Does BK have a combination problem of its own

[George Merc.]

From my understanding of BK's thought:

There are free living organisms which are independent alters of M@L. 

Including the humble amoebae.
On the other hand, the cells in the human body are not considered alters of M@L.

However, some human cells are practically indistinguishable from free-living single-cell amoebae. Such as the human white blood cell. The while blood cell metabolizes, wanders freely throughout the human body, eats whatever it pleases, etc. Exactly as the amoeba does (except it doesn't reproduce).

 So why aren't white blood cells considered alters like amoebae are?

[T S]

Yes, I had this thought too. My question was about sperm and egg. Are they separately M@L and then become an alter at the point of fertilisation?

I also read (not sure if its true) in Supernature by Lyall Watson that a cell could be taken from a carrot and in the right environment could grow into a new plant!

Maybe rather than PAN psychism we could be looking at BIO psychism. Easier to create models around but still a lot of speculation and yes, the dreaded combination problem!

[George Merc.]

>   sperm and egg. Are they separately M@L and then become an alter at the point of fertilisation? 

Good question.

The exact mechanism of initial dissociation is unresolved.
I think a lot more thought need be directed to biology and dissociation.

After the egg/sperm combine, perhaps the apparent growing bodily form of the fetus reflects (or correlates with!) the degree of dissociation? 

Perhaps the dissociation itself grows, evolves, and/or changes over time and correlates with the growing baby's form and level of conscious development?

The human fetus also seems to go thru phases which resemble earlier forms of life. There might be an evolution of dissociation too which, for each new alter, progresses thru previous evolutionary forms?

[Dana Lomas]

I suppose it's possible that the corporeal form is representative of multiple expressions of dissociative processes. Likewise, I still feel there is much to be elaborated and explicated with respect to how a locus of awareness relates to this form, and comes to identify with it ~ especially given that during an OBE event it can be perceived as extrinsic to that locus of awareness, so as to feel none of the sensations associated with it, while dis-identified with it. Needless to say, more explanation is surely warranted.

[Dave Wheeler]

Funny you should mention Supernature by Lyall Watson, "tshe"(?)...this was the first book that started me off on my journey exploring the nature of things, way back when! In fact, I was at school at the end of the 1970s when I won a Theology prize for writing an essay: I got to choose two books to be my prize, and I picked Supernature and The Romeo Error, both by Lyall Watson. I still own them!

[Jason Barr]

Hoffman already solved the combination problem with his combination theorem, but it only works if matter is denied and conscious agents theory is is accepted (sorry Goff).   

[Eugene I]

Jason, could you please give a reference to Hoffman's paper where he proved the combination theorem? I can't find it

[beheren...@gmail.com]

It is a lot of very complicated mathematical equations so I don't think there are many philosophers with the mathematical skills to judge if it solves it or not.

[Eugene I]

OK I found it:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4060643/

Coleman goes further, saying that “The combination of subjects is a demonstrably incoherent notion, not just one lacking in a priori intelligibility … ” (Coleman, 2014). He explains why: “… a set of points of view have nothing to contribute as such to a single, unified successor point of view. Their essential property defines them against it: in so far as they are points of view they are experientially distinct and isolated—they have different streams of consciousness. The diversity of the subject-set, of course, derives from the essential oneness of any given member: since each subject is essentially a oneness, a set of subjects are essentially diverse, for they must be a set of onenesses. Essential unity from essential diversity … is thus a case of emergence … ”
The theory of conscious agents proposes that a subject, a point of view, is a six-tuple that satisfies the definition of conscious agent. The directed and undirected join theorems give constructive proofs of how conscious agents and, therefore, points of view, can be combined to create a new conscious agent, and thus a new point of view. The original agents, the original subjects, are not destroyed in the creation of the new agent, the new subject. Instead the original subjects structurally contribute in an understandable, indeed mathematically definable, fashion to the structure and properties of the new agent. The original agents are, indeed, influenced in the process, because they interact with each other. But they retain their identities. And the new agent has new properties not enjoyed by the constituent agents, but which are intelligible from the structure and interactions of the constituent agents. In the case of undirected combination, for instance, we have seen that the new agent can have periodic asymptotic properties that are not possessed by the constituent agents but that are intelligible—and thus not emergent in a brute sense—from the structures and interactions of the constituent agents.

IMO, Hoffman misses the Coleman's point. I don't see how the Hoffman's mathematical trick addresses the Coleman's argument. Basically, Hoffman's approach is to define CA as an abstract mathematical object C = (X, G, P, D, A, N) and then he defines a math operation to combine two agents into one (without destroying the autonomy of each parent agent) such that the combined agent satisfies the definition of conscious agent. However, what is missing in his math definition of agent is the "oneness" that Coleman is referring to. We all intuitively know this oneness of our consciousness where all qualitative experiences are mysteriously integrated into oneness of subjective experience here-and-now. Because Hoffman did not include the "oneness" in his definition, he is basically ignoring the combination problem in his math model, so no wonder he can now easily bypass it and derive the combination of agents without running into the combination problem. 

The combination problem is essentially a brutal emergence problem just like the hard problem of consciousness. For that reason it is unsolvable and it should be avoided in any idealistic metaphysics. IMO Hoffman cornered himself into the combination problem with his model of conscious agents and he will have to find a way to resolve it. There could be a way around if he includes the property of oneness into his definition of conscious agent and does not claim that the oneness of parent agents is preserved when the child combined agent is created. The merging of agents I think can be best described by the topological operation of  disjoint union ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Join_(topology) ) where the spaces being combined cease to exist as separate spaces after the joint operation. The similar dis-joint operation can model the dissociation into alters.    

[Ben Iscatus]

Very enlightening, thank you, Eugene. 

So ultimately, I presume you're in favour of the top-down process of decombination (MAL dissociating into alters) rather than any possible bottom-up process of combination. 

[Eugene I]

Ben, well, from the standpoint of combination/decombination problem we can not rule out either bottom-up or top-down, as long as they do not claim that the parent subject(s) continue to exist after splitting or combining into the child subjects(s). In Coleman's formulation (with which I totally agree) the problem is with co-existing of the top-subject with the bottom constituting subjects ("since each subject is essentially a oneness, a set of subjects are essentially diverse, for they must be a set of onenesses. Essential unity from essential diversity … is thus a case of emergence … "). So, for example, Hoffman's bottom-up model can still work around the combination problem if he includes the property of "oneness" into his definition of agents. I'm personally not in favor of top-down or bottom-up and prefer to remain open to both. There is actually another possibility (a-la-Buddhist) where subjects do not combine or split and where the Universal Consciousness always exists as a multiplicity of subjects. 

[Dana Lomas]

Yeah, the thing to keep in mind about the dissociation model is that no other consciousness is actually created. Rather, a singular consciousness conceives multiple idea constructions of unique diverse personae via which that singular consciousness expresses/explores a perspective specific to each persona that is identified with at any given time. So at which point that those personae are deconstructed, what remains is the only consciousness there ever was, absent those constructions. Now, if this process writ large still holds true as it pertains to a singular Consciousness-at-large I'm not sure. For as Eugene points out, if a Universal Consciousness forever exists as a multiplicity of subjects that can't be traced to a point of origin, then such can never be otherwise ~ or so it seems. In which case, such subjects can't be likened to transitory personae or identities. Then perhaps factor in Gödel's infinite Candy Store (notwithstanding some of the 'candy' seems indigestible and noxious)

[Lou Gold]

Consider Autopoiesis. Often, my intuition suggests that that a bias toward bottom-up or top-down reflects a difference between biology and physics where biologists would naturally lean toward bottom-up and find greater comfort with panpsychism.  Bottom line: no model is without its unique problem.

[Lou Gold]

Does this reflect a cosmological question over whether the Universe is dissociating (fragmenting from a whole) or expanding (the distance between its pieces is growing)? I'm not sure but I believe that current cosmology favors the latter view.

[David Sundaram]

On Saturday, August 22, 2020 at 7:50:38 AM UTC-7, Lou Gold wrote:

Consider Autopoiesis. Often, my intuition suggests that that a bias toward bottom-up or top-down reflects a difference between biology and physics where biologists would naturally lean toward bottom-up and find greater comfort with panpsychism.  Bottom line: no model is without its unique problem.

Hi-Ho Lou -  

How about this for a system-based 'model' that is neither 'top-down' nor 'bottom-up' (in my treatise I postulate and focus on Love and Joy as being the Essence (or 'nature') of Life/Creativity and, consequently, "the experience and expression of and Love and Joy" as Life's/Creativity's 'purpose', but you can substitute any 'nature' or 'purpose' which you think is 'the case'):

"To picture the activity of the Living Entity of our Creation, imagine a universe-sized network made up of an infinite array of banks upon banks of computers matrixially web-strung together by way of both parallel and series connections, all simultaneously, individually and together, multi-processing the above referenced Love and Joy ‘program’, with each processor and every amalgamation thereof functionally outputting the ‘solution’ it ‘calculates’ will most probably yield the greatest possible Love and Joy ‘result’ in its case (as far as it can prognostically project, that is), which ‘solution’ then operationally functions as input in relation to any and all associated processors to whatever extent they ‘calculate’ it to be relevant to their own Love and Joy process, such that said output-n-input data-packet sequences co-actively ripple and reverberate around the network, sparking Love and Joy focused perceptions and decisions (i.e., experiences and expressions) which conjointly determine what takes place here, there and everywhere in ‘the body’ of said Entity over the course of time."

[Justin]

"So why aren't white blood cells considered alters like amoebae are?"

Yes, it seems incongruous to infer that amoebae or the trillions of bacteria in the human body are alters but white blood cells aren't. But I'm not aware that BK argues that individual cells are not alters. I think the most reasonable position to take is that all cells are indeed alters.

As the organelles in eukaryotic cells are believed to have evolved from the combination of prokaryotic cells, it also seems reasonable to infer that organelles within cells are also alters. From there it could be argued that other bounded systems, such as planets and stars, could be alters containing other alters as well (of course the boundaries of such systems are blurry and not discrete, but so too is the boundary of organisms). 

[Lou Gold]

David,

Please excuse my frankness -- nothing personal intended -- but 'no' it doesn't make sense to me. The twists and turns and styles of expression simply put my mind in a spin. The 'wired' image you portray is not appealing to me, makes me want to run and try to hide in the woods. On the other hand, if you simply mean that Love is a system of embracing possibilities in all directions, I'd probably agree.

[Jason Barr]

 The combination isn't a problem for Idealism because there is no actual combination or actual any conscious agents at all; not even "me" is an actual conscious agent but we are all still conscious agents in-at-least-some-sense even if its not fundamental and purely actual sense. In a consciousness-only ontology; a singular indifferent consciousness is all that exists.

We can make sense of this once we realize that Consciousness is just another word for the Seeming. To say there is Consciousness or a Sun is to say there is the Seeming to be of a sun, to say I'm Conscious of a computer is to say it is Seems-like there's a computer to me etc.

So, Consciousness is ACTUALLY a singular indifferent Seeming, but SEEMING to itself to be "infinite differences of a boundless variety". 

Thus, this is not like the hard-problem at all. The hard-problem is about the actual existence of a brain, magically producing the actual existence of anything "Seeming to be" anything at all. 

Under the flavor I like, since any combination is Seeming to be the case and any "new agents emerging" are Seeming to be the case, then there's no "actual B, from a radically distinct actual A", the difference in agency between you and me has Seeming to exist status, with the only fundamental reality being that primary Seeming. 

On Friday, August 21, 2020 at 9:53:01 AM UTC-5 George Merc. wrote:

[Lou Gold]

Hmmm. It seems to me that we, the human species, and the biosphere of many other alters have a problem of combining our work together in a good way. Yes, it does seem that way.

[George Merc.]

Justine> "But I'm not aware that BK argues that individual cells are not alters." 

Sorry, but I believe he's quite clear on that subject. 

There is one alter per individual living organism (be that organism single-celled or multi-cellular). 

Thus the combination problem is avoided.

[Justin]

"Sorry, but I believe he's quite clear on that subject. 

There is one alter per individual living organism (be that organism single-celled or multi-cellular). 

Thus the combination problem is avoided."

Thanks for pointing that out.

 In that case, I think BK's model could be improved by assuming that each cell is an alter, for the reasons mentioned in this thread. There is no need to posit one alter per organism to avoid the combination problem, because all the alters in an organism (including the alter which is one's 'self') are dissociations of M@L, rather than being combinations of other alters. Also, in a spatial sense BK's model already allows for the existence of alters within alters (eg all the microbes living in the body).

[Lou Gold]

Justin,

Also, in a spatial sense BK's model already allows for the existence of alters within alters (eg all the microbes living in the body).

I agree with your downward pointing view but why assign "top dog" status to h.sapiens? Why is a forest NOT an alter -- an interdependent organism comprised of all its constituent beings?

[David Sundaram]

I only meant 'computers' as being analogs of living intelligence, which makes 'assessments' in terms of value (to Life!), as you do in relation to trees. etc. Maybe try thinking of the 'wired' aspect as merely representing the output-input-output-input interconnectedness of all living things. Maybe the idea of a wifi/wirelessly connected 'system' of computers 'ruffle' your 'romantic' 'feathers' less? 😉

[Lou Gold]

David,

My feathers (romantic or not) aren't 'ruffled' -- they just don't relate. No, I don't like "a wifi/wirelessly connected 'system' of computers" because it's too damn close to the Cartesian machine model that we are trying to overcome. I love when BK says, "We can build a simulation of a kidney function into my laptop but we can't teach it to pee on me desk."

[Justin]

"I agree with your downward pointing view but why assign "top dog" status to h.sapiens? Why is a forest NOT an alter -- an interdependent organism comprised of all its constituent beings?"

I concur that higher level systems (such as forests, planets, stars and galaxies) could possibly be alters. It depends on how the criteria for an alter are elaborated.

The Ecological Self by Freya Mathews might provide some guidance here. She uses systems theory to argue that an open system exhibiting self-regulation, homeostasis, equifinality (the reaching of a final state from different initial conditions) and goal-directedness can be described as self-realising. She calls a self-realising system a 'self', which in BK's model could be equated with an alter.

[Lou Gold]

The Ecological Self by Freya Mathews might provide some guidance here.

Thanks. I know of the notion of an ecological self mostly through the works of Joanna Macy.

[David Sundaram]

On Sunday, August 23, 2020 at 6:34:34 PM UTC-7, Lou Gold wrote:

David,

My feathers (romantic or not) aren't 'ruffled' -- they just don't relate. No, I don't like "a wifi/wirelessly connected 'system' of computers" because it's too damn close to the Cartesian machine model that we are trying to overcome. I love when BK says, "We can build a simulation of a kidney function into my laptop but we can't teach it to pee on me desk."

I agree that all analogies are limited in terms of their applicability - just as concepts, such as the concept of 'an alter, are. LOGIC 101: this doesn't mean that they don't have some, potentially quite useful and prognosticative applicability. You are picking and choosing which 'limitations' you embrace (and pretend aren't so) and which your reject (and prtend are disqualifying), just a 'mushy romantics' do in relation to the idea that the world of Creation is a tough-love arena, IMO. "I just don't relate to what you say" is a non-relational choice on your part which I personally find demeanng. Too bad I am not as 'innocent as a forest full of trees.

From my treatise: "the applicability of any and all analogies is limited by the partiality of the significators they contain." This applies to my computer model (all 'models' are 'analogies') as well. I don't think you realize how 'partial' your 'judgments' of the material offered by others with a different/differing perspective than/with your own are, Lou - or else you would be so 'smugly') dismissive of them, albeit with 'polite' disclaimers here and there and under the 'cover' of Bernardoism(s).

[Jason Barr]

I am not moved by the notion that Hoffman didn't solve the combination problem. Not only did he, he even showed his work! 

Two conscious agents can interact and we literally have a new conscious agent and the math flashed out to boot - Solved. The oneness isn't missing, because the combination of the two agents satisfies the definition of ONE agent.

We just have to remember that we are talking about spectromatic difference between agents not binary differences. Thus the meshing into one while still being itself is fine as long as we imagine it like drops being added to a puddle. The puddle is one, but if the drops are all of a different color then we can still define drops etc. Its only an issue if agents are analogous to billiard balls clanking together. 

[Lou Gold]

Oh David, my intention really was not to be demeaning. I didn't say you are wrong or stupid, just that the metaphor (machine model) wasn't something I can relate to. I was saying something about myself. Anyway, if it seemed a put-down, please accept my apology. 

[Eugene I]

The oneness isn't missing, because the combination of the two agents satisfies the definition of ONE agent.

That's simply because the definition is incomplete. You are clearly missing the Coleman's point. Forget about the math (math is only as good as its definitions and axioms that we mind-construct), look at the core of the problem from your own conscious experience standpoint and try to understand what Coleman is talking about.

"Subject combination problem is as hard as the hard problem of consciousness" D. Chalmers. It's simply unsolvable. But it is more subtle and harder even to understand what the problem is all about compared to the hard problem of consciousness. Even Hoffman, being highly intelligent philosopher/scientists, missed the point.  

The core of the problem is: the same quale can not be shared between two different subjects. Two subjects can experience the same phenomenon, but the qualia of that experience can not be shared between them, because the qualia are subjective experiences that belong to the subject. 

[Lou Gold]

David,

I just watched the Adyashanti video posted by Dana on the "Emptiness of Preferences" thread. It helped me see what you might be talking about. I probably push my poetic preferences too hard. I'll try to look at that.

[David Sundaram]

On Monday, August 24, 2020 at 1:22:51 PM UTC-7, Lou Gold wrote:

Oh David, my intention really was not to be demeaning. I didn't say you are wrong or stupid, just that the metaphor (machine model) wasn't something I can relate to. I was saying something about myself. Anyway, if it seemed a put-down, please accept my apology. 

No, it was a dismissal of my meaning - a choice not to meaningfully relate.Are you saying that you choose to only relate to and interact with 'nature' (as in 'trees') and humans who subscribe to the same philosophy in the same way as you? Is that what you mean to say about yourself to someone who presented a model of Life in which everyone was matrixially output-input-output=input feedback connected, which I assume you also believe - or don't you?

Your response 'sounds' like the "It's not you, its me" 'line' that Seinfeld makes fun: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2uAj4wBIU-8

Let's just leave this back-and-forth between us where it is, with my not 'accepting' your such 'dismissal'. Which also means that your proffered 'apology' is 'dismissed', of course. 😁

[David Sundaram]

On Monday, August 24, 2020 at 1:46:52 PM UTC-7, Lou Gold wrote:

David,

I just watched the Adyashanti video posted by Dana on the "Emptiness of Preferences" thread. It helped me see what you might be talking about. I probably push my poetic preferences too hard. I'll try to look at that.

👍

I prefer 'fullness' to 'emptiness' myself - the kind of fullness wherein people empathetically relate to others' preferences (except as such 'preferences' are 'dismissive' or 'violational'') while honoring their own preferences. I personally find Buddhism in general to be unduly (ultimately unsalutarily) 'dissociative' in relation to Life as a social 'enterprise'.

From https://www.scienceandnonduality.com/article/bypassing-the-spiritual-bypass-re-association-as-a-spiritual-practice :

"In the Somatic Experiencing/Organic Intelligence world, we have the term “coming out of freeze” to describe the journey from dissociation to re-association. Humbling is the best word I have to describe my own journey out of dissociation. Interestingly humble has the latin root “humus” meaning “of the earth”. Freeze and dissociation are of the sky; these days I’m much more interested in being a messy, smelly, embodied, weird human being. Re-association has the very humbling quality of making the details of one’s life much more important, because one is actually present for them. For me this has taken the form of ending a marriage, moving out of my home, changing my career, and pretty much every other detail of my life. Similar shifts are taking place in colleagues, friends, and fellow pilgrims on this journey of embodied spirituality. This path is not for the faint of heart, but the earth desperately needs people who are actually standing on her."

[Justin]

There is no combination problem for Whitehead's panpsychism. Each occasion of experience synthesizes elements from past occasions and then perishes. The many become one and are increased by one.

The flow of occasions of experience which make up one's own stream of consciousness is not fundamentally different from streams of occasions at the subatomic or cellular levels (although it involves more complex syntheses from past events).  

[Lou Gold]

I suspect this is why Dana likes to speak of empty/fullness.

I don't want to invite an in-depth discussion of Buddhism because I'm not a qualified student (that's more in Eugene's department). I believe that, like Christianity or other religious lineages, there are many flavors of Buddhism. My personal preference is the path charted by the late great "Peace Monk" Thich Nhat Hanh who advocated an engaged Buddhism of "Peace is Every Step" -- grounded, humble, humus, whole, holy and fully engaged. This seems quite aligned with your quote. And, of course, "standing on her" has been a core focus and concern of much of my own life. 

However, Buddhism is not my way because it's my nature to prefer (metaphorically) the warmth of heart to the coolness of mind. I lived in Brazil for 15 years and, when asked how it was for me, I would say, "Brazil is crazy for my mind and delicious for my heart," which often evoked a smile or hug. I also found in Brazil a Latin form of Christian syncretism that is very engaged with the forest and indigenous cultures, which are close to my heart. Such a mix (African, European, Indigenous "mixed blood") is a living reality and ideal among a large folk subculture and is celebrated in many ways, Samba being one of the more well known. 

Personally, I'm eclectic -- poetically: Buddha in mind, Jesus in heart, Indigenous in body, walking a Taoist trail. This probably seems crazy and possibly is. The only thing that seems to save me from insanity is to have at least one other to share it with.

VIVA! Embodied Spirituality VIVA!

[Lou Gold]

The many become one and are increased by one.

Interesting Whiteheadian formulation. Almost like a mantra. I'm gonna meditate on it. Whitehead is too dense for me but I'm intuitively drawn to process. My first great spiritual guide spoke very favorably of Whitehead although I suspect that he never read any of his texts.

[Justin]

"Interesting Whiteheadian formulation. Almost like a mantra."

Here's the passage it comes from (yes, very dense, but I think the gist of it comes through) :

‘Creativity’ is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novel entity diverse from any entity in the ’many’ which it unifies. Thus ‘creativity’ introduces novelty into the content of the many, which are the universe disjunctively. The ‘creative advance’ is the application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it originates. ‘Together’ is a generic term covering the various special ways in which various sorts of entities are ‘together’ in any one actual occasion. Thus ‘together’ presupposes the notions ‘creativity,’ ‘many,’ ‘one,’ ‘identity’ and ‘diversity.’ The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from disjunction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the entities given in disjunction. The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the ‘many’ which it finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive ‘many’ which it leaves; it is a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entities which it synthesizes. The many become one,  and are increased by one. In their natures, entities are disjunctively ‘many’ in process of passage into conjunctive unity. 

[Eugene I]

Whitehead is talking about the unity of all forms/entities in the universal oneness of the ontic prime (of Consciousness), not about the subjectiveness of those experiences. As far as I know, the subject combination problem was unknown to the philosophy before Chalmers (except for the intuitive insight into it by James, which was forgotten and ignored).   

[Lou Gold]

In their natures, entities are disjunctively ‘many’ in process of passage into conjunctive unity. 

Is a possible name for conjunctive unity, "respect" or "acceptance" ?

[Anand Damani]

Hello all,

Will try to explain the whole existence in a few lines if it interests some one to go deeper.

Nothing that was not there comes into being and nothing that is there gets destroyed the form just changes. 

From a tree to pulp to paper to ashes to nutrients to trees the journey can be mapped by change in form.

Having said that that are basically two types of atoms making up the whole universe.

Saturated atoms and unsaturated atoms.

Saturated are the soul/life atom which are formless, weightless, permanent.

Unsaturated ones are ones which can change form by releasing or accepting electrons in the outer circle as an effect of the external forces of heat, pressure,magnetism etc. 

The soul is sentient and can interact with other souls once it has a requisite physical body.

Depending upon the type of body it has it can do limited interaction by way of the cognitive power.

All animals that have a cognitive capability have souls giving them life and a will to live.

Many creatures and plants are just organic which grown and decay with no will to live. 

Everything is complete in itself and part of a bigger system.

Human beings have to understand to behave humanly and be in order which is now possible.

Human behavior has been identified and explained for people to understand.

I am writing short pieces about behaving humanly and would love your feedback on ananddamani.com

I can with all humility say I can answer any question about consciousness that is baffling you :)

Warm regards,

Anand Damani.

[Justin]

Chalmers and other contemporary analytic philosophers of mind rarely mention or address Whitehead, and generally talk about a substance-property panpsychism rather than a process-relational form. Here's the take of Matt Segall on the lack of a combination problem for Whitehead:

"The philosophical payoff of panpsychism is that it dissolves the hard problem of consciousness, giving experience its proper place in Nature without undermining the scientific image of the universe. Indeed, panpsychism may have important advantages over materialism for interpreting contemporary physical cosmology (Segall 2018).  But substance-property panpsychists have their own problem to deal with: the combination problem. Does Whitehead’s process-relational approach help solve it?

The solution to James’ original statement of the combination problem is already in James’ own statement: there is a 101st feeling, a “totally new fact,” and “the 100 original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be a signal for its creation, when they came together” (James 1890, 160). Whitehead’s process-relational ontology, in particular his genetic account of mutually sensitive prehensions (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 235ff), is an attempt to make good on James’ psychological insight by building it out into a coherent cosmological scheme.

Whitehead is neither a micropsychist nor a cosmopsychist exclusively. He tries to have it both ways. There is a universal soul, a psyche of the cosmos, a God of this world, and there are countless creatures creating in concert with it. Creativity transcends both, it is the source of all evolving parts, wholes, bodies, and souls. For Whitehead the combination problem becomes a logic of concrescence, a way of thinking change as more than just the rearrangement of pre-existing parts or the fragmentation of a pre-existing whole but as a genuine becoming, as an “emergent evolution” or “creative advance” (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 21, 30, 229) where neither wholes nor parts pre-exist their relations. Whitehead’s account of process is an account of combination and decomposition, of conjunction and disjunction. Process means the growing together of many objects into one subject, and the perishing of that subject back into many as a superject: “The many become one, and are increased by one” (ibid., 21). Concrescence is a cumulative process and not merely an additive one."

[Eugene I]

Justin, this passage sounds beautiful but does not address the core of the combination problem at all.

The thing is, this situation is very similar to how the hard problem is approached by many physicalists: they claim that they solve it but instead they present solutions of a misunderstood versions of the problem (meta-cognition, or correlation etc) because they simply do not understand what the hard problem is about. The subject combination problem is even more subtle and harder to understand, so it is no wonder that many philosophers miss its meaning and present solutions to their misunderstood versions of the problem instead of the combination problem itself.

[beheren...@gmail.com]

RAM posits two things: Reality and Appearance.

Please note: all you can say about appearance not being a separate thing applies to all appearances of the one thing of consciousness.

Harmony

On Tuesday, August 25, 2020 at 3:44:08 PM UTC+1 fundamental...@gmail.com wrote:

The only way to resolve the paradox of duality, a duality that gives rise to the combination problem of panpsychism and/or the decomposition problem of idealism is to posit only one-thing.  Idealism is a white elephant because it posits two (2) things; 

1.  The thinker (subject).  

2.  The thought (object).

3.  AKA, Subject/Object Metaphysics 

Peace

 

 

[Dana Lomas]

Idealism is a white elephant because it posits two (2) things;

For this conclusion to make any sense, both the apparency of a subjectified thinker and the apparency of objectified thought, neither being 'things' at all, would have to be extricable from Consciousness as the ontological primitive. Once again, this coming from someone who cannot quote any passage from one of BK's books that is illustrative of this conclusion, and which if actually read and understood would clearly illustrate why this conclusion utterly misconstrues the fundamental premise. 

[Dana Lomas]

FC ... so this quoted response must also dismiss your reading of Lee's metaphysical model. Do you think that Schopenhauer didn't read Kant, and others, in order to then elaborate and build upon those models. For the record, as if this hasn't already been made clear enough, I arrived at the primacy of Consciousness by way of certain indelible experiential events, which I was already articulating long before coming across BK's books, often through poetry, though not solely. Then came the subsequent inquiry into various models that offer an ancillary conceptual framework to build upon that articulation, with the explanatory power to cogently counter materialism-based claims that those experiences are nothing but brain-generated fantasy. As it happens, BK's model, so far at least, has some significant resonance in that regard, pending further elaboration ~ with other models also factoring in. But ultimately, what remains paramount are those indelible experiences, and this psyche's unique articulation of what has been learned from them. 

[Justin]

Eugene,

I expect that Whitehead would have understood James' formulation of the combination problem. His dissolution of the problem was simple (although, admittedly, the supporting metaphysics certainly isn't):

                             Experiences don't combine at the same time. Rather, traces of past experiences influence the formation of a new experience.

For anyone interested in learning more about Whitehead's dissolution of the combination problem, here are some free resources:

 - Pages 21 to 24  of this paper (which is the final version of Segall's paper previously linked to). 

- pages  177-180 of this book by David Ray Griffin

- The Origins of Self by Stephen Brewer is probably the easiest to read book re Whitehead I've come across.

[Eugene I]

:-)

[David Sundaram]

On Monday, August 24, 2020 at 4:55:54 PM UTC-7, Lou Gold wrote:

I suspect this is why Dana likes to speak of empty/fullness.

I don't want to invite an in-depth discussion of Buddhism because I'm not a qualified student (that's more in Eugene's department). I believe that, like Christianity or other religious lineages, there are many flavors of Buddhism. My personal preference is the path charted by the late great "Peace Monk" Thich Nhat Hanh who advocated an engaged Buddhism of "Peace is Every Step" -- grounded, humble, humus, whole, holy and fully engaged. This seems quite aligned with your quote. And, of course, "standing on her" has been a core focus and concern of much of my own life. 

However, Buddhism is not my way because it's my nature to prefer (metaphorically) the warmth of heart to the coolness of mind. I lived in Brazil for 15 years and, when asked how it was for me, I would say, "Brazil is crazy for my mind and delicious for my heart," which often evoked a smile or hug. I also found in Brazil a Latin form of Christian syncretism that is very engaged with the forest and indigenous cultures, which are close to my heart. Such a mix (African, European, Indigenous "mixed blood") is a living reality and ideal among a large folk subculture and is celebrated in many ways, Samba being one of the more well known. 

Personally, I'm eclectic -- poetically: Buddha in mind, Jesus in heart, Indigenous in body, walking a Taoist trail. This probably seems crazy and possibly is. The only thing that seems to save me from insanity is to have at least one other to share it with.

VIVA! Embodied Spirituality VIVA!

 I unreservedly resonate with all that, Lou!

[Santeri Satama]

lauantai 22. elokuuta 2020 17.50.38 UTC+3 Lou Gold kirjoitti:

Bottom line: no model is without its unique problem.

Savage theory doesn't have unique problem. It embraces the unique. :)