What's wrong with this post

[Jimi]

On another thread I posted this:

"Maybe there is something fundamental, but I think it would be better to assume an infinite regress because we may never be able to know what that fundamental thing is, or whether anything we have observed actually is fundamental. I don't think it is wise to assume that something is an ontological primitive and that no further investigation is needed. People in the 18th century didn't know that water was made of subatomic particles. It wouldn't have been wise for them to assume that water doesn't need any further investigation just because they knew that water is wet and transparent stuff. They didn't know everything that there is to know about water. Likewise, it may be the case that we don't know everything that there is to know about consciousness.

And there seems to be lots of evidence that human minds are in fact brain processes and therefore not ontological primitives. First one that comes to mind is the fact that I don't remember of being conscious before developing the brain. If my mind created my brain, and not the other way around, why does it look as though my mind didn't exist before my brain existed? Also if idealism was true, it would be pretty strange that we even have a brain if the brain not required for consciousness in the first place."

And Bernardo replied

"The remarkable absence of logic and lucidity here makes it rather discouraging to try to engage further. Sorry."

Where was the lack of logic in my post, or did Bernardo just rely on a cheap rhetorical tactic?

[tjssailor]

I agree with Bernardo.

[MrBeezweez]

It might be alright to assume we don't know what the ontological primitive is yet, but what would be the point in assuming infinite regression. Might as well stop with water if that's the case.

[David Gabriel]

In Bernardo's system, the brain is what consciousness looks like from one of the outside perspectives. So you saying consciousness doesn't need to have a brain to exist possibly annoyed him. When consciousness is in a certain form, it correlates with a brain.

[Scott Roberts]

Bernardo is a busy man, but I'm not, so in detail:

"Maybe there is something fundamental, but I think it would be better to assume an infinite regress because we may never be able to know what that fundamental thing is, or whether anything we have observed actually is fundamental."

The question of the nature of the fundamental only comes after the question of infinite regress. We can conclude there is no infinite regress without knowing what is fundamental, or whether we can ever know what is fundamental.

On the question of infinite regress, I believe Sciborg answered that: if there is infinite regress how can this infinity ever have been traversed to get to where we are now?

 "I don't think it is wise to assume that something is an ontological primitive and that no further investigation is needed. People in the 18th century didn't know that water was made of subatomic particles. It wouldn't have been wise for them to assume that water doesn't need any further investigation just because they knew that water is wet and transparent stuff. They didn't know everything that there is to know about water. Likewise, it may be the case that we don't know everything that there is to know about consciousness."

This is playing the skeptic card, but doing so can always be turned back on the skeptic. Do you know everything there is to know about language? if not, how do you know that anything you say makes any sense at all?

No one has said that we know everything about consciousness, nor has anyone said that no further investigation is needed. Physicists don't know everything about subatomic particles, but that does not, and should not, stop them from working within the hypothesis that subatomic structure underlies the structure of large physical objects. I don't know everything there is to know about consciousness, but I adopt the hypothesis that consciousness is fundamental and see where it leads. Where it leads is a lot more comprehensive and explanatory than adopting any other hypothesis about what is fundamental that I know of. If you were to require certainty and complete knowledge before accepting anything, you would never get anywhere.

"And there seems to be lots of evidence that human minds are in fact brain processes and therefore not ontological primitives."

In the first place, no one has claimed that human minds are ontological primitives (see below).  But the main point here is that there is no "evidence that human minds are in fact brain processes", as you would be well aware of if you have read Bernardo's books. There is plenty of evidence to show correlation between mental states and brain processes but none that shows identity. To jump from correlation to identity is fallacious.

 "First one that comes to mind is the fact that I don't remember of being conscious before developing the brain. If my mind created my brain, and not the other way around, why does it look as though my mind didn't exist before my brain existed? "

Idealism does not claim that your mind created your brain. It claims that consciousness in general creates brains and everything else. (It occurs to me that your inability to understand idealism is that you think that it claims that fundamental reality consists of the aggregate of human minds. That would be silly. Human minds are what you get when consciousness is restricted to working within the framework of physical reality, so they are not ontological primitives.)

"Also if idealism was true, it would be pretty strange that we even have a brain if the brain not required for consciousness in the first place."

If idealism is true then it would be the case that brains are not required for consciousness. There is, in fact, anecdotal evidence for consciousness without brains, e.g., in out-of-body experiences. But it appears that brains are required for there to be conscious, functional self-moving bodies operating within the physical framework, for example, to coordinate the activities of the senses so that the organism can match up what it touches with what it sees and what it senses with its muscular activity. Nothing strange about that.

[Jimi]

"No one has said that we know everything about consciousness, nor has anyone said that no further investigation is needed."

Investigation would be unnecessary in the sense that we couldn't find an explanation for why consciousness exists instead of not existing.

"Physicists don't know everything about subatomic particles, but that does not, and should not, stop them from working within the hypothesis that subatomic structure underlies the structure of large physical objects."

Physicists should also be open to the possibility that subatomic particles are contingent upon something else.

"If you were to require certainty and complete knowledge before accepting anything, you would never get anywhere."

I would require certainty before accepting anything as an absolute truth though. Since we can't be certain of anything, all knowledge should be accepted as provisional rather than as absolute truth.

"There is plenty of evidence to show correlation between mental states and brain processes but none that shows identity. To jump from correlation to identity is fallacious."

There is proof of correlation. Correlation between mental states and brain states is not a proof of identity but is certainly evidence of it. If mental states and brain states were identical, correlation is exactly what you would expect to see.

"Idealism does not claim that your mind created your brain. It claims that consciousness in general creates brains and everything else."

If consciousness created my brain, could I not have memories of what consciousness was before it became the consciousness I have right now?

"Human minds are what you get when consciousness is restricted to working within the framework of physical reality, so they are not ontological primitives."

Yes I get it's the idea. But then, how is postulating a more fundamental consciousness more parsimonious than the idea of human minds being programs carried out by the brain? Because that seems to be the main argument of idealists.

[Peter Jones]

Jimi - You really do need to read more. These objections are toothless and easily met and indicate a lack of grasp of the ideas. 

[benjayk]

Well, I can understand Bernardo.
At least the paragraph about human minds seems to be rather arbitrary.
Idealism doesn't say that the mind fundamentally has an "owner", nor that humans are special, nor that being conscious always entails forming memories, nor that the brain is irrelevant for ordinary human consciousness etc...
If you just make up things it's easy to criticize someone's position.

Other than I would concede that you're attacking an actual weakness in the idealist framework.
The problem is that talking as if consciousness were an identifiable thing (even if it's the ultimate thing) does indeed leave many questions open, at the very least.
However I don't see how you have any better alternative.

Materialism doesn't even make sense to me, really. Consciousness is just brain activity?
When I talk about consciousness I try to be clear and honest with regards to what I experience. Doing that I literally can't understand this notion.
My experience is that what my brain is doing is vague to me, it's a complex jumble of electrical signals. Astonishing, but very apparently distinct from looking at a tree.
Materialism says that really all I ever experience is a jumble of eletrical signals, I am just too dense to recognize that....
As far as I can tell materialism entirely relies on discarding clear understanding for vague, indirect abstraction.

To me invoking consciousness does to some degree entail we do not know what we are talking "about". Because the very notion of aboutness stems from the logic of "here I am looking at a thing over there, which I am thinking about".
But that's not the logic I am using when I use the word consciousness.... That mostly leaves me with not-knowing and intuition, I would say.
We can use metaphysics to look at things beyond the reach of ordinary reasoning, but I don't see we can really have a solid, coherent ultimate system of some kind... Be it idealism, or materialism or any other "-ism"...

[Scott Roberts]

On Friday, October 21, 2016 at 3:12:53 PM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

"No one has said that we know everything about consciousness, nor has anyone said that no further investigation is needed."

Investigation would be unnecessary in the sense that we couldn't find an explanation for why consciousness exists instead of not existing.

"Physicists don't know everything about subatomic particles, but that does not, and should not, stop them from working within the hypothesis that subatomic structure underlies the structure of large physical objects."

Physicists should also be open to the possibility that subatomic particles are contingent upon something else.

"If you were to require certainty and complete knowledge before accepting anything, you would never get anywhere."

I would require certainty before accepting anything as an absolute truth though. Since we can't be certain of anything, all knowledge should be accepted as provisional rather than as absolute truth.

You are missing the point. No one, who isn't God or a fool, will claim to know the absolute truth. We are all fallible. What we are doing, in saying "I am an idealist" or "I am a materialist" is laying an intellectual bet on which hypothesis we think is most likely to be true. And we live our lives accordingly, that is, we commit to that hypothesis to see where it leads. The cognitive scientist who looks for a way that mental states can emerge from brain activity has committed a good portion of his or her life to materialism. I dropped out of a cognitive science program when I realized that the better bet is on idealism. There are several reasons why I made that bet (parsimony was not originally one of them, though I do consider it a supporting argument). I won't list them now, since this thread is about your misconceptions, but would be willing to go over them if you want.

 

"There is plenty of evidence to show correlation between mental states and brain processes but none that shows identity. To jump from correlation to identity is fallacious."

There is proof of correlation. Correlation between mental states and brain states is not a proof of identity but is certainly evidence of it. If mental states and brain states were identical, correlation is exactly what you would expect to see.

If hypothesis A and hypothesis B both predict correlation between mental states and brain activity, then correlation is not evidence for either A or B in particular. If hypothesis A is "mind/brain identity" and hypothesis B is "consciousness needs a way to connect sensation with action in physical reality" then correlation of mind and brain is neutral between these two hypotheses.

 

"Idealism does not claim that your mind created your brain. It claims that consciousness in general creates brains and everything else."

If consciousness created my brain, could I not have memories of what consciousness was before it became the consciousness I have right now?

Possibly, but it is the case that we (or at least most of us) don't. Why we don't is most likely a religious question, which could have several answers. The point is that the fact that we (most of us) aren't conscious of reality extending beyond our physical lives does not invalidate idealism. (And what of those who do say they have experience of reality beyond the physical? Assume they must be liars or deluded because the hypothesis of materialism requires that, or should we investigate?)

 

"Human minds are what you get when consciousness is restricted to working within the framework of physical reality, so they are not ontological primitives."

Yes I get it's the idea. But then, how is postulating a more fundamental consciousness more parsimonious than the idea of human minds being programs carried out by the brain? Because that seems to be the main argument of idealists.

The mind/brain identity hypothesis is about as unparsimonious as one can get, if one assumes that brains are formed from mindless stuff. What it claims is that connecting up simple mindless stuff in ever more complex ways will result in mentality. Based on our current knowledge that is saying "and then a miracle occurs". But what if we work to improve our knowledge of the brain in the expectation that we will find out that it is not miraculous? Well, you can place your bet on that occurring. I think, for several reasons, that it will never pay off. And since there is this other hypothesis (idealism) that does not require this or any other promissory note -- hence is more parsimonious -- that's where I would place my bet.

[Jimi]

"If hypothesis A and hypothesis B both predict correlation between mental states and brain activity, then correlation is not evidence for either A or B in particular. If hypothesis A is "mind/brain identity" and hypothesis B is "consciousness needs a way to connect sensation with action in physical reality" then correlation of mind and brain is neutral between these two hypotheses."

Correlation is evidence of causation. The hypothesis B says that there's no causation at all.

"And what of those who do say they have experience of reality beyond the physical? Assume they must be liars or deluded because the hypothesis of materialism requires that, or should we investigate?"

No, I don't think they are altogether liars. I believe they had the experiences they claim they had, I just don't think it proves that consciousness can exist beyond the body.

[Jimi]

"At least the paragraph about human minds seems to be rather arbitrary.

Idealism doesn't say that the mind fundamentally has an "owner", nor that humans are special, nor that being conscious always entails forming memories, nor that the brain is irrelevant for ordinary human consciousness etc..."

If reality is essentially like a shared dream, that makes human minds pretty special. It would mean human minds are components of a larger mind that, as a whole, is fundamental.

[benjayk]

Well I don't really believe in those concepts so I don't think I have much more to contribute.

However I can't help but agree with Bernardo that's it's hard to know what you are getting at.
But then, I find idealism slightly confusing anyway. However at least it doesn't blantantly deny immediate experience as materialism does....

[Jimi]

My point was that it isn't wise to think consciousness is fundamental. It doesn't even make sense to say that consciousness exists without a reason for its existence. Why does anything exist instead of nothing? As long as that question goes unanswered, we should be looking for an answer.

[Scott Roberts]

On Saturday, October 22, 2016 at 1:09:25 PM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

"If hypothesis A and hypothesis B both predict correlation between mental states and brain activity, then correlation is not evidence for either A or B in particular. If hypothesis A is "mind/brain identity" and hypothesis B is "consciousness needs a way to connect sensation with action in physical reality" then correlation of mind and brain is neutral between these two hypotheses."

Correlation is evidence of causation. The hypothesis B says that there's no causation at all.

I don't understand why you think there is no causation in hypothesis B. Consciousness is the cause, both of the brain activity, and (by localizing itself) of the correlated sensations.

 

"And what of those who do say they have experience of reality beyond the physical? Assume they must be liars or deluded because the hypothesis of materialism requires that, or should we investigate?"

No, I don't think they are altogether liars. I believe they had the experiences they claim they had, I just don't think it proves that consciousness can exist beyond the body.

Read Robert Monroe's Journeys Out of the Body. He perceives events miles from where his body is, subsequently checks and confirms that those events took place. Either he is lying (and conspiring with others to back up his lies) or, at minimum, brains can be clairvoyant. He is one of many. At some point, trying to maintain the mind/brain identity hypothesis in the face of all this evidence is just ludicrous. 

 

[SKS]

On Sunday, 23 October 2016 18:44:37 UTC+1, Jimi wrote:

My point was that it isn't wise to think consciousness is fundamental. It doesn't even make sense to say that consciousness exists without a reason for its existence. Why does anything exist instead of nothing? As long as that question goes unanswered, we should be looking for an answer.

Aren't we all interested in these questions? That's why we're here. I don't think materialism is the right approach to understanding 'existence'. I have a passing interest in modal statements. It's difficult to define 'existence' without using intentional terms or making references to a conscious agent. For example, a fictional box cannot be observed except in the imagination, and a fictional agent has no subjective experiences. Yet a fictional box can be defined as having all of the same physical properties (e.g. being wooden) and causal powers (e.g. the ability to hold things) as a physical box, as can all fictional entities. So how do you tell them apart? The obvious reply is, "Well, the fictional box is a linguistic construct. It's nothing like a physical box.". And then you have to start using intentional language to define what you mean by that, so you end up bringing the mind into it anyway. Might the most powerful definition of 'existence' turn out to be 'that which has an effect on consciousness'? It's certainly the simplest.

[Scott Roberts]

On Sunday, October 23, 2016 at 7:44:37 AM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

My point was that it isn't wise to think consciousness is fundamental. It doesn't even make sense to say that consciousness exists without a reason for its existence. Why does anything exist instead of nothing? As long as that question goes unanswered, we should be looking for an answer.

Haven't we been over this already? Something, or some non-thing, has to exist without a reason for its existence -- given that an infinite regress is absurd. Why not consciousness? Why do you think that something other than consciousness would be a better answer? If it is something else, how do you explain the existence of consciousness? 

[Jimi]

"I don't think materialism is the right approach to understanding 'existence'."

The reason I think materialism is better is because it opens the doors for further inquiry. It says that any observed phenomenon has potentially an explanation of its existence whereas idealism says that there is a point in which inquiry is unnecessary.

"It's difficult to define 'existence' without using intentional terms or making references to a conscious agent."

It's pretty easy. For example, some physical processes look as though they occur within milliseconds or nanoseconds which means that they couldn't be perceived nor imagined by a conscious agent. So if you say those processes exist, you are not making any references to a conscious agent.

[SKS]

The reason I think materialism is better is because it opens the doors for further inquiry. It says that any observed phenomenon has potentially an explanation of its existence whereas idealism says that there is a point in which inquiry is unnecessary.

When you say 'explanation', I suppose you mean 'reduction'? You can break a physical object down into elementary components to try and understand it. However, I don't think that's the essence of an explanation, so I'd deny that being unable to break down subjective experiences means there's no possible way of investigating them. For example, we may not be able to reduce the subjective experience of sound to the activity of neurons, but we do know that sounds vary according to loudness and pitch.

It's pretty easy. For example, some physical processes look as though they occur within milliseconds or nanoseconds which means that they couldn't be perceived nor imagined by a conscious agent. So if you say those processes exist, you are not making any references to a conscious agent.

They do have meaningful effects on our subjective experience, even if we don't observe them directly.

[Jimi]

"I don't understand why you think there is no causation in hypothesis B. Consciousness is the cause, both of the brain activity, and (by localizing itself) of the correlated sensations."

It makes no sense that a change in the brain "causes" a change in experience if the brain itself is another experience. I don't see how causality can work non-physically. It seems as incoherent as the idea of interaction between physical brain and non physical mind in dualism. Not only does it seem incoherent, it's also a violation of Occam's razor. It would be an entirely new category of causation in addition to the four fundamental forces.

[Jimi]

Are we really so lucky that we know what reality fundamentally is? Chances are, we aren't. That's why I think it's better to always assume that observed phenomena, including consciousness, are contingent upon something else rather than to think something is unexplainable.

[Peter Jones]

On Monday, 24 October 2016 11:36:33 UTC+1, Jimi wrote:

Are we really so lucky that we know what reality fundamentally is? Chances are, we aren't. That's why I think it's better to always assume that observed phenomena, including consciousness, are contingent upon something else rather than to think something is unexplainable.

Who said anything is unexplainable? And why guess when research is possible? And why endorse a view that doesn't work? And why assume that making consciousness contingent on something else helps us explain anything?  And why assume anything at when you have a brain to do the sums. And why ignore all of Bernardo's arguments without first addressing them? And so on. 

 
  

 

[benjayk]

Jimi:

"I don't think materialism is the right approach to understanding 'existence'."

The reason I think materialism is better is because it opens the doors for further inquiry. It says that any observed phenomenon has potentially an explanation of its existence whereas idealism says that there is a point in which inquiry is unnecessary.

 

Saying "doesn't exist" is the opposite of further inquiry. As you say materialism tries to find explanations for a given "observed phenomenon".
That's the point, the concept of consciousness is meant to allude to what is beyond mere phenomenona. It is the observer and the process of observation, and beyond...
The strategy of materialism is just denying and saying "Evidence!!!!" (which of course needs to be "objective evidence").
If you believe in relying on scientific evidence, good for you, but to disregard everything else is just dogma, certainly not conducive to inquiring deeply.

What is your "evidence" that subjective inquiry, direct perception, intuition, feeling, etc... can't lead to truth and clarity?
Certainly research on mindfulness implies it does... and it did so millenia before it was approved by science.

For what's it's worth I agree the concept "consciousness"  - like all concepts really - can be limiting. But I don't get why you think materialism provides any better alternative...

[David Gabriel]

'Why does anything exist instead of nothing?'

This may be hard to get your head around but there is a concept that says 'nothing' only exists linguistically. That means there is a word for it but it doesn't exist beyond that. That means there isn't any real world example of nothing. Empty space isn't truly nothing, and it's the closest known thing to nothingness.

Let me give you an example of how something can exist linguistically but not in any other way. There is no such thing as the opposite of red. Yet, you could make up a word that, according to you, means the opposite of red. You could call it reddoppo. We could all learn this word and mistakenly come to believe there's such a thing as the opposite of red. The word nothing is similar to this because we don't have any example of it in real life; we only have the word: nothing.

The word nothing is supposed to mean the opposite of something. Something does actually exist, like red does actually exist. The opposite of something, as far as we know, does not exist, just like the opposite of red does not exist.

Black and white is different because they may be opposites. White is all colours being reflected and black is no colours being reflected. That logically is sort of the opposite. If someone very clever has a way of explaining that red has an opposite, then fine. But there will be many other words for things that exist and do not have opposites. I just used red as my example. Another example could easily be found.

I've had arguments with people about whether there is such a thing as nothing and they say things like empty cupboards etc. Totally stupid. Empty space can warp; it's not truly nothing. There is no example anywhere of nothing other than as a word.

So when you ask, 'Why does anything exist instead of nothing? the answer is because there is no such thing as nothing and therefore there can only be something. This also explains why there is a lot of something because if there is only something there will be a hell of a lot of it.

Now this is only a concept. I don't know if it is correct. But I'm hoping it will help you to understand that some of your questions you don't think have any answers are not as smart as you think.

[Scott Roberts]

On Monday, October 24, 2016 at 12:36:33 AM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

Are we really so lucky that we know what reality fundamentally is? Chances are, we aren't. That's why I think it's better to always assume that observed phenomena, including consciousness, are contingent upon something else rather than to think something is unexplainable.

If you are looking for an explanation of consciousness, then you must be looking for a non-conscious explanation, which means that you are working under the assumption that materialism is true. How is that you seem to be so lucky in knowing what reality fundamentally is? So don't you think the wise thing to do is to examine the arguments of someone like Bernardo against materialism, and see if you can refute them? If you can't, then why would you waste your time looking for a non-conscious explanation of consciousness? 

[Scott Roberts]

On Monday, October 24, 2016 at 12:09:05 AM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

It makes no sense that a change in the brain "causes" a change in experience if the brain itself is another experience. I don't see how causality can work non-physically. It seems as incoherent as the idea of interaction between physical brain and non physical mind in dualism.

You consider it incoherent to, for example, say that hunger (an experience) causes one to eat? It only becomes incoherent by assuming materialism (or substance dualism).

 

Not only does it seem incoherent, it's also a violation of Occam's razor. It would be an entirely new category of causation in addition to the four fundamental forces.

No, it's a very old category of causation (purpose), that materialism wishes to eliminate, so far with zero success. And you are drastically misconstruing Occam'z Razor. It says that between two theories that both explain the data, choose the simpler one. One cannot invoke Occam's Razor if doing so leaves something unexplained. Unless and until you can show how, say, the experience of hunger (which causes eating) is reducible to the four forces, you do not have a theory to compare to others, hence you cannot apply the Razor.

 

[Jimi]

"If you are looking for an explanation of consciousness, then you must be looking for a non-conscious explanation, which means that you are working under the assumption that materialism is true. How is that you seem to be so lucky in knowing what reality fundamentally is?"

The difference is that I don't assume matter doesn't have an explanation of its own.

[Jimi]

"You consider it incoherent to, for example, say that hunger (an experience) causes one to eat?"

Without presupposing physical interaction, yes. The feeling of hunger is usually followed by thoughts about food. So hunger and thoughts about food seem to be related, but there is no way to account for that relation without assuming underlying physical interactions that necessitate the feeling of hunger to be followed by certain thoughts.

[Peter Jones]

On Tuesday, 25 October 2016 02:57:03 UTC+1, Jimi wrote:

 
Without presupposing physical interaction, yes. The feeling of hunger is usually followed by thoughts about food. So hunger and thoughts about food seem to be related, but there is no way to account for that relation without assuming underlying physical interactions that necessitate the feeling of hunger to be followed by certain thoughts.

Well, you could assume something else. There is life outside the box....
 

[Jimi]

What would that something else be?

[SKS]

The mainstream functionalist viewpoint does not actually say that the mind depends on any particular set of physical interactions, which is what allows for multiple realisability. In principle, the functionalist view of the mind is as an abstract, mathematical object. You would be able to analyse its state-space in order to see how hunger leads to thoughts of food without making reference to any physical processes. If they are allowed to get away with this, so are we, I think.

[Scott Roberts]

On Monday, October 24, 2016 at 3:36:27 PM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

"If you are looking for an explanation of consciousness, then you must be looking for a non-conscious explanation, which means that you are working under the assumption that materialism is true. How is that you seem to be so lucky in knowing what reality fundamentally is?"

The difference is that I don't assume matter doesn't have an explanation of its own.

What difference would that make? This "explanation of matter" must still be either consciousness or that which is not conscious (unless you have found a way around the law of the excluded middle), and if you choose the latter, the hard problem of consciousness and the other arguments against materialism (perhaps we should call it "not-conscious-ism" just to avoid any ambiguity over the words 'matter' or 'material') are still there unrefuted. 

[Scott Roberts]

On Monday, October 24, 2016 at 3:57:03 PM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

"You consider it incoherent to, for example, say that hunger (an experience) causes one to eat?"

Without presupposing physical interaction, yes. The feeling of hunger is usually followed by thoughts about food. So hunger and thoughts about food seem to be related, but there is no way to account for that relation without assuming underlying physical interactions that necessitate the feeling of hunger to be followed by certain thoughts.

This reply blatantly begs the question..All you are saying here is "hypothesis B is not true because hypothesis A is true".More evidence that Bernardo's reply to your original post is accurate.

[Jimi]

No, I'm saying hypothesis B is false because I don't see how causality can work non-physically. Also, if two hypotheses predict the same outcomes I'd choose the more parsimonious one.

[Peter Jones]

On Wednesday, 26 October 2016 04:27:17 UTC+1, Jimi wrote:

No, I'm saying hypothesis B is false because I don't see how causality can work non-physically. Also, if two hypotheses predict the same outcomes I'd choose the more parsimonious one.

 
So would most people, which is why so many people are not materialists. The fact that you cannot see how causality works has no bearing on anything. If I were you I'd get to know my enemy a bit better rather than fire off objections that consistently miss the mark.

[Scott Roberts]

On Tuesday, October 25, 2016 at 5:27:17 PM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

No, I'm saying hypothesis B is false because I don't see how causality can work non-physically.

I suspect the fact that you "can't see" how non-physical causes work to lie in an inability to question the assumption that there are physical causes existing outside of consciousness altogether (plus rejecting dualism). Have you seriously questioned that assumption? After all, it is only because of that assumption that mind-body questions arise in the first place. How is that one can even choose between two hypotheses if there are only non-conscious causes?

 

Also, if two hypotheses predict the same outcomes I'd choose the more parsimonious one.

The two hypotheses are equally parsimonious in that they both assume only one category of causes. In any case, parsimony is not a virtue if major questions are left unanswered. 

 

[Jimi]

"The two hypotheses are equally parsimonious in that they both assume only one category of causes."

No, they certainly are not. The materialist hypothesis assumes only the four fundamental forces.

[Jimi]

"I suspect the fact that you "can't see" how non-physical causes work to lie in an inability to question the assumption that there are physical causes existing outside of consciousness altogether (plus rejecting dualism). Have you seriously questioned that assumption?"

Sure, but then I find that there's no way to explain how it is that, for example, certain feelings are followed by certain thoughts and vice versa. The only way to account for it is to assume non-conscious causes.

torstai 27. lokakuuta 2016 2.44.11 UTC+3 Scott Roberts kirjoitti:

[Scott Roberts]

On Wednesday, October 26, 2016 at 4:52:05 PM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

"The two hypotheses are equally parsimonious in that they both assume only one category of causes."

No, they certainly are not. The materialist hypothesis assumes only the four fundamental forces.

Likewise, idealism assumes only one fundamental force: consciousness. (Here I should insert that, as force, this appears to us in three ways, namely, thinking, feeling, and willing, so if you want to see this as three forces, the point remains that they are all of one category, namely consciousness.) An Idealist might describe the four physical forces to be the activity of consciousness that underlies the creation of the interface between conscious entities that we call the physical system (e.g., see Hoffman). A materialist considers the force(s) of consciousness to be (depending on the materialist) an epiphenomenon of electromagnetism, or (for the eliminative materialist) not existing at all. So what makes you say that idealism is less parsimonious?

(Note, to avoid confusion: my saying that idealism and materialism are equally parsimonious has to do with the number of force categories each assumes to be fundamental. This is not in conflict with Bernardo's claim that idealism is more parsimonious than materialism. In his case, he is pointing out that in addition to experienced events (thinking, feeling, sensation, etc.) the materialist is also saying that there exists a category of things and events that lies completely outside of all experiencing, a claim for which there can't be evidence, and which is unnecessary to account for all that is experienced.)

[Scott Roberts]

On Wednesday, October 26, 2016 at 6:16:50 PM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

"I suspect the fact that you "can't see" how non-physical causes work to lie in an inability to question the assumption that there are physical causes existing outside of consciousness altogether (plus rejecting dualism). Have you seriously questioned that assumption?"

Sure, but then I find that there's no way to explain how it is that, for example, certain feelings are followed by certain thoughts and vice versa. The only way to account for it is to assume non-conscious causes.

For an idealist, feeling and thinking, being fundamental, account for themselves, just as, for the materialist, electromagnetism and gravity account for themselves (or, if physicists someday manage to unify them, then that unified force accounts for itself). That thinking follows feeling, and that electromagnetic forces in the brain might be involved in connecting them, well -- see previous post -- that is just (for the idealist) saying that consciousness is involved in another way, since electromagnetism is a form of conscious force (obfuscated consciousness helping out our conscious thinking). 

In other words, you are just begging the question again. That you can't see this -- that you don't seem to be able to stop yourself from requiring a non-conscious explanation of consciousness --  it looks to me like you are simply unable to "think like an idealist", which is to say, to understand idealism as an idealist does. I don't have the reverse problem, since I have spent a portion of my life thinking that materialism was true, and so can compare them, seeing the pluses and minuses of both, with the result that I consider placing my intellectual bet on idealism to be a no-brainer. It appears that you have placed your bet without really knowing what you are betting against.

[Jimi]

Inventing a new kind of causation that is additional to and responsible for the four fundamental forces is certainly less parsimonious than to assume that all interactions are comprised of one or more of the four fundamental forces.

[Scott Roberts]

On Thursday, October 27, 2016 at 4:22:33 PM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

Inventing a new kind of causation that is additional to and responsible for the four fundamental forces is certainly less parsimonious than to assume that all interactions are comprised of one or more of the four fundamental forces.

 

What if the four physical forces (or their potential unification) are not fundamental? What if 'purpose' is not invented, but fundamental? Do you not see how you have twice begged the question? 

[Jimi]

"What if the four physical forces (or their potential unification) are not fundamental?"

What would the more fundamental thing be?

"Do you not see how you have twice begged the question?"

I can't see where I'm begging the question.

[Scott Roberts]

On Tuesday, November 8, 2016 at 4:58:25 AM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

"What if the four physical forces (or their potential unification) are not fundamental?"

What would the more fundamental thing be?

Conscious purpose

 

"Do you not see how you have twice begged the question?"

I can't see where I'm begging the question.

The question is: which kind of causation is fundamenatal: conscious purpose or the four physical forces. So when you say that purpose is "added to" the "four fundamental forces" you are begging the question of whether or not the four physical forces are indeed fundamental.The materialist says yes, the idealist says no.

 

[Jimi]

"The question is: which kind of causation is fundamenatal: conscious purpose or the four physical forces. So when you say that purpose is "added to" the "four fundamental forces" you are begging the question of whether or not the four physical forces are indeed fundamental."

No I'm not, because I don't need to assume the forces of nature exist beyond consciousness in order to make that argument. Even if it is the case that the physical forces only exist in consciousness, it still seems inflationary to assume the existence of some additional interaction mechanism.

[Peter Jones]

Jimi - The idea would be that Nature is not 'beyond' consciousness. You're assuming the truth of a view, perhaps without realising it. Assumptions are not a basis for objections and tend to trap you in your own opinions. You have to start by conceding that you know very little about Nature and its relationship with consciousness, and thus take a more honest and scientific approach than most scientists and indeed most people. Then progress is possible. Otherwise you're wasting your time here since nobody including you is going to be able to get past your assumptions. . 

I doubt that anyone on this forum would disagree with the idea that all phenomenon are natural, but they would have a view of Nature by which cosmology would not even get off the ground without consciousness, let alone biology.   

[Jimi]

"The idea would be that Nature is not 'beyond' consciousness. You're assuming the truth of a view, perhaps without realising it."

I just said that I don't assume that nature exists beyond consciousness.

"You have to start by conceding that you know very little about Nature and its relationship with consciousness, and thus take a more honest and scientific approach than most scientists and indeed most people."

As far as science can tell, the forces of nature are the most fundamental kind of interaction. All other known interactions can be described as being comprised of one or more of the four fundamental ones so I don't see why the relationship between mental events (such as thoughts and feelings) should be an exception.

[Scott Roberts]

On Tuesday, November 8, 2016 at 12:38:41 PM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

"The question is: which kind of causation is fundamenatal: conscious purpose or the four physical forces. So when you say that purpose is "added to" the "four fundamental forces" you are begging the question of whether or not the four physical forces are indeed fundamental."

No I'm not, because I don't need to assume the forces of nature exist beyond consciousness in order to make that argument. Even if it is the case that the physical forces only exist in consciousness, it still seems inflationary to assume the existence of some additional interaction mechanism.

Calling conscious purpose "additional" is begging the question. If God created the four physical forces (along with the rest of physical reality) then God's conscious purpose is fundamental, and it is the four physical forces that have been "added" (better said: contingent).

 

[Jimi]

No, it's not begging the question. Because God's conscious purpose would not only be more fundamental than the physical forces, it would also be an additional to them.

[benjayk]

Jimi, the issue is that you simply assume there is nothing to explain beyond the horizon of materialism.

For example: How can material interaction account for trascendence from one realm into another? It can't, because a world is pretty much defined by "stuff that can physically interact".
You might just say there is no evidence of transcendence, but again, how can there be physical evidence of something that's beyond the bounds of physics?
Your reasoning only makes sense if you assume physicalism at the very start.

Assuming less things makes only sense on the level of "how do we conceive of things".
It's not as if we can trust our assumptions to tell us what exist and how things really work, right?

Non-materialism assumes less in the sense that it presupposes less knowledge, less conceptual assumptions. It's no accident most primitive societies are not materialist.
If I don't hold on to a specific complex model of the world I just experience it, and within that there are no "physical laws" that reign supreme over it.
I can acknowledge that conceptually they are often highly useful and accurate, but I don't have to assume anything about what that means.

[Scott Roberts]

On Wednesday, November 9, 2016 at 12:04:32 PM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

No, it's not begging the question. Because God's conscious purpose would not only be more fundamental than the physical forces, it would also be an additional to them.

But the physical forces have now been subtracted, since they are no longer considered to be fundamenatal. Hence idealism is not less parsimonious (as to number of fundamental kinds of causation).

[Jimi]

But the problem is that it would be entirely unknown to science. We have pretty good understanding of how physical things interact with other physical things, but it would be a total mystery of how 'non-physical causation' could work or what it would even mean. I don't see how that's parsimonious.

[Scott Roberts]

On Thursday, November 10, 2016 at 1:01:41 PM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

But the problem is that it would be entirely unknown to science. We have pretty good understanding of how physical things interact with other physical things, but it would be a total mystery of how 'non-physical causation' could work or what it would even mean. I don't see how that's parsimonious.

Of course it is unknown to science. Science (in the modern sense of the word) can only study the physical. To leap from that fact to assuming that only the physical is real is a fallacy of the worst order. It is the old "to a hammer everything is a nail" trap.

 

[Jimi]

It's not a fallacy to choose the coherent explanation over an incoherent one. The only way causation even makes sense is being physical.

[Peter Jones]

On Friday, 11 November 2016 20:24:25 UTC, Jimi wrote:

It's not a fallacy to choose the coherent explanation over an incoherent one. The only way causation even makes sense is being physical.

I struggle to understand how anyone could reach this conclusion. So, you understand causation and it makes sense to you. Perhaps you could explain it to the rest of us. The whole of physics would be grateful.     

[Jimi]

In physics causation is carried out by the fundamental forces. I don't understand what it means for a feeling to 'cause' a thought unless I presuppose physical processes that underlie thoughts and feelings. Without that assumption I would have to believe feelings are followed by thoughts for no reason.

[Scott Roberts]

On Friday, November 11, 2016 at 10:24:25 AM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

It's not a fallacy to choose the coherent explanation over an incoherent one. The only way causation even makes sense is being physical.

Unless and until you can explain how electromagnetism, gravity, and the strong and weak nuclear forces can produce consciousness, you don't have a theory at all, never mind whether or not it is coherent.

Since you cannot conceive of a non-physical cause, do you think that your thoughts and will had nothing to do with producing your posts? 

[Jimi]

"Since you cannot conceive of a non-physical cause, do you think that your thoughts and will had nothing to do with producing your posts?"

I can only conceive of thoughts being followed by related thoughts or related actions but I can't conceive of them being causally connected.

[Peter Jones]

Jimi - I think you have a point, but that it is more subtle than you think. Causation requires two things. If by reduction there are not two things then by reduction there is no causation. This is consistent with the teaching that nothing really exists and nothing really happens. So really there is no causation and nothing to cause or be caused. 

But this would only be true for an ultimate analysis. Meanwhile I think you have a problem, If causation is exclusively physical such that mind cannot cause matter then brains cannot cause minds.

[Jimi]

"If causation is exclusively physical such that mind cannot cause matter then brains cannot cause minds."

I think the mind is physical as well.

[Peter Jones]

You define physical as being extended in space-time. So for you Descartes 'res cogitans' would in fact be 'res extensa'.

This makes it a little tricky to explain why my mind doesn't have be any bigger to imagine an elephant as it does for an elephant.
 .
What about consciousness?

Where would you see space-time as coming from? You seem to be suggesting that there must be something prior to spatial and temporal extension, which would seem to contradict physicalism.

Besides, it doesn't matter what you think. Either you have a workable theory or you don't. If you don't then obviously more thinking is required.

[Scott Roberts]

On Saturday, November 12, 2016 at 11:21:14 AM UTC-10, Jimi wrote:

"Since you cannot conceive of a non-physical cause, do you think that your thoughts and will had nothing to do with producing your posts?"

I can only conceive of thoughts being followed by related thoughts or related actions but I can't conceive of them being causally connected.

So you are telling me that you cannot conceive how a thought can be causally connected to a physical thing (a post) that expresses that thought. Now it is true that if one thinks that physical things are a separate kind of reality than are thoughts, there is a conceptual problem. But this can be resolved in two ways: adoption of materialism, or adoption of idealism. Why have you chosen to adopt materialism, given that science has no means of distinguishing between the two, and by adopting materialism you create the hard problem of consciousness, while idealism produces no such problem?

[Jimi]

"You seem to be suggesting that there must be something prior to spatial and temporal extension, which would seem to contradict physicalism."

Unless you broaden the definition of physical.

"Besides, it doesn't matter what you think. Either you have a workable theory or you don't. If you don't then obviously more thinking is required."

To me it seems like the only workable theory.

[Larry Schultz]

there are likely different flavors of physicalism - my question is the following:   When physicalists suggest that consciousness emerges from a physical process(es) (my use of the word 'emerges' may not be most accurate but I think my question will still stand) - what does that mean?

(1) consciousness emerges from something physical but is not a physical substance itself, but a different kind of substance . . . a kind of dualism

(2) consciousness emerges from something physical but is a concept, ie, 'running' emerges from the movement of legs.  'Running' does not exist per se except as a concept.

(3) consciousness emerges from something physical, and is physical, ie consciousness is a wave/particle and or etc.   If consciousness is physical, then it should be (in principle) capable of being detected.  Why haven't we detected it yet?   I remember a video where a somewhat physicist 'proved' that mind could not exist out of a brain because there were no type of particles/waves that we haven't discovered . . . there's no extra room in the array of possible types of matter for consciousness out side of a brain.  It would seem this criticism cuts both ways.

[Jimi]

"If consciousness is physical, then it should be (in principle) capable of being detected.  Why haven't we detected it yet?"

I don't think that follows. If consciousness is physical (a physical process), the only way it would be possible for you to detect subjective experience from third person perspective is if the third person experience caused your brain to undergo the first person experience. I don't think it would.

[Peter Jones]

This is one of those discussions that never goes anywhere. Completely pointless.

[Larry Schultz]

"If consciousness is physical (a physical process), the only way it would be possible for you to detect subjective experience from third person perspective is if the third person experience caused your brain to undergo the first person experience."

I don't see why this is the case . . . . boiling water is a physical process and I can detect it, and I don't (necessarily) experience boiling water in the first person.  If consciousness is physical it can (in principle) be detected, that's the definition of being physical.