How do we account for self-awareness?This is another question only scientists can answer. Many theories are being explored. Theists, by contrast, have no viable theory at all–as in, a theory that predicts the peculiar features of conscious information processing, such as its dependence on an array of separate physical brain centers, its dependence on chemical balances, the presence of universal cognitive biases and illusions, the ladder of brain complexity development corresponding to level of consciousness and intelligence in animals, and so on. Cognitive scientists can predict all of these features from a common meta-theory: the brain generates self-awareness through chemical information-processing (e.g. mirror neurons, intentionality centers, and narrative memory construction, storage and retrieval, etc.). Theism has no comparable theory. And as for details not yet worked out, science is making steady and impressive progress. Theology has made none.
See my section on this point in Sense and Goodness without God III.6, pp. 135-208, and VI.2, pp. 353-60. The most notable point to reiterate here, is what I noted in the Carrier-Wanchick Debate (and reiterate again, with a more extensive bibliography and broader application, in The End of Christianity, pp. 298-302):
The scientific evidence confirming the necessity of a functioning human brain for human consciousness to exist is vast and secure. We have identified where in a brain different kinds of memories are stored, where emotions and reason operate, where each kind of sensory experience is processed, and so on. We have observed that if we physically remove or deactivate any one of these parts, the memories or abilities it contains then cease. It follows that if we take away all the parts, everything that we are will cease. [Atheism] predicts this must be the case, since on [atheism] there is no other way to have consciousness except as the product of a large, delicate and complex physical system (lying at the end of an extremely long, meandering, faulty process of trial and error over billions of years). But this is not what we’d expect if [theism] were true, since [theism] entails that consciousness can exist and function without a brain, and there is no known reason [any plausible] God would imbue us with any other kind of mind, and good reason to expect he wouldn’t. [Atheism] thus predicts exactly what we observe, while [theism] predicts the opposite: that we would instead be made “in God’s image,” which is not what we observe.
For example:
God could have provided every human being with a brainless mind that (a) always operates correctly without need of food or oxygen, (b) is incapable of being damaged by any wounds or disease, (c) always perceives and reasons correctly, [and] (d) doesn’t pose a physical threat to a mother’s life or health during delivery (as human brains do, in contrast with all other mammalian brains [due to disproportionate size, to accommodate their immense required complexity])…
Whereas, we can predict from the premise of atheism that our minds would lack all four of those things, that in fact the only way we could exist as conscious beings if there is no god nor anything supernatural is with a dangerously large, complex brain, which is highly vulnerable to injury, disorder and disease, massively dependent on consuming a huge chunk of our resources (in food and oxygen, e.g. our brains consume around 20% of our blood, sugar, and oxygen, a huge waste in resources relative to a soul, which requires no blood, food, or oxygen), with many innate gaps and flaws in its information processing capabilities.
That we have brains, and brains like these, therefore proves atheism is more probably true than any credible theism.
How is free will possible in a material universe?
Once again, a fallacy of loaded question. It has not been established that free will even exists. And whether it does depends on how it is defined.
If we revise the question to ask “How is libertarian free will possible in a material universe?,” then the answer is it isn’t, because such a thing doesn’t exist (and has certainly never been shown to exist). In fact it’s logically impossible. See my discussion of this point in Sense and Goodness without God III.4, pp. 97-118. If we revise the question to ask instead “How is compatibilist free will possible in a material universe?,” then the question answers itself (compatibilist free will is by definition compatible with a material universe).
I assume this is meant to ask how we know there “isn’t” such an existence, since it is directed at atheists who don’t believe there is. Thus revised, the answer is that all evidence points to what I already noted for question 10 above: the brain is clearly necessary to generate consciousness–and store memories, personality traits, skills and reasoning abilities, process sensory information, etc., in other words everything that constitutes “you”–so dissolution of the brain entails dissolution of all these attributes. That puts the burden of evidence on anyone who would deny this.
By analogy, all evidence points to my wealth being a function of the money I can spend and the property I can use or sell. Take away my money and property and I will lose my wealth. If someone wants to insist that invisible houses and dollars and limbs remain in my possession, in some sort of magical parallel dimension, and therefore I still have all that wealth even after it is destroyed, the burden is on them to prove this preposterous claim.
I totally agree Bernardo. I also can’t be bothered with this sort of argument anymore, as you say, there doesn’t ever seem to be anything new. You’ve summed it all up so nicely so I can’t really add much, but a few things came to mind…
I think this argument is slightly different to the causation argument. If one discounts all psi phenomenon, and discounts our own subjective feeling of free will, then I think their argument stands up quite nicely, there would be no reason to assume anything more than a biological machine (I appreciate these are huge If’s!). The reason they have come to their conclusion is simply because they are not looking at all of the evidence (or purposely ignoring it). Their explanation fits the limited evidence they are explaining quite nicely. Not sure why it sounds like I’m defending them, I’m not…
…what I’m trying to say is, that if it weren’t for the things that can’t be explained by current science maybe these sorts of explanations would be enough, or do you think it goes deeper than that? Hmm, still think I’m not quite getting this across… basically I think it brings up the question for the motivation for alternative theories such as yours, is it just to explain more of the phenomenon, or is there something more?
I do believe that some psi phenomenon are real, and it certainly does feel like I am a conscious being with free will. My subjective world is the only thing I can really be sure of, if someone wants to tell me that my consciousness doesn’t exist they need some pretty compelling evidence! Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, as they say J
What always gets me is that they don’t think saying that free will doesn’t exist is an extraordinary claim. I’d say almost everyone in the world would disagree with this without much thought. I imagine it takes quite a lot of effort to convince oneself that oneself doesn’t really exist, if that is even possible. It almost seems like some sort of mental illness.
Stewart.
yes, you assume correctly. I'm not sure about the measurable parameters, I wouldn't be surprised if they can one day measure these things, even if they turn out to be different in everyone. However, even if they could measure these things, it still wouldn't be enough to convince me that consciousness only arises from the brain. I see the brain more as a receiver, so I would expect most things would have a measurable physical effect. But I agree, it is a big hole in the materialistic argument at present.
Stewart.
true :-) I think the same could be said of the receiver model. Would you say there is a qualitative difference
between seeing the brain as a receiver and the brain as a filter? ...although I suppose a receiver assumes duality, and a filter assumes idealism, think I've probably just answered my own question :-)
On Thursday, October 4, 2012 6:25:02 AM UTC-4, Stewart wrote:
true :-) I think the same could be said of the receiver model.
The brain as a receiver works very well. Senses must be received to be felt and the receiver translates the bio-electric impulses so that it can be recorded as a memory of an interpretation.
The mind, on the other end, could be considered to be a communication network interfacing with the brain, connecting the various energy planes beyond pure material matter to interact throught what we call an ego.
Looked at it this way, there is no need for duality. The impression of a duality would be rather the consequence of self identification to a form, an image of self, a material structure, a thought, an apparent state of mind totally conditioned by the denser fabric of the material terminal. It is also the consequence of a very immediate sense of powerlessness coupled with a strong intuition of a much greater potential.
By the way Bernardo, I just listened to your interview on Skeptico and enjoyed your well articulated views.
On Thursday, October 4, 2012 6:25:02 AM UTC-4, Stewart wrote:
true :-) I think the same could be said of the receiver model.
Thanks for the reply (I’ve been away). Looking forward to the next book!
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