ARTICLE: History of CA-2 Beverly Hills Freeway Proposal
Don Hagstrom
such a compromise would work today? I did not know about this piece of
history.
This article may be of interest to those who maintain websites on
California's Freeways and Highways
URL: http://www.bhweekly.com/guest.html (Beverly Hills Weekly)
TEXT:
To Freeway or Not To Freeway?-- That Was The Question 9/4/02
Rudy takes a look back at the proposed Beverly Hills Freeway.
By Rudy Cole
This week's offering was to be about Bedford Drive, another in our series on
the streets of Beverly Hills, but the story about the history of the street
and its stores turned out to be a larger task than a holiday shortened week
could handle on our deadline. The street will receive its just deserts next
week.
Instead, we will take a different walk down history lane and recount the
travails and drama behind the almost created Beverly Hills Freeway.
We don't have a freeway because many conflicting interests became involved
in the process of first selecting a route and second in coming to an
understanding on the methods of construction.
First, route selection. The very first stirrings for a proposed freeway to
serve Beverly Hills were the original plans for the Santa Monica Freeway.
The very powerful publisher of the Santa Monica Outlook and chair of the
state's Highway Commission was determined to build a freeway from downtown
to the beach. The route they selected was near Pico Boulevard.
It seemed perfect for Beverly Hills and for the traffic needs of Western Los
Angeles, but guess who didn't approve?-- the major business interests of the
Beverly Hills, and especially those who owned much of the
yet-to-be-developed land in the city. This was in the late 1940s and early
1950s. Their reasons were very pragmatic: With a Santa Monica freeway
running near the southern borders of the city, customers for our stores
could more easily reach both the downtown Los Angeles and Santa Monica
shopping districts, and the freeway could make the development of competing
office buildings on the booming Westside more accessible. (Century City was
then on the planning boards.)
The state agency caved into the opposition and selected the current route of
the Santa Monica freeway many miles south of the original route. Too late,
the business interests realized that the inevitable traffic stemming from
the growth of communities surrounding Beverly Hills was having a very
negative impact on the city.
Next, the City Council, in the 1960s, offered strong support for a freeway
between the two Santa Monica Boulevards that would connect to the Hollywood
Freeway on the east, and north and be a second link to the beach.
But the idea of a freeway so close to the expensive homes in the 500 block
north of Santa Monica drove fear into the hearts of the homeowners. Others
saw the freeway as a less then desirable permanent divider between the north
and south areas. Also, weighing in against the freeway were the churches
along Santa Monica Boulevard.
To counter their objections, the City Council supposedly won an agreement
from the State Department of Highways to construct a "cut and cover"
freeway. This could have meant a minimum of disruption during construction
and a freeway that would not be directly visible.
But there was one very big fly in this planned ointment: the costs of
construction. State legislators from the cow counties, anxious to spend
state dollars on road projects in their districts, howled with pain at the
prospect of allocating funds for a Beverly Hills freeway that could be four
times normal costs. Even though the Council had limited controls over the
route, it had no ability to guarantee the freeway would all be underground.
So, with a much-needed Beverly Hills freeway added to the state's master
plan for freeway planning, the city's problem was in making sure that it
would not be above ground. This city would never have been the same with a
Santa Monica freeway-style construction.
The state agency could not give those assurances; the appropriation would
still have to come from the legislature. So, with the Beverly Hills City
Council approving the route, the freeway could have built above ground even
if the Council objected.
The Council never accepted this argument, insisting that the cut and cover
plan would work and be accepted by the state. But the political realities
were not lost on Anthony Beilenson, a local product who represented the city
in the state legislature. He made sure the Beverly Hills Freeway died a
quiet demise in the assembly, never to be heard from again. Beilenson was
later elected to Congress in 1976.
Even today, some bemoan the loss of the "cut and cover" Beverly Hills
Freeway, and they are right if that had been the choice. But it wasn't.
In recent years, some of those seeking a solution to our traffic problems,
caused mostly by the enormous developments surrounding our city, have urged
that the mass transit plans include a route through Beverly Hills on
Wilshire Boulevard. Sounded good, but again the realities would have been
deadly. How many Wilshire Boulevard business could have survived the years
long construction and how would that have impacted the look and feel of our
business district? The disadvantages always seemed to outweigh the help this
might have offered to our traffic flow. And might is a key word.
The most encouraging steps toward traffic control are not to be found in
sending new developments to our borders, but in a newly revisited regional,
multi-city traffic coordination plan, a newly adopted traffic calming
scheme, the improvements on Santa Monica boulevard on our borders that could
actually deter some through traffic and the improved rapid bus service of
the MTA. It would also help if more of our residents stayed in the city to
shop and dine
Local Hero: Marina Wax, who took a small idea into a national success by
sheer personal will and determination. Her tireless efforts have led to the
creation of a local asset called the Children of the World Choir. If you
have attended one of the many local events at which the group performed, you
know how much pleasure the choral group provides. But it is the concept of
children from so many different religions and cultures working together to
make music that distinguish this effort. Now, with performances in the
nations' capitol, on national television and with a recently released CD,
the choir has become part of our musical lives. With much of the youthful
talent coming from our own community and because she kept the faith, Marina
Wax is this week's local hero.
--
Don Hagstrom
Director, Friends of Southern California's Highways
www.fixtraffic.org
Erik Slotboom
these events, especially the cancellation.
Anyone familiar with that era is probably aware of the severe financial
crisis that hit Caltrans and DOTs nationwide in the 1970's. There was really
no chance that funding could be obtained for a cut-and-cover freeway. Here
is an except from the text from the Houston Freeways book that I am working
on, to provide a little background. This excerpt is from the chapter called
"Crisis" (1970-1980)
Shared Company - the mighty succumb
The funding crisis was a nationwide phenomenon and no states were spared.
The mightiest freeway construction machine that the world has ever known,
the California Highway department of the 1960's, was decimated by funding
issues and a changing political climate. In an ironic twist of fate,
Governor Jerry Brown entered office in January 1975 and set out to dismantle
the world-leading highway construction program that his father, Governor Pat
Brown, had built during his years in office between 1959 and 1967. In
response to "critical financial problems" in July 1975, the California
Department of Transportation placed a freeze on all new highway construction
and halted nearly all land acquisition for freeway right-of-way. (LA times,
July 24, 1975) Plans were announced to eliminate 3300 department positions.
California could not even afford to provide its 10% share of construction
costs on the federal interstate system. (LA times, 14-Sept-1975). It was
estimated that by 1978 or 1979 the department would not even be able to meet
its basic maintenance needs and its already obligated financial commitments.
The California Department of Transportation would weather the crisis, but
for practical purposes it abdicated its role in building new freeways. In
the future, it would be up to localities to raise their own money to build
new freeways.
In November 1975, the California Highway Commission approved an $843.5
million budget for the 1976-1977 budget year that included only $240 million
for new construction - the smallest new construction outlay since 1958. Only
$58.1 million was allocated for the huge Los Angeles region. (LA Times,
11-22-1975) There was a spate of official freeway cancellations in the Los
Angeles area in the period, including the Beverly Hills Freeway, the Slauson
Avenue Freeway (Route 90 Marina freeway), and the 57-Orange Freeway
extension to Huntington Beach (LA Times 05-23-1975). The halt of new
freeway construction in 1975 left numerous missing links, gaps, and unusable
sections of completed freeway. On September 14, 1975, the Los Angeles Times
reported on the uncertain future of Los Angeles freeways. 680 miles of the
planned 1540 mile freeway system had been completed, but it was
"increasingly doubtful that the system would ever get much beyond 700
miles." A Caltrans official stated: "This is it. There no longer is any
money. Sure, there will be a few more miles built, just to fill in the gaps,
but our freeway system is here..well, it's seen its heyday." For the most
part, the Caltrans official was correct. Los Angeles would recover from the
crisis and close most of the gaps in its freeway system over the following
years, and it even was able to build the embattled Interstate 105, now known
as the Century Freeway. But the era of new freeway construction in the
immediate Los Angeles area was over. Several areas of California would
launch their own programs in the 1980's, including Orange County, San Diego,
Riverside County, and, to a lesser extent, Santa Clara County. But Los
Angeles would focus its efforts on retrofitting an HOV system onto the
central emergency lanes of its existing freeways.
Scott M. Kozel
>
> Anyone familiar with that era is probably aware of the severe financial
> crisis that hit Caltrans and DOTs nationwide in the 1970's. There was really
> no chance that funding could be obtained for a cut-and-cover freeway. Here
> is an except from the text from the Houston Freeways book that I am working
> on, to provide a little background. This excerpt is from the chapter called
> "Crisis" (1970-1980)
>
That is true. Probably the main reason was the fact that the federal
fuel tax was not increased from its established level of 4 cents per
gallon in 1956, until 1982 when it was raised to 9 cents per gallon (8
cents for highways and 1 cent for mass transit). State fuel taxes rose
moderately in the same time period. Considerable economic inflation
occurred in that time period, gradually eroding the ability of those tax
levies to accomplish much road construction.
The federal fuel tax rose again in 1990 and in 1993, to its current
level of 18.4 cents per gallon of gasoline and 24.4 cents per gallon of
diesel, with 2 cents per gallon going to mass transit and the rest to
highways. Most states increased their state fuel taxes also.
While the mid- to late 1970s were tough times for DOTs all over the
country, the fuel tax increases starting in 1982 helped a lot. Also,
around the mid 1980s as the Interstate Highway System was nearing
completion, toll revenue bond financing, after having become uncommon
during the Interstate era, started being used to fund new toll roads
again in significant numbers.
So lots of highway construction has been accomplished pretty much all
over the U.S. since 1980.
--
Scott M. Kozel Highway and Transportation History Websites
Virginia/Maryland/Washington, D.C. http://www.roadstothefuture.com
Philadelphia and Delaware Valley http://www.pennways.com
Erik Slotboom
In fact, the section of the book from 1980 to the present is called "The
Second Wave". Houston had one of the nation's strongest second waves, with
its huge freeway expansion program and tollway construction program.
In Texas, the state fuel tax was still 5 cents in 1984, where it had stood
for 29 years in spite of massive inflation. It was increased by 5 cents in
1984, 1987, and 1993 to its present day value of 20 cents. So within 9
years, the Texas fuel tax was quadrupled. 75% of the proceeds from the fuel
tax is constitutionally allocated to the highway fund.
"Scott M. Kozel" <koz...@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:3D79963F...@attbi.com...
Don Hagstrom
here that the main problem in California besides the erosion in the value of
fuel taxes has been the negative attitude towards freeways and the car in
general in this state and the diversion of valuable monies to mass transit
and non-capacity increasing projects. Our priorities in this state--once
dedicated to building and infrastructure--are seriously misguided and are
costing our citizens more money and providing less infrastructure.
--
Don Hagstrom
Director, Friends of Southern California's Highways
www.fixtraffic.org
===
"Scott M. Kozel" <koz...@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:3D79963F...@attbi.com...
stéphane dumas
"Don Hagstrom" <d...@fixtraffic.org> a écrit dans le message news:
hxhe9.12964$LI2.9...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
> I mostly addressed this in a separate e-mail to Eric but suffice it to say
> here that the main problem in California besides the erosion in the value
of
> fuel taxes has been the negative attitude towards freeways and the car in
> general in this state and the diversion of valuable monies to mass transit
> and non-capacity increasing projects. Our priorities in this state--once
> dedicated to building and infrastructure--are seriously misguided and are
> costing our citizens more money and providing less infrastructure.
It's seems familiar to me, in Quebec we have high gas taxes since a while
and surprise the money isn't diverted to mass transit either (but recently
Quebec will have finally some roads projects like the long awaited 4-laning
(expresswaylization? freewaylization?) of PQ175 between Quebec city and
Saguenay
>
> --
> Don Hagstrom
> Director, Friends of Southern California's Highways
> www.fixtraffic.org
>
Stéphane Dumas
Scott M. Kozel
>
> Your observations are fully consistent with my book text. :-)
> In fact, the section of the book from 1980 to the present is called "The
> Second Wave". Houston had one of the nation's strongest second waves, with
> its huge freeway expansion program and tollway construction program.
>
> In Texas, the state fuel tax was still 5 cents in 1984, where it had stood
> for 29 years in spite of massive inflation. It was increased by 5 cents in
> 1984, 1987, and 1993 to its present day value of 20 cents. So within 9
> years, the Texas fuel tax was quadrupled. 75% of the proceeds from the fuel
> tax is constitutionally allocated to the highway fund.
Things slowed down in the 1970s here in Virginia and in Maryland, but
still there was a steady stream of FHWA funding for new Interstate
construction as well as for Interstate widening. Arterial, primary and
urban road programs got hit harder with cutbacks, but still a
significant amount was accomplished in that time period. There were
considerable road user tax increases at the state level in the 1980s,
and that in conjunction with the federal road user tax increases in the
same time period, provided for greatly expanded road construction
programs.
> "Scott M. Kozel" <koz...@attbi.com> wrote:
> > While the mid- to late 1970s were tough times for DOTs all over the
> > country, the fuel tax increases starting in 1982 helped a lot. Also,
> > around the mid 1980s as the Interstate Highway System was nearing
> > completion, toll revenue bond financing, after having become uncommon
> > during the Interstate era, started being used to fund new toll roads
> > again in significant numbers.
--
Robert Cruickshank
[snip]
> Shared Company - the mighty succumb
>
> The funding crisis was a nationwide phenomenon and no states were spared.
> The mightiest freeway construction machine that the world has ever known,
> the California Highway department of the 1960's, was decimated by funding
> issues and a changing political climate. In an ironic twist of fate,
> Governor Jerry Brown entered office in January 1975 and set out to dismantle
> the world-leading highway construction program that his father, Governor Pat
> Brown, had built during his years in office between 1959 and 1967. In
> response to "critical financial problems" in July 1975, the California
> Department of Transportation placed a freeze on all new highway construction
> and halted nearly all land acquisition for freeway right-of-way.
These "critical financial problems" stemmed in part from Governor
Brown's fiscal austerity program that he enacted upon taking office in
1975. State spending levels were frozen across the board...but not
necessarily because of shortfalls in tax revenues. Indeed, between
1975 and 1978, the state regularly ran surpluses of over a billion
dollars. Brown's spending freezes along with inflation forced local
governments to raise property taxes to fund programs, and when
homeowners looked at their rising tax bills and then looked at the
huge surplus sitting in Sacramento, they revolted and produced
Proposition 13, which then created a very real cash crunch in the
state government.
I need to do a lot more work on exactly what was going on here.
Certainly the mid-'70s were a time of severe recession, but it also
seems that Governor Brown did not exactly have to make the cuts he
did. No matter what the reasoning, you are absolutely correct that
after 1975 the California freeway system was never the same.
--
Robert I. Cruickshank
roadgeek, historian, progressive
arga...@my-deja.com
> Shared Company - the mighty succumb
>
> The funding crisis was a nationwide phenomenon and no states were spared.
> The mightiest freeway construction machine that the world has ever known,
> the California Highway department of the 1960's, was decimated by funding
> issues and a changing political climate.
In fact the crisis was experienced internationally, even in countries
where highways were not funded by hypothecated fuel taxes and so were
notionally safe from dips in fuel tax revenue. However, the response
was generally not one of pumping new money into the system by raising
fuel taxes and allowing toll road proposals to go forward, so much as
one of privatizing government agencies in order to achieve (notional)
reductions in the real overhead costs associated with operating trunk
road networks.
In Britain, where motorways were constructed on the strength of a
guaranteed obligation which rose almost without interruption through
the late 1950's and 1960's, the 1973 oil shock hit a year after the
motorway network reached the 1,000-mile mark. The resulting
stagflation and economic crisis, besides forcing the I.M.F. to bail
out Britain in 1975, led to a series of cuts on trunk road spending
between 1973 and 1976. Some of the money thus saved was reallocated
to housing, in accordance with the more socially focused priorities of
the then Department of the Environment.
Motorways were seriously affected, with nearly all unbuilt motorways
within the M25 London orbital eventually being cancelled, and other
projects (such as the M11 through Epping Forest, M3 near Winchester,
and M40 through Ot Moor) being delayed. This left the Department of
the Environment with a large personnel infrastructure (and associated
overhead costs) for designing and constructing motorways, the Road
Construction Units, and almost no motorways left to build. Under
these circumstances, it was logical to eliminate the huge fixed costs
associated with in-house design personnel and to rely on a floating
supply of expertise--i.e. consulting firms--to design and build
motorways as and when required. Thus, in 1975, the ruling
Conservative party (then led by Ted Heath) sold off the Road
Construction Units to the major consulting firms in one of their
so-called "first-wave" privatizations.
The general idea was that although privatization might tend to raise
the running costs associated with an individual project, the
consultants would be free to get design work anywhere in the
English-speaking world when activity came to a standstill in Britain,
and so the elimination of overhead costs (by spreading them among
Britain's former colonies) would more than compensate for the
consultants' higher recurrent costs relative to in-house design staff.
This system has resulted in British consulting engineers designing
projects in Texas. To cite two recent examples, the Loop 20 connector
in Laredo and the Tex. 45/Loop 1 interchange (the latter advertised by
Tx.D.O.T. for this upcoming October) were both designed by Brown &
Root, a well-known British consulting firm. Meanwhile, Sinclair
Knight Merz has been active in preparing both in the Central Scotland
Transport Corridor Study (due to submit its final report later this
year on improvements to the M8, M74, and A80 between Edinburgh and
Glasgow) and the Sydney (Australia) harbor tunnel E.I.S.
It is questionable whether privatization has produced actual
economies. It is possible, I.M.O., that the cost savings were erased
by the removal of incentives to contain costs--an unintended
consequence of the inevitable restructuring of agency relationships
associated with privatization. In Britain, the assignment of design
responsibilities to consulting firms has coincided with the increasing
prevalence of project study rather than design and construction. This
suggests, though it certainly does not prove, that consulting firms
deliberately exaggerate the ambiguity of study data in order to
continue billing additional work. The increase in demand for
environmental documentation on major road projects has been
effectively universal throughout the English-speaking world.
In the event, the Tories lost the 1976 election and Margaret Thatcher
replaced Ted Heath as party leader. (The two subsequently never spoke
to each other for about twenty-four years.) The Tories won the next
election, in 1979, and by 1983 Britain's financial position was secure
enough for Mrs. Thatcher to pursue an aggressively pro-road transport
policy. By this time the Department of Transport had been hived off
the old Department of the Environment, but still had almost no
in-house design personnel left. This led to the D.B.F.O.
(design-build-finance-operate) motorway, where consultants were hired
not just to design, but also to oversee the design and construction,
of new motorways.
Many of the motorways constructed as part of the Thatcher and Major
governments' Roads for Prosperity programs were, in fact, D.B.F.O.
motorways. The M40, constructed 1988-91 in about seven separate
contracts between the A40 (Oxford) and A46 (Stratford to Warwick)
roads after conclusion of a contentious public inquiry, is one
example. Another was the M11 through Epping Forest, built 1991;
design and construction was overseen by W.S. Atkins, which has
recently (2002) been given a new contract for settling compensation
claims brought against the government by propertyholders along the
route. ('Private Eye' claims that some of the problems requiring
compensation were caused by W.S. Atkins itself.)
D.B.F.O. trunk roads and motorways used to be recognized by
nonprescribed traffic signs, to Diagrams 7004-7006, which are posted
after major interchanges on roads so maintained. The legend typically
reads "M40/Maintained by/UK Highways/for/[Highways Agency logo]."
This signing has been discontinued, however.
Erik Slotboom
<arga...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:485ebc3b.02091...@posting.google.com...
> [Mr. Slotboom:]
>
>
> This system has resulted in British consulting engineers designing
> projects in Texas. To cite two recent examples, the Loop 20 connector
> in Laredo and the Tex. 45/Loop 1 interchange (the latter advertised by
> Tx.D.O.T. for this upcoming October) were both designed by Brown &
> Root, a well-known British consulting firm.
I don't think Brown and Root is (or ever was) a British firm. One of the
founders, George R. Brown, was a very prominent Houston and now has numerous
facilities in Houston named after him, including the George R Brown
convention center. Brown and Root is now owned by Halliburton, the
Texas-based oil services giant.
http://www.eh.net/bookreviews/library/0150.shtml
Balfour Beatty, which as far as I know is a British firm, has done a lot of
construction work for the Harris County Toll Road Authority in recent years.
You're definitely right that environmental consulting work is a large
industry. I don't have figures, but there are numerous "major investment
studies" underway in Texas at any given time and I'm sure TxDOT is dishing
out tens of millions of dollars per year for the consulting firms. In
Houston, both national and local consulting firms get pieces of the pie.
arga...@my-deja.com
> > This system has resulted in British consulting engineers designing
> > projects in Texas. To cite two recent examples, the Loop 20 connector
> > in Laredo and the Tex. 45/Loop 1 interchange (the latter advertised by
> > Tx.D.O.T. for this upcoming October) were both designed by Brown &
> > Root, a well-known British consulting firm.
>
> I don't think Brown and Root is (or ever was) a British firm. One of the
> founders, George R. Brown, was a very prominent Houston and now has numerous
> facilities in Houston named after him, including the George R Brown
> convention center. Brown and Root is now owned by Halliburton, the
> Texas-based oil services giant.
Thank you for the U.R.L. and for setting me straight. I had assumed
(incorrectly, it turns out) that Brown & Root were native British
because they had a number of the first contracts for motorway
construction, in the same crowd of native firms including Sir Alfred
MacAlpine, Mott McDonald, etc. But I should have double-checked
because American transportation consultancies have worked in Britain
from the very beginning--for instance, Birmingham's thoroughfare plan
was drawn up by Wilbur Smith & Associates (out of Hartford, Conn.).
> Balfour Beatty, which as far as I know is a British firm, has done a lot of
> construction work for the Harris County Toll Road Authority in recent years.
I'm pretty sure they are native British. In Britain itself they are
known mainly for their work on the national railway system, where they
are subcontractors to Railtrack. But they received a considerable
amount of press attention two years ago when they were being
investigated by our F.B.I. for bribery in connection with Amtrak's
Northeast Corridor project, where they were one of the major
contractors. Several principals of the company, I.I.R.C., were
subsequently prosecuted. It was around this time that the government
(in keeping with its subsequently abandoned, but then much touted,
"ethical foreign policy") proposed to make it an offence, triable in
British courts, for British companies to bribe foreign governments
when seeking business.
Balfour Beatty is also the lead partner in a consortium which wishes
to build the Ilisu dam in Turkey. This project has been widely
decried because it calls for flooding villages (many of them historic,
and dating back to A.D. 100) in a largely Kurdish part of southeastern
Turkey. The river involved is also a tributary of the Tigris, and so
the dam has the potential to initiate a conflict between Turkey and
Syria over water rights. In fact Turkey asked Syria in 1982 if it
could build the dam, and Syria refused to agree, which the Turks (who
are eager to build this project) have apparently now chosen to
interpret as failure to disagree.
Turkey's credit, however, is so shaky it can't build this major
infrastructure project without financial backing from Britain--in the
shape of an export credit guarantee where the British government
serves as a lender of last resort and makes sure Balfour Beatty and
its partners get paid for building the Ilisu if the Turkish government
defaults. So now anti-dam campaigners in Britain are focusing on
abolition of the E.C.G. program, thinking that this will by itself
cause the Ilisu dam to be abandoned (and produce other desirable
results, such as preventing British credit from being put behind arms
merchants).
> You're definitely right that environmental consulting work is a large
> industry. I don't have figures, but there are numerous "major investment
> studies" underway in Texas at any given time and I'm sure TxDOT is dishing
> out tens of millions of dollars per year for the consulting firms. In
> Houston, both national and local consulting firms get pieces of the pie.
In Britain, the Integrated Transport White Paper (released 1998, and
still available--though only in HTML format--on the D.F.T. website)
adds a new step to the process for planning major road and rail
infrastructure projects. A major road project, such as the recently
proposed M6 widening through Cheshire/Lancashire, can now emerge from
a "multimodal study."
These are roughly similar to American major investment studies, but
are area-wide rather than corridor-wide in scope, and there are novel
and explicit requirements for consideration of infrastructure projects
across all modes--foot, cycle, rail, road, etc.--and require
consideration of all infrastructure projects in the study area, not
just within a study corridor, and also traffic movements in, out, and
everywhere within the study area. Various use pricing strategies also
have to be considered; for instance, road widening can't be proposed
unless the study considers the possible effects of road tolls. This
means guessing elasticity of travel demand with respect to cost,
travel time, and travel time reliability--all objects of recent D.F.T.
research projects which are taking place concurrently with about 20
multimodal studies in different parts of the country--as well as
telecommuting.
The amount of modelling work involved in this is formidable and
(I.M.O.) may outpace the ability of steering groups to supervise it
effectively. Also, there is a considerable amount of guesswork
involved since the potential impacts of telecommuting, travel time
reliability, etc. are currently very poorly understood. What is
unambiguously clear is that these studies hold up previously planned
infrastructure projects (in the I.T.W.P. and its daughter document, 'A
New Deal for Trunk Roads', multimodal studies have often been
substituted for widening and other capacity-increasing projects which
the Highways Agency was programming for public inquiries and,
eventually, design and construction--M4 widening around Heathrow
Airport being one example), and are making the transport consultancies
very wealthy.
Some examples of multimodal studies (just off the top of my head):
--looks at alternatives to widening the congested A453 around
Nottingham
--the Scottish equivalent to the typical English M.M.S. (operates
under the Scottish Executive's own transport appraisal manual).