[southnews] UK Iraq war inquiry to get under way
Dave Muller
Iraq war, which opens today, that the invasion was ill-conceived and
that preparations were sabotaged by Tony Blair's government's attempts
to mislead the public.
They were so shocked by the lack of preparation for the aftermath of the
invasion that they believe members of the British and US governments at
the time could be prosecuted for war crimes by breaching the duty
outlined in the Geneva Conventions to safeguard civilians in a conflict.
Official Defense Ministry documents leaked to a British newspaper have
revealed a climate of stark animosity among senior British officers
toward American military commanders after the 2003 invasion of Iraq,
when Britain, as the second-largest troop provider, was cast as the
United States principal ally among about 30 nations constituting the
occupation force
Confidential interviews with British officers returning from Iraq in the
first year after the invasion were emblazoned across the front page of
The Daily Telegraph on Monday. Partial transcripts of the interviews
that appeared in the paper suggested that strains between the two
allies, though known to some degree at the time, were more severe than
previously acknowledged.
Iraq war inquiry to get under way
BBC NEWS: 2009/11/24 02:50:32 GMT
The Iraq war inquiry is to begin its public hearings later, with top
civil servants and a former spy chief giving evidence on the conflict's
origins.
The investigation, looking at the whole period from 2001 to 2009, is
expected to last months, with a report not out until after the next
general election.
Former Prime Minister Tony Blair will be among the future witnesses.
Tuesday's session looks at UK foreign policy towards Iraq in the lead-up
to the war, which began in 2003.
The Iraq inquiry will begin with a statement from its chairman, Sir John
Chilcot.
It will then hear from figures including Sir Peter Ricketts, who was the
chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) - which oversees MI5,
MI6 and GCHQ - from 2000 to 2001.
Others giving evidence are former senior Ministry of Defence official
Simon Webb and ex-Foreign Office officials Sir Michael Wood and Sir
William Patey.
Controversial dossier
The members of the committee were chosen by Downing Street, leading
critics to ask whether it can be independent of the government.
But Sir John has promised the inquiry will not produce a "whitewash".
On Wednesday, the panel will hear from former senior Foreign Office
staff on the claims that Saddam Hussein's regime possessed "weapons of
mass destruction".
Over the coming weeks the inquiry is expected to hear from a succession
of diplomats, military officers and politicians, including Mr Blair, who
is due to appear early in the new year.
Sir John Scarlett, the former chief of MI6 who - as chairman of the JIC
- drew up the Government's controversial dossier on Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction, is also due to give evidence to the five-strong
inquiry panel.
The war resulted in the deaths of 179 UK forces personnel.
Previously, the Butler inquiry looked at intelligence failures before
the war, while the Hutton inquiry examined the circumstances leading to
the death of former government adviser David Kelly.
Sir John Chilcot has said he hopes to complete his final report by the
end of next year, although he has warned it could slip into 2011.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8375439.stm
_____________________________________________
U.K. Documents Show Friction With U.S. on Iraq
By JOHN F.
New York Times : November 23, 2009
LONDON Official Defense Ministry documents leaked to a British
newspaper have revealed a climate of stark animosity among senior
British officers toward American military commanders after the 2003
invasion of Iraq, when Britain, as the second-largest troop provider,
was cast as the United States principal ally among about 30 nations
constituting the occupation force
Confidential interviews with British officers returning from Iraq in the
first year after the invasion were emblazoned across the front page of
The Daily Telegraph on Monday. Partial transcripts of the interviews
that appeared in the paper suggested that strains between the two
allies, though known to some degree at the time, were more severe than
previously acknowledged.
The Telegraphs report revealed that British officers refusal to carry
out American orders resulted in a formal State Department rebuke in 2004
to Britains ambassador in Washington, Sir David Manning.
The newspaper quoted the British commander in southern Iraq at the time,
Maj. Gen. Andrew Stewart, as saying he spent a significant amount of my
time consenting and evading U.S. orders to take military action
against a powerful Shiite militia in the south, and engaging in
negotiation instead.
Col. J. K. Tanner, chief of staff to General Stewart until June 2004 in
the British divisional headquarters in the southern city of Basra, was
quoted in the transcripts as saying that British commanders found that
the Americans then in overall command in Baghdad, led by Lt. Gen.
Ricardo S. Sanchez, were resistant to dialogue and negotiation over
military strategy and other issues, to the point of arrogance and an
insensitivity the colonel compared to dealing with a group of Martians.
The whole system was appalling, Colonel Tanner said. We experienced
real difficulty in dealing with the American military and civilian
organizations who, partly through arrogance and partly through
bureaucracy, dictate that there is only one way: the American way.
He added, Despite our so-called special relationship, I reckon that
we were treated no differently to the Portuguese.
Elsewhere in the transcript, the colonel pressed the point. Speaking of
the Americans, he said: They need to reintroduce dialogue as a tool of
command because, although it is easy to speak to Americans face to face
and understand each other completely, dealing with them corporately is
akin to dealing with a group of Martians. If it isnt on the PowerPoint
slide, it doesnt happen.
The transcripts quoted by The Telegraph were part of a cache of
documents leaked to the paper before an official inquiry into the Iraq
conflict opens public hearings in London on Tuesday. The inquiry is led
by a retired official, Sir John Chilcot, formerly the highest-ranking
civil servant in the Northern Ireland Office.
Critics have said that Prime Minister Gordon Browns choice of a
Whitehall insider to head the inquiry has doomed it to becoming a
whitewash, but Sir John has vowed to investigate all aspects of a war
that became deeply unpopular in Britain, hastening the withdrawal of the
last British troops in July.
The inquiry is expected to last at least 18 months, beginning with
testimony from some of the most powerful figures involved in Britains
decision to join the invasion, including former Prime Minister Tony
Blair, who was President George W. Bushs principal international
partner in launching the war.
Some of the most explosive revelations are expected to come from the
inquirys power to summon, and to publish where it chooses, official
documents like those disclosed by The Telegraph.
The documents obtained by The Telegraph show that the strains in Iraq
reached a peak in April 2004 when General Sanchez, the American
commander, ordered the arrest in Baghdad of a powerful follower of the
Shiite leader Moktada al-Sadr.
Mr. Sadr responded by staging an uprising against American troops in
Baghdad and Najaf, a Shiite holy city 100 miles south of the capital,
that led to one of the most violent chapters in the war.
In the south, the documents show, American commanders ordered the
British to launch offensive operations against the Sadr militia, but
British commanders responded instead by negotiating with local Shiite
leaders.
This led to a showdown in Basra between General Sanchez and British
commanders, who argued that Britains colonial experience had taught
that occupying powers had to govern restive populations as they found
them, not to try to eliminate popular leaders like Mr. Sadr.
The confrontation between the two nations militaries was etched out
starkly in the Telegraph documents. Brig. Bruce Brealey, Britains chief
of operations support in Basra in the second half of 2003, was quoted as
telling debriefers that when American orders reached the British, we
noted the intent but tended to ignore the detail. He added, We would
follow the what, and often ignore the how. General Stewart, in a
similar vein, said that when he evaded American orders to take military
action, it was because he believed that using negotiation could achieve
the same result using different means.
The bitterness persisted deep into the war, with American commanders
accusing the British of appeasing the Shiite militias that ultimately
took control of Basra, and the British accusing the Americans of
resorting too readily to force in cities like Falluja. The
recriminations eased only after 2007, when American commanders under
Gen. David H. Petraeus adopted new counterinsurgency tactics that
British officers saw as drawing partly on lessons Britain had learned in
earlier conflicts, leading British officers to say that the Americans
had finally grasped lessons missed at the outset of the war.
Elisabeth Bumiller contributed reporting from Washington.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/24/world/europe/24london.html
___________________________________________
Five key questions to be answered
* Richard Norton-Taylor
* guardian.co.uk, Monday 23 November 2009 23.26 GMT
1 What assurances did Tony Blair give George Bush about Britain's
involvement in the war with Iraq?
The overriding factor that took Britain into war is a crucial secret the
Chilcot inquiry could unlock. Key could be what assurances Tony Blair
gave George Bush in a series of bilateral meetings, notably at the
president's ranch in Crawford, Texas, in April 2002. One leaked
classified document reveals that two months later, Whitehall officials
noted: "When the prime minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at
Crawford in April, he said that the UK would support military action to
bring about regime change." But asked in July 2002 about whether the
government was preparing for military action, Blair told MPs: "No. There
are no decisions which have been taken about military action."
2 Was Tony Blair warned by Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, and
Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, that regime change was not a lawful
justification for invasion? And what happened between 7 March and 17
March 2003 to make Goldsmith change his views about the legality of an
invasion?
Blair took decisions with a small group of close advisers, described by
the Butler review as "sofa government". The role of these advisers,
notably Lord Falconer and Lady (Sally) Morgan, in persuading Blair that
the invasion was lawful is yet to be resolved. Did the government have
to conjure up another reason to invade Iraq, for example the assertion
that Saddam refused to give up weapons of mass destruction?
3 Why did the intelligence agencies allow themselves to be used?
Although the review by the former cabinet secretary Lord Butler
considered how intelligence was used and abused, it did not fully answer
the question of why. Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6, told
ministers in July 2002 that in the US "intelligence and facts were being
fixed around the policy". The Butler review did not pursue this on the
grounds that Dearlove was talking about US intelligence agencies, not
the British.
4 Did the government delay military preparations?
A crucial question is the extent to which, for political and diplomatic
reasons, the government delayed military preparations. Did this lead, as
military commanders have said, to a shortage of equipment, including
body armour, for British troops and the need to rely on unnecessarily
expensive "urgent operational requirements"?
5 What plans were made for Iraq after the invasion?
Bush told Blair in January 2003 he "thought it unlikely that there would
be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic
groups" in Iraq after an invasion. But Blair's response is unknown.
Cabinet Office officials told ministers in July 2002 that a "postwar
occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building
exercise".
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/nov/23/chilcot-inquiry-questions
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