Idealism, Process and Mind-At-Large

[Bill Meacham]

Here is the text of an essay I just posted at http://www.bmeacham.com/blog/?p=1483. I'm a bit harsh on Dr. Kastrup's logic, but hope to spark some thinking about an inconsistency in his ontology.

Idealism, Process and Mind-At-Large

by Bill Meacham, Ph.D.

Author and self-proclaimed metaphysical speculator⁽¹⁾ Bernardo Kastrup attempts to solve the mind-body problem by embracing philosophical idealism. His basic insight is sound, but the way he defends it is flawed, and some details of his theory don’t support his aim. This essay shows how, with a little tweaking, his insight can be salvaged. But be warned: it gets a little dense.

First, some background. The mind-body problem, recently renamed the “hard problem”⁽²⁾, is the problem of how the ability to be conscious (mind) is related to entirely unconscious matter (body).⁽³⁾ Historically there have been two broad categories of answers, dualism and monism. Dualism asserts that mind and body are two different types of substances. Mind has the ability to be conscious but lacks spatial extension, and body has spatial extension but lacks the ability to be conscious.⁽⁴⁾ Dualism, although favored by some theologians, is unsatisfactory because it fails to explain how an immaterial substance can have any interaction with or effect on a material substance, and vice versa. Monism, on the other hand, asserts that there is basically only one type of substance. One of its variants, materialism, says that the basic substance is matter. Another, idealism, says that the basic substance is mind.

Materialism is unsatisfactory as a metaphysics because it can’t explain how unconscious matter gives rise to experience. Historically the alternative to materialism—at least for those who prefer monism over dualism—has been idealism. But idealism is equally unsatisfactory, as I shall endeavor to show. (I discuss a third alternative, dual-aspect monism, below.)

Idealism is not, in its philosophical form, the espousal of high or noble principles such as truth, justice, loyalty, compassion, and the like. Philosophical idealism would better be called “idea-ism,” as it is the doctrine that everything is basically ideas, that reality at its core is mental. It has a long and varied history in western philosophy from Plato onward to Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, the German idealists culminating in Hegel and a number of now-forgotten British and American idealists who followed Hegel.⁽⁵⁾ It has an even longer history in Indian philosophy, going back to the Upanishads and onward through Shankara’s Advaita Vedanta and, more recently, the teachings of gurus such as Sri Ramakrishna, Sri Aurobindo and others.⁽⁶⁾ I bring up the Indian tradition because it seems to be the inspiration for Kastrup’s idealism.

That inspiration would be fine, except that in a recent paper Kastrup attempts to go beyond mystical intuition to present a logically rigorous defense of idealism, and in fact a particular type of idealism, absolute idealism, the claim that being is ultimately comprehensible as an all-inclusive whole.⁽⁷⁾ Kastrup wants to demonstrate that, as he puts it, “there is only universal consciousness.”⁽⁸⁾ His aim is to show “how the most parsimonious possible ontology can be derived, through rigorous steps of reasoning, from canonical empirical facts available to observation.”[p. 2] Unfortunately neither his facts nor his reasoning holds up to scrutiny. Here are just a few examples.

Kastrup starts by listing nine “empirical facts accessible to anyone through simple observation.”[p. 2] These are to function as premises for his argument. Most are not controversial, but some are. Let’s take his Fact 7:

Fact 7: a nervous system has the same essential nature — that is, it belongs to the same ontological class — as the rest of the physical universe. After all, nervous systems are physical systems. They are composed of the same types of basic subatomic particles that make up the universe as a whole.[p. 2]

This is an assumption, not a fact. There are actually two problems here. The first is that the composition of nervous systems is not accessible through simple observation. Scientists and medical researchers investigating nervous systems reliably observe certain images through microscopes and certain readings on rather complex instruments. It is a plausible theory, based on these observations, that nervous systems are composed of subatomic particles; and it is indeed the most plausible theory so far. But it is nevertheless a theory and certainly not accessible through simple observation. Similarly, the composition of the universe as a whole is a theory, not a fact. Even worse, the assumption that the universe, including nervous systems and the farthest stars, is the same throughout is just that, an assumption. It underlies the scientific method but is not demonstrated by that method. So Kastrup’s alleged fact, although plausible, is hardly an empirical one accessible to anyone through simple observation.

His reasoning is even more suspect. Take his Inference 1, which is based on Facts 1 and 2.

Fact 1: there is subjective experience. This is the primary and incontrovertible datum of existence.[p. 2] 

Fact 2: from Fact 1, we know that there is that which experiences, since experience entails an experiencer. Notice that I am not, at least for now, passing any judgment or making any assumption about the fundamental nature or boundaries of that which experiences. … For ease of reference, I will henceforth refer to ‘That Which Experiences’ simply as ‘TWE.'[p. 2]

Inference 1: the most parsimonious ontological underpinning for Facts 1 and 2 is that experiences are patterns of excitation of TWE. This avoids the need to postulate two different ontological classes for TWE and experiences, respectively. As excitations of TWE, experiences aren’t distinct from it in exactly the same way that ripples aren’t distinct from water, or that a dance isn’t distinct from the dancer. … There is nothing to experience but TWE ‘in motion.’ Ripples, dances and experiences are merely patterns of excitation of water, dancers and TWE, respectively.[p. 3]

Inference 1 has some problems.

• The phrase “subjective experience” in Fact 1 is redundant, as all experience is subjective, accessible directly only by the one who is experiencing. I suppose this is just a quibble, but one would expect a bit more precision from a person who claims to make a rigorous argument. More seriously, it can be argued that the primary datum of existence is not that there is experience but that there is a world. Only after some reflection do we realize that it is we who experience the world.
• Fact 2 is not something accessible through simple observation, it is an analytical truth. This is also just a quibble, though. The interesting part of Fact 2 is that Kastrup says he makes no assumptions about the nature of that which experiences (TWE).
• But in Inference 1 he does make an assumption about TWE. He says it is something excitable. It can be in motion. It is a sort of medium that contains or is composed of patterns of excitation.

No doubt what we experience is constantly in motion and much of it appears in patterns. But to claim that what experiences all that motion is itself in motion is not an inference; it is just an assertion. Kastrup claims that the assertion is based on ontological parsimony, but gives no evidence for that claim. In fact, what he does here is to assume what he wants to prove. His goal is ontological parsimony, so he assumes ontological parsimony to justify the inference to his goal of ontological parsimony. This is not a sound logical move.

Kastrup says that TWE is “an indisputable empirical fact … as opposed to abstractions of thought.”[p. 11] But it is not an empirical fact. Even on his own terms (“experience entails an experiencer”) it is something inferred. Given that his inference is faulty, TWE is just an assertion, and far from indisputable.

His Inference 2, which is based on Fact 4, has problems as well.

Fact 4: there is at least a partial correlation between measurable electrochemical activity in a person’s nervous system and the person’s private experiences.[p. 2] 

Inference 2: from Fact 4, we know that a nervous system is sentient. … Somehow, the activity of these systems is accompanied by inner experience. One possibility is that there is something about the particular structure or function of nervous systems that constitutes sentience. However, it is impossible to conceive — even in principle — of how or why any particular structural or functional arrangement of physical elements would constitute sentience …. This is a well-known problem in neuroscience and philosophy of mind, often referred to as the ‘hard problem of consciousness.’ … It remains conceivable that physical arrangements could still modulate experience, without constituting it, if one postulates some form of dualism. But even if this hypothesis turns out to be coherent, it would still leave That Which Experiences entirely unexplained, since TWE would be that which is modulated (Inference 1). From all this we must conclude that TWE is uncaused, irreducible. It simply is. Technically, we say that TWE is an ontological primitive.[p. 3]

How does he get from the assertion that nerve activity and experience are correlated to the conclusion that TWE is uncaused and irreducible? That is quite a leap. Let’s analyze the argument in detail.

• He asserts that “from Fact 4, we know that a nervous system is sentient.” Already there is a problem, because it is not the nervous system that is sentient but the person or organism whose nervous system it is.
• He then adds an additional premise, one not stated in his list of facts, that it is impossible to conceive how arrangements of physical stuff could result in sentience. But he gives no evidence for the assertion except citing an authority or two. As a matter of fact, it is quite controversial, and there is a large body of literature devoted to arguments pro and con.⁽⁹⁾
• He alludes to dualist explanations of the mind-body problem and claims that they might explain how physical stuff could modulate experience but also claims that TWE would be unexplained. His justification for the latter assertion is his Inference 1, which we have just found to be faulty.
• He concludes that since TWE is unexplained both under monistic materialism and under dualism, it must be an uncaused, irreducible ontological primitive.

All three of his premises are flawed, two being entirely unjustified. Hence, the conclusion does not follow. Once again Kastrup assumes in his premises what he wants to prove. He wants to say that the only explanation for TWE is monistic idealism, but assumes without justification that no other explanations suffice. He begs the question, committing the fallacy of citing as a premise what is in dispute.

OK, that’s enough. There are many more nonsequiturs, unexamined premises and the like. Poking holes in the argument is like shooting fish in a barrel. The conclusion to be drawn, however, is not necessarily that Kastrup’s metaphysics is wrong. It may be simply that logical derivation is a poor way to ground or justify metaphysics.

Kastrup is trying to get at something important. Even if his derivation is flawed there may be something worthwhile in his conclusion, so let’s start there and see if it makes sense. Here is a summary of his thesis:

I argue for a coherent idealist ontology [which] can be summarized as follows: there is only universal consciousness. We, as well as all other living creatures, are but dissociated alters [i.e. alter egos] of universal consciousness, surrounded like islands by the ocean of its mentation. The inanimate universe we see around us is the extrinsic view of thoughts and emotions in universal consciousness. The living creatures we share the world with are the extrinsic views of other dissociated alters of universal consciousness. A physical world independent of consciousness is a mistaken intellectual abstraction.[p. 1]

The statement that there is only universal consciousness puts Kastrup firmly in the absolute idealist camp. He explains reality in terms of ideas—thoughts and emotions—in universal consciousness. By saying “there is only,” he asserts a kind of monism, saying that all that exists is something he calls “universal consciousness.” By that phrase he means TWE, that which experiences. He says “‘Consciousness’ is the ordinary English word that best fits what I mean by TWE.”[p. 11]

(As an aside, I think “consciousness” is actually a terrible word for TWE. It has too many other meanings, ranging from merely being awake to being conscious of things in an ordinary sort of way to being a conscious self. The term “consciousness” as a synonym for TWE conceived of as the ground of all being is misleading. Its meaning is certainly far from just being able to detect your surroundings well enough to navigate around. In another place Kastrup uses the term “mind-at-large,” which is much better.)

So Kastrup is a monist. Now, monism can be of two kinds, which we might call, following the analytic philosophers, Type monism and Token monism. The distinction between a type and its tokens is an ontological one between a general sort of thing and its particular concrete instances. The sentence “A rose is a rose is a rose” contains eight separate tokens, words as individual collections of letters, but only three types, words as things that convey meaning. The word “rose” is one type that appears three times in the sentence; that is, there are three tokens of it.⁽¹⁰⁾ Type monism would assert that although there are lots of different things in the world, they are all made of the same type of stuff or all fit into the same ontological category. Token Monism would assert that, appearances to the contrary, there is actually only one thing.

Materialism is a Type monism. No materialist asserts that there is only one material thing; instead, all things are taken to be of the same type, namely physical matter. Some idealisms, notably that of Bishop Berkeley, are Type monisms, asserting that there are many things, each of which is of the same type, something perceived by the mind via the senses. Berkeley says that such sensible qualities cannot exist apart from being perceived.⁽¹¹⁾ Kastrup, however, is a Token monist. In another work he says “consciousness is unitary and essentially undivided. … I call this unitary consciousness ‘mind-at-large’. … the universe as a whole has subjective inner life.”⁽¹²⁾

Kastrup calls his work a defense of nondualism.⁽¹³⁾ He is a modern apologist for the ancient Indian philosophy Advaita Vedanta. “Advaita” means not two, or non-dual; and “Vedanta” literally means the end of the Vedas. The Vedas are ancient religious texts of India, and their end is the Upanishads, philosophical texts based on them.⁽¹⁴⁾ Advaita Vedanta is a nondualist interpretation of certain themes in the Upanishads, the main point of which is

a consideration of the relation between Brahman, the Holy Power spoken of in the Upanishads … as sustaining and/or informing the cosmos, and the self, or atman. Some Upanishadic texts … assert that in some sense Brahman and atman are one.⁽¹⁵⁾

Here are some representative passages that make that assertion:

“This whole universe is Brahman.”⁽¹⁶⁾

“This finest essence,– the whole universe has it as its Self: That is the Real: That is the Self: That you are!”⁽¹⁷⁾

“This Self is Brahman indeed.”⁽¹⁸⁾

And that’s what Kastrup is getting at when he says there is only the mind-at-large. The whole universe, Brahman, is a self, atman. The universe as a whole, having a subjective inner life, is like a living being. Everything in the universe is something contained in the mind-at-large. All things, nonliving and living, inanimate and animate, are things that the mind-at-large thinks of or feels; in other words, is conscious of.

Kastrup explains the difference between what is not living and what is living in an interesting way. Both are in the mind-at-large, but in different ways. Inanimate things are ideas in this being’s mind and living organisms such as human beings are dissociated alter egos of this being, rather like split personalities of a person suffering from dissociative identity disorder.[p. 4] Each alter ego perceives the world, but only from its own point of view rather than that of the mind-at-large. Each alter ego is like a little piece of the cosmic ego, mind-at-large, which perceives the whole universe.

What each alter ego perceives as separately existing things and as living beings are extrinsic views either of mental activities within the mind-at-large or of other alter egos (which I presume are also mental activities within the mind-at-large). By “extrinsic” Kastrup appears to mean exterior. The mind-at-large thinks of nonliving things such as rocks. The rocks are ideas in the mind-at-large; they are interior or intrinsic to that mind. What we alter egos see as rocks is the exterior, the extrinsic view, of mind-at-large’s ideas of rocks. Living beings are dissociated entities that have an interior or intrinsic view, their own view of the world, and an appearance to other alter egos, an exterior or extrinsic view. That is Kastrup’s ontology in a nutshell, explaining how everything exists in the mind-at-large.

But consider this ontology carefully. Some entities, the inanimate ones, have only an exterior. The mind-at-large thinks of them—i.e., they are objects that the mind-at-large is conscious of—but they themselves are not conscious of anything. We alter egos are conscious of them, but they are in no way conscious of us. Other entities, the living ones, have both an exterior and an interior. They are objects that the mind-at-large is conscious of, and they themselves are conscious of things. We alter egos are conscious of them, and they are or can be conscious of us. In effect Kastrup posits two categories of things, bodies with no mind and bodies with mind. Despite being dressed up in monistic terms, his ontology is dualist!

If we want a truly monist ontology, we must look elsewhere. Fortunately, there is a better one. It is both Type and Token monist, it accounts for the undeniable plurality that we find in the world, and it is true to the unitary mystical insight of the Upanishads. That ontology is based on the process metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead.

I have written about Whitehead’s metaphysics on several occasions: in my book How To Be An Excellent Human and in some blog essays, notably “Dead or Alive?” and “In Defense of Panpsychism.” Here I give just a short summary.

Whitehead’s ontology is one of process. The fundamental units of reality, in his view, are occasions, not inert particles. Occasions are quite tiny. He wrote at a time when quantum mechanics was being developed, and no doubt the mysterious behavior of reality at the subatomic level informed his thinking. Entities submicroscopically small cannot be described as material as we generally think of it. Quantum-level entities do not interact like billiard balls; instead, they seem to have a quasi-existence in a field of mere potentiality until they are detected; then they become actual. The interaction between them and someone or something else that detects them is essential to their existence. Reality at that level is relational and dynamic.

Whitehead seeks categories of explanation that can apply both to the quantum level of reality and to the world revealed by our unaided senses. In our everyday world it is undeniable that, unless we are asleep or sedated, we are aware of our surroundings and remember our past. So Whitehead posits that subatomic actual occasions are, in a way, aware of their surroundings and of their own past. Whitehead calls them “drops of experience, complex and interdependent”⁽¹⁹⁾ and “occasions of experience.”⁽²⁰⁾ They are examples of what Galen Strawson calls “micropsychism.”⁽²¹⁾ We could call Whitehead’s metaphysics a process panpsychism.

One of the objections to panpsychism is that it seems obvious that some things, those that are not alive, have no sentience whatsoever. So how can we say that everything has a psyche? The answer is that in nonliving things the sentience is confined to the constituent actual occasions, and is not found in aggregations of them. The sentience of living things, in contrast, is a function of their complex and dynamic form, which is more than mere aggregation.

Just as subatomic particles combine to form all the objects of our world, so do actual occasions combine into nonliving and living things. In nonliving things the combinations are simple and stable; in living things they are complex and dynamic. The constituent material of nonliving things does not change over time unless impacted from without. The mentality of nonliving things remains isolated at the subatomic level. Tables, chairs and chunks of rock are certainly not sentient, and process panpsychism does not assert that they are. But living things have a unity of form over time as their constituent material changes. They are not mere aggregations. That complex unity of form over time is accompanied by a complex mentality. The primordial experiences of the actual occasions comprising living things, such as plants, animals and human beings, bind together and reinforce each other, giving birth to a higher-level coherence of experience.

Whitehead’s metaphysics can be seen as a form of dual-aspect monism, but with a twist. Dual-aspect monism, also known as neutral monism, says there is only one type of substance, which has both physical and mental properties.⁽²²⁾ Whitehead agrees, but says reality is better conceived as process than as substance. Every instance of reality, that is, every actual occasion, has both a physical and mental aspect, the physical being how it is detected or experienced by other occasions and the mental being how the world and its own internality appears to itself. The difference between Whitehead’s ontology and dual-aspect monism is that in his view the underlying substrate that has both physical and mental aspects or properties is process, not substance.

There is much more to Whiteheads’ process ontology, but that is enough for now. Let’s return to Kastrup. He is not a big fan of panpsychism because it is only a Type monism and he wants a Token monism. He objects to an ontology that postulates as ontological ultimates a slew of abstract subatomic particles.[p. 11], and the notion that they might in some sense be conscious does not impress him. But there is a way to extend process panpsychism that might be more congenial.

The clue is in a passage from the Bhagavad Gita, Chapter 13, verses 1 and 2. Krishna, The God, speaks to Arjuna, a human:

1 This body is called the ‘field’, and he who knows it is called the ‘knower of the field’ ….
2 Know that I am the ‘knower of the field’ in every field.⁽²³⁾

This passage echoes the earlier Brihadaranyaka Upanishad:

The man who possesses this knowledge becomes the Self of all contingent beings.⁽²⁴⁾

What these texts suggest is that TWE, to use Kastrup’s term, that which experiences, is the same in every experiencer. Not just the same type of thing, but the very same thing (although the term “thing” is misleading, as it is not a thing but that which experiences things). Brahman is the atman (self) that experiences its world in every being. This is a slightly different way to understand what Kastrup is getting at.

Kastrup is after unity. The unity of all that exists can be understood from the inside, as it were. We can say that the mind-at-large is that which is conscious and active in everything, in every event. What appears to be many from the outside, Kastrup’s extrinsic view, is in fact the manifestation of one underlying reality. The mind of each of us is the same as the mind-at-large of all of reality. As I like to put it, there is one universal interiority, which incorporates the interiority of all the separate constituents of reality into one unity of experience, one coherence of interiority.⁽²⁵⁾

The difference between this view and Kastrup’s is subtle but important. We’ve seen that Kastrup, although claiming monism, actually ends up with a dualism: in his view some bodies have mind and some don’t. We can ameliorate Kastrup’s dualism by combining it with process panpsychism, which says that everything has mind, just as everything has body. Everything is composed of occasions of experience, each of which has the dual aspects of interiority (mind) and exteriority (body). And we combine process panpsychism with Advaita Vedanta to conclude that all these occasions of experience are united in one mentality, the mind-at-large. Instead of saying that the mind-at-large thinks of everything so that everything exists within it, we can say that mind-at-large is everything. It is broken into bits, as it were; and the bits, being both mind and body, perceive each other. Each one experiences its world; and its world is the extrinsic view of all the others, which experience their world. The mind-at-large as self (atman) perceives all there is through the senses of each of the bits. And the mind-at-large as body is entirely perceived by those bits that comprise itself.

In other words, to use Kastrup’s terminology, every actual occasion is an alter ego of mind-at-large. If we use the term “God” to mean TWE and say that the mind-at-large is the mind of God, we can say that process panpsychism is process pantheism.⁽²⁶⁾

You’ll notice that I have not gotten to process monism and process pantheism by reasoning from premises to conclusions. Doing so is a fruitless task, as we can see from Kastrup’s attempt. Instead, I have joined some insights and ideas that together form a coherent system of metaphysics. As I have noted elsewhere, we evaluate metaphysics differently from how we evaluate empirical science and logical reasoning. By finding a way to relieve Kastrup of incipient dualism, I believe I have come up with something superior. I hope Kastrup himself would agree.

—

Notes

(1) Kastrup’s website, http://www.bernardokastrup.com, is titled “Bernardo Kastrup’s Metaphysical Speculations.”

(2) Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.” pp. 10-11.

(3) Wikipedia, “Mind–body problem.”

(4) Wikipedia, “Dualism (philosophy of mind).”

(5) Acton, “Idealism.”

(6) Smart, “Indian Philosophy.”

(7) Wikipedia, “Absolute idealism.”

(8) Kastrup, “On why idealism is superior to physicalism and micropsychism,” p. 1. Subsequent references to page numbers in brackets are to this paper.

(9) See, for instance, Shear, Explaining Consciousness, and Dennett, Consciousness Explained.

(10) Wetzel, “Types and Tokens.”

(11) Acton, “Idealism,” p. 112.

(12) Kastrup, “The threat of panpsychism.”

(13) Ibid.

(14) Smart, “Indian Philosophy,” p.156.

(15) Ibid., p. 159.

(16) Chandogya Upanishad III.xiv.1. Zaehner, p. 87.

(17) Chandogya Upanishad IVi.viii.7. Zaehner, p. 109.

(18) Brihadaranyaka Upanishad IV.iv.5. Zaehner, p. 71.

(19) Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 28.

(20) Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 221.

(21) Strawson, “Realistic Monism,” p. 25.

(22) Wikipedia, “Mind–body problem,” and Wikipedia, “Double-aspect theory.”

(23) Bhagavad Gita XIII.1-2. Zaehner, p. 303.

(24) Brihadaranyaka Upanishad I.v.20. Zaehner, p. 40.

(25) Meacham, How To Be An Excellent Human, pp. 63-66.

(26) This is a variant of Whitehead’s notion of God. Whitehead has a place for God in his ontology, and his conception is similar this one, but not the same. A comparison of the two is a topic for another time however.

References

Acton, H.B. “Idealism.” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Vol. 4, pp. 110-118.

Chalmers, David. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.” Explaining Consciousness: The ‘Hard Problem’. Ed. Jonathan Shear. Cambridge Mass. and London: The MIT Press (A Bradford Book), 1997. pp. 9-30. Online publication http://consc.net/papers/facing.html as of 6 July 2016.

Dennett, Daniel C. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company Back Bay Books, 1991.

Kastrup, Bernardo. “On why idealism is superior to physicalism and micropsychism.” Online publication https://www.scribd.com/doc/305856953/On-why-idealism-is-superior-to-physicalism-and-micropsychism and https://www.academia.edu/20313118/On_why_Idealism_is_superior_to_Physicalism_and_Micropsychism as of 9 June 2016.

Kastrup, Bernardo. “The threat of panpsychism: a warning.” Online publication https://www.scienceandnonduality.com/the-threat-of-panpsychism-a-warning/ as of 18 June 2016.

Meacham, Bill. How To Be An Excellent Human: Mysticism, Evolutionary Psychology and the Good Life. Austin, TX: Earth Harmony, 2013.

Shear, Jonathan. Explaining Consciousness: The ‘Hard Problem’. Cambridge Mass. and London: The MIT Press (A Bradford Book), 1997.

Smart, Ninian. “Indian Philosophy.” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Vol. 4, pp. 155-169.

Strawson, Galen. “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.” Consciousness and its Place in Nature. Ed. Anthony Freeman. Charlottesville VA: Imprint Academia, 2006. pp. 3-31.

Wetzel, Linda. “Types and Tokens.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 edition. Ed. Edward Zalta. Online publication http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/types-tokens/ as of 11 July 2016.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Adventures of Ideas. New York: The Free Press, 1967.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. New York: Harper and Row Harper Torchbook, 1960.

Wikipedia. “Absolute idealism.” Online publication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Absolute_idealism as of 9 July 2016.

Wikipedia. “Double-aspect theory. Online publication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-aspect_theory as of 6 July 2016.

Wikipedia. “Dualism (philosophy of mind).” Online publication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind) as of 6 July 2016.

Wikipedia. “Mind–body problem.” Online publication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem as of 6 July 2016.

Zaehner, R.C., tr. Hindu Scriptures. London: J.M. Dent Everyman’s Library, 1966.

[Bernardo]

Hi Bill,

It is a plausible theory, based on these observations, that nervous systems are composed of subatomic particles; and it is indeed the most plausible theory so far. But it is nevertheless a theory and certainly not accessible through simple observation.

You can put the material of a brain in a mass spectrometer and precisely measure its atomic composition in detail, including relative ratios of different elements. There is nothing to the total mass of a brain that can't be identified at an atomic level. This is a fact available to observation (wherein observation, of course, can be aided by instrumentation). As a matter of fact, these measurements are routinely done. Type "mass spectrometry" and "brain composition" on Google Scholar and peruse a few results.

 

Similarly, the composition of the universe as a whole is a theory, not a fact.

Although one can never really logically defeat extreme degrees of skepticism (solipsism, for one), I consider it unproductive to go so far, since it would invalidate all knowledge and render all empirically-grounded philosophical debate ultimately pointless. If it helps, read "known universe" where I write "universe."

The phrase “subjective experience” in Fact 1 is redundant, as all experience is subjective, accessible directly only by the one who is experiencing. I suppose this is just a quibble,

Yes.

 

but one would expect a bit more precision from a person who claims to make a rigorous argument.

So much for a substantive rebuttal. Though unnecessary to answer this, you should know that there is talk in neuroscience today, especially in the field of so-called "no-report paradigms," where people talk of "unconscious experiences." See e.g. From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience, by Gregory Nixon. My apparently redundant use of the terms was meant to avoid ambiguity here. So you are publicly criticizing a terminology choice that, at best, is merely redundant, without knowing the reason for it.

More seriously, it can be argued that the primary datum of existence is not that there is experience but that there is a world. Only after some reflection do we realize that it is we who experience the world.

This is simply incorrect. I quote physicist Andrei Linde:

"Let us remember that our knowledge of the world begins not with matter but with perceptions. … Later we find out that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be most conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying reality beyond our perceptions. This model of material world obeying laws of physics is so successful that soon we forget about our starting point and say that matter is the only reality, and perceptions are only helpful for its description. This assumption is almost as natural (and maybe as false) as our previous assumption that space is only a mathematical tool for the description of matter." (source: web.stanford.edu/~alinde/SpirQuest.doc)

So the sole primary fact is that there is perception, a form of experience, and only then do we abstract the conceptual notion of a world.

Fact 2 is not something accessible through simple observation, it is an analytical truth. This is also just a quibble, though.

It isn't a quibble and it isn't correct either. I am simply recognizing that experience always entails a "point of view annexed to a … qualitative field," as Coleman put it. TWE is this point of view annexed to the qualitative field of experience. And this is an empirical fact available to observation, this time in the form of introspection. It is not merely an analytical truth.

But in Inference 1 he does make an assumption about TWE. He says it is something excitable. It can be in motion. It is a sort of medium that contains or is composed of patterns of excitation.

This is, obviously, a modeling metaphor, a way of thinking about TWE, since TWE is the subject, not an object. It is entirely analogous to thinking about the quantum vacuum as an excitable medium in quantum field theory (although it is, by definition, not material), or talking of branes as a vibratory medium in M-theory. There is nothing invalid about it since the goal here is to provide a way of thinking about something that is ultimately unexplainable, since it is taken to be an ontological primitive (as explained in the paper).

 

Kastrup claims that the assertion is based on ontological parsimony, but gives no evidence for that claim.

This is a rather surprising assertion, since the reasoning is very clear in my paper. The parsimony here is to avoid the need to postulate distinct ontological classes for experience and TWE. Frankly, I am beginning to feel discouraged about spending time in continuing to answer your long critique.

 

In fact, what he does here is to assume what he wants to prove. His goal is ontological parsimony, so he assumes ontological parsimony to justify the inference to his goal of ontological parsimony. This is not a sound logical move.

This is an arbitrary claim put forward without substantiation. My reasoning speaks for itself.

How does he get from the assertion that nerve activity and experience are correlated to the conclusion that TWE is uncaused and irreducible?

?? But I don't. TWE is uncaused because of the hard problem. You are misreading my rather straightforward argument.

He asserts that “from Fact 4, we know that a nervous system is sentient.” Already there is a problem, because it is not the nervous system that is sentient but the person or organism whose nervous system it is.

What is the person or organism whose nervous system it is? In what way does saying that "a person is sentient" is fundamentally different from saying that "a nervous system is sentient" in the context of my line of argument? All you accomplish is to make room for the possibility that maybe e.g. kidney cells are also sentient, but that doesn't at all defeat my point. You seem to be motivated by criticizing me, instead of trying to grok the essence of my argument.

 

He then adds an additional premise, one not stated in his list of facts, that it is impossible to conceive how arrangements of physical stuff could result in sentience. But he gives no evidence for the assertion except citing an authority or two. As a matter of fact, it is quite controversial, and there is a large body of literature devoted to arguments pro and con.

Obviously, I am appealing to the well-known hard problem. It is not in the scope of the paper to review and solve the entire controversy about the hard problem. If you disagree that there is a hard problem, then that step of my argument is not valid for you. You then have a choice to either reject my entire argument or evaluate it more globally, to see how it compares to physicalism as an explanatory model, even if there were no hard problem. That's all there is to it. It is entirely legitimate to leverage the literature, in the form of arguments laid out by others, as a step in my own argument, so I don't have to repeat philosophical points made all the way back to Plato. Your critique here -- and elsewhere -- is facile, in my opinion.

 

He alludes to dualist explanations of the mind-body problem and claims that they might explain how physical stuff could modulate experience but also claims that TWE would be unexplained. His justification for the latter assertion is his Inference 1, which we have just found to be faulty.

No. I refer to inference 1 as a cf., not as a justification. Justification aren't needed for dualism, by definition, doesn't explain TWE. It simply takes it as a primitive along with physical ultimates. This is self-evident, since it is the very spirit of dualism. Again, if this is the level of your argumentation it is discouraging to continue replying.

[He] assumes without justification that no other explanations suffice. He begs the question, committing the fallacy of citing as a premise what is in dispute. OK, that’s enough. There are many more nonsequiturs, unexamined premises and the like. Poking holes in the argument is like shooting fish in a barrel. The conclusion to be drawn, however, is not necessarily that Kastrup’s metaphysics is wrong. It may be simply that logical derivation is a poor way to ground or justify metaphysics.

:-) I am happy you succeed in finding a way, satisfactory for yourself, to beat your own chest in claiming that only you, not me, can defend the correct conclusions of my paper. :-)

With due respect, I don't have the time or interest to read and react to the rest of your text.

B.

[Bernardo]

ALL,

I just wanted to take this opportunity, in the context of this thread, to explain something about my own attitude in interacting with people.

I consider it not at all a shame to have difficulties understanding a (my) philosophical argument. There are many forms of intelligence and wisdom, and philosophy is but a tiny, specialized one. Many people who can't follow a philosophical argument are much closer to the truth than I am, and I say this with first-hand knowledge.

Now, there are at least two types of people who have difficulty following my philosophical arguments: (a) those who are sincere and actually trying to understand it, and criticize me as a way to get answers that help them understand it, whether they ultimately agree with my argument or not; and (b) those who simply want to win a little rhetorical game they created themselves to beat their own chest. The latter are not trying to advance knowledge but nurture their ego. Their arguments are not only based on an inability to understand what they are criticizing, but liberally facile and insincere. Bill's tentative rebuttal above, insofar as I can see, belongs to type (b).

I am willing to sacrifice my limited personal time to interact with people I perceive to fall under type (a). But I no longer have the motivation to invest in people operating under type (b). I have better ways to spend my time in continuing to develop and publish my philosophy, and interacting with sincere interlocutors.

Cheers, Bernardo.

[Peter Jones]

Makes sense to me, Bernardo, I'd agree with your assessment of this as being Type B, and I'd imagine that you have better things to do than respond to Type B objections. There are one or two good objections here, I feel, but they're buried in unnecessary niggles and misreadings.

[Bernardo]

Hi Peter,

Can you point them out to me? I stopped reading at the point I stopped replying, but would be interested in your assessment.

Cheers, Bernardo.

[Peter Jones]

Ha! Called out. Now I have to admit I was only being polite. I can't see any decent objection here, mostly just misreadings. I didn't make it to the end. The post would have been a good one had it been a list of questions designed to clarify your position on these issues. To leap in with objections was a mistake. (Sorry Bill, it seems that way to me).

. 

  .  

[Dana Lomas]

I feel it would have sufficed to put forth Whitehead's view, which I do find intriguing, and suggest how it may differ with Bernardo's view, and allow the readers to draw their own conclusions, and of course invite some feedback. At no time do I get the impression from Bernardo that his speculations must be written in stone, and thus not amenable to adjustment. Nonetheless, it seems that some feel the need to take a hammer to it. :)

[SKS]

This paragraph stands out to me, as I made the same mistake at first:

 

But consider this ontology carefully. Some entities, the inanimate ones, have only an exterior. The mind-at-large thinks of them—i.e., they are objects that the mind-at-large is conscious of—but they themselves are not conscious of anything. We alter egos are conscious of them, but they are in no way conscious of us. Other entities, the living ones, have both an exterior and an interior. They are objects that the mind-at-large is conscious of, and they themselves are conscious of things. We alter egos are conscious of them, and they are or can be conscious of us. In effect Kastrup posits two categories of things, bodies with no mind and bodies with mind. Despite being dressed up in monistic terms, his ontology is dualist!

Under idealism, each physical object must be generated by mental activity. This applies equally to rocks and thermostats as humans and dogs. It's just that humans and dogs correspond to a different sort of mental activity. So, by the definition used above, any philosophy of mind other than panpsychism can be accused of dualism, since animate and inanimate objects are always considered to have different characteristics. This is an easy mistake to make for a few reasons:

We're used to thinking in a dualist manner, because it's convenient. So we imagine an objective physical object and try to attach mental activity to it. But idealism says that it's the mental activity creating the object, not the other way round. Similarly, the idea of MAL can be mistaken for a kind of revival of Berkeleyan idealism, in which physical objects have an objective existence as God's percepts. This straightforward isomorphism is implied by, "They are objects that the mind-at-large is conscious of." In this case, yes, it would appear odd that MAL's experiences would include streams, mountains, and the neurons in my brain, and yet only the neurons would really correspond to another subject while the mountains would not. There would be a fundamental separation at work that looks quite dualist. And yet - this is a bit tricky to get across - if physical objects are images of mental activities within MAL, they may be not just a function of MAL's experiences but the individual subject (see Donald Hoffman's interface theory of perception). There aren't really any mountains that can be unconscious, or any neurons that can be conscious. There's just a great, unbroken sea of mental activities, some of which make up human minds.

The idealist argument against Strong AI can be mistaken for relying on a sort of dualism, when actually, the issue at hand - in idealist terms - is whether a machine can be an alter-ego of MAL or not. A machine would correspond to mental activities within MAL, but since physical objects are images of mental processes, a physical difference must reflect a mental difference somewhere; so it cannot be concluded that these mental activities must be similar to our own - localised, emotional, creative, self-reflective, etc - even if the machine displayed some analogous behaviours. I think there is a caveat introduced by the interface theory of perception, in that the apparent physical differences would also be a product of our biased interface to reality - tuned to an ancestral fitness function rather than philosophical truth - but again we couldn't conclude that a human-like mind is really involved.

Reading on... it looks like the writer actually does understand these points, but assumes that Bernardo does not.

The difference between this view and Kastrup’s is subtle but important. We’ve seen that Kastrup, although claiming monism, actually ends up with a dualism: in his view some bodies have mind and some don’t. We can ameliorate Kastrup’s dualism by combining it with process panpsychism, which says that everything has mind, just as everything has body. Everything is composed of occasions of experience, each of which has the dual aspects of interiority (mind) and exteriority (body). And we combine process panpsychism with Advaita Vedanta to conclude that all these occasions of experience are united in one mentality, the mind-at-large. Instead of saying that the mind-at-large thinks of everything so that everything exists within it, we can say that mind-at-large is everything. It is broken into bits, as it were; and the bits, being both mind and body, perceive each other. Each one experiences its world; and its world is the extrinsic view of all the others, which experience their world. The mind-at-large as self (atman) perceives all there is through the senses of each of the bits. And the mind-at-large as body is entirely perceived by those bits that comprise itself.

This is pretty much what Bernardo has been saying, as I understand it. His opposition to 'panpsychism' has more to do with scientists like Koch, Tononi, etc. who conceptualise subjective experience as a property of physical matter. As many people have pointed out, it is not very parsimonious to start with physical matter and begin tacking on additional mental properties. While the view that all physical objects correspond to mental activities within MAL could be called 'panpsychism', it's far more informative to refer to it as 'idealism'. I don't actually see any fundamental disagreement.

[Bill Meacham]

I apologize for any offense I have given.  The first part of my paper, in which I criticize Bernardo's argument, is itself rather argumentative and contentious.  I understand how it would appear to be a type (b) argument.  I appreciate those who read further and found the rest of the paper to be of type (a).  I do find much of value in Bernardo's world view.  I suggest that it is confusing to include what appears to be a dualism within a monist ontology.  And I offer a suggestion for ameliorating that confusion: to take the submicroscopic actual occasions of which everything is composed as alters with a subjectivity of their own, not just as the mind-at-large's thoughts or feelings with no subjectivity of their own.

SKS says "humans and dogs correspond to a different sort of mental activity [from that of rocks and thermostats]."  So Bernardo's theory posits two different kinds of activity within the mind-at-large.  My suggestion is that the theory only needs one type of activity, the activity that forms an alter. Given the assumptions of process panpsychism and the further assumptions of Advaita Vedanta, that's all we need to form a metaphysics that is both Type monist (everything is composed of the same type of entity) and Token monist (everything is part of or an emanation from one being).

Instead of saying, as SKS does, "all physical objects correspond to mental activities within MAL" (emphasis added), the theory would say that all physical objects are MAL. They appear to be separate things because MAL has split itself up, as it were, into many.  They are actually all the same being because MAL is conscious of the world (i.e., other parts of itself) by means of the experience of each of the many pieces.

SKS says "This is pretty much what Bernardo has been saying .... I don't actually see any fundamental disagreement."  I wonder if Bernardo agrees.

[SKS]

On Saturday, 16 July 2016 22:25:34 UTC+1, Bill Meacham wrote:

SKS says "humans and dogs correspond to a different sort of mental activity [from that of rocks and thermostats]."  So Bernardo's theory posits two different kinds of activity within the mind-at-large.  My suggestion is that the theory only needs one type of activity, the activity that forms an alter. Given the assumptions of process panpsychism and the further assumptions of Advaita Vedanta, that's all we need to form a metaphysics that is both Type monist (everything is composed of the same type of entity) and Token monist (everything is part of or an emanation from one being).

I think you need to be clearer about how you define an alter. To me, this is how we conceptualise our relationship to MAL. We feel that we are spatially-separated entities with private thoughts and feelings, experiencing a past-to-future flow of time, and that we can be self-reflectively aware of our very awareness. While this may sound a bit reductionist, these characteristics are all basically collections of experiences within MAL. A human is then what it looks like for MAL to feel these things, just like how a blush is what it might look like for a human to feel embarrassed. But, like with Strong AI, I have no reason to think that the mental activities corresponding to inanimate objects have any of these properties. Even humans can go through profound changes in this respect, like anaesthesia, dreaming or ego death. My everyday experiences probably have more in common with those of a DMT tripper going through ego death than those corresponding to any inanimate object (including subatomic particles). There may be no clear separation from the rest of MAL, nor any sense of space-time localisation, nor self-reflective thought, nor anything else I am familiar with as an alter. So, what does it mean for a quark to be an alter, and if I define my relationship to MAL as that of an alter, what do I have in common with a quark?

[Dana Lomas]

Once again, I'm intrigued to find in Bills summary of Whitehead's view another reference to what could be called 'units of consciousness' -- what he referred to as 'occasions of experience' -- that together form all gestalts of consciousness. I've now come across several such references in my recent exploration of idealist philosophies, all using different terminology to refer to such individuated units. Curiously, my only prior introduction to the idea of such units came long before I had any abiding interest in metaphysics, in the form of some so-called channeled material which I found by happenstance. I've referenced that material elsewhere in this forum, for anyone open-mindedly curious, as it perhaps address some of the question raised by SKS, about just how aware-ized such units may be. Whether accepted or not, it seems to echo much of what Bill has to say about Whitehead's 'occasions' in his brief summary above, and in the blog links he provides. As availability allows, I do intent to explore Whitehead's writings, and perhaps Bill's book as well, for some clarification. However, I'd be very interested in any other view or speculation on the idea of 'units of consciousness' whether pro or con, and how it may or may not fit into Bernardo's view.

[Peter Jones]

On Saturday, 16 July 2016 22:25:34 UTC+1, Bill Meacham wrote:

I apologize for any offense I have given.  The first part of my paper, in which I criticize Bernardo's argument, is itself rather argumentative and contentious.  I understand how it would appear to be a type (b) argument.  I appreciate those who read further and found the rest of the paper to be of type (a). 

Great response Bill. I feel that your objections are mostly misunderstandings of BK but I sympathise with them to some extent because, as has been discussed at great length here, the words 'idealism' and 'monism' have a variety of meanings.

Would it help if you assumed that MaL (or just Mind) is emergent? Then alters and the world of multiplicity can be products of mind which itself can be a product (or aspect, power) of Brahman.   

     

[Bill Meacham]

Peter Jones asks

> Would it help if you assumed that MaL (or just Mind) is emergent? Then alters and the world of multiplicity can be products of mind which itself can be a product (or aspect, power) of Brahman. 

Emergent from what? If you mean emergent from Brahman taken as the ground of all being that "was" "before" the world of multiplicity, space and time, then yes.  ("Was" and "before" are in quotes because it actually makes no sense to talk about what existed before time began, but that's the best we can do with our language that is within space and time.)

I think it is not useful to refer to Brahman as "consciousness," nor as "mind-at-large." Mind-at-large, which is conscious of everything, is an aspect of the world of multiplicity we live in, not of the unmanifest state that existed "before" the world of multiplicity. I discuss this in more detail in my essay "What’s In A Name?" here: http://www.bmeacham.com/blog/?p=1470.

On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 8:49 AM, Bill Meacham <bmeac...@gmail.com> wrote:

SKS asks

> what does it mean for a quark to be an alter, and if I define my relationship to MAL as that of an alter, what do I have in common with a quark?

What you have in common with a quark is that both you and it have an inside and an outside. "Inside" and "outside" are metaphors. "Inside" means subjectivity. Having an inside means to have a view of the world, a way the world appears to you. And by "world" I mean both what is known only to you, such as private thoughts and feelings, and what is known to more than one observing entity, such as the shape, mass and location of a commonly perceived object such as a table or chair. "Outside" means that you appear in some way to others; other observing entities can observe you and agree on certain characteristics such as your shape, mass and location.

Quarks and other subatomic particles combine with each other in two ways. One, the nonliving, is mere aggregation, in which the constituent elements combine in simple and stable ways and the mentality remains isolated at the subatomic level. The other, the living, is complex unity of form over time accompanied by a complex mentality. In the latter the primordial experiences of the elements bind together and reinforce each other, giving birth to a higher-level coherence of experience.

In this view every element of reality from the smallest to the largest is composed of the same type of "stuff," something that is both capable of experiencing its world and of being experienced by other entities.

My claim is that this is a better monism than one that postulates two different types of "stuff," whether that stuff be physical matter or mental activity.

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[Bill Meacham]

SKS asks

> what does it mean for a quark to be an alter, and if I define my relationship to MAL as that of an alter, what do I have in common with a quark?

What you have in common with a quark is that both you and it have an inside and an outside. "Inside" and "outside" are metaphors. "Inside" means subjectivity. Having an inside means to have a view of the world, a way the world appears to you. And by "world" I mean both what is known only to you, such as private thoughts and feelings, and what is known to more than one observing entity, such as the shape, mass and location of a commonly perceived object such as a table or chair. "Outside" means that you appear in some way to others; other observing entities can observe you and agree on certain characteristics such as your shape, mass and location.

Quarks and other subatomic particles combine with each other in two ways. One, the nonliving, is mere aggregation, in which the constituent elements combine in simple and stable ways and the mentality remains isolated at the subatomic level. The other, the living, is complex unity of form over time accompanied by a complex mentality. In the latter the primordial experiences of the elements bind together and reinforce each other, giving birth to a higher-level coherence of experience.

In this view every element of reality from the smallest to the largest is composed of the same type of "stuff," something that is both capable of experiencing its world and of being experienced by other entities.

My claim is that this is a better monism than one that postulates two different types of "stuff," whether that stuff be physical matter or mental activity.

On Sun, Jul 17, 2016 at 7:16 AM, Peter Jones <peterjo...@btinternet.com> wrote:

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[Scott Roberts]

Bill,

I have two questions for your theory

The first is: what does your theory make of mystics, who say that they have transcended the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and that such transcendent consciousness is more fundamental than the subject/object experience we and your quarks experience? 

The second is: what does your theory make of the evidence for consciousness without a body, as in OBE's, NDE's, mediumistic communications, ESP, and other esoterica?

These questions can be asked another way, to wit, would you agree that if one accepts what mystics and/or esotericists say, then one must conclude that your theory is false? And conversely, if one accepts your theory, then must one assume all mystics and esotericists are liars or deluded?

By the way, after SKS's post (mentioning Hoffman's work), I wonder why you repeat your objection to monistic idealism that it contains a hidden duality, between non-living and living things. This objection would only apply if the idealist thought that there any independently existing things "out there". If, instead, one assumes that all apparent externality is an interface between conscious agents then this objection goes away. It could be that what we model as atoms are conscious agents, which happen to be aggregated, and which the interface portrays as a rock. Or it could be (as Hoffman says, and I tend to agree) that what we think of as atoms are just a finer grain of the interface -- like pixels are a finer grain of a computer graphical user interface. In this case, the conscious agent with which we are interfacing might be the entire Earth, or the entire physical universe, whose interface icon is pixilated as quarks and leptons, which can aggregate as rocks. In either case, ontologically, this is no different from there being words spoken between two people. The rock is not a thing in itself, just information that it is a place we shouldn't walk into, that it won't suddenly leap up and bite us, and so on.

[Peter Jones]

On Monday, 18 July 2016 15:00:05 UTC+1, Bill Meacham wrote:

Emergent from what? If you mean emergent from Brahman taken as the ground of all being that "was" "before" the world of multiplicity, space and time, then yes.  ("Was" and "before" are in quotes because it actually makes no sense to talk about what existed before time began, but that's the best we can do with our language that is within space and time.)

I think it is not useful to refer to Brahman as "consciousness," nor as "mind-at-large." Mind-at-large, which is conscious of everything, is an aspect of the world of multiplicity we live in, not of the unmanifest state that existed "before" the world of multiplicity. I discuss this in more detail in my essay "What’s In A Name?" here: http://www.bmeacham.com/blog/?p=1470.

Emergent from Satchidananda, defined as Being, Consciousness, Bliss. As you say, this would not be temporally prior but ontologically prior in every moment, the single precondition for the world of appearances. .

Satchidananda is the usual description of this ground-state so consciousness would be basic but this would not be intentional consciousness. It would refer to 'is-ness' rather than consciousness OF something. Mind would emerge from this consciousness. Thus Idealism would be a fundamental theory where it refers to Consciousness rather than Mind.

  .  .  
  

 

[Dana Lomas]

We do seem to be running into a fundamental conundrum here, in that any 'emergence' of mind requires time and space, and yet time and space seem to be a function of mind. Once again, the available vocabulary appears inadequate. We may do just as well to revert back to the mythical metaphors and dream-like symbols of aboriginal shamans, such as those evoked by the Arandans referred to in More Than Allegory, which is  speaking to the truism that a 'vision' is worth a thousand words. Certainly my own dreams have taught me this :)

[Peter Jones]

Hmm. I see no problem with saying that space-time emerges with mind and is a mental fabrication. Kant would be probably be happy.

[Dana Lomas]

Or perhaps never not a self-perpetuating dream.

[Dana Lomas]

Really, is emergence even relevant? What is there but "___" appearing to itself as whatever forms appear right now? Any emergence of one version of now from another, now seems quite ludicrous!

[Bill Meacham]

Scott Roberts asks

> What does your theory make of mystics, who say that they have transcended the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and that such transcendent consciousness is more fundamental than the subject/object experience we and your quarks experience?

I have no objection and would in fact like to attain such a state myself. But I would not call it "transdendent consciousness." The word "consciousness" has so many meanings that it is ambiguous. Especially in this context, in which the mystic transcends subject and object, I would not use the word "consciousness" for that state, as there is nothing in it (I am told) that the mystic is conscious of. It is reasonable to assume that there is some ground of being that is, as you say, more fundamental than what we normally experience. But it is misleading to call it consciousness. Please see my essay on the subject, "What's in a Name," here: http://www.bmeacham.com/blog/?p=1470. 

> What does your theory make of the evidence for consciousness without a body, as in OBE's, NDE's, mediumistic communications, ESP, and other esoterica?

When a person is in such a state is it possible for someone else in that state to perceive or sense the person? In near-death experiences others do interact with the dying person, so that person does have an outside, as I call it, that is perceptible to others as well as an inside, perceptible only to that person.  Such NDEs do not contradict my assertion that everything has an inside and an outside.  The nature of the outside may be different. It may be some sort of subtle body.  But it is a body.  Same goes for the other types of esoteric phenomena you mention.

Scott Roberts also asks for my opinion on Donald Hoffman's views.  See my take on Hoffman here:  http://www.bmeacham.com/blog/?p=1406.

[Bill Meacham]

Peter Jones says

> It [consciousness] would refer to 'is-ness' rather than consciousness OF something.

In that case, don't use the term "consciousness" to refer to it. Every instance we have of being conscious is being conscious of something. In a state of pure is-ness, there is no being conscious and no object of which anyone is conscious. Again, see my "What's in a Name" here: http://www.bmeacham.com/blog/?p=1470.

[Scott Roberts]

On Wednesday, July 20, 2016 at 5:54:12 AM UTC-10, Bill Meacham wrote:

Scott Roberts asks

> What does your theory make of mystics, who say that they have transcended the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and that such transcendent consciousness is more fundamental than the subject/object experience we and your quarks experience?

I have no objection and would in fact like to attain such a state myself. But I would not call it "transdendent consciousness." The word "consciousness" has so many meanings that it is ambiguous. Especially in this context, in which the mystic transcends subject and object, I would not use the word "consciousness" for that state, as there is nothing in it (I am told) that the mystic is conscious of. It is reasonable to assume that there is some ground of being that is, as you say, more fundamental than what we normally experience. But it is misleading to call it consciousness. Please see my essay on the subject, "What's in a Name," here: http://www.bmeacham.com/blog/?p=1470. 

Sigh, you tell me not to use the word 'consciousness', while Peter tells me not to use the word 'mind', for a similar reason, but he's ok with 'consciousness'. Meanwhile, in your essay, you recommend using Brahman (root: "to grow, to expand"), or Tao ("path", "way"), or zat ("unmanifest knower"). Query: how is a knower not conscious? But nevermind. My point is that every word used for the Absolute (including 'absolute') carries unwanted baggage, hence all such words are being used metaphorically or analogically. The point of using Consciousness or Mind for the Absolute is to differentiate it from a totaly mindless fundamental reality, as in materialism. I see no problem with using 'mind' or 'consciousness', as long as one qualifies it to make the point that it is being used analogically. 

But this is tangential to my question, but I think I'll withdraw it, since to make it clear what I see as the problem gets too complicated. 

 

> What does your theory make of the evidence for consciousness without a body, as in OBE's, NDE's, mediumistic communications, ESP, and other esoterica?

When a person is in such a state is it possible for someone else in that state to perceive or sense the person? In near-death experiences others do interact with the dying person, so that person does have an outside, as I call it, that is perceptible to others as well as an inside, perceptible only to that person.  Such NDEs do not contradict my assertion that everything has an inside and an outside.  The nature of the outside may be different. It may be some sort of subtle body.  But it is a body.  Same goes for the other types of esoteric phenomena you mention.

I seem to have not made my question clear, so let me restate it. You describe quarks as having subjectivity, and that they combine with others, resulting in more complex bodies with more complex subjectivity. Presumably, this continues on through molecules, cells, to our subjectivity. This, I would think, implies that when we die, our subjectivity disappears, as the subjectivity of our cells no longer combines. So would you agree that your theory denies the possibility of subjective survival after death, and therefore all the esoteric evidence that it does survive must be lies or delusions?

 

Scott Roberts also asks for my opinion on Donald Hoffman's views.  See my take on Hoffman here:  http://www.bmeacham.com/blog/?p=1406.

This essay does not address my point, which is not about whether Hoffman is right or wrong, but that his interface theory counters the accusation you make about monisitc idealism having a hidden dualism between living and non-living things. 

[Dana Lomas]

The term 'is-ness' here seems equatable to the buddhist term 'suchness,' in which a factor perceived and a perceiver are none other than the same factor -- i.e. That which is conscious of phenomena that are none other than itself taking form ... insofar as emptiness and form are not-two (re: the Heart Sutra).

[Peter Jones]

Nicely put, Dana.

[Dana Lomas]

Yes well, already a day later, as is my wont, I feel compelled to re-word it, knowing full well that any wording of it is such a sorry substitute that I can just as likely break out into laughter at my foolishness for thinking that there is some definitive expression in words, or possibly resort to poetry such as Adyashanti's 'emptiness dancing.'  But really I'm ok with any version, as long as one realizes what is being pointed to -- at which point, call it the cat's pajamas for all I care :)

On Thursday, July 21, 2016 at 7:10:22 AM UTC-4, Peter Jones wrote:

Nicely put, Dana.

[Bill Meacham]

Scott Roberts says

> You describe quarks as having subjectivity, and that they combine with others, resulting in more complex bodies with more complex subjectivity. Presumably, this continues on through molecules, cells, to our subjectivity.

Yes. As physical form becomes complex enough to maintain its form even though the constituent matter changes, as in metabolism, the mind becomes complex and is associated with the living body, not just the subatomic particles/waves/events of which it is composed.  This is part of Whitehead's process philosophy.

> This, I would think, implies that when we die, our subjectivity disappears, as the subjectivity of our cells no longer combines. So would you agree that your theory denies the possibility of subjective survival after death ...?

No, I don't agree. Our subjectivity does not die, or at least in some cases it does not die, when the gross body dies. I am convinced of that. (See "An Impeccable Death" here: http://www.bmeacham.com/blog/?p=1061.)  So the theory of complex subjectivity arising out of cells, etc., needs to be enhanced.

The enhancement, which goes beyond Whitehead, is this: Mind (the mental, or subjective, aspect of things) is not compartmentalized into tiny bits as body (the physical, or objective, aspect of things) is. If you have ever had the experience of thinking of something and then a mate or partner or close friend's saying it, you know that mind is sort of leaky. Thoughts can pass between minds that are the correlates of physically separated bodies. So when a person's physical body dies, that person's mind might continue as instantiated in another sort of body.  Hindu philosophy speaks of three bodies, causal, subtle and gross (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Bodies_Doctrine_(Vedanta)).  It also speaks of five "sheaths"(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosha), which correspond to the three bodies. This is highly speculative of course, but when I say that everything has an inside and an outside, a mental aspect and a physical aspect, I do not exclude the possibility that the outside might be a more subtle form of body than the gross physical body that dies and decays.

[Bill Meacham]

Scott Roberts says

> By the way, after SKS's post (mentioning Hoffman's work), I wonder why you repeat your objection to monistic idealism that it contains a hidden duality, between non-living and living things. This objection would only apply if the idealist thought that there any independently existing things "out there". If, instead, one assumes that all apparent externality is an interface between conscious agents then this objection goes away. It could be that what we model as atoms are conscious agents, which happen to be aggregated, and which the interface portrays as a rock. 

Yes, that is roughly the position of Whitehead. The little bitty units are proto-conscious and proto-agential. When they combine in an aggregated fashion they form inanimate matter.

> Or it could be (as Hoffman says, and I tend to agree) that what we think of as atoms are just a finer grain of the interface -- like pixels are a finer grain of a computer graphical user interface. In this case, the conscious agent with which we are interfacing might be the entire Earth, or the entire physical universe, whose interface icon is pixilated as quarks and leptons, which can aggregate as rocks.

Saying that the conscious agent with which we interface is the entire earth or the entire physical universe does not negate my panpsychism. My panpsychism -- which should better be called "panphysicopsychism" -- says that there is no mind without body and no body without mind.  The mind-at-large is the mind of the whole universe, and its body is the whole universe.  The body is not ontologically prior to the mind, and the mind is not ontologically prior to the body.  

> The rock is not a thing in itself, just information that it is a place we shouldn't walk into, that it won't suddenly leap up and bite us, and so on.

Yes, we have such information. What is the best way, or at least a good workable way, to interpret it? I assert that nondual panpsychism is a better interpretation than monistic physicalism and monistic idealism.

[Scott Roberts]

This seems like unnecessary complication to preserve subject/object consciousness, which, the mystics tell us, is derivative. Why not treat all bodies as projections of subconscious ideation, devices to allow individuation to develop within MAL? (Sorry, there is a lot packed into that last sentence, so the important bit is that it seems like you (and Whitehead) are postulating unnecessary entities to preserve subjectivity and objectivity as fundamental.)

[Scott Roberts]

On Monday, July 25, 2016 at 7:12:11 AM UTC-10, Bill Meacham wrote:

> The rock is not a thing in itself, just information that it is a place we shouldn't walk into, that it won't suddenly leap up and bite us, and so on.

Yes, we have such information. What is the best way, or at least a good workable way, to interpret it? I assert that nondual panpsychism is a better interpretation than monistic physicalism and monistic idealism.

 Even though (by understanding body as interface) monistic idealism is nondual? Which is to ask, given an understanding of apparent non-living things as communication between conscious agents, how is monistic idealism dual, which as I recall was your objection to it?

[SKS]

Saying that the conscious agent with which we interface is the entire earth or the entire physical universe does not negate my panpsychism. My panpsychism -- which should better be called "panphysicopsychism" -- says that there is no mind without body and no body without mind.  The mind-at-large is the mind of the whole universe, and its body is the whole universe.  The body is not ontologically prior to the mind, and the mind is not ontologically prior to the body.  

Would you say that 'there is no mind without body' is your primary departure from monistic idealism, then? In which 'mind' and 'body' are defined as the internal and external views of an entity? And that they both supervene on each other?

 

This claim could be made with different levels of strength, I think. Must the external view be perceived in order to exist? For example, the strongest form would be to hold that entities have an objective form, 'out there', which is what enters perception. So, if I underwent spectrum inversion (or fading qualia, dancing qualia, etc.), and saw that the sky now looked red, I would be deluded even if I continued to use the word 'blue' to describe it, because the external view of the sky - the body, if you will - is blue, not red. Of course, maybe it is not blue at all, but it does have a definite appearance, and if I perceive it wrongly, it is just that there are certain impurities in my external view of the short-wavelength photons impacting my retinas. I can't imagine this is what you mean. Maybe you are defining the external view as a set of relationships, and saying that an entity cannot be extricated from that web, as it exists relative to other things. Maybe you are rejecting panentheism in favour of pantheism. I'm not quite sure what form you're advocating for.

For my part, I would just say that my external view of somebody else is a component of my internal view, rather than anything ontologically distinct. It's so much easier that way.