>They claim, on the one hand, that they want to attract business fliers,
>but then they drop service to FRA, the premier business destination on the
>continent, and they drastically scale back operations out of JFK; sorry,
>but New York will still be far more important to business travellers than
>STL. They inexplicably drop JFK-TLV routes, often booked solid months in
>advance, to Tower Air and El Al. Nor are business travellers going to be
Jeeeeez.....
I don't know how many times I have had to say this, but please do not post
lies. I understand you may have read this from a previous poster, but TWA
did *not* drop service to TLV from JFK. They did drop JFK-ATH, which they
are planning to serve again as a codeshare with Olympic. But TLV is definitely
still on their schedule.
>enthusiastic about 757's across the Atlantic, which are still pretty rare
>among scheduled carriers. Nor does TWA seem to recognize the importance
>of getting even a toehold in Asia.
As if they haven't tried. They've filed applications numerous times to get
service to Tokyo and Osaka, but have been denied every time. Just because
they aren't there now doesn't mean that they aren't trying...
>TWA still had one important niche to itself: it was the premiere U.S.
>carrier to the Middle East. The code-share with RJ gave this niche
>additional credibility, but then they shot themselves in the foot by
>abandoning JFK-TLV (and ATH, to a lesser extent). And in any case, the
>Middle East is not a large enough market for TWA to subsist on.
They did NOT abandon JFK-TLV. Check any reservation agent if you wish. They
have TLV on their schedules all the way until 12/30/97, when they are
scheduled to change flight times, but *NOT* cease flying there. So that means
that they serve Tel Aviv, Riyadh, and Cairo, with Amman coming back on soon,
and Amsterdam with it.
--
******************************************************************************
Bob Webbink bweb...@cco.caltech.edu
California Institute of Technology bweb...@ugcs.caltech.edu
*****************************************************************************
Chris, not sure where you are getting your information???
TWA pulling out of TLV? I haven't seen any official announcements, and
the schedules still show daily 747 service from JFK to TLV as far in the
future as I can go. I know they have even contemplated the strategy to do
a STL-TLV routing at some point as well....
Getting out of FRA was probably a good move at this point. It is severely
overserved from the east coast (UA and LH), and there is plenty of service
from the west coast (LH and NZ, probably more).
I am not sure a 757 from JFK to LIS is terribly different than taking the
sardine express that UA does from IAD to SEA, with definitely less legroom
than even the new shorter pitch on TWA.
As for Asia, TWA has repeatedly indicated they want the STL-Narita
routing. They may yet get this with the defining problem of the US-Japan
talks being onward freedoms, and TWA isn't talking about that. (I don't
think any entry into Asia is credible without Tokyo bound traffic.)
As for credible European partners, they have probably missed an
opportunity, but at the same rate, those things can come back to haunt
you, such as KLM's current money troubles....
: TWA still had one important niche to itself: it was the premiere U.S.
: carrier to the Middle East. The code-share with RJ gave this niche
: additional credibility, but then they shot themselves in the foot by
: abandoning JFK-TLV (and ATH, to a lesser extent). And in any case, the
: Middle East is not a large enough market for TWA to subsist on.
Still wondering where you heard of them abandoning TLV?
: On the other hand, they aren't doing much to appeal to leisure travellers
: either. Pulling out of ATH and scaling back service to Spain and Lisbon,
: the popular southern European destinations, won't keep the leisure
: travellers rolling in.
But they enhanced their service to the Iberian Pen. They now have daily
service to Lisbon and Mardrid, and 6 days a week non-stop service to BCN,
with daily 1 stop service in the winter. Pulling out of ATH was a wise
move as they were competing against a subsidized carrier, and almost
everyone was on a discount ticket. It probably made sense when they had
the Paris hub and did internal European flights, but I doubt the yield
makes much sense. Anyhow, they said there is strong intent to do a code
sharing with Olympic in the near future.....
Cheers,
--
Christopher M. Keane ke...@jei.umd.edu
Joint Education Initiative ke...@glue.umd.edu
Department of Geology
University of Maryland at College Park
>In article <5mkmbp$9...@gap.cco.caltech.edu>,
>Bob Webbink <bweb...@ugcs.caltech.edu> wrote:
>>Maybe this will get some naysayers to see them as a new improved
>>airline....
>I am sorry, but I am a long-time TWA flier, and I think that after TW800
>the airline has been running around like a chicken with its head cut off.
>They seem to have no clue what their strategy is.
Actually, I think it's just the other way around. Before TWA800, they were
busy having a *horrible* time with thier strategy. They tried to increase
747 flying, which made very little sense and they managed to produce an
almost unflyable schedule. Even without TWA800, TWA was busy ticking off
people who flew them left and right. The STL hub wasn't working very well
last summer, and in the long run that was unsupportable. Even with the
problems at STL, it made money in
1996. But.. JFK lost money. All the money that STL made and then
some. That's a cold hard business fact TWA had to face. Frankly
although I was impressed by a lot of what Erikson did at TWA,
the money that poured out of JFK in 1996 (even pre 800) implies that
he missed the boat on that one. TWA needs to stop losing money. If they
shut down JFK cold and flew only the STL hub, they would have probably
made more money than they did. They would also surrender any claim
to be a national airline, and hurt themselves for future growth for
some time.
>They claim, on the one hand, that they want to attract business fliers,
>but then they drop service to FRA, the premier business destination on the
>continent, and they drastically scale back operations out of JFK; sorry,
JFK was (and to an extent still is) a real conundrum for JFK. The pre
de-regulation model for flying to Europe was get to JFK, board a 747, fly
to your destination. TWA had a decent business doing that, Pan Am had a
decent business doing that. With the rise of 767s, and hubs like ORD and
DFW, with 767 service to major European cities. (And code shares galore)
it's harder and harder to fill that
747. TWA was flying people to JFK at a loss to fill seats in 747s.
That's bad.
The right answer, (And what DL has been doing at JFK over the past few
years) is to fly 767 class planes, largely with O+D traffic from NYC,
along with small amounts of feed from sensibly chosen cities which get
better connections via JFK than other cities. Combine this with transcon
flying and you've got a reasonable answer.
This is what TWA is doing. The only problem is that they don't have enough
right size equipment. (read 767s) TWA's got 14. They missed on getting six
more this spring (outbid) and the direct upshot of that was FRA staying
off the schedule, and CDG-BOS staying off for the summer as well.
Once they get some more 767s I doubt that they they will stay out of FRA
for long, but if they were looking to free up a 767 (and they were) it was
an obvious European station to drop. Delta and AA are having trouble at
FRA as well. The UA/LH deal makes it very hard to compete for the high
yield customers who fly to FRA a lot.
Oh, and by the way, in terms of load, yield and prestige, the destination
in Europe that matters is still LHR. FRA is bigger and more important than
it's been in the past, but it's got a long way to go before it eclipses
LHR.
TWA's also already moving some service back into JFK, like the SEA-JFK
non-stop. And they've added seats JFK-SFO (A morning 757, which
complements the nightly 767, providing an afternoon return from SFO as
well, something TWA's really needed in the SFO market) What's vanishing
are the one a day hops to provide feed for the 747s. (The flights that
arrived at the peak of JFK's inbound traffic nightmare and left in the
peak of the outbound traffic jam) If the people I saw on most of those
flights were any indication, they were low yeild folks connecting to the
747s, not business travellers on the way from Topeka.
>but New York will still be far more important to business travellers than
>STL. They inexplicably drop JFK-TLV routes, often booked solid months in
Ah. Wrong information here. TWA's still flying JFK-TLV. They dropped the
JFK-ATH route, claiming it wasn't profitable. The more accurate read would
be not profitable on the equipment mix TWA currently has available. (It
probably would be fine on a 767-300ER, but TWA doesn't have spare 767s at
this point.)
>advance, to Tower Air and El Al. Nor are business travellers going to be
>enthusiastic about 757's across the Atlantic, which are still pretty rare
>among scheduled carriers. Nor does TWA seem to recognize the importance
>of getting even a toehold in Asia.
TWA knows they need to get to Asia. They have a request into DOT for
routes from both JFK and STL to NRT (and KIX) But... The US-Japan
Bilateral is a mess. A real mess. Until that gets fixed, Japan isn't about
to offer up STL-NRT and JFK-NRT to TWA just to make TWA happy.
>Worse, they have completely dropped the ball on finding a credible
>European partner. This move is essential in a world of AA+BA, NW+KL, and
>UA+LH. They should have been courting AF or IB as aggressively as
>possible -- and they had a lot to offer a potential European partner back
>when they had significant domestic feed at JFK. Now that chief selling
>point is gone, AF has hooked up with CO, and IB with BA.
>TWA still had one important niche to itself: it was the premiere U.S.
>carrier to the Middle East. The code-share with RJ gave this niche
>additional credibility, but then they shot themselves in the foot by
>abandoning JFK-TLV (and ATH, to a lesser extent). And in any case, the
>Middle East is not a large enough market for TWA to subsist on.
>On the other hand, they aren't doing much to appeal to leisure travellers
>either. Pulling out of ATH and scaling back service to Spain and Lisbon,
>the popular southern European destinations, won't keep the leisure
>travellers rolling in.
They aren't cutting back on Spain and Lisbon. They will fly STL-MAD next
year, and they are flying JFK-BCN,LIS and MAD daily this summer. They have
a real juggle on the equipment front, but that should sort itself out by
next summer. They also don't really want the leisure customer per se.
They need better yields. No airline has ever made money by flying more
people at lower yields for long. If TWA had made mere industry average
yield in 1996, they would have made money. Filling the back of the bus
with leisure folks doesn't work unless you get some folks paying full
coach up front.
>Personally, I'll still fly TWA if need be, and I do agree their service
>has improved drastically (although I am not wild about the elimination of
>Comfort Class); but I am cashing in the miles in case they aren't around
>much longer, and after they pulled out of FRA, I have little reason to
>turn to TWA first; I'm probably going to switch to UA+LH, or CO.
I think TWA's got it's work cut out for it, and I think they are being
sensible. First thing, fix the basic airline. Make money, year-round, and
make it in all your operations. Fly on time. Fly clean airplanes.
Complete the schedule. Whether we NY based folks like it or not, that
means that TWA's going to focus on STL until it can get the planes to fix
JFK and make money flying out of JFK.
The other thing I'd like to see TWA realize is that they can serve the NYC
business traveller from LGA and EWR as well as JFK. The only LGA
destination besides STL is PBI. I think that there are markets TWA should
fly in that don't need to be out of JFK, and not on a schedule to feed
Europe. (AM outbound non-stops to business markets from LGA or EWR, with
evening returns, for one day easy business trips) If TWA can scare up five
or six MD-80s, this might be a real way to make TWA a more attractive
airline to NY business folks. But... That's once they have an airline that
business people will pay to fly. That's got to be the key focus.
Yield = $$ = New Equipment = viable airline. I think that's the equation
TWA management is following. It does mean building up STL, it does mean
flying on time.
>We fought long and hard with management for FRA, but guess who won...
Well, that's good to know, but I still don't have any reason to fly TWA
without a way to get to FRA and on to Russia. And for that matter, why
won't TWA even think about re-starting Moscow service, since it has the
authority to do so? Allegedly the service was unprofitable during the few
months TWA served SVO back in 1991. But everything has changed since
then. CO is going to start nonstop EWR-SVO service soon, with a D-10;
Baltia, a Russian-American airline, serves St. Petersburg from JFK. The
European carriers are currently filling the bulk of the market in between
Russia and the USA, just as they do between India and the USA.
Also, perhaps management had good reason for eliminating FRA; LH retooled
all their connections so that connecting through Frankfurt would be much
easier for North American passengers.
--
Chris Stone * cbs...@princeton.edu * http://www.princeton.edu/~cbstone
"Isolationism must become a thing of the past." -Harry Truman
>Chris, not sure where you are getting your information??? TWA pulling
>out of TLV?
As I said earlier, there was discussion of this on the AIRLINE list. I
thought there was discussion on this newsgroup as well, but I may not be
remembering correctly.
>Getting out of FRA was probably a good move at this point. It is severely
>overserved from the east coast (UA and LH), and there is plenty of service
>from the west coast (LH and NZ, probably more).
I am skeptical, simply on the grounds that after leaving FRA, they have
only one credible European destination: CDG, and *maybe* Rome as well.
You say that Asian service isn't feasible without Tokyo; I would counter
that European service isn't feasible without Frankfurt or LHR (or possibly
Amsterdam). Also, Tokyo is "overserved" from the West Coast and ORD;
would you advocate that, say, NW withdraw from Tokyo?
You also go on to say that "pulling out of ATH made sense, since they were
competing against a subsidizied carrier." Again, however, airlines have
to fly somewhere. If it makes sense for TWA to pull out of every major
city in the European continent, can we really call TWA a viable carrier?
>I am not sure a 757 from JFK to LIS is terribly different than taking the
>sardine express that UA does from IAD to SEA, with definitely less legroom
>than even the new shorter pitch on TWA.
Yes, but again, psychologically people think about international service
in a different way than domestic service; remember the LH ads about "why
flying to Munich is different than flying to Muncie" a few years ago?
>As for Asia, TWA has repeatedly indicated they want the STL-Narita
>routing. They may yet get this with the defining problem of the US-Japan
>talks being onward freedoms, and TWA isn't talking about that. (I don't
>think any entry into Asia is credible without Tokyo bound traffic.)
I think that Seoul might be credible, and perhaps the PRC/ROC as well.
Additionally, what about Indonesia? Indonesia is going to be a
phenomenally big market in the coming decades; it's underserved by U.S.
carriers, and could potentially be a huge growth route.
>...although I was impressed by a lot of what Erikson did at TWA,
>the money that poured out of JFK in 1996 (even pre 800) implies that
>he missed the boat on that one. TWA needs to stop losing money. If they
>shut down JFK cold and flew only the STL hub, they would have probably
>made more money than they did. They would also surrender any claim
>to be a national airline, and hurt themselves for future growth for
>some time.
See, I guess this is my fundamental problem with TWA. I think they have
already surrendered any claim to be an international airline, and that
they are precariously close to surrendering any claim to be a national
airline. Internationally, they have zero presence in Asia and Latin
America, perhaps the two most important markets. They have a paltry
presence in Europe, and without the JFK hub, no prospect for finding a
European partner. The sole region they dominate, the Middle East, is an
insignificant one.
This said, then, why not pull out of JFK altogether? As you point out,
they are obsessed with their status, and they think that a facade at JFK
lends them some legitimacy domestically. Problem is, people will see
through that facade. Perhaps TWA ought to drop international service
entirely, and concentrate on domestic service.
>JFK was (and to an extent still is) a real conundrum for JFK. The pre
>de-regulation model for flying to Europe was get to JFK, board a 747, fly
>to your destination. TWA had a decent business doing that, Pan Am had a
>decent business doing that. With the rise of 767s, and hubs like ORD and
>DFW, with 767 service to major European cities. (And code shares galore)
>it's harder and harder to fill that 747.
Counterpoint: BA, LH, and KL, which all have 747 service not only to JFK,
but to other American gateways as well. This is a difficult phenomenon to
explain. Now, as much as I like 747's, I am not suggesting that TWA
should start imitiating these European carriers and fly 747's
transatlantic. But my point is that if TWA can't even fill a *767* to a
major destination like Frankfurt, something is seriously wrong.
>This is what TWA is doing. The only problem is that they don't have enough
>right size equipment. (read 767s) TWA's got 14. They missed on getting six
>more this spring (outbid) and the direct upshot of that was FRA staying
>off the schedule... Once they get some more 767s I doubt that they will
stay out of FRA for long, but if they were looking to free up a 767 (and
they were) it was an obvious European station to drop.
...I thought the reason for dropping FRA was that LH-UA had retooled its
scheduling, making FRA much more convenient for North American travellers
to use as a hub. (I actually have some factual reasons for thinking this
way; it's not merely an educated guess.) I do agree that TWA is short of
767's, however.
Even assuming that the whole reason for dropping FRA was to free up a 767,
was FRA really the "obvious" station to drop? I suspect that many regular
travellers to Frankfurt -- and again, these are business travellers, who
crave reliability -- will now flock to other airline, and TWA will not win
them back even if they restart service to FRA. TWA has lost these folks
for good. Perhaps I am imposing my own personal travel habits onto pax as
a whole; I don't know. Time will tell. I'm not optimistic.
>The UA/LH deal makes it very hard to compete for the high
>yield customers who fly to FRA a lot.
But this is exactly my point! TWA has little future as an international
carrier, precisely because it has no prospects for a mega-alliance, and
the existing mega-alliances have crowded it out of the North Atlantic
market. Now, why should frequent travellers put their eggs in TWA's
basket knowing that the airline faces such difficulties?
>Oh, and by the way, in terms of load, yield and prestige, the destination
>in Europe that matters is still LHR. FRA is bigger and more important than
>it's been in the past, but it's got a long way to go before it eclipses
>LHR.
I agree with this point entirely, but last time I checked, LHR isn't on
TWA's route map either. :) Neither is AMS, and TWA's service into CDG is
faltering. Substantive service to at least some of these stations is
essential for a serious player in the North Atlantic market.
>TWA knows they need to get to Asia. They have a request into DOT for
>routes from both JFK and STL to NRT (and KIX) But... The US-Japan
>Bilateral is a mess. A real mess. Until that gets fixed, Japan isn't about
>to offer up STL-NRT and JFK-NRT to TWA just to make TWA happy.
Again, there is more to Asia than Japan; I agree Japan would be optimal,
but until that time, they ought to find other destinations. At least
after they withdrew from LHR, they maintained service to LGW, no?
Furthermore, TWA has no service to Latin America, either, and no service
to the two most important European destinations, LHR and FRA. I would
really like to see this airline succeed, but how long should one stay on a
sinking ship?
>They aren't cutting back on Spain and Lisbon. They will fly STL-MAD next
>year, and they are flying JFK-BCN,LIS and MAD daily this summer. They have
>a real juggle on the equipment front, but that should sort itself out by
>next summer. They also don't really want the leisure customer per se.
>They need better yields. No airline has ever made money by flying more
>people at lower yields for long.
Agreed; but if TWA isn't aiming for the leisure traveller, re-starting FRA
service should be a greater priority than STL-MAD. This is exactly what I
mean when I say that TWA is running around like a chicken with its head
cut off; they say they have a given strategy in mind, but seemingly do
nothing to implement it.
>Ultimately, I think my points boil down to this. TWA's international
>service is emasculated -- and despite my mistake on the JFK-TLV issue --
>the situation is getting worse, not better. TWA is retrenching its
>international network. Giving up FRA isn't quite the same blunder that
>giving up LHR was, but it's close.
While it is fashionable to suggest that TWA's departure from LHR was a
blunder, I suspect that this is simple revisionist thinking!
First, let's just remember that TWA's pullout from FRA had no quid pro quo,
while leaving LHR got them something like $300M, so the two events are
wildly different in scope.
Second, and more important, is the fact that WHEN TWA sold their LHR access
(to AA), their LHR operations were not as desirable a property as AA has
created. The fact is that TWA was NOT a preferred carrier, and that unless
they could improve their service levels dramatically, they could not compete
with BA for the highly profitable business market. With their lack of cash,
it was unlikely that TWA *could* improve their service, so perhaps the best
thing was for them to sell the assets before LHR became a (relative) drain
on the system.
What I see as the core problem is that the company didn't invest the
resources they gained by the sale in more profitable routes (e.g. South
America).
>Chris Stone * cbs...@princeton.edu * http://www.princeton.edu/~cbstone
Malc.
I'll throw in a counter-counter-point: While I agree that European
carriers tend to use many more 747's to North America that North
American carriers do, it does seem that they are also slowly moving to
smaller planes. BA already operates DC-10's and 767's almost
exclusively from Gatwick to their smaller and medium-sized U.S.
gateways. They are also slowly adding 777's to select trans-Atlantic
routes.
IMO, there are two reasons why 747's are being replaced more slowly by
Europeans than Americans have:
(1) U.S. airlines have much higher cost-cutting pressures on them. It
is no surprise that not only do U.S. airlines use smaller, more
efficient planes on flights to Europe, but their overall service is not
up to the standards the BA's, LH's, SR's, KL's, etc. of the world
currently.
(2) European carriers can offer multitudes of onward connections from
their hubs to places like South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East,
Africa, etc., which means they can still fill up bigger planes. For
example, a person flying on United from Chicago to London is likely to
be staying in London, or perhaps connecting onto nearby British and
northwest Euroepan airports. Thus, a 767 or 777 can suffice. OTOH, a
British Airways flight from Chicago to London will likely have more
people who are connecting to a wider variety of destinations, such as
India, Kenya, South Africa, Dubai, etc. So, BA can therefore easily
fill a 747-200, for example.
This is based on my own experience, opinions, and anecdotes, so if
anyone has harder evidence to support or refute these claims, please do
let me/us know.
As far as TWA and FRA goes, I couldn't agree more. It's already been
pointed out that TWA can't use FRA as a hub (rather than as a spoke as
they did before) because they have been out-code-shared and
out-allianced out of the market.
> Even assuming that the whole reason for dropping FRA was to free up a 767,
> was FRA really the "obvious" station to drop? I suspect that many regular
> travellers to Frankfurt -- and again, these are business travellers, who
> crave reliability -- will now flock to other airline, and TWA will not win
> them back even if they restart service to FRA. TWA has lost these folks
> for good. Perhaps I am imposing my own personal travel habits onto pax as
> a whole; I don't know. Time will tell. I'm not optimistic.
Yes; while TWA obviously couldn't use FRA as a hub, they could've at
least kept it as a high-yield business destination. Business
travellers, especially ones flying to Europe and other international
destinations, have more and more reasons to stay loyal to TWA because of
the routes they've chosen to slash.
> Again, there is more to Asia than Japan; I agree Japan would be optimal,
> but until that time, they ought to find other destinations. At least
> after they withdrew from LHR, they maintained service to LGW, no?
For example, TWA could try to go after SEL, HKG (but it's very crowded
too), TPE, BKK, SIN, KUL, and MNL. A few minor alliances could be worked
out here, such as with EVA, Malaysian, Cathay, or Philippines. However,
the best they could probably do is similar to the limited Asian services
that Delta has out of PDX/LAX or American. Competing with UA and NW, with
their massive cash cow fifth-freedom flight out NRT, would be difficult at
best. Besides, TWA's cabin services are no match whatsoever at this point
with the current batch of services on Asian routes.
As far as LGW, yes: TWA flies a daily 767 flight between STL and LGW,
but that's all the London service they have.
> >They aren't cutting back on Spain and Lisbon. They will fly STL-MAD next
> >year, and they are flying JFK-BCN,LIS and MAD daily this summer. They have
> >a real juggle on the equipment front, but that should sort itself out by
> >next summer. They also don't really want the leisure customer per se.
> >They need better yields. No airline has ever made money by flying more
> >people at lower yields for long.
> Agreed; but if TWA isn't aiming for the leisure traveller, re-starting FRA
> service should be a greater priority than STL-MAD. This is exactly what I
> mean when I say that TWA is running around like a chicken with its head
> cut off; they say they have a given strategy in mind, but seemingly do
> nothing to implement it.
I also can't understand why TWA is dropping a potential high-yield
business route to FRA, but keeping flights to BCN, LIS, MAD, ROM, etc.
Their services to Europe seem to be very heavy on flights to Southern
Europe, which IMO are much more tourist-oriented than airports like LHR,
FRA, AMS, ZRH, CDG, etc. Alliance possibilities at these southern
European airports are poor because they are home to sick, state-owned,
and massively bureacratic carriers like Iberia, TAP, and Alitalia.
Overall, this gives TWA an almost charter-like image, which does not
bode well for their international prospects in the future.
Mihir
________________________________________________
Mihir P. Shah Email: mis...@vt.edu
244 Old Cedarfield Drive WWW: (coming soon)
Blacksburg, VA 24060 Phone: (540) 961-7869
> Also, perhaps management had good reason for eliminating FRA; LH retooled
> all their connections so that connecting through Frankfurt would be much
> easier for North American passengers.
Have you heard about the STAR alliance with a Frankfurt european hub
????
Seems many non-STAR airlines dropped their routes to FRA. Perhaps they
kn wit is pointless to fly there because STAR will eventually be so
powerful on those routes. But airlines sxuch as Air Canada and United
will still keep operations at London because it is also a strategic
location. (even thought it is ruled by BA).
There have been arguments made that TWA could fill a 767 to Frankfurt, but
chose to drop the city rather than another they serve. The decision to
use 767s, not 747s, is a move they HAD to make. They could fill 747s to
Athens, but still lose boatloads of money because they were low yielding
passengers.
By using 767s, TWA could sell fewer seats at a higher yield and make
money. The only problem is they don't have enough 767s currently to serve
all of their trans-atlantic markets. What do you do then? Fly a 747 and
lose money? No, drop the cities which lose money or make the least until
you can find more aircraft to fly the routes profitably.
Remember, TWA's biggest goal right now isn't what is the best decision for
us to make now to help us out five years from now. Their goal is what is
the best decision for us to make in order to help us be in existance this
time next year.
Greg
Greg
> I am skeptical, simply on the grounds that after leaving FRA, they have
> only one credible European destination: CDG, and *maybe* Rome as well.
> You say that Asian service isn't feasible without Tokyo; I would counter
> that European service isn't feasible without Frankfurt or LHR (or
> possibly Amsterdam). Also, Tokyo is "overserved" from the West Coast
> and ORD; would you advocate that, say, NW withdraw from Tokyo?
I too see that TWA seems to be pulling out of European marketrs they
should be staying in, while remaining in the wrong ones. Their European
service now seems centered on CDG, LIS, MAD, BCN, and ROM. With the
possible exception of CDG, all of these cities are more tourist-oriented
than cities like London, Frankfurt, and Amsterdam. All of these cities
are also home to hopelessly bureaucratic, money-losing, and inefficient
state-owned airlines, which means that alliance and code-sharing
possibilities are weak at best. TWA, IMHO, is rapidly becoming a
quasi-charter and holiday carrier to these southern European cities, and
is in a horrible position to market itself as a reliable carrier worthy of
the high-yield business market. As far as London service goes, it is also
limited to a seemingly tourist-oriented STL-LGW route.
As far as Tokyo goes, here are my comments on the "overservice" idea you
propose:
- UA and NW make zillions of dollars on fifth-freedom flights from Tokyo
to other Asian destinations, which is why we see a plethora of West
Coast-Asia flights routed through NRT. Even with open skies with
nations like Singapore, Taiwan, and Brunei, I think as long as the
current bilateral allows UA and NW these beyond rights, we'll contintue
to see heavy service to NRT.
- At ORD, I wouldn't quite say NRT is "overserved". It is not
"underserved", per se, but AFAIK, there are three daily non-stop flights
from ORD to NRT:
- UA, 747-200 (I think)
- JL, 747-400
- NW, 747-200 (I think)
That being said, TWA could try to go after fast-growing non-Tokyo routes,
such as to Singapore, Malaysia, Taipei, Manila, etc. There are some
decent alliance prospects with a handful of airlines that are not in
full-blown mega-partnerships, such as Philippines, Cathay, Malaysian, EVA,
etc. Some big obstacles here, though: (1) TWA doesn't have the necessary
aircraft to fly these routes; (2) They would get their butts whipped by
the likes of Singapore and Thai in terms of service; (3) They simply are
not big or strong enough to compete route-wise, etc. against UA or NW; (4)
TWA is weak on the West Coast, although tagging on STL and/or JFK might
help. The bottom line, IMHO, is that even if TWA could crack into Asia,
they would need a very creative marketing and niche strategy to succeed.
> I think that Seoul might be credible, and perhaps the PRC/ROC as well.
> Additionally, what about Indonesia? Indonesia is going to be a
> phenomenally big market in the coming decades; it's underserved by U.S.
> carriers, and could potentially be a huge growth route.
I think cities like Seoul, Taipei, and perhaps Kuala Lumpur and Singapore
are viable. Manila, Bangkok, and Jakarta aren't bad either. While I
agree places like Indonesia are very underserved by the U.S., I think
there has actually been a slight retrenchment from SE Asia by US carriers,
probably becasue of the mega-alliances (ex.: UA can afford to cut back on
Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, etc., where Thai can fill the gap). I believe NW
said it will serve Jakarta, but only as a code share with Garuda (? - not
sure of exact details). (Keep in mind there is not a large resident
Indonesian community in the U.S. like there are the Japanese, Korean,
Chinese, Vietnamese, and Filipino communities). Delta has already pulled
out of Taipei, Bangkok, Singapore, etc. and limited its APAC flights to
NRT, SEL, and HKG, I believe. And besides, I expect UA and NW to move
into SE Asian markets long before TWA would. I would be utterly shocked
to wake up and find out TWA is starting say STL-NRT-SEL flights, for
example, rather than say UA launching an ORD-TPE-MNL route.
> (2) European carriers can offer multitudes of onward connections from
> their hubs to places like South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East,
> Africa, etc., which means they can still fill up bigger planes. For
> example, a person flying on United from Chicago to London is likely to
> be staying in London, or perhaps connecting onto nearby British and
> northwest Euroepan airports. Thus, a 767 or 777 can suffice. OTOH, a
> British Airways flight from Chicago to London will likely have more
> people who are connecting to a wider variety of destinations, such as
> India, Kenya, South Africa, Dubai, etc. So, BA can therefore easily
> fill a 747-200, for example.
I thought of this too, but then again I thought of a few counter-examples.
BA can fill a 747 because of its onward connections from London, true; but
Virgin also fills 747's from the U.S. to London, yet Virgin has few
connecting flights out of London.
Christopher B. Stone wrote:
> >They did drop JFK-ATH, which they are planning to serve again as a
> >codeshare with Olympic.
> A "codeshare with Olympic" isn't the genuine article, I'm afraid. TWA
> does not need a hodgepodge of small codeshares; they need a major
> alliance, along the lines of UA-LH or KL-NW or AA-BA. They had two
> decent potential partners in AF or IB, and they've lost them both to
> nimbler rivals. I submit that throwing away their trump card, the JFK
> hub, had a lot to do with this.
Perfectly said. While JFK is still avoided by the plague by many
travelers (and appropriately so in many if not most cases), TWA's terminal
there had a chance of forging a reasonable trans-atlantic gateway if the
domestic feed situation and alliances were straightened out.
Unfortunately, TWA has had either no major alliance partners, or very
poor, weak, and inefficient ones at best. Their domestic feed into JFK
was limited to one or two daily flights simply to supply passengers to
their European flights; for business travelers, this is unacceptable as
they want frequent, round-the-clock service.
> Also, for an airline trying to recover from an image of shoddy service,
> Olympic is perhaps the worst partner they could have found, since
> Olympic consistently ranks among the worst airlines in terms of service.
See above...Unfortunately all the good partners have been taken, and TWA
is left with the state-owned monstrosities that are hopelessly inept in
operating quality, efficient air services. TWA has effectively been shut
out of the lucrative world of meaningful code-shares and alliances.
> >As if they haven't tried. They've filed applications numerous times to
> >get service to Tokyo and Osaka, but have been denied every time. Just
> >because they aren't there now doesn't mean that they aren't trying...
Anyhow, the current 1952 bilateral agreement limits US-Japan service
almost exclusively to UA, NW, and JL, with scraps left over for AA, DL, CO
(via Guam on Air Mike), and ANA. Japan has consistently and stubbornly
resisted any significant open-skies type agreement, so major
liberalizatoin of this market is not going to happen any time soon.
Japan's carriers, especially JL and ANA, are hopelessly tied down by very
restrictive laws and rules, and their cost structures mean they would be
in a very tough fight in a liberalized and competitive environment.
TWA's chances of getting into Japan are remote at best...As you've
pointed out, services to other Asian destinations may be the only other
option.
> First off, now that they are getting rid of the 747-200's, what are they
> proposing to fly to Asia when they next file an application? A 767?
> Gee, that will be competitive! :)
Yet another burden on TWA; while they down-size their fleet and make the
767 their flagship, they will eventually have no aircraft that is either
physically or economically able to sustain any sort of Asian operation.
At best, a 767 might be able to make it from Seattle to Northeast Asia,
and I don't see TWA using SEA as an APAC gateway anytime soon.
> Secondly, and more importantly, if they can't get service to Japan, why
> aren't they looking at other options? Japan isn't the only hot market in
> Asia by a long shot. Why not Korea, the PRC, or ROC? Or why not try to
> forge an alliance with a decent Asian carrier, instead of the paltry
> Phillippine Air Lines (PAL), such as Eva Air or All Nippon or Asiana?
Asiana, a VERY good airline from what I've heard, already has a fairly
strong code-share and alliance with Northwest. TWA at one point actually
partnered with All Nippon from Washington to Osaka and/or Tokyo (do they
still have this alliance?). EVA seems very good; I see them as a Virgin
Atlantic of the Pacific, with their "Deluxe Economy" class. Cathay,
Malaysian, and Garuda are other ones that I can think of that don't have
strong alliances yet.
A big problem is that TWA remains weak on the West Coast, and even with a
few Asian carriers serving JFK, TWA massive downsizing their doesn't make
them look attractive.
> Again, I think they real problem in getting service to Asia started is
> this: STL is not exactly a viable international hub. I think they will
> see some success with flights to London from STL, but beyond that, it's
> questionable. Remember, this isn't the first time TWA has tried to serve
> Europe extensively from STL; didn't they once fly STL-FRA? My point is
> this: if Denver (DIA) can't support European operations to anywhere other
> than LHR and FRA -- and currently DIA lacks flights even to those points
> -- how will STL support flights to even smaller European cities,
> particularly when TW's domestic feed network is much smaller than
> United's?
I don't recall TWA ever having served STL-FRA. Their Euroepan service,
AFAIK, is limited to a daily 767 on STL-LGW, and a seasonal daily 767 on
STL-CDG. STL is just a little to far west and a little too small to
support a strong European network (I say a little too far west because
airports like CVG, which is smaller than the STL market, is further east
and can capture connecting flight traffic from nearby cities like SDF,
CMH, IND, DAY, EVV, FTW, MEM, BNA, etc.; as such, their European traffic
is booming). In short, I think a city has to have at least some
combination of the following traits to have good European service:
- big enough in its own right (like LAX, SFO, SEA, DFW, IAH, etc.)
- be in or near the East Coast, Midwest, or Southeast where small
city/airport/market size countered with a massive connecting hub having
flights to nearby medium-sized and larger cities (like PIT and CLT,
where US Airways have their biggest hubs, or CVG, as mentioned above).
- have an extremely healthy and rapidly-growing economy (like RDU, where
AA has daily service to LGW)
> Again, piecemeal codeshares -- though I agree they are a more practical
> strategy in the Middle East than in Europe or Asia -- will not rejuvenate
> TWA. In general, I agree that TWA is still the best choice to the Middle
> East; they're going to have to work on improving service, however. I have
> heard that Saudis and other Arabs refuse to fly TWA as they believe the
> European carriers offer better service. More importantly, as much as I
> personally like the Middle East, Europe and Asia are far more important
> markets.
Here, Royal Jordanian is the major partnership TWA has just forged.
Unfortunately, as you've alluded to, RJ is a bit player in the world of
international commercial aviation.
While I do agree Europe and Asia are the bigger markets that will generate
the most revenues, TWA could try to do better in the Middle East and
position itself as a better niche player. How about an alliance with
Emirates? The are probably considered the best carrier in the Middle East
and Gulf, and currently does not serve the U.S. (and I assume they would
like to). I also believe Dubai Airport, which I think is their base, is a
completely open-skies airport; ANYONE can fly into there, AFAIK. What I
don't understand is why TWA chose RJ, which is a fine carrier but is based
in an economically weak nation; I think a stronger alliance with a carrier
based in one of the richer Gulf states, like Kuwait Airways, Gulf Air,
Qatar Airways, or Emirates could provide a better and more profitable
niche. The alliance with RJ doesn't seem to have any cohesive route
network or overall market strategy to it that would make it profitable in
the long run.
> I haven't even brought up the Latin America issue yet. Latin America is
> second only to Asia in terms of future importance to the air industry, and
> once again TWA is light-years behind. Whatever happened to those rumors
> of service to Brazil we heard a few months ago?
I too wonder what happened to that Brazil service possibility. I think
the most they ever got was some charter services.
> Ultimately, I think my points boil down to this. TWA's international
> service is emasculated -- and despite my mistake on the JFK-TLV issue --
> the situation is getting worse, not better. TWA is retrenching its
> international network. Giving up FRA isn't quite the same blunder that
> giving up LHR was, but it's close.
To paraphrase: what's worse is that TWA, with its already-limited and
paltry international services, is cutting the very core routes they
should be keeping.
> In the long term, TWA has two options, as I see the situation. Either
> they can declare themselves to be a large domestic airline, perhaps a
> glorified version of Midwest Express; or they can try to merge with
> another carrier, such as USAirways, to whom they have something to offer
> in the way of international routes and from whom they could gain
> additional hubs and aircraft.
On the international front, TWA already has become, IMO, a glorified Tower
Air. Merging with US Airways, while attractive on the domestic route
network side of things, is not going to happen because they are almost as
weak and isolated as TWA is. US Airways labor and cost situation is not
good, they were betrayed by the one big international partner they could
had (BA), and still have a hodgepodge of aircraft to worry about that
would pose problem with a TWA merger (i.e.: lots of 737's and F-100's to
deal with). Their international routes aren't a whole lot to cheer about
either. In short, merging two very weak carriers isn't going to make a
good one.
> Yet another burden on TWA; while they down-size their fleet and make the
> 767 their flagship, they will eventually have no aircraft that is either
> physically or economically able to sustain any sort of Asian operation.
> At best, a 767 might be able to make it from Seattle to Northeast Asia,
> and I don't see TWA using SEA as an APAC gateway anytime soon.
This is a good reason perhaps to retain a couple of 747's, which could
also come in handy for HNL or if TWA regains access to LHR.
Alternatively, they could lease 777's.
> While I do agree Europe and Asia are the bigger markets that will
> generate the most revenues, TWA could try to do better in the Middle
> East and position itself as a better niche player. How about an
> alliance with Emirates?
This is a pretty good suggestion, IMO. Emirates does have access to
destinations in the subcontinent, the Middle East, Africa, and Central
Asia. It also has a reputation for first-rate service.
TWA could also re-start service to Kuwait; I think they still have the
authority, no? Again, there are fleet problems, however. This would
require 767-300's, I believe, and TWA is especially short on those.
I have not really followed this thread. I just want to point out a
few errors, and some quick thoughts:
1. Delta dropped Taipei, Hong Kong, and Bangkok. Seoul, Tokyo, and
Nagoya are the only Asian cities served by Delta's own aircraft.
Singapore is served through codeshare service with SIA via the
Atlantic.
2. NW (and UA) wanted to serve Jakarta via Japan but can't get the
necessary fifth-freedom rights. Even with the new agreement with
Garuda, NW is still pursuing direct flight to Jakarta via Osaka.
3. Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta won't become major trans-Pacific
gateways any time soon. There are about eight daily direct B747
flights between Singapore and the US, but the annual traffic between
the two countries is about 300,000. UA, NW, and SQ rely heavily
on fifth- and six-freedom traffic. Don't forget there are quite a few
other airlines offering convenient connecting services, such as TG,
MH, PR, CX, CI, BR, JL, NH, KE, OZ, as well as many European
carriers.
4. NW is unlikely to operate significant number of non-stop trans-Pacific
flights to non-Japanese destinations. Currently, Beijing, Seoul,
and Hong Kong are the only NW destinations served directly from
the US without going through Japan; and none of these flights are
daily. NW's trans-Pacific operation is too heavily dependent on
Japan. IMHO, NW will one day be hurt by its dependency on Japan.
5. TW has to start with Japan for its trans-Pac services. Other than
the Japanese carriers, most airlines in East Asia have very
competitive operating costs. That's why Korean, Asiana, Taiwan's
China Airlines, EVA Air, and Singapore have significantly increased
their trans-Pacific market shares between US and their respective
countries, while UA's and NW's shares have dropped, especially in
Seoul and Taipei.
TWA will be switching to 767-300s on the JFK-TLV route this winter. When
they start STL-TLV service (hopefully next year), an additional 767-300
would bring capacity greater than one 747 per day.
>First off, now that they are getting rid of the 747-200's, what are they
>proposing to fly to Asia when they next file an application? A 767? Gee,
>that will be competitive! :)
Route authorities to Japan are years away. If and when they receive them,
TWA would either use the 747s they own (and I presume will keep stored in
Arizona) or lease a 747-400, 777 or other similar aircraft.
>I haven't even brought up the Latin America issue yet. Latin America is
>second only to Asia in terms of future importance to the air industry,
>and once again TWA is light-years behind. Whatever happened to those
>rumors of service to Brazil we heard a few months ago?
I believe TWA decided that with the limited aircraft they currently have
for international service (767s and 757s -- lets face it, the 747s day had
LONG passed) it would be best to focus on those cities they already served
profitably, rather than seeking to expand to new markets in which you will
probably initially lose money.
Last summer, TWA announced a code share with TransBrasil... I don't know
what ever came of that.
>Ultimately, I think my points boil down to this. TWA's international
>service is emasculated -- and despite my mistake on the JFK-TLV issue --
>the situation is getting worse, not better. TWA is retrenching its
>international network. Giving up FRA isn't quite the same blunder that
>giving up LHR was, but it's close.
What makes more sense? Continuing to fly a number of trans-atlantic
routes with 747s that continue to bleed you dry, or downsize to aircraft
and routes on which you can make money? I think TWA did the right thing.
It is better to have cash in the bank for the winter of '97-98 than to
fold with a larger network flying 747s.
Greg
>On the international front, TWA already has become, IMO, a glorified
>Tower Air. Merging with US Airways, while attractive on the domestic
>route network side of things, is not going to happen because they are
>almost as weak and isolated as TWA is. US Airways labor and cost
>situation is not good, they were betrayed by the one big international
>partner they could had (BA), and still have a hodgepodge of aircraft to
>worry about that would pose problem with a TWA merger (i.e.: lots of
>737's and F-100's to deal with). Their international routes aren't a
>whole lot to cheer about either. In short, merging two very weak
>carriers isn't going to make a good one.
Sorry, Mihir, I couldn't let that "US betrayed by BA" remark pass!
Perhaps BA was betrayed by US, in that in the time frame that they were
partners, BA controlled *their* costs but US didn't... and still haven't.
One partnership that might be interesting would be with Aer Lingus.
Neither TWA nor Aer Lingus are large, but the two airlines do have the
rights to fly in the two largest markets. And Dublin is geographically in
a great location. So perhaps we may see a US/Eire/Europe system develop,
different from normal alliances, but perhaps useful. Certainly, marketing
a change-of-plane in Dublin to US travellers is probably much easier than
one in, say, Brussels!
>Mihir
Malc.
> Yes; while TWA obviously couldn't use FRA as a hub, they could've at
> least kept it as a high-yield business destination. Business
> travellers, especially ones flying to Europe and other international
> destinations, have more and more reasons to stay loyal to TWA because of
> the routes they've chosen to slash.
SELF CORRECTION: Business travelers have more and more reasons to _NOT_
stay loyal to TWA because the routes they've slashed.
Here's the point: They have dropped routes that have proven over the past
two or three years to be unprofitable. You all cry wolf when they drop
Frankfurt, but the fact of the matter is they weren't making any money
there, so they had to cut it. They have focused on those cities where
they can make money. If those happen to be tourist destinations in
Southern Europe, so be it. As long as they fill the planes, they will be
overjoyed.
I keep hearing that people are upset that Kennedy routes are being cut.
But, JFK is no longer profitable for TWA. They lost $150 million dollars
there last year because of too many European services. But they have been
able to make a lot of money in St Louis. So they have focused services
there. Many forget that according to Fortune 500, St Louis has the second
largest collection of Fortune 500 companies' headquarters in the US --
after Chicago. There is a ton of business travel (Monsanto, McDonnel
Douglas, Ford, Crysler, Met Life Insurance, Ralston Purina,
Anheuser-Busch, Maritz, May Department Stores, etc.) in the 3 million pop
metro area.
I have heard of some talk that TWA is starting to become a Holiday Carrier
and somewhat of a mirror charter line. That's why they've started the new
ad campaign "we want to be your airline." They have plenty of domestic
business routes, especially if your business is in St Louis or even New
York.
The fact of the matter is, we have to get over the "image" of TWA. We all
think of the great days when TWA (along with Pan Am) was the premier US
carrier to Europe. But that's not the case anymore. They are a niche
carrier now. But they still provide service that is important to business
travelers Trans Atlanticly. Routes that are unparalleled like St Louis to
London (twice daily) are important to St Louis businesses. Madrid is one
of the fastest growing business markets in Europe. And the old world
cities of Rome and Milan have always been important. After all, it can
now be argued that TWA is the premier US carrier to Southern Europe and
the Middle East right now. Granted, Athens is now gone, but they could
not make money there for one reason or another -- though I don't think the
competition Olympic provided is the real reason they had to pull out. At
any rate, it sounds as if they will be code sharing, and that will provide
that link without having to fill a 747 with low-yield passengers and lose
money.
TWA may have alienated a lot of business travellers by dropping the
Frankfurt route -- but I feel it will be back as soon as they can justify it
-- and as soon as they have a plan to compete against the STAR allaince
in Frankfurt.
I think Gitner has TWA on the right track. Their service is among the
best in the US as per my opinion and that of many other posters. And they
are focusing on their niche in hopes of having the luxury of sticking
things out in cities like Frankfurt and Amsterdam, and eventually Asia.
John "Jack" A. Penning, III
Morning Drive Anchor/Aviation Beat Reporter
NewsTalk 1400 WDWS-AM, Champaign
e-mail: pen...@uiuc.edu
Anyone know generally what percentage of tickets on BA, UA, and Virgin
are at the "fare sale" level?
Cheers
Chris
ke...@jei.umd.edu
When TWA sold their LHR routes to American, they also sold their
Philadelphia routes to USAir. They tried to sell what is now the STL-LGW
route as well - the authority would have been moved by the buyer, but the
DOT refused them permission to sell STL because, with their STL hub, it
was both a viable routing and STL itself had lobbied to keep the service.
Note that TWA was in pretty dire straits when they sold off their London
routes - the airline was going down the tubes (previous posters have
mentioned Carl Icahn) and was desparately seeking to stay alive. The
situation was very much like Pan Am's when they sold off their Asian
routes to United.
Another thing I've seen on this ng is continued mention of the fact that
US airlines' inflight service is not up to the quality of major
international carriers. I think this isn't totally an acurate statement,
because in most cases, people are comparing apples to oranges. YOu can't
compare Delta's Atlanta-LaGuardia service to their Atlanta - Gatwick
service, for example, because of the stage length. Airline inflight
service is very much a function of the length of the flight. Because
American carriers give you a box lunch on a 2 hour flight (if you're lucky
enough to get anything) doesn't mean that an airline that feeds you twice
on a 8 hour flight JFK-LHR offers "better service".
Note that meals are just one part of the equation. There are others.
Like advance seat selection in coach - many non US carriers don't allow
this.
Of the airlines flying any given route, I believe that the level of
service is comparable, more or less. You can have a great flight on BA,
or a lousy one. Same thing on United or American. Granted, that is for
the "average" passenger, and one airline's premium service may well be
differentiated from another's. But I would submit in this area that
products such as Continental's Business First international service, and
TWA's Trans World One, are easily at least the equal of BA's Club World or
Singapore's Raffles Class, and possibly closer to those airlines' first
class.
> >Ultimately, I think my points boil down to this. TWA's international
> >service is emasculated -- and despite my mistake on the JFK-TLV issue
> >the situation is getting worse, not better. TWA is retrenching its
> >international network. Giving up FRA isn't quite the same blunder that
> >giving up LHR was, but it's close.
> What makes more sense? Continuing to fly a number of trans-atlantic
> routes with 747s that continue to bleed you dry, or downsize to aircraft
> and routes on which you can make money? I think TWA did the right
> thing. It is better to have cash in the bank for the winter of '97-98
> than to fold with a larger network flying 747s.
I don't think Chris was disputing TWA cutting back on routes or planes,
per se. Almost everyone agrees the 747-100's, which were gas-guzzling
dinosaurs, had to be eliminated. I think what he IS saying that
dropping a key European business market, in this case FRA, is a bad
choice. I seem to agree: TWA seems to be retaining southern European
and Mediterranean destinations like LIS, MAD, BCN, and FCO, not exactly
high-yield business markets. I suppose FRA had to be dropped as they
could not compete with superior buiness-oriented and partnered airlines
like UA, LH, AA, and DL, but TWA business travelers will have an
increasingly difficulty time remaining loyal at this rate.
Short-term, TWA may gain some cash from this, but their long-term
strategy seems very vague and scatter-brained at this point.
Mihir
> Yes; while TWA obviously couldn't use FRA as a hub, they could've at
> least kept it as a high-yield business destination. Business
> travellers, especially ones flying to Europe and other international
> destinations, have more and more reasons to stay loyal to TWA because of
> the routes they've chosen to slash.
While TWA's decision to cut Frankfurt may not be the best LONG term
decision they could make, it may very well be the better short-term
decision. Based on TWA's cash position and historical financial data,
their big concern right now is having enough money on hand to make it
through next winter, when they are at their weakest. In order to do so,
their short-term (remainder of 1997) goals should be stockpile as much
cash as possible. The best way to do this? Cut any money losing routes
and focus on those which can make you money.
Short term, this may have meant cutting Frankfurt due to the stiff
competition of United, Lufthansa and other airlines. While Frankfurt
may be a key destination to serve long-term, it will do no good to build
loyalty on a route which is costing them the cash they need to survive
the upcoming winter.
We do not know TWA's future Frankfurt strategy. Perhaps when they
acquire more 767s and a healthier balance sheet, they will be willing to
re-enter the market and weather through whatever losses they may have
rebuilding the market.
> As far as LGW, yes: TWA flies a daily 767 flight between STL and LGW,
> but that's all the London service they have.
TWA has two 767s a day from St. Louis to Gatwick.
Greg
TWA has one year-round STL-LGW non-stop and has added a second seasonal
flight this year. The STL-CDG flight became year-round with its
addition this May.
> STL is just a little to far west and a little too small to
> support a strong European network (I say a little too far west because
> airports like CVG, which is smaller than the STL market, is further east
> and can capture connecting flight traffic from nearby cities like SDF,
> CMH, IND, DAY, EVV, FTW, MEM, BNA, etc.; as such, their European traffic
> is booming).
While STL may be further west, I doubt the distance adds significantly
to the flight time to Europe to many of those cities. TWA offers
connections from all the cities you mention to both London and Paris.
> > I haven't even brought up the Latin America issue yet. Latin America is
> > second only to Asia in terms of future importance to the air industry, and
> > once again TWA is light-years behind. Whatever happened to those rumors
> > of service to Brazil we heard a few months ago?
>
> I too wonder what happened to that Brazil service possibility. I think
> the most they ever got was some charter services.
Currently, TWA does not have enough aircraft capable of these routes to
begin service. While they could, it would be at the expense of cutting
other routes where TWA is more established. With the addition of more
757 and 767 aircraft, this may once again become a possibility.
> On the international front, TWA already has become, IMO, a glorified Tower
> Air.
I think this is a stretch. TWA's service is much better than Tower
Air. In addition, their European network is not vastly smaller than
that of Continental or USAir, although well behind the big three.
Greg
>While I do agree Europe and Asia are the bigger markets that will generate
>the most revenues, TWA could try to do better in the Middle East and
>position itself as a better niche player. How about an alliance with
>Emirates? The are probably considered the best carrier in the Middle East
>and Gulf, and currently does not serve the U.S. (and I assume they would
>like to).
Emirates (EK) is definitely interested in the US -- Newark is a
target rather than JFK which is too expensive. EK wants fifth freedom
flights from the UK, which probably means from LHR as I think that
EK's other UK airports, Gatwick and Manchester, cannot participate in
fifth freedom UK-US flights.
--
Roger Chung-Wee <ro...@concord-world-travel.co.uk>
Publisher of Caribbean Aviation Newsletter
How about this scenario:
TWA codesharing with Virgin for Atlantic Trips and EVA for Pacific Trips.
They eliminate all international service and use their 767's for transcon
and hawaii. They then move their 727's into a Hub in Orlando (MCO) or
Miami (MIA) to start carribbean service for Virgin's vacation pax as well
as their own domestic feed going into
BDA/the Bahamas, Aruba, etc.
Ideas?
ML> TWA's future:
ML> How about this scenario:
ML> TWA codesharing with Virgin for Atlantic Trips and EVA for Pacific
ML> Trips. They eliminate all international service and use their 767's
ML> for transcon and hawaii. They then move their 727's into a Hub in
ML> Orlando (MCO) or Miami (MIA) to start carribbean service for Virgin's
ML> vacation pax as well as their own domestic feed going into BDA/the
ML> Bahamas, Aruba, etc.
problem with that is that Virgin has recently signed a relatively long
term (3 year?) code share deal with Continental. The deal doesn't even
start until later this year, so the sooner Virgin would be able to get
divorced from Continental would be 2000 or 2001. TWA can change
drastically (one way or the other) before then.
--Helen
TWA has not pursued rights to serve countries in South America with
its own planes. The codeshare deal with Transbrasil is stuck somewhere,
I'd guess waiting for approval from Brazilian bureocrats.
TWA would not have a chance without codesharing. Why? Because two
much more powerful airlines (DL + CO) have written in their expansion
charts that they will have the South American market covered
NO MATTER WHAT. DL started its Brazil service this past weekend, and
has just applied to fly Atlanta-Caracas.
DL & CO (& UA playing a pre-emptive strategy) are embroiled in a fight
to get rights to Santiago. I expect CO to win. This could result in CO
servicing 8 cities in South America, as opposed to United's current 7
(assuming my own count is precise).
Tassio AT watson.ibm.com
> Sorry, Mihir, I couldn't let that "US betrayed by BA" remark pass!
> Perhaps BA was betrayed by US, in that in the time frame that they were
> partners, BA controlled *their* costs but US didn't... and still
> haven't.
OK, let me clarify things a little, then: The fact the BA "dumped" US
didn't bother me in and of itself, per se. I think there was
justification for the two airlines to part ways, including for the reason
you mentioned. BA clearly did a lot better job at trimming and containing
costs compared to US (who we all know is still mired in cost and labor
troubles). What did bother me was the fact that BA announced the alliance
with AA before settling things with US. As far as I remember, while BA
and US were having problems, difficulties, and disagreements between them
at the time of the BA/AA announcement, there was little or no talk of BA
and US actually "divorcing" at the time. It's like getting engaged while
you're still married to your future spouse's enemy (I know that may not be
the best analogy, but it's the best I could think of). In fact, I think I
recall BA actually stating at one point that it could feasibly be partners
to AA and US simultaneously. To me, the BA/AA alliance announcement
without settling things with US first smelled of not doing business in
good faith. I would have looked at the whole deal more positively if BA
annouced cutting off ties with US _AND_ partnering with AA more or less
simultaneously (or at least in a reasonable time period, say a few days or
a couple of weeks at most). Compare this to the relatively quick and
controversy-free re-alignment between Delta, Virgin, and Continental. In
short: Did BA stab US in the back by severing their relationship? IMO,
no. Did BA stab US in the back by announcing an alliance with AA (and not
finalizing a divorce or other matters with US first)? IMO, the answer is
at the very least, "perhaps".
> One partnership that might be interesting would be with Aer Lingus.
> Neither TWA nor Aer Lingus are large, but the two airlines do have the
> rights to fly in the two largest markets. And Dublin is geographically
> in a great location. So perhaps we may see a US/Eire/Europe system
> develop, different from normal alliances, but perhaps useful.
> Certainly, marketing a change-of-plane in Dublin to US travellers is
> probably much easier than one in, say, Brussels!
Unfortunately, Aer Lingus is already a partner with Delta. So a
potential alliance with TWA is pretty much out of the question.
While I do think that a hypothetical TWA-Aer Lingus alliance would be
nice (ex: strategic location of Ireland in the route network scheme of
things; Aer Lingus' relatively new fleet; state-owned but not hopelessly
adrift like Olympic or Alitalia), it would still be yet another
piece-meal alliance. Again, all the major carriers have been spoken
for: there simply isn't enough significant "supply of alliances" left,
at least in Europe.
> TWA codesharing with Virgin for Atlantic Trips and EVA for Pacific
> Trips. They eliminate all international service and use their 767's for
> transcon and hawaii. They then move their 727's into a Hub in Orlando
> (MCO) or Miami (MIA) to start carribbean service for Virgin's vacation
> pax as well as their own domestic feed going into BDA/the Bahamas,
> Aruba, etc.
As has been pointed out, Virgin Atlantic already code-shares with
Continental, so that possibility for TWA is out the door for the time
being.
EVA, however, would be a terrific potential partner, IMO. They are a
very young airline with a spanking-new fleet. Their in-flight service
has gotten very good reviews, especially with their 4-class layout that
includes "deluxe" economy for full-fare coach passengers. They are much
better than the other Taiwan carrier, China Airlines. They have five
convenient US gateways: LAX, SFO, SEA, EWR, and JFK (seven if you count
HNL and ANC as well). EVA also has reasonably extensive service to
Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand.
The downsides are that TWA's presence on the west coast is nominal at
best, and they have no intra-west coast route network to speak of that
could effectively feed EVA flights at LAX, SFO, or SEA. There is some
hope using JFK, however, as it is both a hub (albeit a heavily downsized
one) for TWA and a gateway for EVA. Also, EVA serves only one city in
Japan: Fukuoka. IMO, not serving the rest of a Japan (like Tokyo,
Kansai, and Nagoya) is a big hole in EVA's network. And would EVA want
to code-share with such a sick U.S. carriers, when it could possibly
forge an alliance with a much healthier and stable airline?
One the other suggestions you mention, I can only say that TWA has other
fish to fry for now (like surviving). It will be along time before TWA
can consider a major domestic expansion, especially if it means
establishing new hubs. Besides, TWA would be hammered in Florida and
the Caribbean by other airlines, particularly AA.
They have just dropped JFK. EWR is now served daily instead of four times
a week.
>EVA also has reasonably extensive service to Southeast Asia, Australia,
>and New Zealand.
Reasonable network to SE Asia, marginal network to Australasia, and
minimal network to Europe.
>Also, EVA serves only one city in
>Japan: Fukuoka. IMO, not serving the rest of a Japan (like Tokyo,
>Kansai, and Nagoya) is a big hole in EVA's network.
China has hinted that it will no longer object Taiwanese airlines serving
Osaka. Thus, Osaka/Kansai may be coming online for both EVA and China
Airlines in a year or two.
>And would EVA want
>to code-share with such a sick U.S. carriers, when it could possibly
>forge an alliance with a much healthier and stable airline?
EVA has a close relationship with All Nippon. In fact, the Fukuoka
service is code-shared with Air Nippon, an ANA subsidary. I don't
think EVA is actively looking for a partner. If it is, it will be
airlines that cooperate with ANA. Thus, in the US, Delta will be the
likely candidate. EVA is quite different from your usual passenger
airlines. It heavily emphasizes cargo business (which is not a big
surprise, as its parent company is the world's largest container
shipping company). In short, I don't think EVA and TWA is a good fit.
>OK, let me clarify things a little, then: The fact the BA "dumped" US
>didn't bother me in and of itself, per se. I think there was
>justification for the two airlines to part ways, including for the reason
>you mentioned. BA clearly did a lot better job at trimming and containing
>costs compared to US (who we all know is still mired in cost and labor
>troubles). What did bother me was the fact that BA announced the alliance
>with AA before settling things with US. As far as I remember, while BA
>and US were having problems, difficulties, and disagreements between them
>at the time of the BA/AA announcement, there was little or no talk of BA
>and US actually "divorcing" at the time. It's like getting engaged while
>you're still married to your future spouse's enemy (I know that may not be
>the best analogy, but it's the best I could think of). In fact, I think I
>recall BA actually stating at one point that it could feasibly be partners
>to AA and US simultaneously. To me, the BA/AA alliance announcement
>without settling things with US first smelled of not doing business in
>good faith. I would have looked at the whole deal more positively if BA
>annouced cutting off ties with US _AND_ partnering with AA more or less
>simultaneously (or at least in a reasonable time period, say a few days or
>a couple of weeks at most). Compare this to the relatively quick and
>controversy-free re-alignment between Delta, Virgin, and Continental. In
>short: Did BA stab US in the back by severing their relationship? IMO,
>no. Did BA stab US in the back by announcing an alliance with AA (and not
>finalizing a divorce or other matters with US first)? IMO, the answer is
>at the very least, "perhaps".
I think it's probably worth pointing out that we, the general public, have
no idea of what was really discussed between US and BA in their corporate
head offices. Particularly with 3 BA appointees to the USAir board of
directors and a 24% share of the equity...
Personally, I don't see why BA could NOT have partnered US and AA
simultaneously. I think that US has, like TWA, become a domestic regional
carrier: their presence outside the eastern seaboard is pretty minimal.
Against which, AA's presence in the east is thin, except for the long-haul
services trans-con and transatlantic. This is reflected by AA's desire to
acquire the US shuttle routes DCA/LGA/BOS.
Actually, BA already had a partnership with HP around Phoenix, largely to
cover US's withdrawal from that area.
But overall, I think that Wolf saw the AA/BA thing as a great opportunity to
cast off a relationship that, in some areas, tied his hands. Personally, I
think (based on US's ongoing troubles) that this was motivated more by ego
than pure business practices...
>Mihir
Malc.
You make some good points.....
It is beginning to appear that Wolf did indeed have his hands tied
with the BA partnership, and felt that BA was "skimming his cream".
But there were other reasons that I can't figure out....I think
the BOD brought on Wolf to do his trick...his "fix it, paint it,
sell it" trick....
US is for sale, and I think that wolf is the man to do the deal. It
is appearing more and more to me that he never intended to do anything
else.
Ed S.
> Personally, I don't see why BA could NOT have partnered US and AA
> simultaneously. I think that US has, like TWA, become a domestic
> regional carrier: their presence outside the eastern seaboard is pretty
> minimal. Against which, AA's presence in the east is thin, except for
> the long-haul services trans-con and transatlantic. This is reflected
> by AA's desire to acquire the US shuttle routes DCA/LGA/BOS.
I suppose this is plausible. US , for the most part, has been relegated
to an East Coast niche carrier, while AA (not counting their nominal
alliance with Midway) has virtually no intra-East Coast service to speak
of. One might say there's AA's MIA hub on the "East Coast", but that's
mainly for feeding Latin American/Caribbean flights and is a poor gateway
for European passengers to connect onto other domestic flights (and for
domestic passengers to connect to European flights).
> Actually, BA already had a partnership with HP around Phoenix, largely
> to cover US's withdrawal from that area.
This seemed to be a very narrow-scoped niche alliance (i.e.: Arizona,
Nevada, and Southern California). If BA could have re-defined its
relationship with US in a similar fashion (i.e.: code-share only to places
in the East Coast/Northeast), then perhaps both US and AA could have both
partnered with BA.
> But overall, I think that Wolf saw the AA/BA thing as a great
> opportunity to cast off a relationship that, in some areas, tied his
> hands. Personally, I think (based on US's ongoing troubles) that this
> was motivated more by ego than pure business practices...
As far Stephen Wolf's ego, I couldn't agree with you more. Many at UA,
when he CEO there, thought of him as the anti-christ. I've never
particularly liked his wishy-washy style of management, which is neither
like Herb Kelleher on the one hand or Robert Crandall on the other. He
seems to be more interested in cosmetic changes like color schemes,
aircraft interiors, and naming things (whether it be frequent flyer
programs or the airline itself). I don't think they're in quite as bas
shape as TWA, but they sure do seem awfully direction-less at the
moment.
US is a target waiting to be acquired, once "round one" of cost cuts
occurs. "Second bite of the apple" will be once the deal is announced, to
sweeten the terms.
American Express announced USAir is leaving Amex' Membership Rewards
program, as of 01Feb98.
In addition to all the other signs, this suggests a ??+US deal in late
1997, with implementation in the early 1998 time frame, and for the buyer
to be a non-Amex participant.
Who's that? UA, AA, NW, among others, but not DL or CO (or WN).
--
- Bob Mann, R.W. Mann & Company, Inc. Port Washington, NY 11050 USA
office 516-944-0900, fax-7280
mailto:rwma...@interport.net
http://www.interport.net/~rwmannco
.........
>A "codeshare with Olympic" isn't the genuine article, I'm afraid. TWA
>does not need a hodgepodge of small codeshares; they need a major
>alliance, along the lines of UA-LH or KL-NW or AA-BA. They had two decent
>potential partners in AF or IB, and they've lost them both to nimbler
>rivals. I submit that throwing away their trump card, the JFK hub, had a
>lot to do with this.
>Also, for an airline trying to recover from an image of shoddy service,
>Olympic is perhaps the worst partner they could have found, since Olympic
>consistently ranks among the worst airlines in terms of service.
********************************************************************
First of all I would like to apologize about the timing, but I just
read this article and I couldn't help it.
Is it possible to reveal your source of the rankings in terms of
service?
I would be obliged.
Thank you
Andreas Dakanalis
ad...@prometheus.hol.gr
> US is a target waiting to be acquired, once "round one" of cost cuts
> occurs. "Second bite of the apple" will be once the deal is announced, to
> sweeten the terms.
>
> American Express announced USAir is leaving Amex' Membership Rewards
> program, as of 01Feb98.
>
> In addition to all the other signs, this suggests a ??+US deal in late
> 1997, with implementation in the early 1998 time frame, and for the buyer
> to be a non-Amex participant.
>
> Who's that? UA, AA, NW, among others, but not DL or CO (or WN).
Even so, I see an asset sale (possibly coordinated with a pre-packaged
bankruptcy filing) as far more likely than a straight acquisition which would
involve eating US's current labor structure (e.g., pilot and flight attendant
seniority lists, work rules).
--
John R. Grout john....@reasoning.com
My postings are not official statements by Reasoning, Inc.