Wallerstein: "Can NATO Survive Georgia?"
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jd in .hu
Sep 8, 2008, 10:36:30 AM9/8/08
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"Can NATO Survive Georgia?"
by Immanuel Wallerstein
Commentary No. 240, Sept. 1, 2008
Amidst all the journalistic brouhaha about a new cold war, most
analysts are missing out on the real crisis that has been crystallized
by Saakashvili's imprudent excursion into South Ossetia. The very
existence of NATO has been put into question.
To understand that, we have to go back to the beginning of NATO as an
institution and a concept.
The story began in 1947 when the United Kingdom and France signed the
Treaty of Dunkirk, pledging mutual assistance in case of a revival of
German military aggression. In 1948, this grouping was expanded to
include the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg in the Treaty of
Brussels, in a move still designed to defend against Germany. Later
that year, the five nations set up the Western Union Defence
Organization, with a combined chiefs of staff committee. There are two
things to note about these treaties. The United States was not part of
them, and they were aimed primarily at Germany, not the Soviet Union.
The founding of NATO in 1949 came in the wake of the Berlin Blockade
of 1948. NATO in effect nullified the Western Union defense treaties.
It was focused not on the dangers of renewed German militarism but on
the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. From the
point of view of the United States, NATO served several purposes. It
was a message to the Soviet Union that the United States was committed
to maintaining the existing boundaries of the division of power in
Europe, which had seemed threatened by the Berlin Blockade. It was a
method of reconciling the French and the British to the rearmament of
West Germany. And it was a way of controlling the military operations
of the allies by undoing their nascent military structure and
subordinating their troops to a U.S. command.
The political leaders and the majority of the population of western
European countries were initially quite favorable to the concept of
NATO. For them, it guaranteed that the United States would indeed
defend them should the Soviet Union come to think it could violate the
Yalta arrangements. And France was now ready to accept West German
rearmament as a part of their historic reconciliation. France,
however, chafed at the third objective - keeping French troops under
U.S. command, which is what led Charles De Gaulle in 1966 to withdraw
from the NATO command structure and require its headquarters to move
from Paris to Brussels.
Beginning in the 1970s, western Europe had not only gotten over its
worries about Germany but had begun to think that the Soviet Union no
longer posed an imminent menace of invasion. Various countries, and
not only France, began to think of how they could bring a tamer, post-
Stalinist Soviet Union into more intensive cooperation with western
Europe. This was notably the case with West Germany's Ostpolitik. And
when, in the 1980's, the idea was broached of a gas pipeline from the
Soviet Union to western Europe, this was favorably received even by
the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher.
The United States was dismayed by these developments. It
unsuccessfully opposed the gas pipeline. It sought to discourage all
talk of reviving a European army that was not part of NATO. In
general, it became considerably less friendly to the idea of Europe as
Europe, one that was separate from a North Atlantic community.
The strain was intensified with the collapse of the communisms in 1989
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since NATO had been
created as a structure to defend western Europe against a Soviet Union
governed by a Communist party, what function did NATO now have? The
United States was determined to maintain NATO, and sought a new
definition of its role. It was also determined not to permit the
emergence of an autonomous European structure, delinked from the
United States, and worse still, possibly creating the "common European
home" that would include Russia, and which Mikhail Gorbachev had
proposed.
The immediate structural question for NATO was the issue of expansion
- to include or not the former Soviet satellites, which were now
emancipated from their links with the Soviet Union/Russia. The United
States pushed hard, almost immediately, for their incorporation into
NATO. The western Europeans were less enthusiastic. The former
satellites saw their incorporation as their link to the United States,
as protection against Russia, and as a gateway to economic betterment.
The United States saw their incorporation as a constraint on Russia's
possible resurgence but even more as a guarantee that "Europe" would
not be able to delink from its U.S. close alliance, since these
countries would oppose it. And western Europe was less enthusiastic
precisely because they understood what the United States was doing.
The Iraq war exacerbated the situation greatly. Donald Rumsfeld
gloated over two Europes - "old" Europe, which was effete and
uncooperative, and "new" Europe, which was committed to the same world
objectives as the United States. Actually, in the immediate situation
of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, there were three Europes:
Rumsfeld's "new" Europe (that is, the former Soviet satellites); those
that refused to join the "coalition of the willing" (notably France
and Germany); and those western European countries that in 2003
supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq (notably the United Kingdom,
Spain, and Italy). France and Germany pulled closer, politically, to
Putin's Russia in their common opposition to the United States at the
United Nations.
The strain continued. When the United States pushed this year for the
launching of the process to include Ukraine and Georgia in NATO, they
met strong opposition not only from France and Germany but from the
United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy as well. Indeed they had strong
support in only four of the eastern European states - Poland and the
three Baltic states. The other eastern European states were reticent
as well.
Then came Saakashvili's march into South Ossetia and Russia's vigorous
and successful riposte. Poland and the three Baltic states immediately
gave full support to Georgia, and the United States a bit less rapidly
raised its rhetorical level, and sent in warships with humanitarian
aid.
What did western Europe do? Immediately, and without consulting
anyone, President Sarkozy of France negotiated a truce in the
fighting, and then got the European Union to endorse this fait
accompli. Chancellor Merkel of Germany then got into the act with
further negotiations with Russia. Even Silvio Berlusconi of Italy was
telephoning Putin. All this while, Condoleezza Rice was out of the
real diplomatic picture.
Did the diplomacy work? Only of course up to a point, as controversy
continues about where Russian troops are presently stationed and
Russia's definitive recognition of the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. But western European statesmen keep making statements
about how one should be careful not to cut off ties with Russia. And
it seems the most the western European press can do is to scold Russia
that it is they who are breaking friendly relations with western
Europe. Most revealing of all is the report in the New York Times that
Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states are calling not Rice
but Angela Merkel, asking her to use her influence to help resolve the
situation. Angela Merkel has made it clear that Germany will not be
rushed into approving Georgian membership in NATO.
Most remarkable of all is an op-ed in the Financial Times by Kishore
Mahbubani, a senior academic in profoundly pro-Western Singapore.
Mahbubani says that 10% of the world is united in condemning Russia,
and the other 90% "is bemused by western moralising on Georgia." He
says Mao Zedong was right in one thing - the distinction between the
primary contradiction and the secondary contradictions with which one
must always compromise. "Russia is not close to becoming the primary
contradiction the west faces." He ends by saying that it is Western
"flawed (strategic) thinking" that is causing the world to be a more
dangerous place.
The United States is not yet ready to listen to the sage counsel of
its own friends in the non-Western world. Western Europe is grappling
its way to understanding what's at stake for them. NATO cannot survive
the irrelevance of its strategic activity in what Mahbubani calls the
"post cold-war era."
by Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein, distributed by Agence Global. For
rights and permissions, including translations and posting to non-
commercial sites, and contact: rig...@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002
or 1.336.286.6606. Permission is granted to download, forward
electronically, or e-mail to others, provided the essay remains intact
and the copyright note is displayed. To contact author, write:
immanuel.w...@yale.edu.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be
reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the
perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
http://fbc.binghamton.edu/
by Immanuel Wallerstein
Commentary No. 240, Sept. 1, 2008
Amidst all the journalistic brouhaha about a new cold war, most
analysts are missing out on the real crisis that has been crystallized
by Saakashvili's imprudent excursion into South Ossetia. The very
existence of NATO has been put into question.
To understand that, we have to go back to the beginning of NATO as an
institution and a concept.
The story began in 1947 when the United Kingdom and France signed the
Treaty of Dunkirk, pledging mutual assistance in case of a revival of
German military aggression. In 1948, this grouping was expanded to
include the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg in the Treaty of
Brussels, in a move still designed to defend against Germany. Later
that year, the five nations set up the Western Union Defence
Organization, with a combined chiefs of staff committee. There are two
things to note about these treaties. The United States was not part of
them, and they were aimed primarily at Germany, not the Soviet Union.
The founding of NATO in 1949 came in the wake of the Berlin Blockade
of 1948. NATO in effect nullified the Western Union defense treaties.
It was focused not on the dangers of renewed German militarism but on
the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. From the
point of view of the United States, NATO served several purposes. It
was a message to the Soviet Union that the United States was committed
to maintaining the existing boundaries of the division of power in
Europe, which had seemed threatened by the Berlin Blockade. It was a
method of reconciling the French and the British to the rearmament of
West Germany. And it was a way of controlling the military operations
of the allies by undoing their nascent military structure and
subordinating their troops to a U.S. command.
The political leaders and the majority of the population of western
European countries were initially quite favorable to the concept of
NATO. For them, it guaranteed that the United States would indeed
defend them should the Soviet Union come to think it could violate the
Yalta arrangements. And France was now ready to accept West German
rearmament as a part of their historic reconciliation. France,
however, chafed at the third objective - keeping French troops under
U.S. command, which is what led Charles De Gaulle in 1966 to withdraw
from the NATO command structure and require its headquarters to move
from Paris to Brussels.
Beginning in the 1970s, western Europe had not only gotten over its
worries about Germany but had begun to think that the Soviet Union no
longer posed an imminent menace of invasion. Various countries, and
not only France, began to think of how they could bring a tamer, post-
Stalinist Soviet Union into more intensive cooperation with western
Europe. This was notably the case with West Germany's Ostpolitik. And
when, in the 1980's, the idea was broached of a gas pipeline from the
Soviet Union to western Europe, this was favorably received even by
the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher.
The United States was dismayed by these developments. It
unsuccessfully opposed the gas pipeline. It sought to discourage all
talk of reviving a European army that was not part of NATO. In
general, it became considerably less friendly to the idea of Europe as
Europe, one that was separate from a North Atlantic community.
The strain was intensified with the collapse of the communisms in 1989
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since NATO had been
created as a structure to defend western Europe against a Soviet Union
governed by a Communist party, what function did NATO now have? The
United States was determined to maintain NATO, and sought a new
definition of its role. It was also determined not to permit the
emergence of an autonomous European structure, delinked from the
United States, and worse still, possibly creating the "common European
home" that would include Russia, and which Mikhail Gorbachev had
proposed.
The immediate structural question for NATO was the issue of expansion
- to include or not the former Soviet satellites, which were now
emancipated from their links with the Soviet Union/Russia. The United
States pushed hard, almost immediately, for their incorporation into
NATO. The western Europeans were less enthusiastic. The former
satellites saw their incorporation as their link to the United States,
as protection against Russia, and as a gateway to economic betterment.
The United States saw their incorporation as a constraint on Russia's
possible resurgence but even more as a guarantee that "Europe" would
not be able to delink from its U.S. close alliance, since these
countries would oppose it. And western Europe was less enthusiastic
precisely because they understood what the United States was doing.
The Iraq war exacerbated the situation greatly. Donald Rumsfeld
gloated over two Europes - "old" Europe, which was effete and
uncooperative, and "new" Europe, which was committed to the same world
objectives as the United States. Actually, in the immediate situation
of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, there were three Europes:
Rumsfeld's "new" Europe (that is, the former Soviet satellites); those
that refused to join the "coalition of the willing" (notably France
and Germany); and those western European countries that in 2003
supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq (notably the United Kingdom,
Spain, and Italy). France and Germany pulled closer, politically, to
Putin's Russia in their common opposition to the United States at the
United Nations.
The strain continued. When the United States pushed this year for the
launching of the process to include Ukraine and Georgia in NATO, they
met strong opposition not only from France and Germany but from the
United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy as well. Indeed they had strong
support in only four of the eastern European states - Poland and the
three Baltic states. The other eastern European states were reticent
as well.
Then came Saakashvili's march into South Ossetia and Russia's vigorous
and successful riposte. Poland and the three Baltic states immediately
gave full support to Georgia, and the United States a bit less rapidly
raised its rhetorical level, and sent in warships with humanitarian
aid.
What did western Europe do? Immediately, and without consulting
anyone, President Sarkozy of France negotiated a truce in the
fighting, and then got the European Union to endorse this fait
accompli. Chancellor Merkel of Germany then got into the act with
further negotiations with Russia. Even Silvio Berlusconi of Italy was
telephoning Putin. All this while, Condoleezza Rice was out of the
real diplomatic picture.
Did the diplomacy work? Only of course up to a point, as controversy
continues about where Russian troops are presently stationed and
Russia's definitive recognition of the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. But western European statesmen keep making statements
about how one should be careful not to cut off ties with Russia. And
it seems the most the western European press can do is to scold Russia
that it is they who are breaking friendly relations with western
Europe. Most revealing of all is the report in the New York Times that
Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states are calling not Rice
but Angela Merkel, asking her to use her influence to help resolve the
situation. Angela Merkel has made it clear that Germany will not be
rushed into approving Georgian membership in NATO.
Most remarkable of all is an op-ed in the Financial Times by Kishore
Mahbubani, a senior academic in profoundly pro-Western Singapore.
Mahbubani says that 10% of the world is united in condemning Russia,
and the other 90% "is bemused by western moralising on Georgia." He
says Mao Zedong was right in one thing - the distinction between the
primary contradiction and the secondary contradictions with which one
must always compromise. "Russia is not close to becoming the primary
contradiction the west faces." He ends by saying that it is Western
"flawed (strategic) thinking" that is causing the world to be a more
dangerous place.
The United States is not yet ready to listen to the sage counsel of
its own friends in the non-Western world. Western Europe is grappling
its way to understanding what's at stake for them. NATO cannot survive
the irrelevance of its strategic activity in what Mahbubani calls the
"post cold-war era."
by Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein, distributed by Agence Global. For
rights and permissions, including translations and posting to non-
commercial sites, and contact: rig...@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002
or 1.336.286.6606. Permission is granted to download, forward
electronically, or e-mail to others, provided the essay remains intact
and the copyright note is displayed. To contact author, write:
immanuel.w...@yale.edu.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be
reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the
perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
http://fbc.binghamton.edu/
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