'sensitive' information
tay...@hplabsc.uucp
article on the effects of the recent definition of "sensitive, but not
unclassified information" issued by John Poindexter, former NSC adviser to
Reagan.
He said that any information which the "disclosure, loss, misuse, or
destruction of could adversely affect national security" would be subject to
careful monitoring.
The article then mentions some of the types of information that might fall in
this category...then there is a very eye-openning paragraph:
"Under these guidelines, the US Air Force, the CIA, and the National
Security Council have asked the keepers of some fo the country's largest
PUBLIC [my emphasis] databases, including Mead Corp.'s Nexus, to supply
names of subscribers and install software that will allow the company to
more accurately track who asks for what information and when."
Under the broad definition of vital information, an agency of the government
may decide that any other private information is valuable, and it can monitor
or hinder, that flow of information.
I was just imagining the next step...tie the government systems into the city
and university libraries, then start checking into what we buy at book stores,
followed eventually by monitoring what we read in the papers. I feel like some
of my freedom is eroding again. Thoughts?
Well, now I will have someone watching what I read and what I have in my
urine. Isn't it nice to have all this attention?
--Bi//
tay...@hplabsc.uucp
classification.
My research is on the verge of getting this classification. I have been
told that my some work is no longer for distribution outside the US.
It is undergoing further review. My work for those not aware is under
the heading of parallel processing. Other obvious areas are things like
AI, and other types of high technology.
There are two principal motives for the sensitive classification: 1) the
economic "threat of our neighbors (which hits me twice because of
ancestory)," and the military threat of the technology appearing in
weapons of the SU. It is useless to argue against these people from my
position (maybe not other readers). Research should involve the
exchange of information. I hate the thought that I request information
from one set of people and in turn I would not be able to respond
(reciprocate) in kind.
Needless to say these are my views and NOT the views of my employer or
the US Government.
From the Rock of Ages Home for Retired Hackers:
--eugene miya NASA Ames Research Center
tay...@hplabsc.uucp
(especially of late). Someone told me this analogy, which I
think is appropriate:
The race to build and use technology is like the Indy 500. The
scientists and researchers are trying to win this race by
building faster and better cars. The government is trying to win
by scattering tacks on the racetrack.
Alan Wexelblat W...@MCC.ARPA or W...@MCC.COM
tay...@hplabsc.uucp
THE THREAT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROLS ON ELECTRONIC DATABASES
that contain "sensitive but unclassified information" has receded, at
least temporarily (WN 27 Feb 87). In a stunning reversal of policy,
Frank Carlucci, the new National Security Advisor to the President,
announced in a conciliatory letter to Rep. Jack Brooks (D-TX), Chairman
of the Government Operations Committee, that NTISSP-2, the notorious
"Poindexter Memorandum," was being rescinded. It was this directive
that defined "sensitive but unclassified information" as information
affecting "national security or other Federal Government interests," a
definition that could fit a giraffe. Carlucci also said that NSDD 145,
National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems
Security, which in Brook's words created a "shadow government," was being
reviewed. The reversal is attributable to the solid opposition of groups
such as the library associations and scientific societies.
Although Carlucci declined to testify on grounds of executive
privilege, he refused to extend that protection to Poindexter. showed up before
the Committee on Tuesday, but confined himself to puffing on his pipe taking
the Fifth. Secretary of Commerce Baldrige and Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft
testified that responsibility for computer security should be moved to a
civilian agency.
Perhaps the most significant testimony on Tuesday came at the end,
after most of the press had left to file their stories. Harold Relyea of the
Library of Congress discussed the whole phenomenon of National Security
Decision Directives (NSDD's). Out of some 200 NSDD's, all but five are secret,
and are not generally available even to Congress. They have apparently been
used to authorize such things as the disinformation campaign against Libya and
$50M for Argentina to train Contras. He said they bring us very close to the
most dangerous practice of totalitarian government -- rule by secret law.
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