idealism and the virtual reality hypothesis

[felipezandim]

Hello to all. I've been wondering about the virtual reality hypothesis and the ontology of idealism. Digital physics is a growing research line in the mainstream science. Edward Fredkin, Brian Whitworth, Nick Bostron, Vlakto Vedral are just a few names on this area. Is it possible that the reality is just a process of information computation done in and by Mind at large?

The virtual reality Hypothesis seems to solve, very elegantly, the problems with quantum mechanics. Good videos on the subject:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqVrIBkhqOo

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v2Xsp4FRgas 

[Peter Jones]

Hi Felipe.  I like information theories. I find that Chalmers non-reductive 'double-aspect theory of information' would sit very well with the Buddhist view of phenomena given a couple of tweaks. But I'm no scientist and do not have a good grasp on information theory. I can't even get my head around the idea that repetition is redundancy.

The thing is that science does not do ontology. If mind-at-large does the processing then it is not part of the process and cannot be explained as information. If Reality is just a process of computation then there is no such thing as Reality. Information processing can explain a lot, but not ontology. Ontology requires a phenomenon that is not a process. Computation requires a computer. 

   

 

   

[felipezandim]

Could we say that M@L's  excitations are process of information  cumputation?

[Sciborg]

I like Arvan's Peer-to-Peer Hypothesis.

It utilizes something from computation without itself being computational. Only problem is reliance on the Many Worlds Interpretation though I'd consider substituting Weiss' Doctrine of Subtle Worlds.

[peter jacco Sas]

Hi,

Interesting thread. I have myself devloped some ideas about how to combine Absolute Idealism with a computational approach to reality: http://critique-of-pure-interest.blogspot.nl/

Greetings,
Peter

[Dana Lomas]

Great blog sir, thanks for sharing so much to explore. ... Self-enjoyed your take on Plotinus's take on Plato's take, etc, etc ... ;)

[Sciborg]

Second on the great blog Peter Jacco Sas!

Would be interesting to see a dialogue between yourself and Bernardo one day as it seems, at first glance, you guys are both Idealists but have your own views.

I think we get caught up on immaterialism vs materialism a bit much sometimes, while the dialogue between people who've moved on from the folly of trying to reduce mind gets ignored...

[peter jacco Sas]

Thanks for the comments! I'm new to this group, still finding my way. But I will certainly participate in some future discussions....

[Trevor Martin]

Idealism in general entails digital physics. If idealism is true, then the empirical world is ontologically identical in its constituency to thoughts, and thoughts are informational states- so the physical world would be derived from information, following information-theoretic principles. Moreover, add in free will, and the states do not need to be properly determinate beforehand, meaning that one's selection of what to learn should, at least at the some scale, influence results. What we end up with are the three core physics theses of John Archibald Wheeler, which most physicists in quantum gravity or quantum information theory: "it from bit" (reality is not separate from our knowledge of it); "participatory universe" (observation is an act that itself plays a role in what will be observed by posing the necessary questions); "law without law" (no actual laws governing behavior exist. Instead, things act on their own, only forming tendencies, patterns, and relations, for which there is almost inevitably a case where such things break down) http://web.calstatela.edu/faculty/kaniol/a360/wheeler_law_without_law.pdf

[beheren...@gmail.com]

A virtual reality model can explain the results of quantum mechanics without retrocausation.

https://youtu.be/uEuOGCEmiTg

[beheren...@gmail.com]

I agree. VR theory where Mind is the programmer has much more detailed, broader. elegant, scientifically backed and common sensical explanations than 'excitations', guitar strings and the like :-)

[Mark Tetzner]

The first link in the top post was not working?
Cheers, Mark

[Mark Tetzner]

[Bernardo]

Idealism is totally distinct from what Bostrom and other bozos postulate. Their views simply postpone the question of ontology and make it inaccessible. Idealism is also entirely, totally distinct from digital physics, or ontic pancomputationalism. Here is a segment of a paper I recently wrote and which should be published soon:

By postulating a material world outside mind and obeying laws of physics, physicalism can explain the patterns and regularities of perceptual experience. But it fails to explain experience itself. This is called the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ and there is now vast literature on it (e.g. Levine 1983, Rosenberg 2004, pp. 13-30, and Strawson et al. 2006, pp. 2-30). In a nutshell, the qualities of experience are irreducible to the parameters of material arrangements—whatever the arrangement is—in the sense that it is impossible even in principle to deduce those qualities from these parameters (Chalmers 2003).
As I shall elaborate upon in Section 4, the ‘hard problem’ isn’t merely hard, but fundamentally insoluble, arising as it does from the very failure to distinguish abstraction from reality discussed in this paper. As such, it implies that we cannot, even in principle, explain mind in terms of matter. But because the contemporary cultural ethos entails the notion that mind and matter constitute a true dichotomy, one is liable to conclude that there must also be a symmetric ‘hard problem of matter’—that is, that we cannot even in principle explain matter in terms of mind (as shown in Kastrup 2015, pp. 10-36, this is a false conclusion). The natural next step in this flawed line of reasoning is to look for more fundamental ontological ground preceding both mind and matter; a third substrate to which matter and mind could both be reduced.
It is for this equivocated reason that the adherents of ontic pancomputationalism posit that pure information processing is what makes up the universe at its most fundamental level (Fredkin 2003). As such, their position entails that computation precedes matter ontologically. But “if computations are not configurations of physical entities, the most obvious alternative is that computations are abstract, mathematical entities, like numbers and sets” (Piccinini 2015). According to ontic pancomputationalism, even mind itself—psyche, soul—is a derivative phenomenon of purely abstract information processing (Fredkin forthcoming).
To gain a sense of the epistemic cost of this kind of abstraction, consider the position of physicist Max Tegmark (2014, pp. 254-270): according to him, “protons, atoms, molecules, cells and stars” are all redundant “baggage” (p. 255). Only the mathematical parameters used to describe the behavior of matter are real. In other words, Tegmark posits that reality consists purely of numbers—unanchored information—but nothing to attach these numbers to. The universe supposedly is a “set of abstract entities with relations between them,” which “can be described in a baggage-independent way” (Ibid, p. 267). He attributes all reality to a description while—paradoxically—denying the existence of the very thing that is described in the first place.
Clearly, ontic pancomputationalism represents total commitment to abstract concepts as the foundation of reality, despite the innate human tendency to attribute reality only to what is concrete. According to it, there are only numbers and sets. But what are numbers and sets without the mind or matter where they could reside? It is one thing to state in language that numbers and sets can exist without mind and matter, but it is an entirely other thing to explicitly and coherently conceive of what—if anything—this may mean. By way of analogy, it is possible to write—as Lewis Carrol did—that the Cheshire cat’s grin remains after the cat disappears, but it is an entirely other thing to conceive explicitly and coherently of what this means.
Information is defined as the number of different states discernible in a system (Shannon 1948). As such, it is a property of a system—associated with the system’s possible configurations—not an entity or ontological class unto itself. Under physicalism, the system whose configurations constitute information is a material arrangement, such as a computer. Under idealism, it is mind, for experience encompasses different qualitative states that can be subjectively discerned from one another. Hence, information requires a mental or material substrate in order to be even conceived of explicitly and coherently. To say that information exists in and of itself is akin to speaking of spin without the top, of ripples without water, of a dance without the dancer, or of the Cheshire cat’s grin without the cat. It is a grammatically valid statement devoid of any semantic value; a language game less meaningful than fantasy, for internally consistent fantasy can at least be explicitly and coherently conceived of and, thereby, known as such. But in what way can we know information uncouched in mind or matter?
Although ontic pancomputationalism is an admittedly extreme example, the same attempt to replace concrete reality with mere abstractions lies behind both physicalism and the alleged mind-matter dichotomy, as I shall argue next. So if you consider ontic pancomputationalism absurd, the ontological intuitions underlying contemporary culture should give you pause for thought. At the root of this concerning state of affairs is a generalized failure to recognize that every step of abstraction away from the concreteness of direct experience—the primary datum of reality—implies a reduction in epistemic confidence. As such, they can only be justified if the facts cannot be explained without them, lest we conflate science and philosophy with meaningless language games.    

[Jason Barr]

Actually, here is an interesting you-tube video:

Digital Physics Meets Idealism: The Mental Universe

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=QiZLlpqAQ7U

So I think Bernardo is wrong when he says Digital Physics and Idealism are mutually exclusive.

[Bernardo]

I didn't say that. I said they are distinct in the sense that they don't say the same thing. Yet, there is always a way to interpret both, linguistically, so to make them mutually consistent. I don't dispute that, but consider it a language game. The essence of idealism is the notion that all reality can be reduced to consciousness, the latter being the sole ontological primitive. Digital physics and the simulation hypothesis do not require, entail or imply that.

[beherenow space]

I think the point is that idealism and digital physics together are an awesome combination. What is one of the main ways that consciousness creates and communicates? Through the exchange of information and the patterning of information. What does digital physics tell us? That the 'physical' universe is information, programmed information, that creates experiences when measured by consciousnesses.

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[RHC]

"It is one thing to state in language that numbers and sets can exist without mind and matter, but it is an entirely other thing to explicitly and coherently conceive of what—if anything—this may mean."

and to paraphrase:

It is one thing to state in language that the physical processes of the brain can generate consciousness, but it is an entirely other thing to explicitly and coherently conceive of what -- if anything -- this may mean."

Thats its.  End of story. Its that clear and INESCAPABLE.  Arguing against, or even more frequently around this, is to purposely use language as a weapon of mass delusion.  And I have depressingly come to see that much, maybe most of what passes for intellectual activity amounts to this.  

[Jason Barr]

Bernardo, Digital Physics is argued to imply or require Idealism. Either the universe is being simulated in a mind or a classical computer. But it couldn't reasonably be a classical computer because to simulate a single qubit would require exponential hardrive size (the computer would have to be bigger than the universe). Also if Tononi's Integrated Information Theory of consciousness is true, the integrated information is consciousness. This means that if the universe reduces to quantum information (which it would if it was digital), and the information is entangled (as it is quantum), it would follow that the universe is a quantum state.

It might not be obvious at first site, but I have seen many arguments that aim to show that Digital Physics implies Idealism.

[Jason Barr]

it would follow that the universe is a conscious state*

[Bernardo]

I agree that, if any sense of reason is brought to bear, some key tenets of digital physics only make sense if couched in idealism.

[Peter Jones]

Physics cannot say anything much about idealism or consciousness due to its methods and boundaries but there's no doubt that it's findings are consistent with the perennial philosophy. Nonlocality is surely a dead giveaway that time and space are not fundamental, and the 'fields on fields' view of matter almost sees it evaporate.

[Peter Jones]

On Thursday, 25 June 2015 15:39:13 UTC+1, felipezandim wrote:

Could we say that M@L's  excitations are a process of information computation?

Seems reasonable to me. So a fundamental theory would require that we reduce all information, and contact with the fundamental would mean an absence of information, thus a reduction of information and information-space, thus a transcendence of information theories.

Many thinkers get as far as information and information-space, but reducing this distinction requires a dose of nonduality.

[Adrian Stratulat]

"Digital physics" postulates two things (even if they are hidden assumptions, not explicitly stated):

1) that consciousness is emerging as an informational pattern. Thus it would be substrate independent, but still not fundamental. Otherwise, us, as potential simulations, we would not have consciousness, not more than a Sim has nowadays in Sim City.

2) that our world is simulated on computing machines in some base reality... which are still physical, and thus the ultimate nature of reality would still be physicalist/materialist.

So no matter how you look at it, it is just a complicated way of saying the same thing, adding unneeded and unwarranted levels of complexity.

Like scratching yourself on the head on the left side with your right hand.