So, Eugene, are we saying that quantum non-locality *should* defeat physicalism but that it is not accepted as proof because of a technicality, an unfalsifiable "many worlds" get-out clause? .... And the primary challenge to P=P is non-locality, agreed?
Dave, there is a good discussion about this subject in a parallel thread
To consider all scenarios M>P, P=P, P>M, P+M is too much to cover, they all have their own challenges. But to conclude on P=P:
It's not so black-and-white. First, it is good to distinguish between realism and physicalism, although "physicalism" is ambiguous term by itself. But in general "physicalism" assumes the existence of "matter stuff" (whatever it is), while realism is more general and assumes the existence of mind-independent reality, whatever the ontic primitive of this reality might be other than consciousness. For example. in informational interpretations of QM the ontic fundamental is pure information, in relational interpretations - pure relations with no "relata". Non-locality does not refute realism per se and even physicalism if we are prepared to assume that the "reality" or "matter" is simply non-local and non-causal. So, in the P=P framework, there are several alternatives to resolve the entanglement paradoxes:
- many-world matter
- non-local and non-causal matter
- pure information or pure relations (no "matter")
In addition, in the P>M framework, if realism or physicalism is to resolve or avoid the "wavefunction collapse" problem (which is really P-M interaction problem), there are further implications:
- MWI again, or
- non-local non-causal hidden variables
Physicists came up with hypotheses to explain anthropic principle, such as the bullion of universes each having a unique set of constants, so that we live in a universe where the values of constants are such as to allow for life to exist.
The bottom-line is: none of the above refutes realism/physicalism, because, being a metaphysics, it is non-falsifiable. Realists are very resilient and prepare to go to lengths to save the mind-independent reality, but it doesn't come free, they have to trade something for that - either assume MWI, or to give up on matter, locality, causality and assume hidden variables. There may be other ways around their problems, realists are in a continuous search for them. But either way, the "naive" old physicalism with a single material local and causal world can indeed be refuted.
But of course, in addition to the above, the major problem with any mind-independent monistic realism (P is fundamental) is the "hard problem", where no one among realists has had yet even a slightest conceivable idea how to even approach it.
PS: may be to be more specific on terminology, Hoffman calls his model "consciousness realism", so may be we should use something like "non-consciousness realism" to refer to the (P is fundamental) ontologies.