The argument against idealism from conflicting perspectives

[Laird]

Dear Bernardo and group,

I write in to share a couple of related arguments against idealism as Bernardo conceives of and presents it. These arguments conclude that this form of idealism is false because it entails an impossibility: the impossibility that a single experient experiences multiple streams of phenomenal consciousness, or experiences from multiple conflicting perspectives, simultaneously.

The first, and more direct, argument to this effect is made by Titus Rivas on his page Is noetic monism tenable?

Titus argues that a single self can by definition, and analytically, only be associated with a single stream of phenomenal experience, and because noetic monism, to which Bernardo's idealism conforms, entails that a single self undergoes multiple streams of phenomenal experience simultaneously, noetic monism is false.

The second, and more liberal, argument to this effect is my own, which I refer to as The argument against idealism from conflicting perspectives.

My argument is more liberal because it allows - unlike Titus's argument - that a single Self might coherently "dissociate" into multiple "pseudo" selves, each of which might coherently experience from a unique perspective, but it goes on to demonstrate that even allowing this, on the (implied) premises of Bernardo's idealism, one "pseudo" self - the universal mind - itself then experiences from multiple conflicting perspectives simultaneously, which is impossible, and thus this form of idealism is anyway falsified.

I arrived at my argument via a process which can be viewed by clicking "Contents" at the middle of that page, top and bottom. The page immediately prior, An analysis of Bernardo Kastrup's semantic model of idealism, provides some further critical analysis as well as the genesis out of which my argument emerged.

On that page, I propose that Bernardo uses "experience" in two different senses, one subjective ("the redness of red") and one objective (the "excitations", "vibrations", "mirrors", and "protrusions" of "the medium of mind"). I further propose that Bernardo ought to accept that the latter - the objective sense of "experience" - can reasonably be referred to as "mental energy".

For completeness, I had written an initial review of Why Materialism Is Baloney back in February last year, as well as a follow-up a couple of months ago.

Titus and I have discussed these arguments in personal communication, and he is aware that I am going to be sharing them to this forum, but as he is very busy, he may not have time to get involved in any discussions that might eventuate.

I welcome your thoughts and response.

With fruitful respect,
Laird

[Cosmin Visan]

There is no stream of consciousness: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233700746_There_Is_No_Stream_of_Consciousness

[Philosophical Inquirer]

Hi,  thank you for pointing out your articles which seem to contain the kind of analysis and criticism which interests me relating to Bernardo's work. I am currently very interested in the

work of George Bealer (cf. his masterpiece Quality and Concept) which though focused on formal logic, ontology and linguistic analysis has very relevant arguments relating

to the analysis (and definition !) of consciousness.  I am also, by the way, interested in developing the proof theory and implementing a proof checker for Bealer's logic of propositions, properties and relations. 

[Jim Cross]

"The gist of the argument is that if we are all experiences of the universal mind, then the subjective perspective of the universal mind must be identical to each of our subjective perspectives - but this is clearly impossible, because it can only be identical to a single perspective, not multiple (and so, because it leads to something impossible, Bernardo's idealism can't be right). "

I don't think it follows that "if we are all experiences of the universal mind, then the subjective perspective of the universal mind must be identical to each of our subjective perspectives".

The universal mind is comprised of the subjective perspectives and everything outside those perspectives, not identical to each of them which is nonsensical.

[Hamza Djily]

Laird : 

There is one tenable form of noetic monism, in my view: solipsism. There may just be one stream of consciousness, namely mine, which would make me the only self or experient in the universe. Of course, this is not the kind of noetic monism most proponents have in mind or even find attractive.
If we reject solipsism, only noetic pluralism remains as a tenable option.

Any way....I think there is some contradiction in Mr Kartrup's idealism because it is a pragmatic idealism.

And you : 

if solipsism is irrefutable and a tenable position = other philosophies are improvable.

the question: why do you choose noetic pluralist over the solipsism? 

you must be neutral...your position is pragmatic as well.

[Sci Patel]

If you ascribe to the position there must be an entity that fulfills certain roles - for example holding Logical Universals within Its Mind, or directing causes toward effects - then solipsism must be false given I do not have these powers so there must be Someone Else.

I am still not sure of the argument that M@L cannot experience the conscious streams of the Many, that this signals a coherence problem. An author of fiction can experience, in some sense, the conscious streams of the varied characters for example.

p.s. It does occur to me that the Author is not just the sum of characters in the fiction, so this might be better an argument for the reality of alters at a fundamental level...

[Jim Cross]

 An author of fiction can experience, in some sense, the conscious streams of the varied characters for example.

I can be thinking about dinner, driving a car, and listening to the radio. In a sense, three different streams although we generally think of it as one stream of consciousness. 

At any rate, nobody is saying that M@L is just like an alter or a single subjective viewpoint. It is inclusive all of subjective perspectives. 

BTW, in case it is not clear, I am agreeing with you, Sci.

[Sci Patel]

Heh, to disagree with myself then I'd note that the differentiated streams aren't usually thought to have their own subjective privacy.

OTOH, ultimately we can only work via analogy to describe what it might "sort of" be like to experience reality as M@L does. We can imagine two characters arguing, and have knowledge of their thoughts and inner lives. Yet authors do note how the characters seem to go their own way, or at least not in a way the author may have expected. Maybe that is close to how M@L experiences us within Itself.

I do think that trying to completely make alters illusory, with only a Single Subject, falls into the problem of starting with our individuated experiences as Idealism's foundation stone but then getting to a place where those PoVs have no foundational reality. But DID, to me, suggests there is something in between Noetic Pluralism and Noetic Monism, where alters are distinct and real but also, as William James put it, we are connected in the deep.

[Jason Barr]

We (disassociated alters) experience what we experience, MAL experiences what MAL experiences (transcendant to us).

It's not as if there is one subject experiencing everything including conflicting view points.

[Laird]

On Tuesday, September 17, 2019 at 7:55:44 PM UTC+10, Cosmin Visan wrote:

There is no stream of consciousness: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233700746_There_Is_No_Stream_of_Consciousness

I'm not sure what the alternative is, and I don't see that the paper provides one or even succeeds in making the case its title suggests: it is littered with examples of perceptions - if these are not perceived in a conscious stream, then what? Surely one perception at least succeeds another, so is the author simply proposing that consciousness flickers in and out of existence, with one perception followed by a period of unconsciousness, after which the next perception occurs? Let's say that that's what she's suggesting (because I honestly can't work out what else it might be): then that is in any case no threat against the arguments which Titus and I have made, because all our arguments require is that an experient undergoes consecutive experiences (even if broken up by periods of unconsciousness) from a unique perspective.

[Laird]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:21:46 AM UTC+10, Jim Cross wrote:

I don't think it follows that "if we are all experiences of the universal mind, then the subjective perspective of the universal mind must be identical to each of our subjective perspectives".

That conditional wasn't intended as a self-justifying one though: it is justified by the argument. If you want to understand why I think it follows, you might like to read through the numbered steps of the argument and their defences (and/or the Q&A following the one that you quoted).

 

The universal mind is comprised of the subjective perspectives and everything outside those perspectives, not identical to each of them which is nonsensical.

Note that I'm not saying that the universal mind is identical to anything other than itself; it is only its perspective that must be - according to the argument - identical with the perspectives of each psyche. Again, if you want to see why this is, please refer to the numbered steps of the argument, and if you want to contest this claim, perhaps you could point out which of the numbered steps you reject and why.

[Laird]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:24:52 AM UTC+10, Hamza Djily wrote:

Laird : 

There is one tenable form of noetic monism, in my view: solipsism. There may just be one stream of consciousness, namely mine, which would make me the only self or experient in the universe. Of course, this is not the kind of noetic monism most proponents have in mind or even find attractive.
If we reject solipsism, only noetic pluralism remains as a tenable option.

Note that here you have misattributed the words of Titus to me, though I too reject both noetic monism and solipsism.

 

Any way....I think there is some contradiction in Mr Kartrup's idealism because it is a pragmatic idealism.

Why would it follow that pragmatism entails a contradiction?

 

And you : 

if solipsism is irrefutable and a tenable position = other philosophies are improvable.

I don't think any of us is arguing that we can prove our positions though, just that we can disprove some of the other alternative positions, and that our positions are better supported by facts and reason.

 

the question: why do you choose noetic pluralist over the solipsism?

 I justify that choice here: https://creativeandcritical.net/ontology/a-mostly-grounded-semantic-model-of-conscious-reality#solipsism

you must be neutral...your position is pragmatic as well.

Why must I be neutral? I have good reasons to reject solipsism.

[Laird]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:33:50 AM UTC+10, Sci Patel wrote:

An author of fiction can experience, in some sense, the conscious streams of the varied characters for example.

It's the "in some sense" which is the problem, Sci: my argument given this analogy is that the author must simultaneously perceive from each of these perspectives as its own perspective - which clearly is incoherent because an experient can only perceive from a single perspective as its perspective at a time. On top of this, some of these perspectives explicitly conflict. For example, if the character John is perceiving a field of red flowers in the middle of his field of vision, whereas character Mary is staring into the deep blue ocean, then it is explicitly impossible for the author to be perceiving from both perspectives as its own perspective - the one contradicts the other.

[Laird]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:47:13 AM UTC+10, Jim Cross wrote:

I can be thinking about dinner, driving a car, and listening to the radio. In a sense, three different streams although we generally think of it as one stream of consciousness.

But you can't be simultaneously thinking about dinner and not thinking about dinner, or driving a car and not driving a car, or listening to the radio and not listening to the radio - and those sort of consequences are generally what are entailed by the proposition that multiple perspectives can all be identical.

 

At any rate, nobody is saying that M@L is just like an alter or a single subjective viewpoint. It is inclusive all of subjective perspectives.

It has a subject though (there is only one subject under Bernardo's idealism), and so in that sense it is personal, and thus must have a single personal - subjective - perspective.

[Laird]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 5:11:02 AM UTC+10, Sci Patel wrote:

But DID, to me, suggests there is something in between Noetic Pluralism and Noetic Monism, where alters are distinct and real but also, as William James put it, we are connected in the deep.

Yes, I think that that's a plausible candidate solution to the problem identified by the arguments of this thread.

[Laird]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 7:05:05 AM UTC+10, Jason Barr wrote:

It's not as if there is one subject experiencing everything including conflicting view points.

But that's exactly what I think is implied by the (implicit) premises of Bernardo's idealism, so if you want to contest it, I'd encourage you to identify which step(s) of the argument you reject and why.

Edit: to be clear, I'm referring to my own argument here, but you could equally refer to Titus's argument and explain why you reject it.

[Laird]

On Tuesday, September 17, 2019 at 11:51:56 PM UTC+10, Philosophical Inquirer wrote:

Hi,  thank you for pointing out your articles which seem to contain the kind of analysis and criticism which interests me relating to Bernardo's work.

You're welcome. (Only one of the articles is mine though, just to be clear).

 

I am currently very interested in the

work of George Bealer (cf. his masterpiece Quality and Concept) which though focused on formal logic, ontology and linguistic analysis has very relevant arguments relating

to the analysis (and definition !) of consciousness.  I am also, by the way, interested in developing the proof theory and implementing a proof checker for Bealer's logic of propositions, properties and relations.

I'm not familiar with George Bealer, but if you do develop a proof checker for his logic, and if you use semantic tableaux in that proof checker, then please let me know, because I maintain a page which compares free semantic tableaux software: https://creativeandcritical.net/prooftools/comparison-of-proof-tree-software

[Scott]

"which clearly is incoherent because an experient can only perceive from a single perspective as its perspective at a time. On top of this, some of these perspectives explicitly conflict"

I think it's an unjustifiable jump to say that the One is not capable of something because I am not. A one-eyed creature may think it inconceivable that there could be a creature able to see from two eyes simultaneously, and yet the two-eyed creature does, and sees a richer, stereoscopic view.

[Laird]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:21:30 PM UTC+10, Scott wrote:

"which clearly is incoherent because an experient can only perceive from a single perspective as its perspective at a time. On top of this, some of these perspectives explicitly conflict"

I think it's an unjustifiable jump to say that the One is not capable of something because I am not. A one-eyed creature may think it inconceivable that there could be a creature able to see from two eyes simultaneously, and yet the two-eyed creature does, and sees a richer, stereoscopic view.

I don't think that that analogy holds though: if an eye is analogous to a perspective, then each experient by definition has only one "eye", and by analogy idealism entails that the "creature" which is the universal mind sees - simultaneously - two different (and conflicting) vistas out of its single "eye", which of course is not possible.

[Laird]

Titus has tried to post to this thread but has encountered technical problems, so he has asked me to post this on his behalf:

Regarding solipsism: I personally hold that solipsism is a logically tenable position and that the same can be said about subjective idealism, although I'm a noetic pluralist and a substance dualist respectively.

Why I'm not an idealist primarily has to do with intuition: I find it too counter-intuitive. I wouldn't know what is "pragmatist" (rather than (intuitionist) about that. 

A similar, though much stronger intuition makes it impossible for me to be a solipsist. By the way, I'm not impressed by the argument that I don't have conscious power over everything that happens. My mind does not equal my consciousness, so that anything that I don't control consciously might in theory be controlled by me at a subconscious level.  

However, there is a another  reason why solipsism should not be part of any philosophical debate. To make a serious debate between several intelligent people possible, it should not be undermined as such by a position that there is just one intelligent participant involved in it, namely me. My opponents cannot be illusory if I want to speak of a real debate.

[Scott]

which of course is not possible.

Tip: Stating "of course" doesn't make your argument any more "obvious" or "true".

It is to me entirely not obvious that the One cannot see from multiple perspectives at once. Indeed, it is my belief that the One sees from every possible perspective simultaneously. Among our many limitations of seeing from our perspective is that we cannot understand how some/many/most things work. Indeed, if you understood completely what the One is capable of, then you would be the One (and I'm presuming here you aren't ;-)).

But if all is in mind, and we experience a shared reality, and there is no distance between thoughts, then it follows that - somehow! - there is a mind containing/thinking all these thoughts simultaneously. Put another way, if your perspective and my perspective are both thoughts occurring simultaneously in a reality which consists only of mind, then there are at least two perspectives occurring simultaneously in a mental reality. How the One does that? I don't know. Just like I don't know how he can contain all knowledge (which I believe he must), and yet I have free will (which I believe I must).

Scott.

[Laird]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:57:11 PM UTC+10, Scott wrote:

It is to me entirely not obvious that the One cannot see from multiple perspectives at once.

As I wrote to Sci, it depends on what we mean by "seeing from multiple perspectives at once" as to whether or not it's possible. It is obviously possible, as an author, to "put yourself into the shoes" of your characters, and in a sense to see from those multiple perspectives at once: but in doing so, the author retains her own perspective; her perspective is not identified with those of her characters, it is just augmented in her imagination by them.

My argument is that idealism as Bernardo conceives of it entails that multiple perspectives are identified with the "author's" (the universal mind's) perspective - but this is of course impossible, because a perspective - like any entity - can only have a singular identity.

[TPM Rivas]

Regarding solipsism: I personally hold that solipsism is a logically tenable position and that the same can be said about subjective idealism, although I'm a noetic pluralist and a substance dualist respectively.

Why I'm not an idealist primarily has to do with intuition: I find it too counter-intuitive. I wouldn't know what is "pragmatist" (rather than (intuitionist) about that. 

A similar, though much stronger intuition makes it impossible for me to be a solipsist. By the way, I'm not impressed by the argument that I don't have conscious power over everything that happens. My mind does not euqal my consciousness, so that anything that I don't control consciously might in theory be controlled by me at a subconscious level.  

[TPM Rivas]

Very good, Laird.

[Scott]

because a perspective - like any entity - can only have a singular identity.

Or not.

I don't understand how you can draw such a conclusion and present it as a given. You can't envision an all-encompassing mind being able to see from multiple (all) perspectives simultaneously, because you can't. A scientist a couple of hundred years ago might have said that it is impossible for something to have multiple states at the same time, and yet it is now a staple of quantum mechanics. If quantum mechanics is also a thought, then apparently it is possible for a single entity to have multiple states simultaneously.

[Bernardo]

Hi Laird,

This is the most obvious, if relatively old, argument against one-mind idealism (Schopenhauer already dealt with it 200 years ago). Technically it is called the 'decomposition problem,' which is the mirror image of the 'combination problem' of constitutive panpsychism. It has been, however, addressed. 'Perspectives' correspond simply to different contents of awareness, like contents of perception, in what is essentially one field of subjectivity. When these different sets of contents -- each corresponding to a different perspective -- dissociate from each other, you get different but co-conscious relative subjects of experience. We know empirically that dissociation has the power to do this, so that doubt can be discarded. As for the one field of subjectivity, other philosophers have carefully explained what it is and how to think about it. Itay Shani, for instance, calls it 'core-subjectivity.' See e.g. this: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/05568641.2015.1106709. Shani carefully elaborates on how the one-mind hypothesis can be reconciled with multiple perspectives. It's a relatively technical argument, but worth the effort. Add dissociation to that and there is nothing fatal against idealism in this criticism.

Cheers, B.

PS: Schopenhauer called core-subjectivity "the one eye of the world which looks out from every creature."

[Scott]

If one holds that solipsism is true, then it makes no sense for that person to discuss it, because they're only ever discussing it with themselves.

It's a bit like a theory there is no free will. In order for any theory to mean anything (other than just being a machine state), one has to be able to have chosen between other theories.

I'm a subjective idealist. While some see (or are troubled by) solipsism as an alternative conclusion, I don’t think there’s any reason to believe in it. I’ve never had any reason to theorise that others are not conscious, other than the fact that I cannot prove they are. While it is true that the only thing I have proof of is that I am conscious, and I have no concrete evidence that others are also conscious, it is also true that an absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. If anything, I have reason to theorise that things which do not appear conscious, do in fact have some level of awareness, as consciousness is everything. Furthermore, say I were the creator of reality: then I am either a) somewhere else, ‘asleep’ and dreaming this reality, or b) ‘awake’ and imagining this reality. If I am asleep, then I am a lucid dreamer, yet I seem unable to control my dream in the way I can when I have a lucid dream at night. If I am awake, and my consciousness truly is the creator of reality, then I should have some sense of omniscience, yet I have mostly questions and precious few answers. If I and the One are one and the same, then I am clearly suffering some sort of amnesia, but that can’t be, because the One is all knowledge and there is no place for knowledge to go missing. Another argument against solipsism is that it implies that, since mine is the only mind which exists, I have single-handedly created/invented everything, including algebra, calculus, the internal combustion engine, the principles of computer circuit design, the statue of David, as well as cats and penguins… yet there is no explanation for how these inventions would have simply appeared in my mind (again, where was this knowledge beforehand?).

[Sci Patel]

I'm with Scott - if you go through the varied proofs of God, it's not hard to come to the conclusion that there are at least two entities in existence. Namely yourself and God.

Since God determines the effects (Final Cause) of causes (Efficient Cause), and the only way such a thing is possible is if effects are in an Intellect, Aquinas names God the Supreme Intellect. Since God also holds the Mathematical/Logical Universals in Its mind as the Active/Universal Intellect, this further shows the Real is not born merely of unconscious processing.

Is everyone else around you just a zombie or do they have inner lives? I believe we can show, with effort, it is more than likely the latter though we need to get into God's relationship with the Good and with Truth.

Caveat: Obviously for those of us who ascribe to One->Many ontologies in a sense I am an aspect of the One as a member of the Many. In that loose sense one might regard solipsism as true...and not true...heh.

[PanLamda]

This is very close-or basically identical-to the so-called 

"de-combination problem" of panpsychism (cosmopsychism which basically is identical to Kastrup's idealism)

Check this paper out and a proposed solution (be warned, its a technical paper though)

Abstract:

"Growing concern with the panpsychist's ostensive inability to solve the ‘combination problem’ has led some authors to adopt a view titled ‘Cosmopsychism’. This position turns panpsychism on its head: rather than many tiny atomic minds, there is instead one cosmos‐sized mind. It is supposed that this view voids the combination problem, however I argue that it does not. I argue that there is a ‘de‐combination problem’ facing the cosmopsychist, which is equivalent to the combination problem as they are both concerned with subjects being proper parts of other subjects. I then propose two methods for both theorists to avoid the problem of subject‐subject proper parthood relations: a distinction between absolute and relative phenomenal unity, and a modification of the essential nature of subjects. Of these two options, I find the latter option wanting and propose that the first should be adopted."

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/rati.12166


Your proposition from what i see is identical to this argument

Phenomenal Unity: a set of experiences E1… En is phenomenally unified at time T1 iff they have a conjoint phenomenology at T1, i.e. there is something which it is like to have them ‘together’ at T1.

Phenomenal Boundedness: a set of experiences E1… En is phenomenally bound at time T1 iff (i) they are phenomenally unified and (ii) not phenomenally unified with any other experience Ex beyond that set at T1.

Hence

Unity/Boundedness Inconsistency Thesis (UBIT): (i) phenomenal unity cannot extend beyond a bound phenomenal field, and (ii) phenomenal boundedness cannot occur within a unified phenomenal field.17

aka Jamesian phenomenal privacy

which leads to

The De‐Combination Argument

• 1)Cosmopsychism: The cosmos is a single subject‐whole and all macro‐subjects are subject‐proper parts of the single cosmos‐subject.
• 2)Unity/Boundedness Inconsistency Thesis (UBIT): (i) phenomenal unity cannot extend beyond a bound phenomenal field, and (ii) phenomenal boundedness cannot occur within a unified phenomenal field.
• 3)Subject Essence (SET): Subjects are essentially phenomenally unified and bound.
• 4)The cosmos is essentially phenomenally unified and bound, and each of its macro‐subject‐proper parts is essentially unified and bound (from 1 and 3).
• 5)If the cosmos has phenomenal boundaries ‘within’ its phenomenally unified field, then it is not a subject, and, if phenomenal unity extends beyond the boundary of the subject‐proper parts, then they are not subjects (from 2 and 3).
• 6)Hence, the cosmos is not a subject and its proper parts are not subjects (from 4 and 5)
• 7)Hence, cosmopsychism is false (from 1 and 6).
  
  
  So the author proposes this solution
  
  "The moral: in making sense of subjects being proper parts of other subjects (i.e. subject‐subject proper parthood relations), we must stipulate that the subject‐parts are phenomenally boundrelative while the subject‐whole is phenomenally unifiedabsolute. Doing this allows us to avoid the incoherence of a subject‐whole's unified conscious field having the phenomenal boundaries of their subject‐parts within it, and either the part or whole ceasing to be a subject.31"
  
  You have to see the paper for the more detailed proof though, which is more complicated. 

[Hamza Djily]

Laird : 

 

Note that here you have misattributed the words of Titus to me, though I too reject both noetic monism and solipsism.

Oh, sorry.

Why would it follow that pragmatism entails a contradiction?

You know, if there are not people out there but you write in a book that you believe in the existence of other minds and souls to avoid the sound of laughs, That's a pragmatic philosophy and this how can a pragmatic philosophy be a contradictory philosophy. I believe that the radical Idealism is strong and with every step we move away from this Idealism we make Montagnes of contradictions.

I do not adopt solipsism proper: this is the only theoretical leap made in this semantic model; otherwise the model is grounded. How do I justify this theoretical leap? Solipsism is probably false in that if it were true, I would probably have no limitations on the exercise of my will, nor experiences of that with which I do not consciously identify, but neither of these are the case.

With all the respect

You are not better than Russel and Schopenhauer in this case.

Mature philosophers know that the war against solipsism is lost before it began.

You can't win

Certainly not with argument like this one : 

if it were true, I would probably have no limitations on the exercise of my will

This not how a philosopher argue!

The solipsism is the strongest position and when one recognizes that, He chooses "pragmatic position" when he talk about his philosophy of life, I recognize the power of Solipsism, I don't like it, I prefer don't thinking about it and I don't let this idea infect my social life, but, when we do philosophy we must have the decency of declaring our defeat instead of pretending illusional victories.

 

[Sci Patel]

 Schopenhauer from what I'm told believed in "Blind Will" which suggests he was not familiar enough with the work of his predecessors (and IMO, betters in philosophy) or lacked some crucial understanding that would make him realize Blind Will is a brute fact in need of explanation.

But then I've not read the man so perhaps he does address why Aquinas and other theists were wrong?

IIRC Russel was an atheist? If so he's so far off the mark we can easily be his better (IMO of course). :-)

[TPM Rivas]

There is absolutely no conclusive evidence for co-conscious multiple personalities, nor can there be. Such evidence would imply that researchers can have direct and infallible access to streams of consciousness that are not their own. So not only should they be telepaths, but there should be no doubt that the information they gather about other people's minds concerns their consciousness rather than their mind in general. The best thing we have that might suggest co-consciousness is statements from alters that they were conscious, while a dominant personality was  in charge of the body consciously, which could be easily explained away as the result of a reconstruction based on non-conscious cognitive processing, motivated by the psychodynamics within that particular personality structure (my guess). Why should we believe alters if they can't prove they really were conscious without being in charge?  It does not convince me, to be frank.

Everything we do know empirically about multiple personality is that several distinct personality structures within a person's mind can be active at the same time. Nothing forces us to believe that this literally involves co-consciousness. Co-consciousness is an incoherent concept for which there is no convincing evidence whatsoever, so it most certainly can't be used to save noetic monism. 

Now,  as logic trumps ambiguous empirical evidence, we should conclude that noetic monism is untenable. 

[Hamza Djily]

"he was not familiar enough with the work of his predecessors"

 

He was very familiar, his works on the story of philosophy prove it...he saw the perfection of Idealism you can see that at the beginning of his big book, saying that "Idealism is the fundament of any right philosophy". His problem was his love for Kant and his will to resolve his contradictions, otherwise, he is with Berkley, the most clever philosophers ever existed. For me, Schopenhauer is a "Father".

For Russel, He was agnostic and a solipsist-idealist in heart.

[Sci Patel]

This seems to project human limitations onto a Cosmic Consciousness.

It also seems odd to me to deny the experience of alters - "explaining away" is a tactic I usually see materialists engaged in.

DID is only a key, a way to analogically think of our relationship to M@L. I don't think BK or anyone else who believes in a One->Many kind of explanation for reality thinks DID is *exactly* like the transcendent One containing the Many within Itself.

I'm not convinced co-consciousness is logically incoherent, but I'll give the arguments a fresher look.

[Laird]

G'day Scott,

It is not just that "I can't" envision an all-encompassing mind being able to see from multiple (all) perspectives simultaneously: it is that the idea is logically incoherent. Take this excerpt from the paper (by Itay Shani) which Bernardo shared. It explains the logical problem with the idea that multiple perspectives can be combined. Much less, then, could multiple perspectives be held simultaneously!

"That each subjective perspective is individuated in terms of a characteristic form is, in turn, instrumental in explaining why perspectives do not combine. To see why this is so, recall first how the combination problem arises in the context of perspectives. Suppose that a given perspective P is a compound made of other, more limited perspectives, say Q and R. As seen earlier, this seems to imply that viewing reality from viewpoint P consists, in part, in viewing reality from viewpoint Q. The trouble, however, is that the vista which P opens up transcends the limitations (or boundaries) of viewpoint Q, and therefore that it presupposes the elimination of such limitations. Thus, on the assumption that Q is a compositional component of P, it follows that Q must be both present and absent—a contradiction."

You refer to quantum physics, suggesting that holding multiple perspectives simultaneously could be compared to the multiple simultaneous states in quantum mechanics - but these are (1) only theoretical constructs which explain certain empirical observations, and (2) applicable only at a scale so small that we cannot perceive them. We do not perceive in our macro reality entities with multiple simultaneous states, and, indeed, the very idea is incoherent - which, if I understand correctly, was the basis of Schrodinger's thought experiment with the dead-and-alive cat. So, quantum mechanics is of no help in validating this idea.

[Laird]

G'day Bernardo,

Thank you for the reference. I had begun reading Itay's paper several weeks back but had not yet finished it. I have now done that. I see that there are significant similarities between idealism as you conceive of it, and cosmopsychism as Itay conceives of it.

To cut to the chase: I do not think that this paper refutes (or even indicates any sort of awareness of) my argument, nor of Titus's argument.

I elaborate on my second contention first. Titus points out that if all subjects have an identical self, then, by definition, their phenomenal experiences must be identical. His page addresses various possible ways that the noetic monist might try to argue around the fact that empirically, we know that our experiences are not identical. Itay's paper does not mention this point of Titus's, let alone try to refute it, let alone address the counter-arguments that Titus makes to potential arguments by the noetic monist that try to work around the fact that our experiences are not identical.

Now, I turn to my own argument. It allows, unlike Titus's, that although we psyches, and the universal mind, all have an identical actual self, we might, as "pseudo" selves, coherently experience different streams of phenomenal consciousness. It points out, though, that on the (implied) premises of your conception of idealism, it follows that one such "pseudo" self - the universal mind - is experiencing from multiple conflicting perspectives simultaneously, which is incoherent. Again, Itay's paper does not raise this argument, let alone attempt to refute it. Indeed, as my previous response to Scott makes clear, Itay's paper even contains argumentation which buttresses my argument.

To reiterate, I think that the best way out of these arguments for you is to (1) adopt pluralism: to accept that each psyche really is a distinct self from all of the others, such that it can coherently experience a different stream of phenomenal consciousness from a different perspective, and (2) to drop the idea that everything - including the brains which are the external image of psyches - is an experience of the universal mind, and to allow that some phenomena - particularly brains - are not "experienced by" or "experiences of" the universal mind, but instead simply consist in "mental energy" which, when structured appropriately, can itself instantiate a (new and unique) mind.

[Laird]

On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 6:40:28 AM UTC+10, PanLamda wrote:

This is very close-or basically identical-to the so-called 

"de-combination problem" of panpsychism (cosmopsychism which basically is identical to Kastrup's idealism)

Check this paper out and a proposed solution (be warned, its a technical paper though)

G'day PanLamda,

Thank you, too, for the reference to a very interesting and rigorous paper. I had not explicitly thought of nor framed the decombination problem in this way, and it was enlightening to read about it.

I do think, though, that the author misses something. He is concerned to solve problems regarding the boundaries and unity of selves on cosmopyschist and panpsychist views. In doing so, he seems to simply assume that phenomenal experiences can be coherently agglomerated (as a set) from the various selves into a whole (set), that this is coherent, and that it will cause no problems. On the contrary, I think that this misses a core feature of subjective experience: that subjective experience entails an unique perspective which is not compatible with other perspectives. In solving the decombination problem, it is not enough to find a way to combine the phenomenal experiences of relative selves into a cosmic whole: it is also necessary to find a way to combine, too, their perspectives, and this, per the paper that Bernardo shared, and which I quoted from to Scott, seems impossible to do coherently. To repeat that quote:

[Laird]

On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 9:21:53 AM UTC+10, Hamza Djily wrote:

Laird : 

Why would it follow that pragmatism entails a contradiction?

You know, if there are not people out there but you write in a book that you believe in the existence of other minds and souls to avoid the sound of laughs

But in that case one hasn't contradicted oneself - one is just wrong.

 

Mature philosophers know that the war against solipsism is lost before it began.

You can't win

Certainly not with argument like this one : 

if it were true, I would probably have no limitations on the exercise of my will

This not how a philosopher argue!

I am not claiming it to be an infallible argument. I am not claiming it proves solipsism false. It is simply a probabilistic argument. I see no reason for philosophers to avoid probabilistic arguments. Do you?

 

The solipsism is the strongest position and when one recognizes that, He chooses "pragmatic position" when he talk about his philosophy of life, I recognize the power of Solipsism, I don't like it, I prefer don't thinking about it and I don't let this idea infect my social life, but, when we do philosophy we must have the decency of declaring our defeat instead of pretending illusional victories.

Oh, I'm not claiming a "victory" over solipsism, at least not in the sense of certainty, and I think it's fair to say - as you do - that rejecting solipsism is "pragmatic", but I think it's more than that too: it is also consistent with a principle that we might refer to as "the principle of preferential straightforwardness". This principle is that, unless we have good reason not to, we ought to prefer interpretations that are the most obvious, natural, intuitive, and straightforward. Applied to other people, this principle entails that we ought to prefer the interpretation that has them as conscious beings in a shared reality, which is more straightforward, intuitive, and obvious than interpreting them as figments of our (my) imagination.