In my language (Finnish) neologisms for 'individual' (yksilö) and 'person' were artificially created by a single scholar in 19th century for the administrative purposes of the colonizing state structure. How did language refer e.g. to countable number of people without those word concepts? We still say 'How many spirits?' (Kuinka monta henkeä) e.g. when making restaurant reservation. Like Latin spirit, 'henki' refers to breathing. 'Human' is another possibility.
Finnish strongly tends to avoid agentive structures unless specifically needed, in linguistic expressions events just happen by themselves, often expressed by just a verb in indefinite/asubjective person, without any subject or object. It was interesting to hear Indian self-conceptualization as hierarchic node of relations. Before colonization, Finnish society was anarchic rather than hierarchic, and because of how the weather is etc., Finns are highly introverted compared to better climates where extroverts tolerate each other instead of trying to get away from crowded places.
Being introverted does not mean being separated and distinct individual, but it's also different from the extroverted 'self' constructed mainly from the social sphere. The underlying philosophy is being unique (cf Stirner), each event, being etc. is an unique aggregate of relations (cf Mitakuye Oyasin). Finnish animistic concept of soul is tripartite, dynamic balance of Self (itse), Nature (luonto) and Spirit (henki).
From Finnish anarchic uniqueness it's interesting to observe how Indo-European language has taken different turns of how Hindu soul/atman is described as radically different from the metaphysical political project of individualism, both of which carry and reproduce the class society model of ruling class of scribes organizing the work of subject classes.
It might be interesting to note also that Finnish word for 'Self' has also the earlier meaning of 'Shadow', perhaps referring also to the double layered character of metacognition, awareness of being aware for various durations. According to some studies, metacognitive durations grow in size in social interactions of speech acts, which define the usual first (speaking), second (spoken to) and third (spoken about) personal pronouns. Metacognition is most clearly absent during deep sleep.
Finnish unique is not limited only to interpersonal relations, but relates to whole nature. Which is not an external object, but relation of participatory creation, as 'luonto' shares same root with word 'to create', 'luoda', and suffix -nto has reflexive, intransitive character, compared to 'luomus', with transitive, objectified character.
What we need is a more creatively functional philosophy (tool?) whereby such potential for change may actually be activated/inspired and guided, which is what my treatise is about Sanman.
This is an invitation for you 'Come out' (or further out) of your 'closet'
Is individualism the notion that many apparent individuals are somehow other than the sole Individual ?
I'd be interested in takes on this explication of neutral monism from Michael Silberstein ~ who as been referenced before in this forum ... Neutral Monism: Reintegrating Space, Time and Conscious Experience
Or ... As the center collapses there is no-thing in-between to separate, which means war or peace. It's a choice. Therefore, act with hope.
Anti-individualism is a return to the unconscious collectivist nightmare. It is a full embrace of Colin Wilson's 'Robot' - "The average man is a conformist, accepting miseries and disasters with the stoicism of a cow standing in the rain." The individual properly understood, respected and integrated is the means through which the New Heaven and New Earth are revealed, the New Jerusalem awakened.
This is a very large postulate (much larger than a singular M@L at play, porpoising in and out of form) subject, but here's to think about (from my treatise):
"Despite the fact that each and every soul and
personality aspect thereof really derives from and so may
truly be regarded as being an expression of Life Itself, some
configurations thereof are more conducive of experience and
further expression of Love and Joy while others are not only
less so but may
even be counterproductive
in said regard. As the apostle Paul put it: “In a great house
there are not only vessels of gold and of silver, but also of wood
and of earth; and some to honor, and some to
dishonor.” (II Timothy 2:20)
So embracing and supporting everyone and everything equally,
without reservation in any regard, will not serve to
operationally maximize the flowering and fructification of Love and
Joy in The Flow Field of Life.
Among other things (expanding the scope of The Tree of
Life analogy), because of the fact that still incarnating
souls are often, in one way or another, still fairly self ishly
motivated, they may also (in many cases quite unconsciously!)
in effect function (sometimes quite ‘poisonously’ even) as
‘parasites’ and ‘thorns’ in relation to others. Would-be
Cosmic, i.e. Tree-hugging☺,
souls may therefore be purposed (by Love and
Joy, the imperative of Life Itself !)
to learn to recognize as well as then devise and implement ways of
deflecting and educationally redirecting or, such measures possibly
failing, counteracting such tendencies in oneself and/or
others so as to stop these from being harmfully ‘acted out’,
if, when and in whatever ways and to whatever extent one may have the
capacity to so do.
The point being made here is that, to become and
synergically [continue to] function as a self-transcendentally
wholesome agent of Life, one must both learn to perceptively
discern what sorts of things will and what sorts of things won’t
really serve to optimize and augment the experience and
expression of Love and Joy in the self ish-temptation
filled context of Life’s earthly matrix, as well as then act
wisely (i.e. judiciously) on the basis of such
knowledge. As the Biblical story of Solomon’s
most famous ‘judgment’ clearly illustrates, there is much more
to serving the cause of Life than ‘unconditionally’ embracing
and/or supporting every aspect of one’s own or others’
being-n-doing processes."
'Integrating' can't be simply, one's-own-or-all-others'-wish fulfillingly accomplished, IOW.
The Sun Is In Your Eyes Lyrics – Jacob Collier
The sun is in your eyes
The sun is in your eyes
Throw me the cold
Throw me the cold, cold water of your smile again
To take me by surprise
You take me by surprise
Throw me the bold
Throw me the bold, bold treasure of your lips again
And where I go
You lead me in the right direction
With your love is my protection
I’ll be a world of your projection
And where I go
Singing songs of your affection
With rhymes to your perfection
In my eyes see a reflection
Of you
I see you clearly now
I hold you dearly now
The sun is in my eyes
Does everyOne just want a womb of one's own ?
In order to understand the trajectory of Derrida’s position, we must first attend to its roots. Derrida wrote his dissertation on the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and he remained committed to phenomenology and rationalism.[7] Phenomenology seeks the premise of pure intuition that grasps the phenomena that appear to consciousness but, even in this basic premise of Husserl’s philosophy, Derrida suspects classical metaphysics. For the purposes of brevity, the main problem Derrida locates in Husserl’s phenomenology is its claim to analyze the perceptions of things in themselves without preconceptions and, based on this intuition, to determine the absolute structures of knowing.[8] For Derrida, there is an interpenetration here that already suggests a lack of clear distinction: how does one determine the structures of knowing apart from the phenomenon? Derrida argues that Husserl moves towards an articulation of some pure, ideal form of knowing that reintroduces classical metaphysical distinctions between something absolute and fundamental (the structure of knowing) and contingent and passing (the phenomenon).[9] The introduction of language and time into Derrida’s analysis of Husserl seals his break from the father of phenomenology. For Husserl, linguistic signs are both indications (“contingently and empirically associated with an external entity”) and expressions (“meaning is immediately present to the speaker”) that are ineluctably interwoven. But, for Husserl, expressions are unrelated to anything outside the self even as expressions remain signs; that is to say, representative of something else. Signs simultaneously bridge a gap between exterior and interior referents and elide the distinction that Husserl is trying to maintain between empirical experience and the perception thereof. In other words, the linguistic distinctions that prize expression (immediate meaning) over indication (contingent external entity) reinscribe the metaphysical binaries that Husserl sought to overcome—mind and externality remain divided.
The rub gets worse when Derrida points out that, even as ideal, expressions are still signs and, as such, must also be repeatable. In his attempt to get at a pure source of meaning, Husserl has simultaneously posited a unique ideal that grounds meaning and freedom in language even as he has conceded that this ideal is repeatable and, as such, is not primary but secondary because it is already repeated! Derrida’s close study of Husserl reveals an inconsistency between ideality and reality, between a self that is self-positing and the inevitability of language and time that requires repetition in order to determine the legitimacy of signs (i.e. their alignment with referents).
Instead, Derrida argues that the self must operate in and through language and, therefore, must somehow externalize in order to repeat, to re-present; it cannot be trapped in a purely self-referential language (what he calls auto-affection). But how is the self both distinct and already outside of itself? When the self speaks, it is both speaker and listener. When the self looks at a mirror, it is both viewer and seen. The danger here for Derrida, as it is so pervasively throughout his thought, is the concern of establishing some presence, some immediacy that could, even in its most fleeting of moments, reinscribe binaries and metaphysics—an absolute difference between interior and exterior, self and other, and not allow the tension to remain. A pure continuity of the self as rooted in Descartes’ cogito, for example, throughout time would be discounted because it cannot account for the self’s inevitable grounding in language. However, language as pure “otherness” would lock something original and different into a relation wherein they could be tracked, and therefore, an analogy would start to emerge.[10]
And it is here that we arrive at arguably the most fundamental (and fundamentally difficult to define) element of Derrida’s philosophy: différance. Quite literally, différance is no-thing, no intelligibility, a constantly encountered impossibility that is the source of deconstruction and the re-presenting of the self that must be deconstructed over and over again.[11] We inevitably operate in and through language and history and, for Derrida, it is not that language is strictly conventional but neither is it pure or metaphysical—the iterability of language as it shifts between contexts reveals continuity alongside the destabilization inherent to language itself. A word can only mean something if it can be repeated in another context which means that the very use of the word relies on something that is not the word, on time and difference, that both makes the word possible and also makes it impossible. Writing, for Derrida, is more primary than speaking not in a literal sense but in the sense that language is radically embedded in inherited traditions, systems of meaning, and webs of relation that determine the nexus of meaning before the person speaks it. And not just before the person speaks it, but when the person speaks she is already so thoroughly enmeshed in this complexity of relations of meaning that instability, polysemy, and iterability are endless. The temporal dimension of reality creates destabilizing differences that are neither entirely distinct nor the same and can never find themselves apart from or before language. Language points to an origin outside of itself that drives the other-ing but that it can never get at or reveal. Meaning derives from the synthesis of continuity and difference inseparably bound with différance.[12] Derrida is not attempting to redefine (or un-define) each and every concept and word but to inscribe any and all concepts, language, things, whatever into this continuous/discontinuous play of différance.
https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/derrida-politics-and-the-little-way/
We should comprehend 'language' here very generally, corresponding to the Nature-aspect of Self-breathing-Nature. Singing into being and being bursting into song. We start our songs of Birth/Origin by invoking Nature, inviting Nature to intuit "self-an-sich" ;) and put it's soul aspect into the Self-singer - to possess and inspire a recreation of Nature-self. Recreation is neither absolute break nor permanence, but
"différance"
as short for Divinely Integrated Differentiation.
Divinely Integrated is the immanence. Differentiation is the transcendence. Derrida was a deep mystic and mythologer, writing-reading the ineffable in the textual tradition of transcendental idealism, differentiating and deconstructing it by his creative participation.
There's no support for the view that Derrida considered
"human experience of the world as such has always been the same and will always remain the same", on the contrary. His participation in evolution of consciousness was conscious of the evolution, and there for deeply and highly ethical path-finding in the ways of the heart.
2. However Derrida’s underlying assumption (which this essay does not explore) is that there is no God in the equation to guarantee such absolutes, and hence ideas about certainty are now ruptured. He concludes that any idea of a fixed centre was only a structure of power imposed on us by our past or by institutions of society, and does not in reality exist at all.
3. Hence for Derrida there is no ultimate reality, no God outside the system to which everyone and everything relates. Instead the only relationships that we can know are within the system of the world which Derrida calls discourses. For him ultimate reality is only a series of these discourses.
4. Because there is no fixed centre, there should no longer be any limits on what it is possible to think or believe. We should literally be able to think anything. We can be playful and flexible about the way we think, when we realise that “truth” and “falsehood” are simply wrong distinctions to make. Indeed they are just a destructive and harmful manifestation of that power structure.
5. Therefore we must stop considering everything in life, culture and thought in relation to absolute truth. To not do so is, for Derrida, oppressive and immoral.
In whatever way Bergson meant 'Intuition', his meaning was not aligned with Derrida's conclusion - there is no knowledge as such, there is no truth as such, there is no perception, no intuition of anything as such. So unless the author of that article is misrepresenting Derrida's conclusion (which is possible), there is a fundamental incongruency there between him and most (if not all) transcendental idealists, process philosophers, existential/phenomenological philosophers, integral philosophers and otherwise unclassified thinkers like Jung.
I just don't see it.
" It's the same old anatman conclusion, which is expressed in many different ways by various philosophers and wisdom traditions. "An-sich" and "as-such" have same meaning with "atman" in the Derrida-Buddhism bridge, which was not left unnoticed by Buddhists."I can't really speak to this, but I remember Scott had referenced a book about this Derrida and Buddhism connection before, Derrida on the Mend. Maybe he can speak to that more.
Most famously, in La Condition postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir (The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge) (1979), he proposes what he calls an extreme simplification of the "postmodern" as an 'incredulity towards meta-narratives'.[34] These meta-narratives—sometimes 'grand narratives'—are grand, large-scale theories and philosophies of the world, such as the progress of history, the knowability of everything by science, and the possibility of absolute freedom. Lyotard argues that we have ceased to believe that narratives of this kind are adequate to represent and contain us all. He points out that no one seemed to agree on what, if anything, was real and everyone had their own perspective and story.[35] We have become alert to difference, diversity, the incompatibility of our aspirations, beliefs and desires, and for that reason postmodernity is characterised by an abundance of micronarratives.[36] For this concept Lyotard draws from the notion of 'language-games' found in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Lyotard notes that it is based on mapping of society according to the concept of the language games.[37]