statement, a sphere or locus of consciousness around which the *entire*
physical reality (including other *purportedly* self-aware "selves") is
arranged; and the statement "I am self-aware" is, in fact, equivalent to the
statement "I and I alone am the *only* self-aware entity in all of the
physical reality."
Although it is quite natural to assume that a table, for example, is not
self-aware, due to the fact that it is incapable of making such a claim, the
fact is that it cannot even legitimately be asserted by any "self" that any
*other* "self" is self-aware. Such an *assumption* may very well be made,
but the "self" can have no real or direct *knowledge* that any other "self"
is self-aware at all--the disastrous implications of which are too
complicated for this reply.
But it gets worse. Much worse.
Precisely *how* 'self-aware' is a "self" which is either unaware, ignores,
or specifically denies that the structure of thought itself is fundamentally
dualistic, and that the statement "I am self-aware" is a specific *denial*
that there is any *other* "self"--or any other element of the physical
reality--which is self-aware at all?
Is that really "self-awareness" in the first place?
In other words, the statement "I am self-aware" may very well be a
self-contradiction because it ignores the fundamental structure of thought
itself and the ultimate implications of that duality.
Thus, there is a "self" with a limited degree of 'self-awareness'--it is
this "self" that says "I am self-aware". But a "self" which is *more*
self-aware would say, instead, "there is such a thing as self-awareness--of
which there can be no direct knowledge of any spatial dimension." In other
words, for all that the "self" knows, the entire physical reality (and not
merely the singular "self" alone) may very well be self-aware. And, in fact,
the onus of proof would be upon any "self" that says that the entire
physical reality is *not* self-aware. (That is, on what grounds could the
dimension of spatiality be applied to consciousness?)
Thus, once it is asserted that "I am self-aware", it is no *less* likely
that a table, for example, is self-aware than that there are other
*"selves"* which are self-aware.
And to observe that the structure of thought itself is fundamentally
dualistic is to establish an initial experience of another dimension of
consciousness (alluded to in the Gospel of Thomas) altogether beyond the
dualistic consciousness of the "self" and the 'thinker' (represented by the
second and third observers in the train station in the thought experiment)
necessary for the observation of that dualistic consciousness in the first
place; a consciousness which, from the perspective of the 3rd observer in
the thought experiment, might very well be referred to as the "tree of the
knowledge of good and evil."
Michael Cecil