Enabling iPhone's exposure notification is taking forever...

[Ant]

Hello.

As of about 12 minutes ago twice (aborted the first attempt to retry), I
enabled my iPhone 12 mini's iOS v15.2's exposure notification feature
but it is still stuck with "This may take a few minutes." with its
circular animation. Does it really take that long after 12 minutes? Is
it stuck? :(

Thank you for reading and hopefully answering soon. :)
--
A year already?! Tree and hair cutting time! 2022 isn't any better and different so far. :(
Note: A fixed width font (Courier, Monospace, etc.) is required to see this signature correctly.
/\___/\ Ant(Dude) @ http://aqfl.net & http://antfarm.home.dhs.org.
/ /\ /\ \ Please nuke ANT if replying by e-mail.
| |o o| |
\ _ /
( )

[Joerg Lorenz]

Am 07.01.22 um 09:23 schrieb Ant:

> Hello.
>
> As of about 12 minutes ago twice (aborted the first attempt to retry), I
> enabled my iPhone 12 mini's iOS v15.2's exposure notification feature
> but it is still stuck with "This may take a few minutes." with its
> circular animation. Does it really take that long after 12 minutes? Is
> it stuck? :(

Did Apple deactivate it because it is absolutely worthless? Feature not bug?

When are you planning to react in the do not disturb-thread?

--
De gustibus non est disputandum

[Chris]

Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch> wrote:
> Am 07.01.22 um 09:23 schrieb Ant:
>> Hello.
>>
>> As of about 12 minutes ago twice (aborted the first attempt to retry), I
>> enabled my iPhone 12 mini's iOS v15.2's exposure notification feature
>> but it is still stuck with "This may take a few minutes." with its
>> circular animation. Does it really take that long after 12 minutes? Is
>> it stuck? :(
>
> Did Apple deactivate it because it is absolutely worthless? Feature not bug?

Nope. It's working here.

> When are you planning to react in the do not disturb-thread?

Valid question.

[Joerg Lorenz]

Am 08.01.22 um 11:23 schrieb Chris:

> Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch> wrote:
>> Am 07.01.22 um 09:23 schrieb Ant:
>>> Hello.
>>>
>>> As of about 12 minutes ago twice (aborted the first attempt to retry), I
>>> enabled my iPhone 12 mini's iOS v15.2's exposure notification feature
>>> but it is still stuck with "This may take a few minutes." with its
>>> circular animation. Does it really take that long after 12 minutes? Is
>>> it stuck? :(
>>
>> Did Apple deactivate it because it is absolutely worthless? Feature not bug?
>
> Nope. It's working here.

No. It isn't delivering what is promised.You just do not recognise it.

BT is a data transmission protocol and completely unsuitable for this
purpose.

[nospam]

In article <srjjrb$ln7$1...@dont-email.me>, Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch>
wrote:

> >>> As of about 12 minutes ago twice (aborted the first attempt to retry), I
> >>> enabled my iPhone 12 mini's iOS v15.2's exposure notification feature
> >>> but it is still stuck with "This may take a few minutes." with its
> >>> circular animation. Does it really take that long after 12 minutes? Is
> >>> it stuck? :(
> >>
> >> Did Apple deactivate it because it is absolutely worthless? Feature not
> >> bug?
> >
> > Nope. It's working here.
>
> No. It isn't delivering what is promised.You just do not recognise it.
>
> BT is a data transmission protocol and completely unsuitable for this
> purpose.

bluetooth is very suitable for that purpose.

the problem is that few people bothered to install it, erroneously
thinking it was some sort of privacy invasion when in fact it was the
exact opposite, designed to be totally anonymous, thereby making it not
very useful.

[Andy Burnelli]

On Tue, 11 Jan 2022 10:16:23 -0500, nospam wrote:

> the problem is that few people bothered to install it, erroneously
> thinking it was some sort of privacy invasion when in fact it was the
> exact opposite, designed to be totally anonymous, thereby making it not
> very useful.

The strategic problem is far bigger than the immediate tactical problems.

Sure, tactically these apps can't work in the western world because there
are enough well educated people who comprehend the strategic problem.

The strategic problem with these surveillance apps is that the phone makers
themselves (both Apple & Google) are opening the door wide open to _future_
mass surveillance abuses, in the name of the current exigency.

[nospam]

In article <srkjjr$16g9$1...@gioia.aioe.org>, Andy Burnelli

<sp...@nospam.com> wrote:

> The strategic problem with these surveillance apps is that the phone makers
> themselves (both Apple & Google) are opening the door wide open to _future_
> mass surveillance abuses, in the name of the current exigency.

the apple/google covid notification technology is expressly and
intentionally *not* for surveillance and cannot be used for other
purposes either.

[Joerg Lorenz]

Am 11.01.22 um 16:16 schrieb nospam:

It failed everywhere. It is a privacy nightmare and it does not deliver
what is promised. It is in any case a conceptual failure and the market
recognized that quickly.

Installation rate is 25 % in Germany and a meager 18% in Switzerland. It
is practically the same in other countries.
It was another waste of taxpayers money.

[Joerg Lorenz]

Am 11.01.22 um 20:00 schrieb nospam:

As always you do not understand anything beyond the immediate and the
perhaps obvious. It can - like the shitty CSAM-spyware - be used for
very bad things.

[Andy Burnelli]

On Tue, 11 Jan 2022 14:00:10 -0500, nospam wrote:

>> The strategic problem with these surveillance apps is that the phone makers
>> themselves (both Apple & Google) are opening the door wide open to _future_
>> mass surveillance abuses, in the name of the current exigency.
>
> the apple/google covid notification technology is expressly and
> intentionally *not* for surveillance and cannot be used for other
> purposes either.

I must agree with nospam that Apple and Google didn't design the covid
tracking mechanisms "expressly" so that the government and hackers could
take advantage of the surveillance implications...

At the same time we know that neither Apple nor Google can design even
something as simple as a web browser that doesn't have huge flaws in it.

The fact remains that Safari has so many holes in it even now that anyone
can drive a truck through, and Chrome isn't too far behind Apple in privacy
flaws, that any intelligent person can't believe that the covid tracking
doesn't have similar huge holes that even Apple & Google are unaware of.

In short, anyone who believes either Apple or Google have _ever_ shipped a
product without huge privacy flaws in it is an idiot of the first order.

[Lewis]

In message <srksrh$5sv$1...@dont-email.me> Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch> wrote:
> It failed everywhere.

Untrue. It failed where governements wanted to slurp up surveillence
data.

> It is a privacy nightmare

No, it is exactly the opposite of that, but he anti-privacy kooks and
spooks do very much hate it because it preserves privacy.

> and it does not deliver what is promised.

Only in locations where, as I said, the government wanted to 'roll
their own' so they could slurp surveillance data. that didn't work
because, astonishingly, people were not stupid enough to install those
surveillance apps.

> It was another waste of taxpayers money.

The exposure notification system was developed by Google and Apple and
cost no one a single cent.

Your ignorance is showing. Again.

--
One of the universal rules of happiness is: always be wary of any
helpful item that weighs less than its operating manual. --Jingo

[nospam]

In article <srksrh$5sv$1...@dont-email.me>, Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch>
wrote:

> >> BT is a data transmission protocol and completely unsuitable for this
> >> purpose.
> >
> > bluetooth is very suitable for that purpose.
> >
> > the problem is that few people bothered to install it, erroneously
> > thinking it was some sort of privacy invasion when in fact it was the
> > exact opposite, designed to be totally anonymous, thereby making it not
> > very useful.
>
> It failed everywhere.

because people do not understand how it works and instead believe it
was somehow a privacy nightmare. it is not.

> It is a privacy nightmare and it does not deliver
> what is promised.

absolutely false.

read the white papers on how it works. it's expressly designed to be
private and anonymous.

as usual, you are pretending to know how it works when you clearly do
not.

[nospam]

In article <srkt3u$5sv$2...@dont-email.me>, Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch>

wrote:

> >> The strategic problem with these surveillance apps is that the phone makers
> >> themselves (both Apple & Google) are opening the door wide open to _future_
> >> mass surveillance abuses, in the name of the current exigency.
> >
> > the apple/google covid notification technology is expressly and
> > intentionally *not* for surveillance and cannot be used for other
> > purposes either.
>
> As always you do not understand anything beyond the immediate and the
> perhaps obvious.

unlike you, i've read the various white papers, including the original
work done at mit on which it is based, which was led by ron rivest.

in case you do not recognize the name ron rivest, he's the 'r' in rsa
encryption.

you are wrong

> It can - like the shitty CSAM-spyware - be used for
> very bad things.

no, they cannot.

[%]

Lewis <g.k...@kreme.dont-email.me> wrote

> In message <srksrh$5sv$1...@dont-email.me> Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch>
> wrote:
>> It failed everywhere.
>
> Untrue. It failed where governements wanted to slurp up surveillence
> data.
>
>> It is a privacy nightmare
>
> No, it is exactly the opposite of that, but he anti-privacy kooks and
> spooks do very much hate it because it preserves privacy.
>
>> and it does not deliver what is promised.
>
> Only in locations where, as I said, the government wanted to 'roll
> their own' so they could slurp surveillance data. that didn't work
> because, astonishingly, people were not stupid enough to install those
> surveillance apps.
>
>> It was another waste of taxpayers money.
>
> The exposure notification system was developed by Google and Apple

That came later.

and
> cost no one a single cent.

That’s wrong too in lots of jurisdictions.

> Your ignorance is showing. Again.

So is yours.

[Joerg Lorenz]

Am 11.01.22 um 23:20 schrieb nospam:

The reality is relevant and not your judgement or any whitepapers.

> as usual, you are pretending to know how it works when you clearly do
> not.

No better arguments? It failed because the technological setup and the
concept is utter bullshit.

The killer was: The location of people is not equal to the location of a
phone. What is measured is *not* he the exposure of the owner or even
worse the user of the phone. It is just the exposure of the phone in
some cases. But even that is not sure.

You are an anonymous Troll with no real arguments.

[Andy Burnelli]

On Tue, 11 Jan 2022 17:20:50 -0500, nospam wrote:

> unlike you, i've read the various white papers, including the original
> work done at mit on which it is based, which was led by ron rivest.

All Apple & Google accomplished was open yet another hole in smart phones.

What nospam will never comprehend is that it doesn't matter _what_ bullshit
Apple puts in those white papers (which are written by TECHNICAL MARKETING
and not by anyone whose name Apple finally puts on the paper).

The fact nospam is unaware of who actually publishes white papers is one
thing, but what's worse is that nospam thinks every single flaw has been
fixed already, by design, by Apple, as described in those white papers.

Plenty of people like nospam thought the German Enigma was unbreakable also.
And yet, the British and Americans were reading U-boat Atlantic Wolfpack
traffic before Karl Donitz had a chance to have it decoded it for himself.

Likewise with the 14-page ultimatum by the Japanese on December 7th, 1941.
Just as with the German Navy, US Secretary of State Cordell Hull had the
last page _before_ the Japanese ambassadors were even able to type it up.

For some reason, nospam feels a white paper will protect him from effort.
All Apple & Google accomplished was open yet another hole in smart phones.

Hell, *Apple can't even create a web browser that doesn't have huge holes.*
The chance of Apple not having huge holes in this stuff is absolutely zero.

[Andy Burnelli]

On Tue, 11 Jan 2022 17:20:49 -0500, nospam wrote:

> read the white papers on how it works. it's expressly designed to be
> private and anonymous.

What nospam doesn't understand is that it doesn't matter what Apple
TECHNICAL MARKETING wrote in that white paper when Apple can't even design a
web browser for Christ's sake that doesn't have huge permanent holes in it.

*Apple has _never_ written secure code* (not even for the secure enclave!).

Why does nospam feel a technical marketing white paper will suddenly mean
that Apple has finally, for the first time in its history, written secure
code?

[nospam]

In article <srlbas$161f$1...@gioia.aioe.org>, Andy Burnelli

<sp...@nospam.com> wrote:

>
> > read the white papers on how it works. it's expressly designed to be
> > private and anonymous.
>
> What nospam doesn't understand is that it doesn't matter what Apple
> TECHNICAL MARKETING wrote in that white paper

the white papers (plural) were not only from apple.

both google *and* apple collaborated on the notification system, based
on work done at mit, led by ron rivest.

if you think ron rivest is a marketing dude, you are far dumber than
anyone could possibly have imagined.

[nospam]

In article <srla96$kpq$1...@dont-email.me>, Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch>

wrote:

> >> It is a privacy nightmare and it does not deliver
> >> what is promised.
> >
> > absolutely false.
> >
> > read the white papers on how it works. it's expressly designed to be
> > private and anonymous.
>
> The reality is relevant and not your judgement or any whitepapers.

the reality, along with the various white papers which were written by
the people who designed and implemented it, including ron rivest of rsa
fame, does not support your baseless and uninformed claims.

> > as usual, you are pretending to know how it works when you clearly do
> > not.
>
> No better arguments?

there is no argument.

you clearly do not know anything about how it works and are making up
shit pretending that you do. what you've said so far is very much
wrong.

> It failed because the technological setup and the
> concept is utter bullshit.

nope. it failed because people are ignorant and thought the
apple/google system tracked their every move, partly due to *other*
systems that did do that.

the reality is that the apple/google system was not only designed to
not track people but it's impossible to do so. it also uses randomly
generated ids that change, making it impossible to identify people.

you have no understanding on how it works and as usual, refuse to learn.

> The killer was: The location of people is not equal to the location of a
> phone. What is measured is *not* he the exposure of the owner or even
> worse the user of the phone. It is just the exposure of the phone in
> some cases. But even that is not sure.

that is simply false.

people normally carry their phones when they're out and in areas where
they would encounter a potentially infectious person.

it's exceptionally rare that someone would go to work, school, stores,
etc., without their phone.

what killed it is deliberate disinformation from the tinfoil-hat crowd.

[Lewis]

In message <srla96$kpq$1...@dont-email.me> Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch> wrote:
> Am 11.01.22 um 23:20 schrieb nospam:
>> In article <srksrh$5sv$1...@dont-email.me>, Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch>
>> wrote:
>>> It is a privacy nightmare and it does not deliver
>>> what is promised.
>>
>> absolutely false.
>>
>> read the white papers on how it works. it's expressly designed to be
>> private and anonymous.

> The reality

The reality is that you have no fucking idea what you are talking about
and are once again spewing ignorant bullshit.

> No better arguments? It failed because the technological setup and the
> concept is utter bullshit.

Further proof you have not a single fucking clue.

> You are an anonymous Troll with no real arguments.

You are a dumbass who cannot read, much less understand.


--
What we have here is a failure to communicate.

[Andy Burnelli]

On Tue, 11 Jan 2022 21:23:47 -0500, nospam wrote:

>> The reality is relevant and not your judgement or any whitepapers.
>
> the reality, along with the various white papers which were written by
> the people who designed and implemented it, including ron rivest of rsa
> fame, does not support your baseless and uninformed claims.

What's interesting is how nospam only knows the bullshit that comes out of
Apple's (admittedly brilliant) *TECHNICAL MARKETING* team "white papers."

The _entire world_ knows that Apple's technical marketing team is dancing
around with these very carefully crafted ghost-authored "white papers."

The fact remains that Apple can't even code a web browser without permanent
flaws for heaven's sake; and Apple has _never_ tested iOS code sufficiently
(as proven by Google's Project Zero which they outright stated openly so).

If Apple doesn't even test their webkit code, what makes nospam think that
these surveillance capabilities Apple builds into iOS will ever be tested?

[Andy Burnelli]

On Tue, 11 Jan 2022 21:23:46 -0500, nospam wrote:

> the white papers (plural) were not only from apple.

Point to the white paper you "claim" was written by any other than Apple,
and if it has an Apple URL, then your claim is instant bullshit, nospam.

> both google *and* apple collaborated on the notification system, based
> on work done at mit, led by ron rivest.

There's fundamental research on encryption and then there is an Apple flawed
implementation on the iPhone of that encryption which are different things.\

Apple even fucked up their vaunted secure enclave for heaven's sake, nospam.
And you know that.

> if you think ron rivest is a marketing dude, you are far dumber than
> anyone could possibly have imagined.

Apple did the same thing when they blamed battery chemistry for their sneaky
decision to hide the fact they were secretly throttling batteries.

Overall Apple's decision to openly lie to the public in their _unsigned_
so-called "apology" (which blamed battery chemistry for Apple's own
decisions to shorten the life of certain iPhones) cost them a billion
dollars (admittedly a drop in the bucket for Apple's bottom line).

But the fact Apple openly _lied_ in those "white papers" is what you miss.

[Joerg Lorenz]

Am 12.01.22 um 03:23 schrieb nospam:

That is simply bullshit. That is a claim you will never be able to
substantiate. Tests in Germany showed the exact opposite.

> it's exceptionally rare that someone would go to work, school, stores,
> etc., without their phone.
>
> what killed it is deliberate disinformation from the tinfoil-hat crowd.

*ROTFLSTC*
Anonymous Trolls like you make things even worse. Undifferentiated
boot-licking like you do all the time is undermining such ill-fated
applications even further.

EOD

[Chris]

Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch> wrote:
> Am 08.01.22 um 11:23 schrieb Chris:
>> Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch> wrote:
>>> Am 07.01.22 um 09:23 schrieb Ant:
>>>> Hello.
>>>>
>>>> As of about 12 minutes ago twice (aborted the first attempt to retry), I
>>>> enabled my iPhone 12 mini's iOS v15.2's exposure notification feature
>>>> but it is still stuck with "This may take a few minutes." with its
>>>> circular animation. Does it really take that long after 12 minutes? Is
>>>> it stuck? :(
>>>
>>> Did Apple deactivate it because it is absolutely worthless? Feature not bug?
>>
>> Nope. It's working here.
>
> No. It isn't delivering what is promised.You just do not recognise it.

You're confusing working with functional. I was correcting your statement
that Apple deactivated it.

It hasn't been deactivated and is working as designed.

[Joerg Lorenz]

Am 12.01.22 um 09:04 schrieb Chris:

> Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch> wrote:
>> Am 08.01.22 um 11:23 schrieb Chris:
>>> Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch> wrote:
>>>> Did Apple deactivate it because it is absolutely worthless? Feature not bug?
>>>
>>> Nope. It's working here.
>>
>> No. It isn't delivering what is promised.You just do not recognise it.
>
> You're confusing working with functional. I was correcting your statement
> that Apple deactivated it.

That was an ironic question and not a claim. Pls recalibrate your
irony-sensor.

> It hasn't been deactivated and is working as designed.

The function is working perhaps - albeit I doubt that - as designed. The
problem is it does not deliver the results it was designed for.

[nospam]

In article <srm317$9kk$1...@dont-email.me>, Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch>
wrote:

>

> > It hasn't been deactivated and is working as designed.
>
> The function is working perhaps - albeit I doubt that - as designed. The
> problem is it does not deliver the results it was designed for.

yes it very much does deliver.

the problem is that few people enabled it because they erroneously
believed it was somehow tracking them, making it not as effective as it
could have been. that is not a technical flaw in the system's design.

[nospam]

In article <srltl8$el8$1...@dont-email.me>, Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch>

wrote:


> >> The killer was: The location of people is not equal to the location of a
> >> phone. What is measured is *not* he the exposure of the owner or even
> >> worse the user of the phone. It is just the exposure of the phone in
> >> some cases. But even that is not sure.
> >
> > that is simply false.
> >
> > people normally carry their phones when they're out and in areas where
> > they would encounter a potentially infectious person.
>
> That is simply bullshit. That is a claim you will never be able to
> substantiate. Tests in Germany showed the exact opposite.

what german tests show that people don't carry their phones?

why would anyone buy a mobile phone and then not take it with them?

do you even think about how stupid the shit you say is?

> > it's exceptionally rare that someone would go to work, school, stores,
> > etc., without their phone.
> >
> > what killed it is deliberate disinformation from the tinfoil-hat crowd.
>
> *ROTFLSTC*
> Anonymous Trolls like you make things even worse. Undifferentiated
> boot-licking like you do all the time is undermining such ill-fated
> applications even further.

resorting to ad hominem attacks means you have nothing to back up your
baseless claims.

> EOD

wise move.

[nospam]

In article <srlte2$n6l$1...@gioia.aioe.org>, Andy Burnelli

<sp...@nospam.com> wrote:

>
> > the white papers (plural) were not only from apple.
>
> Point to the white paper you "claim" was written by any other than Apple,
> and if it has an Apple URL, then your claim is instant bullshit, nospam.

as i said, the original work was done at mit.

both apple *and* google implemented it for ios and android devices.

all three have extensive documentation.

also note the list of collaborators, which includes massachusetts
general hospital and several universities, who may have additional
references.

anyone who claims it's only apple (i.e. you) is ignorant and trolling.

here's a mix of overviews and white papers. there are also additional
documents available.

overviews:
<https://news.mit.edu/2020/bluetooth-covid-19-contact-tracing-0409>
A team led by MIT researchers and including experts from many
institutions is developing a system that augments łmanual˛ contact
tracing by public health officials, while preserving the privacy of
all individuals. The system relies on short-range Bluetooth signals
emitted from peopleąs smartphones. These signals represent random
strings of numbers, likened to łchirps˛ that other nearby smartphones
can remember hearing.
...
łI keep track of what Iąve broadcasted, and you keep track of what
youąve heard, and this will allow us to tell if someone was in close
proximity to an infected person,˛ says Ron Rivest, MIT Institute
Professor and principal investigator of the project. łBut for these
broadcasts, weąre using cryptographic techniques to generate random,
rotating numbers that are not just anonymous, but pseudonymous,
constantly changing their ŚID,ą and that canąt be traced back to an
individual.˛
...
łWeąre not tracking location, not using GPS, not attaching your
personal ID or phone number to any of these random numbers your
phone is emitting,˛ says Daniel Weitzner, a principal research
scientist in the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence
Laboratory (CSAIL) and co-principal investigator of this effort.
łWhat we want is to enable everyone to participate in a shared
process of seeing if you might have been in contact, without
revealing, or forcing anyone to reveal, anything.˛
...
Rivest emphasizes that collaboration has made this project possible.
These collaborators include the Massachusetts General Hospital Center
for Global Health, CSAIL, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Boston University,
Brown University, MIT Media Lab, The Weizmann Institute of Science,
and SRI International.

<https://www.google.com/covid19/exposurenotifications/>
Once you opt-in to the notification system, the Exposure
Notifications System will generate a random ID for your device.
To help ensure these random keys canąt be used to identify
you or your location, they change every 10-20 minutes.
...
The Exposure Notifications System does not collect or use the
location from your device. It uses Bluetooth, which can be used
to detect if two devices are near each other ‹ without revealing
where the devices are.


white papers:
<https://pact.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/The-PACT-protocol-speci
fication-2020.pdf>
We describe here the PACT (Private Automated Contact Tracing)
protocol, a simple, decentralized approach to using smartphones for
contact tracing based on Bluetooth proximity. Users of this scheme do
not reveal anything about themselves, unless they volunteer to do so.
In particular, users can volunteer to donate their private data to a
(trusted) health authority, who can then use this data to further
control the spread of the virus, but this is discretionary to the
users.
...
Furthermore, the PACT protocol satisfies the property that ł no
information, aside from these chirp values, ever leaves the userąs
phone without his permission.˛ The privacy of the user is paramount
in the PACT design.

<https://blog.google/documents/69/Exposure_Notification_-_Cryptography_S
pecification_v1.2.1.pdf/>
This document provides the detailed technical specification for
cryptographic key scheduling for a new privacy-preserving Bluetooth
protocol to support Exposure Notification. Exposure Notification
makes it possible to combat the spread of the coronavirus ‹ the
pathogen that causes COVID-19 ‹ by alerting participants about
possible exposure, through someone they have recently been in
contact with who has subsequently been positively diagnosed. This
specification complements the Bluetooth specification, which contains
further information about the scheduling of broadcasts and the
higher- level life cycle of the Bluetooth protocol.
...
€ The key schedule is fixed and defined by operating system
components, preventing applications from including static or
predictable information that could be used for tracking.
€ A Temporary Exposure Key is required to correlate between a
userąs Rolling Proximity Identifiers. This reduces the risk of
privacy loss from broadcasting the identifiers.
€ Without the release of the Temporary Exposure Keys, itąs
computationally infeasible for an attacker to find a collision on a
Rolling Proximity Identifier. This prevents a wide range of replay
and impersonation attacks.
€ When reporting Diagnosis Keys, the correlation of Rolling Proximity
Identifiers by others is limited to 24 hour periods due to the use of
Temporary Exposure Keys that change daily. The server must not retain
metadata from clients uploading Diagnosis Keys after including those
key in the aggregated list of Diagnosis Keys per day.

<https://blog.google/documents/70/Exposure_Notification_-_Bluetooth_Spec
ification_v1.2.2.pdf/>
This document provides the detailed technical specification for a
new privacy-preserving Bluetooth protocol to support Exposure
Notification. Exposure Notification makes it possible to combat the
spread of the coronavirus ‹ the pathogen that causes COVID-19 ‹ by
alerting participants about possible exposure to someone they have
recently been in contact with, who has subsequently been positively
diagnosed as having the virus. The Exposure Notification Service is
the vehicle for implementing exposure notification and uses the
Bluetooth Low Energy wireless technology for proximity detection of
nearby smartphones, and for the data exchange mechanism.
...
Maintaining user privacy is an essential requirement in the design of
this specification. The protocol maintains privacy by the following
means:
€ The Exposure Notification Bluetooth Specification does not use
location for proximity detection. It strictly uses Bluetooth
beaconing to detect proximity.
€ A userąs Rolling Proximity Identifier changes on average every 15
minutes, and needs the Temporary Exposure Key to be correlated to a
contact. This behavior reduces the risk of privacy loss from
broadcasting the identifiers.
€ Proximity identifiers obtained from other devices are processed
exclusively on device.
€ Users decide whether to contribute to exposure notification.
€ If diagnosed with COVID-19, users must provide their consent to
share Diagnosis Keys with the server.
€ Users have transparency into their participation in exposure
notification.

[Lewis]

In message <120120220952079908%nos...@nospam.invalid> nospam <nos...@nospam.invalid> wrote:
> In article <srm317$9kk$1...@dont-email.me>, Joerg Lorenz <hugy...@gmx.ch>
> wrote:

>>
>> > It hasn't been deactivated and is working as designed.
>>
>> The function is working perhaps - albeit I doubt that - as designed. The
>> problem is it does not deliver the results it was designed for.

> yes it very much does deliver.

> the problem is that few people enabled it because they erroneously
> believed it was somehow tracking them

Encouraged by the anti-privacy kooks and the various governments that
tried (and failed spectacularly) to ;roll their own' inferior and
demonstrably shitty anti-privacy methods.

> making it not as effective as it could have been. that is not a
> technical flaw in the system's design.

--
'It must have been Fate that brought you here,' said Twoflower. 'Yes,
it's the sort of thing he likes to do,' said Rincewind.

[Andy Burnelli]

On Wed, 12 Jan 2022 09:52:12 -0500, nospam wrote:

> as i said, the original work was done at mit.

As I said, it doesn't matter where the "original work" was done, as the
original work for the German Enigma didn't matter to all those dead Germans.

The hardware/software implementation is the flaw, nospam... not the theory.
Remember, Apple can't even design a web browser without all those flaws.

> both apple *and* google implemented it for ios and android devices.
> all three have extensive documentation.

Even _without_ documentation, many Japanese sailors & airmen died at Midway
because the Americans broke the "impregnable" (in theory) JN-25b encryption.

Even Apple's vaunted secure enclave has its huge unfixable holes, nospam.
And Apple has plenty of bullshit white papers on that secure enclave crap.

> also note the list of collaborators, which includes massachusetts
> general hospital and several universities, who may have additional
> references.

You don't understand that it isn't the theory which is the weakest point.

>
> anyone who claims it's only apple (i.e. you) is ignorant and trolling.

Only you would claim I said that when I use examples from _history_ nospam.

This happens to be an Apple newsgroup so we're talking here about Apple.
What makes you think Apple _can_ design anything that's secure?

> here's a mix of overviews and white papers. there are also additional
> documents available.

Apple wrote plenty of bullshit papers about the secure enclave nospam.
And yet the secure enclave has unfixable holes you can drive a truck thru.

You don't understand that it isn't the theory which is the weak link.
It's the implementation.

Hackers have stopped accepting zero-day iOS holes for Christ's sake, nospam.
What makes you think Apple _can_ design _anything_ that is secure?

Suffice to say Apple marketing bullshits safety like there is no tomorrow.
And yet, their are so many zero-day holes in iOS that they don't need more.

[Andy Burnelli]

On Wed, 12 Jan 2022 09:52:07 -0500, nospam wrote:

> the problem is that few people enabled it because they erroneously
> believed it was somehow tracking them, making it not as effective as it
> could have been. that is not a technical flaw in the system's design.

The problem that nospam is ignorant of is that even _before_ it was
implemented, they _knew_ they needed unrealistic uptake for it to work well.

Thankfully, there are intelligent people in this world who understand the
flaws in that Apple has _never_ designed a secure "anything" in its history.

Hell, Apple can't even design their own web browser without huge flaws.
Google Project Zero proved Apple doesn't even bother to test their iOS code.

Despite the (admittedly brilliant) marketing bullshit from Apple, what
marketing doesn't tell you is _every_ implementation they have is flawed.

Even the greedy hackers have stopped accepting zero-day iOS holes, nospam.

[Andy Burnelli]

On Wed, 12 Jan 2022 15:53:15 -0000 (UTC), Lewis wrote:

> Encouraged by the anti-privacy kooks and the various governments that
> tried (and failed spectacularly) to ;roll their own' inferior and
> demonstrably shitty anti-privacy methods.

What's interesting is an idiot like Lewis think he knows more than Snowden.

*Snowden warns government surveillance amid COVID-19 could be long lasting*
<https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/snowden-warns-government-surveillance-amid-covid-19-could-be-long-lasting/>

There is nobody who stands for privacy who is _not_ against this
surveillance that both Apple and Google put into our smartphones.