ESSAY SUBMISSION: The_single_alter_fallacy._A_critique_of_Bernardo-Kastrup's_ontology

[Adur Alkain]

(This is only a first draft. I deliberately have used some provocative phrasing, categorically labelling some of Bernardo's ideas as "fallacies" and using expressions like "this is obviously absurd". I just did it like this because I was having such fun. I hope it is clear that this "critique" is nothing but a tribute to Bernardo's inspiring work. I also think that this is a good time for posting this. I just watched Bernardo's defense of his thesis, and I was excited to see that one of the professors (Prof. Coleman, I think is his name... he was the third in line) raised some of the same questions I'm raising here.)

The single alter fallacy. A critique of Bernardo Kastrup's ontology

Bernardo Kastrup’s case for idealism, as expounded most recently in his book The Idea of the World (2019) and his doctoral dissertation “Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology.” (2019), constitutes without doubt a monumental intellectual achievement, and an important contribution to contemporary philosophy. Kastrup’s arguments for idealism and against the current dominant paradigm of physicalism are so powerful and compelling that it is no longer inconceivable that idealism might displace materialism/physicalism as the dominant ontology in Western philosophy and science in the not so distant future. The urgent need for this paradigm shift, given our current civilizational and ecological crisis, endows Bernardo Kastrup’s body of work with the utmost relevance.

That said, Bernardo Kastrup’s version of idealism presents some problems that (in my view) diminish its potential as the ontology of the future. Most of these problems can be reduced to a fundamental error that we can call “the single alter fallacy”. The purpose of this essay is to elucidate this fallacy, showing its deep implications.

The single alter fallacy

In The Idea of the World, Bernardo Kastrup describes the hypothetical origin of alters in consciousness (here called TWE, “that which experiences”) in the following fashion:

“(...) before its first alter ever formed, TWE experienced only thoughts. There were no perceptions. The formation of the first alter then demarcated a boundary separating the experiences within the alter from those outside the alter (all of which were, of course, still within TWE). This newly formed boundary is what enabled perceptions to arise: the thoughts surrounding the alter stimulated its boundary from the outside, which in turn impinged on the alter’s internal dynamics.”

(Kastrup, Bernardo. The Idea of the World (p. 74). John Hunt Publishing. Kindle Edition.)

Figure 1: The single alter fallacy (Kastrup, 2019, "Analytic Idealism".)

The fallacy here resides in the idea of a single alter (beginning with the “first alter”), separated by a boundary from the “outside world” (this outside world being constituted by the “thoughts” or non-dissociated experiences of TWE or “cosmic consciousness”). In reality, it is not possible to have a single alter. Alters can only exist as a multiplicity. The minimum number is two. Either there are multiple alters, or there is none.

The crucial point is this: the boundary that demarcates an alter doesn’t separate it from a hypothetical “outside world” (there is no such thing as an outside world), but from other alters. All boundaries are boundaries between alters.

Figure 2: Dissociation creates a boundary between at least two alters.

Like Bernardo Kastrup explains, without alters there can be no perceptions. Before the formation of alters there were only thoughts (following Bernardo Kastrup’s terminology, the word “thought” refers here to any experience distinct from perception), the thoughts of the unified, non-dissociated consciousness. Only when consciousness divided itself in two, giving rise to the first two alters, did perceptions arise.

The only difference between thoughts and perceptions is that thoughts are private, while perceptions are collective. The thoughts of Alter 1 and Alter 2 are independent of each other, but the perceptions of Alter 1 and Alter 2 are connected: borrowing a term from quantum physics, we can say that the perceptions of all alters are entangled.

Let’s try to imagine a single alter. Could this single alter have perceptions? The only way we can carry out this thought experiment is by imagining that we are that single alter. So, let’s say that I am the only alter in the universe, and that right now I’m experiencing myself as a man walking through a forest. I can see the trees, insects, birds, maybe a deer, but none of those are alters. They don’t have consciousness. I am the only one who is experiencing this forest. Is this experience different from a dream? No, it isn’t. I am having a dream. I am not perceiving anything. That forest exists only in my mind. All my experiences of this forest are thoughts. This simply means that I am not really an alter. I may experience myself as a man in a forest, but both the forest and the man are just thoughts in my mind.

But let’s imagine that I decide to dissociate myself, to split my consciousness into two. As I walk through the forest I suddenly encounter another human being. Let’s say this other being is a woman. And she too has consciousness. She experiences the forest too, from a different point of view. All our experiences are consistent. If I see a rock here, or a tree, or a pond, she sees it too. And vice versa. Now we are having perceptions. She and I are dissociated alters.

This simple thought experiment shows that it is necessary to have at least two alters for perceptions to arise. We can say that dissociation of consciousness into at least two different points of view (alters) is what gave rise to the physical world in the first place.

Having explained this “single alter fallacy”, we can now analyse its far-reaching implications. Closely connected to the erroneous notion of a single alter are two other fallacies, both deeply ingrained in Bernardo Kastrup’s ontology: we can call them the “local fallacy” and the “second-person fallacy”.

The local fallacy

In Bernardo Kastrup’s view, as we have seen, the boundaries that demarcate alters create a separation between the experiences within the alters and the experiences outside them. This distinction between inner and outer experiences implies the idea that alters are localized bubbles of dissociated consciousness surrounded by non-dissociated consciousness (“mind-at-large”). In other words, consciousness is imagined as a sort of space in which alters exist. Different alters are located in different points of this space, in the same way as in classical (Newtonian) physics material objects were thought to be located in an absolute three-dimensional space.

Figure 3: The local fallacy (Kastrup, 2019, "Analytic Idealism".)

In this view, which we can call “local idealism”, alters are seen as disconnected from each other. Their perceptions of the physical world are caused by the thoughts of a hypothetical non-dissociated cosmic consciousness or “mind-at-large”. This universal mind surrounds and contains alters in the same way as in physicalism the physical world is supposed to contain material objects, including conscious observers.

In reality, there is no such thing as a non-dissociated universal mind or “mind-at-large”. This “mind-at-large” is nothing but an explanatory abstraction. Kastrup falls into the same error he accurately points out as the fundamental fallacy of physicalism: to postulate the existence of a hypothetical objective reality “out there”, as the explanation for a) the fact that we all seem to perceive the same world and b) the regularity and consistency of our perceptions. Kastrup goes as far as to propose that the laws of physics are the thoughts of this hypothetical non-dissociated universal consciousness. This error is a direct result of the single alter fallacy.

Once we realize that dissociation is nothing but the split of consciousness into a multiplicity of alters, we can see that we don’t need any explanatory abstractions (no notions of an objective reality existing outside our experience) to account for the aforementioned facts. We all perceive the same world simply because we are dissociated alters of the same consciousness. Our separation is only relative and apparent: it exists only on the level of perceptions. On a deeper level, we are one. We are one consciousness. The regularity and consistency of our perceptions (the laws of physics) are the result of the simple fact that we all are dreaming the same collective dream. We are constantly creating the physical world with our perceptions. These perceptions have to be mutually consistent in order for us to dream the same dream. If that consistency failed, we would fall into the realm of individual dreams or hallucinations. Our individual perceptions constantly influence and interact with each other. This is what physicists call entanglement. The laws of physics are the laws of perception. Perception is entangled experience.

Figure 4: The world according to nonlocal idealism. The perceptions of all alters are entangled.

We can call this view “nonlocal idealism”. In nonlocal idealism, there is no notion of a world “out there”. There is no distinction between “inner” and “outer” experiences. All experiences happen in consciousness. Consciousness has no spatial qualities. Space exists only on the level of perception. The only difference between our thoughts (dreams, fantasies, philosophical abstractions, etc.) and our perceptions of the physical world is that our perceptions are entangled with the perceptions of all other alters. The physical world is nothing but our perceptions. We don’t need to postulate any “objective” (and essentially unknowable) reality outside our perceptions to explain the regularity and consistency of these. Entanglement, which is not an explanatory abstraction but an observable fact, provides sufficient explanation.

The second-person fallacy

The last fallacy we are going to discuss in this short essay is the idea that consciousness can be experienced from a second-person perspective. In Bernardo Kastrup’s analytic idealism (or local idealism, as it could accurately be called), when an alter (A1) perceives the body of another alter (A2), A1 is having an “extrinsic view of the inner experiences of A2”. In other words, A1 is having a second-person experience of the first-person experiences of A2.

Figure 5: The second-person fallacy (Kastrup, 2019, "Analytic Idealism")

This notion is obviously absurd. It is not possible to have conscious experiences from a second-person perspective. Consciousness can only be experienced from a first-person perspective.

We can see this clearly if we recall the Mars rover metaphor. When we see the Mars rover, we are not seeing in any way the conscious experiences of the scientists using the rover to explore Mars. Analogously, when we see the bodies of other conscious beings we don’t perceive their conscious experiences. We just perceive their bodies, which are part of the physical world, and therefore consist solely of first-person perceptions (the entangled perceptions of all alters perceiving those bodies, including the alters that inhabit them). There is no such thing as the extrinsic appearance of a conscious experience.

We may infer the inner experiences of another human being by looking at the expression of their faces (we can’t do the same with plants and most animals), but that’s only a logical deduction. We may also experience states of deep connection with other human beings, in which we feel we share their emotions. These are instances in which the dissociative boundaries between alters become transparent and we get glimpses of the underlying oneness. All these experiences are only accessible from a first-person perspective.

It is important to remember that alters are not part of the physical world. There is no such thing as the extrinsic appearance of an alter. Alters perceive, but they can’t be perceived. Alters are dissociations of consciousness, and as such, exist only as consciousness. The physical world exists inside alters (in the form of perceptions), not the other way round.

Nonlocal Idealism

As we have shown, nonlocal idealism (the view proposed in this essay) is more parsimonious than Bernardo Kastrup’s analytic (or local) idealism. In nonlocal idealism we don’t add any explanatory abstractions (like a hypothetical non-dissociated universal consciousness or “mind-at-large” whose thoughts are the cause of the laws of nature and of all our perceptions) to the only empirical facts about the physical world: our own perceptions.

It remains to be seen how nonlocal idealism compares with local idealism in terms of explanatory power. We have already shown that nonlocal idealism explains in a parsimonious, elegant manner two of the basic facts which traditionally have been considered the most powerful arguments in favour of physicalism: a) the fact that we all seem to inhabit the same world, and b) the fact that the physical world behaves in a regular, predictable fashion, independent from our personal volition.

Let’s briefly consider these two facts again. According to nonlocal idealism, the physical world is a collective dream. We are constantly creating it with our perceptions. The reason why we all perceive the same world, why we all share the same dream, is that underneath our superficial dissociation we are all one: we are one consciousness.

As for the regularity and predictability of the physical world (in other words, of our perceptions), it is accounted for by the fact that this world is a shared dream. All regularities in nature can be deduced from the fundamental entanglement of all conscious observers (alters), including all living organisms. Entanglement also explains why our perceptions are independent from our personal volition. The laws of perception (i.e., the laws of physics) are the necessary condition for the existence of the collective dream (i.e., the physical world). On a fundamental level, these laws are the result of nonlocal entanglement.

Let’s examine now a third fact that is often proposed as evidence for physicalism: the correlation between brain activity and inner experience. From the perspective of nonlocal idealism, this correlation can be explained quite simply. Our brains, like the rest of our bodies, are physical objects. As such, they are the result of billions of years of evolution constrained by the laws of perception (the laws of physics). Our nervous system, which includes our sense organs and our brain, enables our consciousness to perceive the collective dream (the physical world) in particular ways. Our sense organs and brains don’t generate our perceptions, but they act as a conduit for them. Our eyes and visual cortex, for example, play the same role as the cameras and radio transmitters on a Mars rover. The actual experience of seeing doesn’t happen in the brain (in the same way that no experience happens inside the Mars rover), but in consciousness. Our bodies, including our brains, function as an interface between our consciousness and the physical world.

When it comes to thoughts (experiences distinct from perceptions), we can safely say that the brain doesn’t generate thoughts (or any other experience), but that it does generate the content of those thoughts. We can hypothesize, for example, that the same brain areas that function as a transmitting interface between our sense organs and our consciousness can generate visual and other sensory images during dreams, hallucinations or visualizations. The crucial point is that the brain generates or arranges the content of our conscious experiences, but not the experiences themselves. The experiencing awareness is a quality of consciousness, which is the fundamental and ultimate reality, the ontological primitive.

This may sound as a kind of dualism, but since we have defined the physical world (which includes brains) as the sum of the perceptions of all alters, we can see that we are not contradicting in any way our monistic, idealistic ontology. Our brains are nothing but a very sophisticated arrangement of conscious perceptions, the result of billions of years of evolution, as part of this vast experiment in dissociated experience or collective dreaming created by consciousness, this amazing research project we call the physical universe.

[Bernardo]

Hi Adur,

In reality, it is not possible to have a single alter. Alters can only exist as a multiplicity. The minimum number is two. Either there are multiple alters, or there is none.

Yes, but that is a trivial issue of terminology. 'Mind at large' is, technically, also an alter, though at a completely different scale. So I reserved the use of the word 'alter' to the scale of living creatures. But, again, mind-at-large is technically an alter.

The only difference between thoughts and perceptions is that thoughts are private, while perceptions are collective. 

Not really. 'Thoughts,' as the word is used in this part of the book, are endogenous, arising within the dissociative boundary of the respective alter (or mind-at-large). Perceptions, on the other hand, are triggered by experiential states beyond the boundary of the respective alter. They are not defined in terms of consensus at all.

Let’s try to imagine a single alter. Could this single alter have perceptions? The only way we can carry out this thought experiment is by imagining that we are that single alter. So, let’s say that I am the only alter in the universe, and that right now I’m experiencing myself as a man walking through a forest. I can see the trees, insects, birds, maybe a deer, but none of those are alters. They don’t have consciousness. I am the only one who is experiencing this forest. Is this experience different from a dream? No, it isn’t. I am having a dream. I am not perceiving anything. That forest exists only in my mind. All my experiences of this forest are thoughts. This simply means that I am not really an alter. I may experience myself as a man in a forest, but both the forest and the man are just thoughts in my mind.

Clearly I lost you in my argument. If there is an alter there is also mind-at-large (i.e. a second, 'very big alter'), or the rest of universal consciousness beyond the dissociative boundary of the one alter. My perceptions would then correspond to experiential states of mind-at-large. I would see no living beings (no birds or trees), only an inanimate universe. Now, you can argue that such an 'inanimate' universe is just another, unfathomably huge 'alter.' That would be correct, but also trivial in the context of the argument. I just use the word 'alter' at a given scale, for ease of discourse.

In reality, there is no such thing as a non-dissociated universal mind or “mind-at-large”. This “mind-at-large” is nothing but an explanatory abstraction. Kastrup falls into the same error he accurately points out as the fundamental fallacy of physicalism

This seems like an entirely arbitrary statement to me.

We all perceive the same world simply because we are dissociated alters of the same consciousness.

Yes, indeed. This is what I say...

The regularity and consistency of our perceptions (the laws of physics) are the result of the simple fact that we all are dreaming the same collective dream.

The only interpretation of this that would make it different from what I am claiming is this: at a deeper level we are all connected, like branches of a single tree, and a dream is broadcast to each branch from the root of tree, so to speak, with some perspectival adjustments. This doesn't work for reasons I discuss in the 'closing commentary' of the book: it cannot explain why we see other alters around. If each of us is a TV to which a common 'dream' is broadcast, why to we see representations of other TVs within our dream? The broadcast idea implies one-way communication from the root of consciousness to the branches. But clearly we see other alters around ourselves as well. If, in turn, you say that communication is actually two-way and can happen locally, then the whole thing will boil down to what I am saying already, even if you prefer a different metaphor for it.

The last fallacy we are going to discuss in this short essay is the idea that consciousness can be experienced from a second-person perspective. ... This notion is obviously absurd. It is not possible to have conscious experiences from a second-person perspective. Consciousness can only be experienced from a first-person perspective.

Oh well. Here you seem to be ignoring my explanations. Each time I see, touch and talk to my girlfriend I am experiencing her conscious inner-life from a second-person perspective, in the sense I explain it: what I see, hear and touch are the extrinsic appearance of her inner states, as conveyed to me through mind-at-large. To deny that when I see, talk and touch to another human being I am interacting, indirectly, with the other person's conscious inner life is obviously false.

Anyway, I understand the rest of your essay follows from the arguments I commented on above, so I will stop here.

I'd encourage you to read my material again.

Cheers, Bernardo.

[Dana Lomas]

Once again, it seems that the inherent limitations of language and our time-bound perspective trips us up in the very conceiving of some state prior to, and exclusive of M@L's self-excitation and/or individuation. Please excuse my repetition here, as I copy and paste from another thread, in which I ponder how such a state could possibly exist ... The sole Subject  -- Consciousness -- can only have a phenomenal experience of itself as form by way of some apparent subject/object dynamic -- e.g. It self-excitates, and also individuates into an aware self-referencing locus of itself experiencing those seemingly objectified 'excitations.'  Absent such a dynamic, no self-excitation/no individuation/no self-referencing, there are no phenomena to be experienced. There is only the state of being the sole Subject, utterly empty of form. However, if it is the immanent nature of Consciousness to self-excitate/individuate, and that too is fundamental and unpreventable, having no point of origin or causation other than forever-now, then any such state of being the sole Subject utterly absent phenomenal experience becomes a moot point, for there can be no exclusive abidance as that state, as it can only ever succumb to Its immanent self-perpetual dynamic. Thus, in searching for One's essential nature, look no further than now/here .. or nowhere, if preferred :)  In the words of Ramana Maharshi (paraphrasing): "There is no greater mystery than this: being Reality ourselves, we seek to attain Reality."

[Lou Gold]

Dana,

Are you saying that self-excitation by M@L is mental masturbation?  :-)))

[Dana Lomas]

Lou ... I prefer to think of it as auto-erotic Self-love :))

[Lou Gold]

Dana,

Either way, it's undoubtedly stimulating. Why then might one or One prefer a quiet mind?

[Dana Lomas]

Well, in any given moment, relatively speaking, one might prefer stillness, or excitation, but the expectation of some exclusive abidance as one or the other seems problematic.

[Lou Gold]

I suspect or at least entertain the possibility that novel excitations emerge just to see how the kids will respond, knowing full well that innovations result overwhelmingly in failure. It's not randomness, just the way falsifiability works. 

[Dana Lomas]

Lou ... Something to ponder ... But not wanting to drift too far from the core point of the essay, I'll leave it at that ... unless Adur wishes to venture down that road.

[Lou Gold]

Dana,

Yes, I agree. I just thought these questions pop up with the notion of multiple alters. Perhaps there will be an opportunity to get into them elsewhere. Enuf for now.

[Adur Alkain]

Thanks for responding so quickly, Bernardo!

I went back and re-read the "Closing commentary" of The Idea of the World. I must admit I had skipped the section called "Alternative formulations of dissociation-based idealism" because I thought it was a literal reproduction of the section under the same title in your dissertation, which I had already read. Thus, I had missed this sentence: "I have taken the trouble to explore this defunct formulation here for the following reason: in my experience, many intelligent people who hear the idealist adage ‘reality is akin to a collective dream’ try to construe its meaning along the general outline of this formulation." This, combined with the questions some of the professors made during your defense, gives me the reassuring impression that I may be into something here... it also makes me feel that I'm one of those "intelligent people"! Haha

That said, I don't feel you really responded to my objections here, but the reason is that I'm sure I didn't make my points sufficiently clear. So, let me explain myself better: I am not denying the inner consistency and explanatory power of your ontology. As I said, I think it's a monumental achievement. I simply feel that it isn't convincing enough to turn the tables. I didn't make this clear in my "essay", but my purpose is only to point out why I think your ontology isn't convincing enough, and to suggest a more viable (in my opinion, of course) alternative.

By the way, from your defense video I got the impression that the professors weren't convinced either, but that they certainly were impressed. In any case, that's what I feel. I just think that with a little tweaking your ontology would not only be impressive in its scope and depth, but also more compelling.

I will respond to your comments below.

On Thursday, 2 May 2019 12:07:33 UTC+2, Bernardo wrote:

Hi Adur,

In reality, it is not possible to have a single alter. Alters can only exist as a multiplicity. The minimum number is two. Either there are multiple alters, or there is none.

Yes, but that is a trivial issue of terminology. 'Mind at large' is, technically, also an alter, though at a completely different scale. So I reserved the use of the word 'alter' to the scale of living creatures. But, again, mind-at-large is technically an alter.

I don't think this is a trivial question. What I'm saying is that there is no mind-at-large. My point is that, once dissociation happens, mind-at-large (non-dissociated universal consciousness) ceases to exist. I remember you saying in your thesis defense that in DID cases there seems to be a "host personality". I don't know if that's the case, and I'm not sure what it means (what is the difference between the host personality and the other alters?), but there is a fundamental difference between alters and mind-at-large, isn't it? Saying that mind-at-large is technically an alter is a trivial use of terminology, though! The question here is: does mind-at-large exist?

 

The only difference between thoughts and perceptions is that thoughts are private, while perceptions are collective. 

Not really. 'Thoughts,' as the word is used in this part of the book, are endogenous, arising within the dissociative boundary of the respective alter (or mind-at-large). Perceptions, on the other hand, are triggered by experiential states beyond the boundary of the respective alter. They are not defined in terms of consensus at all.

I perfectly understand how you define perceptions, as opposed to thoughts. I am just proposing a different definition here. Note that your definition rests on the idea of the existence of mind-at-large. If there is no mind-at-large. and if there are only dissociated alters (that's the view I'm proposing) there is nothing beyond the boundary of an alter but other alters.

 

Let’s try to imagine a single alter. Could this single alter have perceptions? The only way we can carry out this thought experiment is by imagining that we are that single alter. So, let’s say that I am the only alter in the universe, and that right now I’m experiencing myself as a man walking through a forest. I can see the trees, insects, birds, maybe a deer, but none of those are alters. They don’t have consciousness. I am the only one who is experiencing this forest. Is this experience different from a dream? No, it isn’t. I am having a dream. I am not perceiving anything. That forest exists only in my mind. All my experiences of this forest are thoughts. This simply means that I am not really an alter. I may experience myself as a man in a forest, but both the forest and the man are just thoughts in my mind.

Clearly I lost you in my argument. If there is an alter there is also mind-at-large (i.e. a second, 'very big alter'), or the rest of universal consciousness beyond the dissociative boundary of the one alter. My perceptions would then correspond to experiential states of mind-at-large. I would see no living beings (no birds or trees), only an inanimate universe. Now, you can argue that such an 'inanimate' universe is just another, unfathomably huge 'alter.' That would be correct, but also trivial in the context of the argument. I just use the word 'alter' at a given scale, for ease of discourse.

You are right, Bernardo, I can see now that my thought experiment doesn't work within the parameters of your definition of alters. Given your definition of what an alter is, a single alter would only witness an inanimate universe. Still, I can't see in what meaningful way a single alter surrounded by an inanimate universe would be an alter. Let's say this alter is watching stars. Where is the dissociation? You need to postulate from the beginning that stars are the extrinsic appearance of something else, something we can't even begin to imagine, the inner life of this hypothetical mind-at-large. So, even if my thought experiment doesn't work as such, I think it serves to show that my definition of alters is more intuitive and parsimonious. I can't imagine that mysterious mind-at-large, or how and why dissociation began. If you are correct, and mind-at-large exists, its inner experience is fundamentally different from ours. If I'm correct, the primordial non-dissociated consciousness would be essentially identical to ours. This primordial consciousness would have dreams, like we do, and at some point would decide to dissociate itself into different alters, different points of view, just to make the dream more interesting... Alan Watts has some beautiful talks about this kind of idea. Some may find it naive, but it makes sense. Contrary to what some scientists seem to think, I believe that an intuitive theory is always preferable to a counter-intuitive one, especially if it works better and is more consistent with the empirical facts!

 

In reality, there is no such thing as a non-dissociated universal mind or “mind-at-large”. This “mind-at-large” is nothing but an explanatory abstraction. Kastrup falls into the same error he accurately points out as the fundamental fallacy of physicalism

This seems like an entirely arbitrary statement to me.

Well, again, I was being deliberately provocative. But given that we have no direct experience of this mind-at--large (we have no idea how it is like to be that mind-at-large), I think it's just that: an explanatory abstraction. I completely agree with you in that consciousness is the ontological primitive and the most basic fact in our expereince, but this mind-at-large is only an abstraction. Can you explain to me why you think it isn't?

 

We all perceive the same world simply because we are dissociated alters of the same consciousness.

Yes, indeed. This is what I say...

The regularity and consistency of our perceptions (the laws of physics) are the result of the simple fact that we all are dreaming the same collective dream.

The only interpretation of this that would make it different from what I am claiming is this: at a deeper level we are all connected, like branches of a single tree, and a dream is broadcast to each branch from the root of tree, so to speak, with some perspectival adjustments. This doesn't work for reasons I discuss in the 'closing commentary' of the book: it cannot explain why we see other alters around. If each of us is a TV to which a common 'dream' is broadcast, why to we see representations of other TVs within our dream? The broadcast idea implies one-way communication from the root of consciousness to the branches. But clearly we see other alters around ourselves as well. If, in turn, you say that communication is actually two-way and can happen locally, then the whole thing will boil down to what I am saying already, even if you prefer a different metaphor for it.

I claim that there is another possible interpretation: yes, we are all connected on a deeper level (I think true emotions like love and compassion arise from that deeper level), but the dream is not generated on that deep level. The collective dream is co-created simultaneously by all alters. Communication is not two-way, but "zillions-way": it happens between all alters. This is what I call entanglement, and as far as I can see is consistent with the findings of quantum physics. In chapter 6 of your book you propose a very sophisticated and complex way of reconciling your ontology with quantum mechanics, but I think my hypothesis (that entanglement precludes solipsism) is more simple and parsimonious.

 

The last fallacy we are going to discuss in this short essay is the idea that consciousness can be experienced from a second-person perspective. ... This notion is obviously absurd. It is not possible to have conscious experiences from a second-person perspective. Consciousness can only be experienced from a first-person perspective.

Oh well. Here you seem to be ignoring my explanations. Each time I see, touch and talk to my girlfriend I am experiencing her conscious inner-life from a second-person perspective, in the sense I explain it: what I see, hear and touch are the extrinsic appearance of her inner states, as conveyed to me through mind-at-large. To deny that when I see, talk and touch to another human being I am interacting, indirectly, with the other person's conscious inner life is obviously false.

I'm not ignoring your explanations, Bernardo! I'm simply saying that even if they are consistent and ingenious (by the way, I'm sorry I said your theory is absurd... I don't think it is, I think it's very ingenious and original) I don't think they quite do the trick. But I didn't really explain why I think this, so I'll try to do it here:

1. When you see your girlfriend I'm sure you can sense her inner states in some way, but I believe this is only possible because you are connected on a deeper level, not on the level of perceptions. You can talk to her on the phone and still feel her state, even if she isn't talking. That has nothing to do with perceptions but with a deeper connection (I'm sure you are familiar with Rupert Sheldrake's work about telepathy, etc.). Let's use another example: Clint Eastwood. Mr. Eastwood's face looks exactly the same, whatever his inner state is.

2. What you say about interacting with another human being doesn't hold up. If you watch a video of that human being, for example, there is no interaction, but still the extrinsic appearance of that person will be the same.

3. If your theory is correct, out-of-body experiences (like in near death experiences) are not possible.

3. I think a big problem with your idea is that it seems to ignore all that science says about how our bodies function. For example, scientists seem to have a fair understanding of how our eyes work, of how the cells in the retina detect light and those signals are transmitted through the optic nerve into the visual cortex, etc. Your notion of bodies as the extrinsic appearance of inner states seems to fly against all that. In my view, our bodies are like instruments or vehicles used by consciousness to perceive and interact with the physical world. The Mars rover is a very good analogy, in my view.

4. Probably the main problem of your theory is what one of the professors (the only woman among them) pointed out: you rightly claim that your ontology solves the "hard problem of consciousness", but then (unnecessarily, in my view) you introduce a new "hard problem". You rightly say that it's impossible to reduce consciousness to physical quantities like mass, spin, momentum, etc. But then, you say that matter is the extrinsic appearance of inner experience. How can you reduce spin, mass, momentum, to inner experience? This seems quite a hard problem to me.

A dead body looks very similar to a living body, and yet it has no inner experience. A dead brain looks very similar to a living brain. You could argue that what inner experience really looks like from outside is brain activity (electrical impulses between neurons, etc.). But then, how much different is this from the "hard problem of consciousness"? Why on Earth would sadness, for example, look like a particular pattern of brain activity?

Anyway, I understand the rest of your essay follows from the arguments I commented on above, so I will stop here.

I'd encourage you to read my material again.

Cheers, Bernardo.

I really appreciate you taking the time to respond... I am only trying to help promoting idealism as the ontology of the future... which I'm convinced it is!

 

[jeffnf...@gmail.com]

Hi Adur,

"My point is that, once dissociation happens, mind-at-large (non-dissociated universal consciousness) ceases to exist."

1) In your opinion, what is it that dissociates?

2) if that (this things that dissociates) becomes unstable and dissaptes, you think there is then absolutely nothing?

For me, the substrate as MaL makes sense of all the "play" of dissociation that can come and go, all arising and fading within MaL.

Thanks

Jeff

[Bernardo]

Brief comments in bold below. Cheers, B.

On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 1:01:49 AM UTC+2, Adur Alkain wrote:

Thanks for responding so quickly, Bernardo!

I went back and re-read the "Closing commentary" of The Idea of the World. I must admit I had skipped the section called "Alternative formulations of dissociation-based idealism" because I thought it was a literal reproduction of the section under the same title in your dissertation, which I had already read. Thus, I had missed this sentence: "I have taken the trouble to explore this defunct formulation here for the following reason: in my experience, many intelligent people who hear the idealist adage ‘reality is akin to a collective dream’ try to construe its meaning along the general outline of this formulation." This, combined with the questions some of the professors made during your defense, gives me the reassuring impression that I may be into something here... it also makes me feel that I'm one of those "intelligent people"! Haha

That said, I don't feel you really responded to my objections here, but the reason is that I'm sure I didn't make my points sufficiently clear. So, let me explain myself better: I am not denying the inner consistency and explanatory power of your ontology. As I said, I think it's a monumental achievement. I simply feel that it isn't convincing enough to turn the tables. I didn't make this clear in my "essay", but my purpose is only to point out why I think your ontology isn't convincing enough, and to suggest a more viable (in my opinion, of course) alternative.

By the way, from your defense video I got the impression that the professors weren't convinced either, but that they certainly were impressed. In any case, that's what I feel. I just think that with a little tweaking your ontology would not only be impressive in its scope and depth, but also more compelling.

I will respond to your comments below.

On Thursday, 2 May 2019 12:07:33 UTC+2, Bernardo wrote:

Hi Adur,

In reality, it is not possible to have a single alter. Alters can only exist as a multiplicity. The minimum number is two. Either there are multiple alters, or there is none.

Yes, but that is a trivial issue of terminology. 'Mind at large' is, technically, also an alter, though at a completely different scale. So I reserved the use of the word 'alter' to the scale of living creatures. But, again, mind-at-large is technically an alter.

I don't think this is a trivial question. What I'm saying is that there is no mind-at-large. My point is that, once dissociation happens, mind-at-large (non-dissociated universal consciousness) ceases to exist. I remember you saying in your thesis defense that in DID cases there seems to be a "host personality". I don't know if that's the case, and I'm not sure what it means (what is the difference between the host personality and the other alters?), but there is a fundamental difference between alters and mind-at-large, isn't it? Saying that mind-at-large is technically an alter is a trivial use of terminology, though! The question here is: does mind-at-large exist?

You are disputing word definitions. I define mind-at-large as the segment of universal consciousness that remains outside all life-scale alters. As such, it obviously exists. Is it an alter? Technically it is, but at another scale. A host personality is itself also an 'alter,' technically, but it is the more encompassing alter and the one into which all alters collapse if DID ends. So we distinguish it linguistically by calling it 'host personality,' instead of 'alter.'

  

The only difference between thoughts and perceptions is that thoughts are private, while perceptions are collective. 

Not really. 'Thoughts,' as the word is used in this part of the book, are endogenous, arising within the dissociative boundary of the respective alter (or mind-at-large). Perceptions, on the other hand, are triggered by experiential states beyond the boundary of the respective alter. They are not defined in terms of consensus at all.

I perfectly understand how you define perceptions, as opposed to thoughts. I am just proposing a different definition here. Note that your definition rests on the idea of the existence of mind-at-large. If there is no mind-at-large. and if there are only dissociated alters (that's the view I'm proposing) there is nothing beyond the boundary of an alter but other alters. 

As I define it, mind-atlarge exists, for trivial reasons. 

 

Let’s try to imagine a single alter. Could this single alter have perceptions? The only way we can carry out this thought experiment is by imagining that we are that single alter. So, let’s say that I am the only alter in the universe, and that right now I’m experiencing myself as a man walking through a forest. I can see the trees, insects, birds, maybe a deer, but none of those are alters. They don’t have consciousness. I am the only one who is experiencing this forest. Is this experience different from a dream? No, it isn’t. I am having a dream. I am not perceiving anything. That forest exists only in my mind. All my experiences of this forest are thoughts. This simply means that I am not really an alter. I may experience myself as a man in a forest, but both the forest and the man are just thoughts in my mind.

Clearly I lost you in my argument. If there is an alter there is also mind-at-large (i.e. a second, 'very big alter'), or the rest of universal consciousness beyond the dissociative boundary of the one alter. My perceptions would then correspond to experiential states of mind-at-large. I would see no living beings (no birds or trees), only an inanimate universe. Now, you can argue that such an 'inanimate' universe is just another, unfathomably huge 'alter.' That would be correct, but also trivial in the context of the argument. I just use the word 'alter' at a given scale, for ease of discourse.

You are right, Bernardo, I can see now that my thought experiment doesn't work within the parameters of your definition of alters. Given your definition of what an alter is, a single alter would only witness an inanimate universe. Still, I can't see in what meaningful way a single alter surrounded by an inanimate universe would be an alter.

It's dissociated from its surroundings. That's what defines a life-scale alter.

 

Let's say this alter is watching stars. Where is the dissociation?

In the very fact that it is watching stars. Otherwise, there would be no perception. The 'stars' would be directly evoked, endogenous ideas.

 

You need to postulate from the beginning that stars are the extrinsic appearance of something else, something we can't even begin to imagine, the inner life of this hypothetical mind-at-large.

That's precisely the point. It's a postulate--rather an inference--with significant explanatory power and parsimoniously anchored on empirical facts: my own inner ideas appear to others as my 'material' brain activity, which is qualitatively different from how the inner ideas feel to me. So the inner ideas of mind-at-large appear to us as the 'material,' inanimate universe around us, although they feel differently to mind-at-large itself.

 

So, even if my thought experiment doesn't work as such, I think it serves to show that my definition of alters is more intuitive and parsimonious. 

I can't imagine that mysterious mind-at-large, or how and why dissociation began. If you are correct, and mind-at-large exists, its inner experience is fundamentally different from ours. If I'm correct, the primordial non-dissociated consciousness would be essentially identical to ours. This primordial consciousness would have dreams, like we do, and at some point would decide to dissociate itself into different alters, different points of view, just to make the dream more interesting... Alan Watts has some beautiful talks about this kind of idea. Some may find it naive, but it makes sense. Contrary to what some scientists seem to think, I believe that an intuitive theory is always preferable to a counter-intuitive one, especially if it works better and is more consistent with the empirical facts!

 

In reality, there is no such thing as a non-dissociated universal mind or “mind-at-large”. This “mind-at-large” is nothing but an explanatory abstraction. Kastrup falls into the same error he accurately points out as the fundamental fallacy of physicalism

This seems like an entirely arbitrary statement to me.

Well, again, I was being deliberately provocative. But given that we have no direct experience of this mind-at--large (we have no idea how it is like to be that mind-at-large), I think it's just that: an explanatory abstraction.

Only insofar as my belief that your conscious inner life is also an explanatory abstraction; or that the conscious inner life of my cats, or of the bacteria in my toilet, are also explanatory abstractions. If you are skeptical of that, solipsism is your only option.

 

I completely agree with you in that consciousness is the ontological primitive and the most basic fact in our expereince, but this mind-at-large is only an abstraction. Can you explain to me why you think it isn't?

If you deny the conscious inner-life of mind-at-large, you either deny any form of noumena to make sense of the regularities of perceptual experience; or you need some arbitrary discontinuity in your model.

  

We all perceive the same world simply because we are dissociated alters of the same consciousness.

Yes, indeed. This is what I say...

The regularity and consistency of our perceptions (the laws of physics) are the result of the simple fact that we all are dreaming the same collective dream.

The only interpretation of this that would make it different from what I am claiming is this: at a deeper level we are all connected, like branches of a single tree, and a dream is broadcast to each branch from the root of tree, so to speak, with some perspectival adjustments. This doesn't work for reasons I discuss in the 'closing commentary' of the book: it cannot explain why we see other alters around. If each of us is a TV to which a common 'dream' is broadcast, why to we see representations of other TVs within our dream? The broadcast idea implies one-way communication from the root of consciousness to the branches. But clearly we see other alters around ourselves as well. If, in turn, you say that communication is actually two-way and can happen locally, then the whole thing will boil down to what I am saying already, even if you prefer a different metaphor for it.

I claim that there is another possible interpretation: yes, we are all connected on a deeper level (I think true emotions like love and compassion arise from that deeper level), but the dream is not generated on that deep level. The collective dream is co-created simultaneously by all alters. Communication is not two-way, but "zillions-way": it happens between all alters.

Then, and assuming that you don't deny the existence of an inanimate universe surrounding life, you need a surrounding mental substrate to enable the communication; i.e. mind-at-large. You may be imaging it in a different 'shape' then my schematics of mind-at-large, but if you make explicit what you are imaging, and look at its topology, you will see that it is entirely equivalent to mind-at-large. Otherwise, you end up with an arbitrary discontinuity: the matter in our bodies is the image of inner life, but the matter in the inanimate universe is, ontologically, something completely different and purely imagined, even though it is the same matter; so much so that the matter in our bodies even becomes part of the inanimate universe upon our deaths (and even during life, with secretion).

[Dana Lomas]

But given that we have no direct experience of this mind-at--large (we have no idea how it is like to be that mind-at-large), I think it's just that: an explanatory abstraction.

Surely many mystics, adepts of deep meditation practice, and even users of certain entheogens, would make the case that there are ways to glimpse such a state, call it nondual, primoridial Awareness -- albeit it ultimately defies any languaging of it, and as mentioned earlier there is no exclusive abidance as such a state.

[Bernardo]

And even if this weren't the case, we still need to postulate something beyond personal experience if we are to avoid solipsism.

[Lou Gold]

But given that we have no direct experience of this mind-at--large (we have no idea how it is like to be that mind-at-large), I think it's just that: an explanatory abstraction.

Surely many mystics, adepts of deep meditation practice, and even users of certain entheogens, would make the case that there are ways to glimpse such a state, call it nondual, primordial Awareness -- albeit it ultimately defies any languaging of it, and as mentioned earlier there is no exclusive abidance as such a state.

There is abidance but it has rules including no action expressing dissociation. Unlike many of his saintly peers, Ramana Maharshi did not remain in a cave in the Heart of Shiva (Arunachala Hill) but compassionately returned to be among us, making concessions in order to do so. In a sense, this is the Bodhisattva Way of compassionately choosing less than full enlightenment unless attained by all. It is archetypally represented by Jesus being Son of God and dealing with the terrible ordeal of being Son of Man. That creativity or life depends on dissociation suggests that there is something more but we can't talk about it, which may be an impossible hurdle for ontology. This would seem to lead to the pragmatic ontological claim of simply being the most parsimonious and plausible but not the ultimate. This is how I make sense of Adur's assertion that it may be best not to speak of a M@L. 

[Lou Gold]

If once dissociation occurs one is no longer possible may be why Jesus says, "wherever two gather in my name." Union is possible only if there are more than one. Such is the marvelous mystery of Love.

[Dana Lomas]

There is abidance ...

I said no exclusive abidance, meaning not ultimately sustainable, and was referring to a state such as whatever state Ramana was in -- voidness? -- prior to leaving the caves, wherein he was so utterly immersed in that state that he never spoke, and was oblivious to any corporeal concerns, and from which state, short of corporeal death, he eventually had to emerge and interact again with the world and others ...

"The youth was so absorbed in the Effulgence of Bliss  that he didn’t even realize when some devotees finally came, lifted him out of the pit and brought him to the nearby Subrahmanya shrine. For about two months he stayed in that shrine, not speaking, paying no attention to his bodily needs.  To make him eat, food had to be forcefully put into his mouth."

[Lou Gold]

Dana,

My sense is that we agree.

Your additional adjective "exclusive" is necessary to describe the constraint of corporeal life. However, if one is willing to consider something other or beyond corporeal life one might arrive at the abode of the abidance in which all distinctions no longer make sense, for example Rumi's field.

On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 7:26:30 AM UTC-5, Dana Lomas wrote:

There is abidance ...

I said no exclusive abidance, and was referring to a state such as whatever state Ramana was in -- voidness? -- prior to leaving the caves, wherein he was so utterly immersed in that state that he never spoke, and was oblivious to any corporeal concerns, and from which state, short of corporeal death, he eventually had to emerge and interact again with the world and others ...

[Dana Lomas]

Lou ... Sure, but in this thread, in strict ontological terms, I just meant that M@L can only ever succumb to its immanent, imperative, self-perpetual dynamic of self-excitaion/individuation.

[Lou Gold]

Dana ... I get your drift. 

Some considerations: 

1) I'm exploring how Adur may be onto something but I'm not smart enough or philosophically informed enough to participate technically. It's above my paygrade. I'm jumping in only because it excited something in me. My intuitive grok is that ontology is a vitally important tool and that idealism's time has come. I am also skeptical that idealist ontology can be more than a greatly improved expression of dissociation. To achieve this improvement as BK has done is a substantial achievement AND I'm certain that it will invite greater and greater refinement of it concepts.

2) Scott likes to point out that to move beyond an ontological model of a fundamental to questions of meaning and purpose will probably require moving from philosophy into the realms of religion. I agree. In this sense I am not sure that a "rationalist spirituality" is possible. I'm not denying it, just saying I'm agnostic about it.

3) I am uncertain about linking self-excitation/individuation in that the word "individuation" biases toward individualism (with strengths and limits). I know that we have beautiful ethical statements like the Golden Rule aimed at individual behavior but how might we express it for a species and how does the species choose to follow it? What is the role of the colony or hive? And doesn't individualism imply or tend toward the illusion of "exclusive abiding"? Endless questions. 

4) I agree that there is something immanent that biases the mysteriousness toward life. I believe that life requires dissociation. I believe that life is the "immanent, imperative, self perpetual dynamic" and that dissociation is the needed device.

I'm sure that I've not expressed this well. Perhaps it's relevant to Adur's explorations. Maybe not.

On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 7:52:42 AM UTC-5, Dana Lomas wrote:

Lou ... Sure, but in this thread, in strict ontological terms, I just meant that M@L can only ever succumb to its immanent, imperative, self-perpetual dynamic of self-excitaion/individuation.

[Adur Alkain]

Hi Jeff!

Thanks for your questions! You made me realize that I hadn't expressed myself accurately. I need to rephrase my thoughts on this. In The Idea of the World, Bernardo defines mind-at-large as "the segment of universal mind that is not comprised in any alter". I have an issue with this definition, specifically with the idea that a "segment" of universal mind (or cosmic consciousness) stays "outside" the alters after dissociation. I think universal mind or cosmic consciousness cannot be segmented. The segmentation happens only on the level of alters. In other words, it is a kind of illusion. The consciousness "inside" the alter is exactly the same as the consciousness "outside" the alter.

There is no separation between alters and universal consciousness. There is only a separation between alters. That's the only dissociation possible. In other words, mind-at-large as defined by Bernardo simply doesn't exist. Universal mind or cosmic consciousness is inside all alters.

So, to answer your questions:

1) What dissociates is Consciousness (I prefer to call it simply "Consciousness", rather than "cosmic or universal consciousness", since the term "cosmos" or "universe" is usually identified with the physical universe), which is the ontological primitive.

2) Consciousness doesn't disappear or dissipate. It is the source and ground of everything.

I think what you call MaL is what I call Consciousness. Yes, all arises from it and fades back to it. Crucially, it never gets "shut out" by dissociation. Dissociation is simply the appearance of different points of view.

A good way to visualize this is to take the tree metaphor, which Bernardo accurately uses to describe my view (in his thesis and book he explains the metaphor in detail, although there he calls it a shrub). Consciousness is like a tree. The individual branches are the alters. So, from the perspective of the alters there is separation: all branches experience themselves as separated from one another. From the perspective of the root, though, there is no sense of separation. The branches are not disconnected from the root. They are only disconnected from each other (on a superficial level: deep down they are all connected through the root).

You may call the tree root "mind-at-large", if you like (and you could call the whole tree "cosmic consciousness"). But that would be a trivial distinction, since there is no separation between root, trunk and branches. The crucial element here is that alters are not "surrounded" by mind-at-large. Non-dissociated consciousness is not "outside" alters.

As I said, my idea is that the "collective dream" we call the physical world is not generated by the root, but by the alters. The root cannot have perceptions. The tree can only perceive (and thus create) the world through its branches.

I hope this clarifies my position!

[jeffnf...@gmail.com]

Hi Adur. 

I think you are getting a bit lost in what language unfortunately does to any idea that doesn't assume time/space as fundamental. He doesn't always use the word 'segment,' but any other term will be able to be framed via the problem of time/space. It is the idea he's pointing to that I find clarifying. I've not yet found anybody who can speak clearly without implying some kind of space/time problem.

You said:

"1) What dissociates is Consciousness..."

What does consciousness dissociate from?

Well, your 2 answer tells me: It dissociates from consciousness, you say.

GREAT! So you recognize that even if all alters destablized (like a dead flower or cow or person), the consciousness OF which they are constituted and FROM which they dissociate is just fine. 

I think you agree. Having new terms is great. And your terms might really serve others perfectly. But I don't see a disagreement in terms of the idea itself. 

Thanks for responding!

jf

[Dana Lomas]

There is no separation between alters and universal consciousness ~ Adur

Well, BK doesn't say that there is an actual dichotomous separation, which is why he speaks of dissociation. Referring to his inherently limited analogy of the whirlpool in a greater body of water that is M@L, the whirlpool being a localized configuration of M@L, there is never any actual separation, as the whirlpool, in essence, is never apart from the greater body of water, albeit a kind of boundary is formed, within which a locus of consciousness can be said to be dissociated from the greater consciousness -- the boundary becoming the interface between them. But beyond that boundary and its event horizon, there are noumenal  aspects, conceivably infinite, of the greater consciousness that are inaccessible to the finite locus, however much a whirlpool might expand to encompass more of the greater body.

In any case, I have to concur with Jeff, that while I appreciate that BK's model may be subject to revision, and the lexicon can be tweaked to clarify ambiguities that almost inevitably arise due to the inherent limitations of language, to be honest, I'm just finding your revisioning and tweaking of it to be less clear.

[Adur Alkain]

Hi Jeff,

I don't think consciousness dissociates from consciousness. The way I see it, dissociation is the creation of at least two alters. Alters are dissociated from each other, not consciousness from itself. Since ultimately there is nothing but Consciousness, that's what I meant by "what dissociates is Consciousness". Going back to the tree metaphor, the branches are separated (dissociated) from each other, but they are not separated from the root: they are not dissociated from consciousness. I think there is a disagreement here, and I think Bernardo sees it too when he uses the tree metaphor.

It may seem like a trivial disagreement, but I don't think it is. It has vast implications.

It's true that language has limitations: consciousness is dissociated from the point of view of alters, but it is non-dissociated from the point of view of Consciousness (or cosmic consciousness, if you prefer). But there is no disconnection between these two points of view. We, as human beings, can experience both: we experience dissociated consciousness in our usual state (as alters), but we also can experience non-dissociated Consciousness through meditation, psychedelics, spontaneous mystical experiences, etc. In other words, Consciousness is "inside" the alters, not outside them. When we look at the physical world we are not seeing non-dissociated consciousness: we are seeing our own projections.

[Adur Alkain]

Hi again, Bernardo!

I respond to your comments below (I deleted some of the text, to make it more readable).

On Friday, 3 May 2019 09:36:35 UTC+2, Bernardo wrote:

Brief comments in bold below. Cheers, B.

I don't think this is a trivial question. What I'm saying is that there is no mind-at-large. My point is that, once dissociation happens, mind-at-large (non-dissociated universal consciousness) ceases to exist. I remember you saying in your thesis defense that in DID cases there seems to be a "host personality". I don't know if that's the case, and I'm not sure what it means (what is the difference between the host personality and the other alters?), but there is a fundamental difference between alters and mind-at-large, isn't it? Saying that mind-at-large is technically an alter is a trivial use of terminology, though! The question here is: does mind-at-large exist?

You are disputing word definitions. I define mind-at-large as the segment of universal consciousness that remains outside all life-scale alters. As such, it obviously exists. Is it an alter? Technically it is, but at another scale. A host personality is itself also an 'alter,' technically, but it is the more encompassing alter and the one into which all alters collapse if DID ends. So we distinguish it linguistically by calling it 'host personality,' instead of 'alter.'

I dispute that any "segment" of universal consciousness remains outside alters. Inside every alter there is the totality of cosmic consciousness. This sounds like an impossibility, but that's the way it is. In deep meditation or psychedelic states, an alter can experience universal consciousness. Dissociation exists only as a separation between alters. There is no separation between alters and cosmic consciousness.

 

  

The only difference between thoughts and perceptions is that thoughts are private, while perceptions are collective. 

Not really. 'Thoughts,' as the word is used in this part of the book, are endogenous, arising within the dissociative boundary of the respective alter (or mind-at-large). Perceptions, on the other hand, are triggered by experiential states beyond the boundary of the respective alter. They are not defined in terms of consensus at all.

I perfectly understand how you define perceptions, as opposed to thoughts. I am just proposing a different definition here. Note that your definition rests on the idea of the existence of mind-at-large. If there is no mind-at-large. and if there are only dissociated alters (that's the view I'm proposing) there is nothing beyond the boundary of an alter but other alters. 

As I define it, mind-atlarge exists, for trivial reasons. 

I don't think they are trivial reasons. But the point is: do we need mind-at-large to avoid solipsism, like you say? I don't think we do. If, as I claim, it is possible to make sense of the world we perceive without resorting to an hypothetical mind-at-large surrounding us (it is hypothetical, since we can't experience it directly), then it would be clear that the concept of mind-at-large is unnecessary and unparsimonius.

 

 

You are right, Bernardo, I can see now that my thought experiment doesn't work within the parameters of your definition of alters. Given your definition of what an alter is, a single alter would only witness an inanimate universe. Still, I can't see in what meaningful way a single alter surrounded by an inanimate universe would be an alter.

It's dissociated from its surroundings. That's what defines a life-scale alter.

 

Let's say this alter is watching stars. Where is the dissociation?

In the very fact that it is watching stars. Otherwise, there would be no perception. The 'stars' would be directly evoked, endogenous ideas.

 

You need to postulate from the beginning that stars are the extrinsic appearance of something else, something we can't even begin to imagine, the inner life of this hypothetical mind-at-large.

That's precisely the point. It's a postulate--rather an inference--with significant explanatory power and parsimoniously anchored on empirical facts: my own inner ideas appear to others as my 'material' brain activity, which is qualitatively different from how the inner ideas feel to me. So the inner ideas of mind-at-large appear to us as the 'material,' inanimate universe around us, although they feel differently to mind-at-large itself.

 

Well, again, I was being deliberately provocative. But given that we have no direct experience of this mind-at--large (we have no idea how it is like to be that mind-at-large), I think it's just that: an explanatory abstraction.

Only insofar as my belief that your conscious inner life is also an explanatory abstraction; or that the conscious inner life of my cats, or of the bacteria in my toilet, are also explanatory abstractions. If you are skeptical of that, solipsism is your only option.

Solipsism is an absolute abstraction. Nobody in its right mind can seriously believe that other human beings (or cats) have no conscious inner life. Humans and animals (and in my view, plants and bacteria too) are obviously conscious. The same can't be said from the inanimate universe, which you claim to be the extrinsic appearance of the conscious inner life of mind-at-large. This isn't obvious at all. Most people see the inanimate universe as unconscious matter. I personally see the inanimate universe as a collective dream, created by our perceptions. It doesn't exist in any way outside our perceptions. It is not the extrinsic appearance of anything else. That's the way I see it, and this is far from any sort of solipsism.

 

 

I completely agree with you in that consciousness is the ontological primitive and the most basic fact in our expereince, but this mind-at-large is only an abstraction. Can you explain to me why you think it isn't?

If you deny the conscious inner-life of mind-at-large, you either deny any form of noumena to make sense of the regularities of perceptual experience; or you need some arbitrary discontinuity in your model.

I don't deny a noumenon. I would call it pure consciousness or empty awareness. It is formless consciousness, aware of itself. This pure consciousness or empty awareness can be accessed through meditation. It is not an abstraction. As for the regularities of perceptual experience, my view is that perceptions arise only on the level of dissociated alters. The regularities of perceptual experience are the result of entanglement. Obviously, my knowledge of quantum mechanics is only superficial, but many physicists seem to be pointing at the existence (at least in principle) of a single wave function that describes the entire universe. That single wave function would explain all regularities. You can say "that wave function is the inner life of mind-at-large"... Well, I can't even begin to imagine what that could mean... I think the single wave function simply describes the simple fact (simple from the point of view of idealism, not for physicalism) that all perceptions happen in the one consciousness. Why do we need to suppose that the regularities of perception (the laws of physics) are the result of the mysterious inner life of this inconceivable mind-at-large?

 

  

I claim that there is another possible interpretation: yes, we are all connected on a deeper level (I think true emotions like love and compassion arise from that deeper level), but the dream is not generated on that deep level. The collective dream is co-created simultaneously by all alters. Communication is not two-way, but "zillions-way": it happens between all alters.

Then, and assuming that you don't deny the existence of an inanimate universe surrounding life, you need a surrounding mental substrate to enable the communication; i.e. mind-at-large. You may be imaging it in a different 'shape' then my schematics of mind-at-large, but if you make explicit what you are imaging, and look at its topology, you will see that it is entirely equivalent to mind-at-large. Otherwise, you end up with an arbitrary discontinuity: the matter in our bodies is the image of inner life, but the matter in the inanimate universe is, ontologically, something completely different and purely imagined, even though it is the same matter; so much so that the matter in our bodies even becomes part of the inanimate universe upon our deaths (and even during life, with secretion).

Yes, I do deny the existence of an inanimate universe surrounding life. This is called idealism. The inanimate universe we perceive doesn't exist outside our perceptions. It is nothing but our perceptions. It is a collective dream.

And no, I don't believe the matter in our bodies is the image of our inner life. Matter is not the image of anything else. Matter is nothing but perception. It only exists in the minds of the observers. When I perceive a body, there is nothing there but my perception of that body. It is part of the dream. When we die, our bodies remain there only as long as they are perceived by other conscious beings (bacteria would do).

Anyway, it seems clear that this essay doesn't work as it is. I'm withdrawing it. I'll take some time to think a little more about all this. My plan is to submit a completely different essay, in a less provocative form (no talk of "fallacies"), under the title "Nonlocal idealism: an alternative to Bernardo Kastrup's analytic idealism". I don't think we need to agree in all points. I think it would be good to have different competing versions of idealism... Of course, I don't have the time or the qualifications to compete with your encyclopedic body of work, Bernardo, but I'll do what I can. Hopefully younger and more capable thinkers will join the fray, and new and better ideas will flourish. I envision a near future where physicalism will be considered defunct, and academics will discuss different versions of idealism! :)

 

 

[jeffnf...@gmail.com]

Fair enough. I don't see the disagreement, but I respect the passion. Thanks for sharing.

Jeff

[Adur Alkain]

Hi Lou!

Thanks for your comments!

I do believe that a rationalist spirituality is possible. The best version I know of this "rationalist spirituality" is the Diamond Approach, developed by A.H. Almaas. Almaas originally started his intellectual career as a physicist, and his work has an accuracy, rigour, consistency and logical subtelty that you won't find in any other philosopher or scientist I'm familiar with. Almaas is both a scientist and a spiritual teacher, with absolutely no discrepancy or separation between both. He says, for example, that ultimately there is no difference between psychology and spirituality.

I also believe that life (and the physical universe itself) requires dissociation. I understand Bernardo says that too.

I don't have much more to say to you at this moment, other than telling you that I often read your posts and find them very beautiful and inspiring. The same goes for Dana... I love your long and sometimes quite enigmatic conversations! :)

[Adur Alkain]

Hi Dana,

thanks for your comments! Yes, it is obvious that this essay is a complete failure. Not even Bernardo seems to understand what I'm trying to say. As I said to him, I'm withdrawing it. I'll take some time to try to rephrase my ideas and make them easier to grasp, and more compelling, if I can. My plan is to submit a new, improved essay under the title "Nonlocal idealism: An alternative to Bernardo Kastrup's analytic idealism".

However, I'm going to try to explain my position now in as concise and clear a way as I can: In a nutshell, my disagreement with Bernardo can be reduced to a disagreement with this statement, which Bernardo himself identifies as the foundation of his entire system (he says so at the beginning of his "Closing commentary"): matter is the outer appearance of inner experience. I completely disagree with this. I think that the idea of outer or extrinsic appearances is incompatible with idealism. In idealism, there can't be any extrinsic appearances because everything is in consciousness. We can't get out of consciousness, to look at it from the outside. Experience is always inner experience, and it can't be experienced in any other way. This seems self-evident to me, but obviously it isn't so clear for everybody. I believe this is a residue from materialism. We have been trained to think in terms of objects existing out there, and our perceptions of those objects being their outer appearances... It is difficult to get rid of these old thinking patterns, but I'm convinced that idealism requires a radical change in our way of thinking.

I think Bernardo's ideas are easier to grasp than mine because he is using this kind of thinking that feels familiar to us. He claims that there is an objective world "out there", and that we are separated from it by an objective boundary, like objects in a world of objects. I see this as materialistic thinking. Of course, Bernardo would say, like you do, that ultimately there is no actual separation, etc., but I deny the existence of that inner/outer boundary. The finite locus is only defined in opposition to other finite loci. The only boundaries are the boundaries between different alters. There is no boundary between me and universal consciousness. Nothing in that "greater consciousness" is inaccesible to the finite locus. Buddha, for example, can experience the entire cosmic consciousness, and still be this finite man, Gautama Buddha. Our bodies are the interface between consciousness (the one and only consciousness) and the physical world of perceptions.

Okay, I'll leave it here before I make things worse, haha! I said I was going to be concise... I obviously need to think more about how to convey this ideas in a clear way, instead of rambling like this.

Anyway, thanks for your interest!

[Bernardo]

In a nutshell, my disagreement with Bernardo can be reduced to a disagreement with this statement, which Bernardo himself identifies as the foundation of his entire system (he says so at the beginning of his "Closing commentary"): matter is the outer appearance of inner experience. I completely disagree with this. I think that the idea of outer or extrinsic appearances is incompatible with idealism.

An appearance is itself an experience, purely mental. So this isn't incompatible with idealism at all. But okay, you disagree that matter is how experience looks like from across a dissociative boundary. How, then, do you explain the tight correlations between inner experience and brain activity? How do you explain that, if you add alcohol to the chemistry of your brain, your inner experience changes? How do you explain that trauma to the head changes experience? How do you explain that your body is the immediate manifestation of your inner life, or the 'bodying-forth' of inner experience?

[Dana Lomas]

He claims that there is an objective world "out there", and that we are separated from it by an objective boundary, like objects in a world of objects. I see this as materialistic thinking.

Sorry, I just interpret this statement as a complete misunderstanding of BK's version of idealism, which stems from Schopenhauer's ideas, who in turn borrowed from Kant -- although they all eventually diverge in significant ways. And without some mutual understanding of, and resonance with those foundational ideas, we're clearly going to be talking past each other here, in terms of our respective takes on idealism.

But briefly, my interpretation of BK's model is that it shows how the apparency of an objective world takes shape. However, there are no actual objects 'out there', but rather representational experiences of M@L's immanent ideation -- such ideas not being in any way material -- appearing as phenomena on the 'screen' of perception to an individuated locus of none other than M@L.  So there is nothing 'materialistic' about this model at all, as it actually exposes any so-called objective material substance existing independent of M@L to be but a chimera of materialism.

Nonetheless, I look forward to your expanding and elaborating upon your model, and showing how it can better explain, absent the notions of materialism, more of our range of experiences than other models.

[Adur Alkain]

Thanks for not giving up on me, Bernardo! :)

I respond to you below.

On Saturday, 4 May 2019 11:44:21 UTC+2, Bernardo wrote:

In a nutshell, my disagreement with Bernardo can be reduced to a disagreement with this statement, which Bernardo himself identifies as the foundation of his entire system (he says so at the beginning of his "Closing commentary"): matter is the outer appearance of inner experience. I completely disagree with this. I think that the idea of outer or extrinsic appearances is incompatible with idealism.

An appearance is itself an experience, purely mental. So this isn't incompatible with idealism at all. But okay, you disagree that matter is how experience looks like from across a dissociative boundary. How, then, do you explain the tight correlations between inner experience and brain activity? How do you explain that, if you add alcohol to the chemistry of your brain, your inner experience changes? How do you explain that trauma to the head changes experience? How do you explain that your body is the immediate manifestation of your inner life, or the 'bodying-forth' of inner experience?

Yes, of course, an appearance is a purely mental experience. My issue is with the qualifier outer or extrinsic. All experience is intrinsic. How can there be extrinsic experiences? How can experience have an outer appearance? I don't think an experience is an object that can be perceived from outside.

I don't see any difficulty in explaining why alcohol in my brain changes my inner experience, etc. It is obvious that the brain modulates the content of my inner experience. The brain doesn't generate consciousness, but it certainly modulates it. I can go as far as saying that the brain generates some of the content of my experience. For example, the words I think are clearly generated in my brain. Head trauma can make a person lose the ability to speak, etc. I think when it comes to the functioning of brains and of the rest of our bodies, the mechanistic models developed by materialistic science can be very helpful. It seems absurd to dismiss all the findings of neuroscience and biology. Materialistic science sees our bodies (including our brains) as machines. I think they are right, but not in the sense they think. Our bodies and brains are machines used by consciousness to explore the physical world. Consciousness uses our brains in the same way that we use our computers. Right now there is a direct correlation between what I'm thinking and what appears on this computer screen. This doesn't mean that the computer is generating my thoughts. It doesn't mean that the computer screen is the extrinsic appearance of my thoughts, either. My consciousness is using the computer (and the English language, and the complex code that makes the computer programs work, etc.) as a tool to communicate its thoughts. I'm not sure this analogy works, but there it goes.

And of course, these "machines" (brains and bodies) are made of perceptions (matter is nothing but perceptions). Consciousness has created these complex arrangements of perceptions (our bodies and brains) after billions of years of evolution. If in a few decades humans have been able to create these sophisticated arrangements of perceptions that we call computers, is it so surprising that nature after millions of years has created these other arrangements of perceptions that we call brains? As you can see, I agree with you in that the "matter" of our brains is no different from the "matter" in inanimate objects like computers. They all are made of perceptions.

The way I see this, the closer we stay to the findings of mainstream science, the more explanatory power our ontology will have. Idealism is perfectly compatible with science. It is physicalism-materialism that is incompatible with the findings of contemporary science.

I don't think my body is the immediate manifestation of my inner life in any meaningful way. As I keep saying, my body is nothing but a vehicle or tool that my consciousness uses to explore and interact with the physical world (the collective world of perceptions). These words I'm writing are a much more immediate manifestation of my inner life, right now. But I don't think you will say that these words are the extrinsic appearance of my inner life, or anything like that.

By the way, I'm currently reading Irreducible Mind, by Edward Kelly et. al. I think this is a very important book, I'm sure you are familiar with it. As far as I understand, Kelly disputes the idea of an exact correlation between brain activity and inner experience. How do you stand on that issue? Does your theory require an exact correlation? I feel it does, and that would not fit the evidence shown by Kelly et al.

Thanks again for reading and responding, Bernardo!

[Bernardo]

My issue is with the qualifier outer or extrinsic. All experience is intrinsic. How can there be extrinsic experiences?

Can you not see that you are fixating on a word, judging it based on your interpretation of what that word means out of context, and ignoring the way in which I define my use of that word? Yes, all experience is 'intrinsic' in the sense that it is subjective, but I think I very clearly say what I mean by 'extrinsic appearance' in the context of my philosophy. It's pointless to repeat it here.

You proceed to say things that seem to directly imply dualism. But then you claim you are an idealist... because the 'machines' we call brains are 'made of perception,' even though they 'modulate' and even 'generate experience' (?!?!)... So I am afraid now I will have to give up. :-) I can't make sense of what you are saying. Frankly, I am not quite sure you know what you are saying.

[Jim Cross]

This theme of your use of a term or your definition of concept seems to be a regular theme.

I remember this came up when someone questioned how the mind at large could be volitional without it thinking or planning.

Of course, in the regular use of the word "volitional", it means something is thought out or planned.

And here we have something similar where apparently experience, which you acknowledge is intrinsic and subjective, can be extrinsic in your context.

Perhaps your ideas would be comprehensible if you used terms as people normally used them rather than requiring someone to learn a new vocabulary where white is black and down is up. Or maybe you should invent your own terms so at least people won;t confuse a commonly used word to mean one thing ordinarily but must be translated to a different meaning in your context.

[jeffnf...@gmail.com]

I don't think I can make you see that you are getting stuck on YOUR interpretation if 'extrinsic."

But Bernardo carefully has addressed the exact point you worry about.

On another note, you actually speak of the brain as an object that interacts with experience.

I'm with Bernardo here in seeing the brain as a partial image of consciousness, not entity interacting with it.

[Dana Lomas]

Jim, if the misunderstanding BK's model is all about his misuse of terminology, how is that many of us have no problem understanding his model based on the use of the same terminology?

[jeffnf...@gmail.com]

Hi Jim,

I don't think I agree with that definition of volitional. I feel comfortable saying that my dog uses volition to get through the blankets or to eat his food.

For me, and others, volition and experience go hand in hand. Yet, I acknowledge there is a wide spectrum whereupon both extremes may appear very different.

One thing I've noticed as I study more and more ontological systems, is that arguments about the definition of words never stops.

However, things get most interesting when even people who disagree are noticing and respecting the different uses of words. that's when the conversation can move from pure semantic-image land.

I'm not holding up my understanding of volition as the right one. I fully understand how it could be carved out so that volition should only be used when describing abstract and highly cognitive behaviors.

[Dana Lomas]

I just don't see the problem with using the term 'extrinsic' in the context that BK uses it. Right now, the intrinsic ideas of other forum members are appearing, from this perspective, as the apparency of extrinsic images on the screen of a laptop, all the while assuming that those word-forms are not solely my intrinsic creation, utterly unrelated to another sentient interlocutor, for whom they are coming from within. I suppose one could say in some sense that these images are a co-creation, but whatever they are they most certainly have the apparency of being extrinsic images of 'your' intrinsic ideas.

[Jim Cross]

https://definitions.uslegal.com/v/volitional/

Volitional means voluntary, or done by an act of will. It refers to something intentional, premeditated, deliberate, conscious.

https://www.yourdictionary.com/volitional

done by conscious, personal choice; not based on external principles.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volition_(psychology)

Volition or will is the cognitive process by which an individual decides on and commits to a particular course of action. It is defined as purposive striving and is one of the primary human psychological functions. 

As I understand BK's use of the term it is something like Schopenhauer's will - a pressure or force or urge to manifest.

So my quarrel isn't so much with the concept but rather that idiosyncratic use of common terms and concepts needs to be kept to a minimum unless the intention is to communicate only  in philosophical journals.

BTW I am thinking of writing a paper titled "There Is Consciousness,’ but It May Well Be Unconscious". What do you think? :)

[jeffnf...@gmail.com]

Yeah, Jim, that's what I mean. Many scientists will describe the intricate actions of a baby or a dog as 'cognitive' and demonstrating structure. Some people translate that in 'preplanning.' 

Fortunately, from my perspective there does not need to be debate about this term as long as we can track the qualitative difference between the way a baby can visually distinguish its mother's nipple from other women's THE FIRST TIME it sees it FROM when that baby begins to use language and, then, from when that baby begins to do algebra and write poems about doing algebra.

Thanks. 

[Dana Lomas]

"There Is Consciousness,’ but It May Well Be Unconscious".

No problem here, for my interpretation is that there is consciousness, but it has a subliminal aspect ... of course now we can quibble about the term 'subliminal.' ;)

[jeffnf...@gmail.com]

Agreed, Dana. This is why I find BK's metaphor of 'the stars at noon' so useful. I think he gives credit to somebody else for that analogy, but I can't remember who. I can comfortably use the term 'unconscious' without carrying its primary physicalist assumption. 

[Dana Lomas]

Btw, I also have a quibble with those friggin' physicists, because I would better understand Quantum Mechanics, if they would stop abusing terms like 'charm' and 'strange' and 'matter'. :))

[Dana Lomas]

Jeff ... Yes, and like BK I can also be uncomfortable with the term, 'the unconscious', and see it as a misnomer.  But as long as the reason why one sees it as a misnomer is clearly pointed out, as BK certainly does, one can still make concessions and use in certain contexts.

[jeffnf...@gmail.com]

Well put! And to be clear, I am mostly uncomfortable with it because MOST context in which I personally am discussing it are contexts in which the most important detail IS that, well, there's no unconscious :) 

[Adur Alkain]

Bernardo, I know quite well what I'm saying, although it's obvious that I'm not expressing myself clearly.

The thing is, I can assure you that I understand your system perfectly. I understand what you mean by extrinsic appearance, when you say that matter is the extrinsic appearance of inner experience. It is an ingenious idea, and it makes sense on a superficial level. I simply don't think it ultimately works.

On the other hand, it doesn't seem to me you are paying attention to what I'm saying. I never said that our brains generate experience, I said they generate some of the content (not all) of our experience. The distinction between experience and the content of experience is crucial.

I'll use a simple example: we have a man and a tree, on a sunny day. Both the man and the tree are conscious, and they have experiences. Both feel the warmth and the brightness of the sun, filling them with joy. (Yes, I believe trees can feel emotions. Emotions, in my view, have nothing to do with brains.) The tree has no brain, and no eyes, and so its experience is quite simple, pure joy. The man, on the other hand, has eyes, and a visual cortex, etc., so his brain generates a complex image of the scene arround him. His brain also generates thoughts, like for example "What a lovely day! And what a beautiful tree! Is it an ash, or an alder?" etc. In this example, it is clear that the brain does generate some of the content in the man's conscious experience. Why is that so mysterious?

There is no implied dualism in what I'm saying. Another example to show this: I'm shortsighted, so I need glasses. If I take my glasses off, everything goes blurry. If I put them on, everything goes back to focus. Therefore, my glasses modulate my experience. The glasses are inanimate objects. According to your view, they are the extrinsic appearance of some mysterious inner experience of mind-at-large. According to my view, the physical world is created by the sum of the perceptions of all conscious beings. The materials the glasses are made of (glass, metal, plastic, etc.) are the result of the perceptions of millions of living beings (for example, plastic comes from oil, and oil is the residue of zillions of organisms, dead millions of years ago, etc.) Then, somebody took those materials and made the glasses and sold them to me. All this happens in consciousness. There is no dualism. In your system, I guess when somebody takes inanimate matter and makes something with it (a pair of glasses, say), they are somehow changing the inner experience of mind-at-large. Okay, why not? But I don't think what I'm saying is in any way more dualistic. On the contrary, this distinction between mind-at-large and alters is closer to dualism than my view.

Another example: I'm watching TV. The TV is an inanimate object, but it is generating part of the content of my experience. Not all of the content (I can also feel the chair I'm sitting in, taste the apple I'm eating, get distracted from the boring movie I'm watching and think about something else, etc.), but at least part of it. Again, the TV set with all its complex machinery is made of perceptions. You would say that the TV set is the extrinsic appearance of some inner experience mind-at-large is having. Okay. But I don't think my idea (that physical objects are arrangements of perceptions) is weirder than that.

Imagine a dream. In a dream, there is nothing but perception. Imagine that this dream suddenly becomes solid. By solid I mean that things (perceptions) don't constantly change, they stay put. In this dream, I could begin to build things. I could take materials lying around and make myself a pair of glasses, or a telescope, or a bicycle. Still, these things would be nothing but arrangements of perceptions (I call them "arrangements" because the experience of a bicycle, for example, entails a multiplicity of perceptions arranged in a fixed way). My whole idea is that, through dissociation and entanglement (the laws of physics, which are the laws of perception), the collective dream we are dreaming becomes solid. That "solidity" makes it possible to build things. It also made possible the evolution of our bodies and brains.

One last example: imagine you are a powerful shaman. You can shape-shift, turn yourself into an animal. This means that you have total control over the arrangements of perceptions that comprise your own body, so that you can transform them at will. Let's say you turn yourself into an eagle. You feel your eyesight becoming sharper. You feel the inner perceptions of your body transforming completely as your arms turn into wings, your entire body grows feathers, etc. Another person watching you would see your body transform into the body of an eagle. Both your inner experience and your outer appearance would be transformed. I use this example to show that there is, in my view, a correlation between inner experience (specifically, perceptions) and outer appearance. But the correlation is only between your perceptions and your physical body (made of perceptions, both your inner perceptions and the perceptions of other observers watching you). This seems less mysterious to me than a correlation between my inner experience (including thoughts, emotions, etc.) and the outer appearance of my physical body.

Why is this so difficult to grasp? Basically, what I'm saying is that I am not my body. I am consciousness. My "outer appearance" is the appearance of my physical body (the vehicle my consciousness uses to interact with the physical world). My outer appearance is not the appearance of my inner experience. This seems so evident to me.

Ultimately, what I'm proposing doesn't entail any "hard problems": I'm talking about correlations between different arrangements of perceptions (for example, there is a correlation between the way atoms are arranged in my glasses and the way I perceive the world when I look through those glasses, and the way the glasses look to somebody else looking at me). In other words, I'm talking about correlations between contents of perception. This seems an "easy problem" to me, to use David Chalmers's expression. In your system, you postulate a correlation between perceptions (the outer appearance) and any kind of experience, including emotions, etc. You are saying that experience itself (not just its content, and not only perceptions) has an outer appearance. I think this is quite a jump. I can't even begin to imagine how we can describe that jump in other than vague terms. This looks to me very similar to the "hard problem of consciousness".

[jeffnf...@gmail.com]

Adur,

Many of us just see no evidence that the brain is something interacting at all with experience. So far you've pointed to nothing that shifts me from seeing it as a partial image of another alter's inner process.

[Lou Gold]

Hi Adur,

I'm enjoying this thread immensely. Thank you for sailing into troubled waters. Selfishly, I must note that, after being accused of many misunderstanding or misrepresentations that I chalked up to my own philosophical illiteracy, I now can say, "hmmm, I'm not alone" and, of course I like that.

I also am profoundly impressed by Bernardo's marvelous achievement and want it to become even more compelling. The achievement of challenging materialism on it's own terms with its own devices is no small thing. AND, one must wonder if the devil can be defeated with the devil's tools? OR, it may be more like Einstein's statement that "one cannot solve a problem with the thinking that created it." Perhaps, this is why BK offers a new lexicon linking to another way of thinking??? If so, confusion should be expected and reducing it would surely make the argument more compelling. I have some thoughts about how this might unfold but they are still ripening. 

About my agnosticism concerning a rational spirituality, much turns on the word "rational." If it links to the general outlook of the European Enlightenment or Age of Reason, I'm deeply skeptical. I never got into Almaas because by nature I'm more of a bhakti guy but I witnessed a friend who is both a psychologist and trained in physics benefiting greatly from the Diamond Approach. This is what moves me from skepticism to agnosticism. In brief, I'm open-minded but prefer the path of heart.

Yes, the Universe requires dissociation. It's an act of Love.

[Dana Lomas]

Adur ... If I take all the words-forms and letters of your previous post, all of which from my perspective are the extrinsic appearance of your intrinsic ideas, and I rearrange them in such a way as to create an entirely different piece of prose describing a baseball game, does that in any way alter your experience of the original intrinsic ideas? It seems to me that if we understand M@L's intrinsic fundamental ideas as the 'language' of Nature, then our rearranging of them into human artifacts likewise makes no difference to M@L's fundamental ideas, as they still inherently exist as those foundational ideas from which the artifact is conceived. Why is this so mysterious?

[Dana Lomas]

I now can say, "hmmm, I'm not alone"

For sure, and I was once among those ranks, having very early on intuited that there was something seriously amiss with materialism, so out of whack with my experiences, and struggling mightily to come up with a viable alternative, unable to let go of the deeply ingrained conditioning embedded in our collective ethos and figures of speech -- like my dad saying "your head is full of silly ideas". And I too tried to salvage some semblance of 'matter' while first inclined toward some kind of panpsychism, unable to really grok idealism because I kept tripping over those hurdles seemingly made of some physical substance. It wasn't really until I came upon BK's version of idealism that the penny finally dropped. Nevertheless, I don't see BK's model as being beyond elaboration, revision and enhancement. But in so many efforts to do so, I still find those same old hurdles tripping some very bright minds up. Yet I remain open to the hurdles eventually being dispelled, and more novel models to come.

[Lou Gold]

Dana,

That's a wonderful way of describing a process of arriving at idealism and I'm sure that it will describe the process for some others. I'm not sure if Adur is trying "to salvage some semblance of 'matter'" as that would be for him to say. For myself, I can unequivocally say that I am not trying to salvage matter but I am concerned about the sufferings of those trapped in its illusion. Thus I search for a model that is compelling beyond the needed refutations, a model that would express compellingly the promise, power and glory of being in the truth. I strongly suspect that in our most trying times this will be found somewhere along the healer's path. 

[Dana Lomas]

Lou ... Good points. I certainly don't consider my path a typical case study -- indeed we may be as rare as Leopardus Guttulus . And even with the finding of a compelling model, as of yet a work in progress, there is still a healing process going on, and the supporting model is more just a permission slip to embrace that process within the context of the primacy of consciousness. How it will play out in any other cases, through whichever combination of experiential revelation, compelling model, and healing, not necessarily in that order, I'll have to leave to The Great Mysteriousness :)

[Lou Gold]

Dana,

I hope Leopardus Guttulus will survive despite there being lots of ways to skin a cat. Materialism does seem like that, always finding a new trinket or lure to dangle before the prisoner's eyes. I'm not sure that the pull of materialism can be modelled out of power except by all too rare living examples. Once again, I'm reminded of The Grand Inquisitor and wonder if the way toward liberation might not be as simple as just helping each other along the way. 

On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 6:02:36 AM UTC-5, Dana Lomas wrote:

Lou ... Good points. I certainly don't consider my path a typical case study -- indeed I may be as rare as Leopardus Guttulus . And even with the finding of a compelling model, as of yet a work in progress, there is still a healing process going on, and the supporting model is more just a permission slip to embrace that process within the context of the primacy of consciousness. How it will play out in any other cases, through whichever combination of experiential revelation, compelling model, and healing, not necessarily in that order, I'll have to leave to The Great Mysteriousness :)

[Bernardo]

I recognize that I may not be putting in sufficient effort/time to go beyond language and understand more deeply what Adur is trying to say. I don't mean it as an excuse, but it is a fact that I am having trouble keeping all the balls in the air, and so my time for the forum is, unfortunately, limited. I cannot follow long replies and commentaries on what I say. I must assess an essay quickly, which may be somewhat unfair. On the other hand, blog readers also assess essays quickly, so either the point is easy and quick to grasp, or the essay doesn't work anyway. So let me say this: I am open to the possibility that Adur's points are more coherent than I realize, and that it is just me who isn't studying the essay and his replies long and closely enough to understand them. But alas, if that is so, blog readers would have the same difficulties.

[Bernardo]

Adur, there seems to be enough complexity and nuance in the system you are trying to communicate to make it impractical to explain in a short blog essay. As it is now, I still see what I believe to be multiple points of contradiction. Insofar as your idea entails an entire ontology, I'd encourage you to submit a longer paper (say 9K words) to an open-access journal. You would then get proper peer commentaries that would help you refine and make your argument more explicit and coherent. It is hardly possible to articulate a whole ontology in a 1.5K-word essay. It took me seven books and 15 papers to articulate mine. This is likely an exaggeration, but I think a longish paper is the minimum, if you want to be correctly understood. Cheers, B.

On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:35:38 PM UTC+2, Adur Alkain wrote:

Bernardo, I know quite well what I'm saying, although it's obvious that I'm not expressing myself clearly.

The thing is, I can assure you that I understand your system perfectly. I understand what you mean by extrinsic appearance, when you say that matter is the extrinsic appearance of inner expereince. It is an ingenious idea, and it makes sense on a superficial level. I simply don't think it ultimately works.

[Lou Gold]

Bernardo,

I can't say much with the logical rigor of metaphysics but as a human being I really appreciate the generosity of your spirit. It's good to be voyaging with you. Blessings on your (our) works.

[Dana Lomas]

As it is now, I still see what I believe to be multiple points of contradiction ~ Bernardo

I concur, and I've read Adur's most recent post three times, and given more than just cursory consideration to the points made therein, and notwithstanding some valid questions being raised, I still find it problematic, especially when it comes to the understanding of the correlation between brain activity and its supposed generation of thoughts, which is not at all clear to this mind, as I still find deeply embedded assumptions being made. 

[Adur Alkain]

Thank you, Bernardo!

I completely agree. My ideas are too complicated and weird to be explained in a short essay. I'm not really interested in academic papers, since I don't read them myself, so I will concentrate on fiction, which is really my thing. I've already written several novels and novellas based on these ideas. My own introduction to idealism was through fiction too, when I read Jorge Luis Borges's "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius". I feel popular fiction can be a great way of spreading idealistic ideas into mainstream culture. Right now I'm finishing a novel which I feel has potential to become a hit (at least I hope so). Wish me luck! :)

[Peter Lloyd]

Adur, 

It is often hard to tell when Borges is revealing his real beliefs and when he is jesting. But his "Circular Ruins" is to my mind the clearest indication of his idealist creed.

Peter

[Adur Alkain]

Peter,

Yes, "Las Ruinas Circulares" is also a great short story... It's probably more accesible than "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius", although I love the subtelty and irony of the latter. I don't think Borges took any of those fictions seriously. He didn't believe in idealism, he just loved playing around with the idea. He was also very influenced by Schopenhauer.

Now I remember Borges saying that "The Circular Ruins" was a unique story for him because while he was writing it (I think it took him weeks, he was a very slow writer) the whole world around him seemed to vanish, everything was like a dream and only the story he was writing was real... Or something like that.

In any case, I certainly did take those stories seriously... I read them when I was 14 or 15, and I've been an idealist ever since!

[Peter Lloyd]

Adur,

That's a young age to become an idealist! :-) I started reading Berkeley when I was 16 but it took me two years to realise he was right. I had an epiphany in my last year at school: it suddenly became, and remained, obvious that there can be nothing but consciousness. It's taken me 41 years since then to write what I now consider a proof of that intuition. The next step is to figure out how this philosopy meshes with physics. I hope it doesn't take me another four decades ...

Good luck with your fiction!

Peter