The impossibility of consciousness coming of matter-Prove it!

[Ilyass]

A lot of people here talk about the impossibility of " the matter giving rise to consciousness " statement.

I accept that, but to all who don't accept how can argue with them?

And is there any scientific way to prove this once for all?

[Lou Gold]

BK cleverly notes you can program a kidney function into your laptop but you can't teach it to piss on your desk. Consciousness belongs to life. If you can show matter creating life it would then be possible for it to create consciousness. This would be a required scientific truth >>> show matter making life.

[Ilyass]

Lou,

thanks for the quick activity.

You misunderstood it me, I'm talking about consciousness coming from the brain.

I'm asking for a way to disprove this notion.

I'll put it like this: I want arguments to prove that the hard problem is insoluble.

I really would like it if there is a lot of arguments.

[Lou Gold]

Ilyass,

Perhaps a word tangle here. "Coming from brain versus coming from mind" means "coming from matter versus coming from consciousness."

[Ilyass]

I am trying to disprove coming from the brain, but I want to do so strongly.

[Marco Masi]

How can one prove with a materialistic science the existence of something that is not material? It is  like pretending to prove the existence of light using a microphone. It is only by going inwardly that one can see consciousness and matter being distinct and then it becomes almost self-evident without the need for further explanation. But from the philosophical analytical standpoint one should point out the fact that science has made progress in all fields, but not regarding the hard problem of consciousness. Since the times of Descartes, after four centuries of scientific inquiry, science did not make a yota of progress when it comes to explain how matter causes qualias. Zero, nada, nix. This is for me the strongest logical indication that it is outside its domain and indeed consciousness must be immaterial.

[Ilyass]

Marco, I see where you come from, but my goal is to prove that consciousness is immaterial.

I don't think it's material but I want to prove that using logic and if possible science, so that materialists can see it.

[Sci Patel]

For scientific validation against materialism, best bet would be QM arguments like the ones BK makes in his SciAm articles.

For proof against materialism from a philosophical standpoint, I think the following can help as a starting point:

Do Physical Laws Make Things Happen?

Does Mary know I experience plus rather than quus?A new hard problem

[Ilyass]

sci,

Yeah, I really forgot about it!

QM really questions everything realist physicalism has to say.

I guess in this way we are trying to see what is "matter" in the first place to finally disprove the from-brain-consciousness statement, but somehow I feel this isn't enough.

Cause they ( physicalists ) will likely say we just still didn't figure it out completely.

[Robert Arvay]

https://futureandcosmos.blogspot.com/

This is a link to a web blog by Mark Mahan,

who has posted numerous arguments against matter producing consciousness.

If you are looking for absolute proof, then such proof would have ended the

argument long ago.

Mahan, however, offers strong and IMO persuasive challenges to materialism / physicalism,

and his arguments have not been convincingly refuted, AFAIK, by anyone.

If you do find proof, please be sure

and let us know.  It will be world-changing news.

https://futureandcosmos.blogspot.com/

..

[Marco Masi]

On Tuesday, 7 January 2020 21:14:59 UTC+1, Ilyass wrote:

Marco, I see where you come from, but my goal is to prove that consciousness is immaterial.

I don't think it's material but I want to prove that using logic and if possible science, so that materialists can see it.

So, can you find a logical way around to sense light with a microphone? If logic and science could prove something about the hard problem of consciousness then it could be only that it is material. The other way around is impossible for sheer logic. Fortunately.

On Tuesday, 7 January 2020 21:36:40 UTC+1, Ilyass wrote:

QM really questions everything realist physicalism has to say. 

I guess in this way we are trying to see what is "matter" in the first place to finally disprove the from-brain-consciousness statement, but somehow I feel this isn't enough.

In fact, most physicists who know well QM don't see in it any reason to doubt physicalism. This shows that science alone isn't enough, there must be an opening in people's mind.

 

Cause they ( physicalists ) will likely say we just still didn't figure it out completely.

If you bring up the argument of lack of progress since Descartes they can't. They didn't figure out even not partially. Why? Why is it so hard then? This is IMO the strongest logical and scientific argument.

At any rate, I wrote couple of sections of my book that argues why QM is the strongest support for an idealistic worldview and which hopefully offers some food for thought. Will post it here soon.

[Ilyass]

I see, but don't you think
that that argument that will settle this is our goal? I mean although I don't think I'm genius, I will do my best to form such argument.
The web is full of materialist theories and arguments.
Ah, I'll check it out later but intersting.

[Ilyass]

When I said scientific way to probe that, I meant a scientific argument against all materialist consciousness theories.
QM doesn't challenge physicalism in the sense that matter-is-everything alone.
But it challenges every thing we thought ( especially physicits ) about the nature of reality.

[Scott Roberts]

On Tuesday, January 7, 2020 at 10:14:59 AM UTC-10, Ilyass wrote:

Marco, I see where you come from, but my goal is to prove that consciousness is immaterial.

I don't think it's material but I want to prove that using logic and if possible science, so that materialists can see it.

As compelling proof only exists in mathematics, in philosophy one can only give more or less precise arguments. Here (taken slightly out of context) is my argument for why observation can not arise from a universe containing only non-observed but observable objects. (For the context, this is taken from this essay).

One could imagine a universe consisting only of a bunch of objects, which could be distinguished if there were an observer, but nevertheless exist without an observer.  Indeed, most people in modern societies think that just such a universe existed for billions of years. Now being without an observer, there is no distinguishing, so in this imagined universe, a form just is an object, and we would say it is made out of parts, not a set of distinctions. This would mean that an observer, when they finally come into existence, is just another such object. This raises the question of how one object can be aware of another object. An observing object must somehow connect each element of the observed form into a whole. But if the observing object is itself nothing but a set of parts, where can it "put", so to speak, these connections? If we say that some elemental parts of the observing object are changed in an observation (like cells in the retina are changed when struck by photons, causing changes in neurons), then either each of those elemental parts are observing, or other parts of the observing object observe the changed parts of itself. The second possibility obviously just pushes the problem back, so the elemental parts must themselves be observers, like Leibniz' monads. But this just repeats the initial problem on a smaller scale: how does this tiny observer make its connections? Where can it put the knowledge that it has changed, and what can connect these bits of knowledge? So this too is just regressing the question. It might be objected that a form need not be made up of discrete "elemental parts", but is, perhaps something like a continuous field (like an electromagnetic field). However, this doesn't change anything. There would still have to be differences -- different field strengths, perhaps -- and the observing form still needs to alter its continuous features as it observes, and we have the same infinite regress. Another possible objection is that awareness isn't a structure of parts, but of events. Again, this doesn't change anything. Simply substitute 'event' for 'part', and you get the same argument. The only way out is to acknowledge that awareness of form requires that which is other than form, and that can only be formlessness.

On a completely different tack, you might consider James Ross' argument discussed in this post by Edward Feser: "Revisiting Ross on the immateriality of thought".  (Though this may be repeating the argument in Sci's second link).

[Sci Patel]

Scott,

 I'd say Goff and Ross make the same argument from different perspectives. I personally think the raw feels of subjective experience, because of their qualitative nature, make it easy to suppose there will someday be some explanation by materialism.

OTOH the fact that matter cannot be about anything in the way thoughts are - it's more damning for materialism IMO, or at least more clearly so.

[Ilyass]

Thank you scott & sci

[Kip Ingram]

Ilyass - my reasoning on this (and I've spent a LONG time thinking about it) roots in what the fundamental physical laws that form our theories are.  There are two fundamental aspects: 1) systems of differential equations, and 2) randomness (many quantum outcomes are random, within a set of prescribed probabilities).  What I mean by that last is that the random events are not necessarily drawn from a uniform probability distribution the way a roll of dice would be.

No matter how complicated a system is, it ultimately winds up being built on top of a small collection of fairly simple differential equations.  Maxwell's equations, Einstein's field equations, Schrodinger's equation.  If you want to go deeper and think in terms of quantum field theory, there are some slightly different equations, and you wind up deriving Maxwell's equations from those when you average over a large number of quanta.  But at bottom it's just differential equations, and they just evolve according to their initial and boundary conditions with no possible variation.  There is nothing in the theory at all that has anything to do with consciousness / self-awareness.  When I want to put it bluntly, I just say "differential equations don't think."

Randomness doesn't think either - it's random.  Now, I do think that one potentially workable explanation of consciousness is a dualistic proposal where we posit that there is a material arena and also a mental arena, and in that case the mental arena could be controlling some of that "randomness" behind the scenes to influence the material arena.  In that case it wouldn't really be random, but it looks random because that mental arena is denied by the people who've built the theories, so randomness is all they can call it.

Another example, at a higher level.  A popular notion is that someday we'll build a computer that's complex and powerful enough to become conscious.  But let's think about what a computer is.  The transistors in computers aren't used in the most general way a transistor can be used.  They're always either on, or off - they're switches.  A computer is nothing but a bunch of on/off switches that are able to control one another.  But each transistor still does that one simple thing - there's an input signal, and if that signal is in one state th switch is on, and if it's in the other the switch is off.  No transistor has any idea that there are other transistors in the system - it just watches its one input signal and responds.  Most importantly, the transistors in a computer don't know whether they're in a small low-power computer or a massive, planet-size computer.  So where would consciousness "reside" in a computer?  There is no place.

You can apply a similar argument to the software.  All software is is a pattern of bits (1 or 0) stored in the memory cells of the computer.  None of the memory cells have any awareness of the values in other memory cells, or, for that matter, even that the other cells are there.  

So, if one transistor can't be conscious, then many can't be.  If one memory cell can't be conscious, then many can't be.  I feel like I haven't done the greatest job explaining this, but the above reasoning just seems as clear as crystal to me.  There's just no place in the theories for consciousness / awareness to get its foot in the door.

I think "emergence" is a fascinating concept, but I think it clear cases of emergence you can always see a connection between the small-scale events and the large scale emergent pattern.  They say the shape of snowflakes is an emergent property of how water molecules behave, but it still has to do with how they fit themselves together - it's a complex large scale shape that arises out of many small scale shapes.  There's no "nuance of consciousness" in the low level bits of material physics to lead to a large scale event.  Panpsychism claims that perhaps there is, and then maybe they might be onto something - you argue in other ways if you want to refute panpsychism.

Please note that what I'm really saying here is not "material behavior can't lead to consciousness."  It's more accurate to describe my argument as "our current theories of material physics can't explain consciousness."  If it turns out that consciousness does arise from material behavior, then we need new theories.  The ones we have don't get you there, no matter how much we wave our hands.

[Marco Masi]

Scott, isn't that the so called "binding problem"? There was a lot of discussion going on on this a couple of decades ago. Nowadays it faded somewhat into the background. But, as far as I know, it remains unsolved as it was then.
It could be useful to collect the non-physicalist historical philosophical arguments that have been made so far to fix the ideas. The ones that come to my mind now are....

Hard problem of consciousness.
What is it like to be a bat?
Mary the colorblind neuroscientist.
The binding problem.
Searl's Chineese room.
The philosophical zombie.
Penrose-Lucas argument.

Other? Please add.

Here also some other food for thought with several links: https://theconversation.com/why-a-computer-will-never-be-truly-conscious-120644

[Kip Ingram]

I tend to agree with whoever said (earlier in this conversation) that it may be impossible to prove that materialism can't explain consciousness.  Nothing I said in my prior answer was a proof.  It's just a set of thought processes that I find extremely compelling.  When materialists start talking about consciousness as an emergent property of complexity, I often accuse them of arguing along the lines of this famous cartoon:

https://pmpaspeakingofprecision.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/then-a-miracle-occurs-logic-1050x700.jpg

BK hasn't proven his case either, but when I read his dissertation and noted the analogy he draws between dissociative personality disorder and the notion that we are all alters of a universal consciousness, I found it immediately compelling.  It's unproven, but it just doesn't have the "ridiculous feel" to it that "consciousness from material complexity" has for me.

A solid proof in any direction here may be impossible, in which case we have to go with what seems most plausible.  BK is way, WAY ahead of the materialists in this regard, at least in my opinion.

[Ilyass]

Kip,

First I want to thank you for writing this whole explanation, I appreciate it.

But I personally think it is impossible for matter to give rise to consciousness.

I won't prove the above statement.

your response has clarified to me how our current theories about matter are not complete.

So do you think it's possible that matter can give rise to consciousness?

Note: we don't even know how the hell physics and chemistry laws give rise to biology?

[Ilyass]

Kip, 

I have to admit that my psychological problems won't let me understand materialistic explanations, because it triggers a deep anxiety and fear and hatred and anger.

if materialism were true I'd hate my own existence.

So that's something that may lead me to be more than skeptical, and be a bit close-minded, but this very problem is the root of the hard problem.

do you think it isn't impossible that matter gave rise to consciousness?

don't feel the absurdity in saying " your experience of the green color is electrical/chemical party in your brain "

[Scott Roberts]

On Tuesday, January 7, 2020 at 11:22:52 AM UTC-10, Sci Patel wrote:

 I'd say Goff and Ross make the same argument from different perspectives. I personally think the raw feels of subjective experience, because of their qualitative nature, make it easy to suppose there will someday be some explanation by materialism.

I'm not following you here. Isn't any qualitative nature something the materialist needs to (but can't) explain?

 

OTOH the fact that matter cannot be about anything in the way thoughts are - it's more damning for materialism IMO, or at least more clearly so.

I'm not so sure that they aren't the same. That is, true "aboutness" may be a matter of cognitive raw feels, like sensory raw feels. But this is just a thought.

 

[Scott Roberts]

On Tuesday, January 7, 2020 at 12:42:02 PM UTC-10, Marco Masi wrote:

Scott, isn't that the so called "binding problem"? 

I think so, also called the "combination problem", or the "unification problem".  

[Kip Ingram]

Ilyass, I think it *is* impossible for consciousness to arise from material processes.  I think consciousness is something else - something which is more or less magic as far as regular mainstream science goes.

[Sci Patel]

Scott,

I just meant that Materialists will continue (forever?) to make the claim that Subjectivity is achievable by certain arrangements of matter. This is because the chasm is the quantitative/qualitative gap, so they make their Appeal to Mystery - "How can we really know if matter is incapable of subjectivity?"

OTOH one can note how matter cannot be determinate in the sense of representing a single thing intrinsically, as any piece of matter can represent a plethora of different things.

Anyway it's probably just a matter (pun maybe intended?) of opinion but I find arguments against materialism stemming from the determinate nature of our thoughts more hard hitting than those arguing that subjectivity cannot arise from matter.

As to whether thoughts are feels in some sense...possibly, but my preference is based on the at least surface distinction between thoughts and feels.

[Kip Ingram]

I'll stick with my earlier argument.  When you bring two entities A and B together, you only get a difference from "A alone" plus "B alone" if the two things interact in some way.  The "interaction term."  For the transistors in a computer there is no such term - when you put N transistors together, you get "transistor 1 effect" + "transistor 2 effect" + ... + "transistor N effect."  There is no interaction term to make something new and interesting happen.  So at all times you have "a bunch of transistors turned on and a bunch of transistors turned off."

Yes, we can manipulate information in interesting and impressive ways by properly controlling this arrangement, but that's because each transistor always contains one bit of information.  So put a lot of them together and we get N bits of information, N large.  But we don't get something "fundamentally new."

[Kip Ingram]

Also, I've always found Searle's Room to be a very effective argument.  It get poo-pooed by materialists, but I feel this is just because they don't want to deal with it.  But let me describe a slight modification (no Chinese involved).  Each page of the notebook contains a bunch of 1's and 0's reflecting the state of a computer's memory, processor registers, and so on.  The human in the room emulates a CPU.  I think that we can all agree that a typical CPU isn't conscious.

At each time step, the human writes a new page in the notebook, making appropriate changes to the 1's and 0's to reflect the instruction he's been asked to emulate (note - the series of instructions is also written in the book).

Ok, obviously our human has human self-awareness, but he's doing nothing but emulating a CPU.  The only other thing in the room is a stack of paper with marks on some of the pages.  That is clearly not self-aware.

To me this is a completely compelling, completely convincing argument that a computer can't be conscious.

Dennett at least makes the argument not by showing how material can be conscious, but by denying that consciousness exist.  Ridiculous argument if you ask me, but at least it's a logically consistent one.  Though he does need to deal with the "if consciousness is an illusion, what is it that is experiencing the illusion?" thing.

Also note that the "Searle's Digital Room" argument presented above certainly does describe a situation that could potentially produce "conscious seeming responses."  I have no doubt that eventually we'll produce digital systems that behave as though they're conscious.  But that's not the same thing as being conscious.  Unless you're Dennett...

[Sci Patel]

Just to note, Searle actually eventually went farther than the Chinese Room - see Is the Brain a Digital Computer?

A mirror of that argument that people find easier to read/understand is Jaron Lanier's You Can't Argue with a Zombie.

[Jim Cross]

Kip, if it is magic scientifically, then you can't be sure it doesn't come from matter because that would be magic too.

[Jim Cross]

A few people keep comparing consciousness with a digital computer and find the digital computer wanting.

You should keep in mind that there are also the analog computer and the best evidence is that brains work both digitally and in a analog fashion.

You might find this interesting: https://www.discovermagazine.com/technology/evolving-a-conscious-machine

[Kip Ingram]

Jim - yes, if you read back up above you see that I clarified that what I'm actually claiming is that our current theories of material physics don't have the capacity to explain consciousness.  If we're prepared to say that we don't really understand material physics completely, and that there are chunks missing from our theory, then you can certainly say that those unknown bits of theory might tell us how consciousness can arise from matter/energy.  But that's not really very different from saying that it arises from something non-material that we don't know anything about - it's still a great big "we have no idea."

I would argue that even if the transistors in a computer are operating in their active regions, instead of just in saturation or cutoff (i.e., analog computer), each transistor still is just doing it's isolated transistor thing, and there's no place for consciousness to reside.  I think the next thing beyond that would be to invoke quantum behavior and say that all of the "quantum transistor" states could be entangled with one another - that gives you a massively larger state space to explore.  It still doesn't seem to me that would make consciousness possible, but I can't claim I really understand entanglement enough to know for sure.

Obviously our bodies seem to contain consciousness - they either directly cause the consciousness or they allow the consciousness to manifest somehow.  In materialist theory, our bodies create the consciousness - in BK's theory our bodies allow the consciousness to manifest as an individual conscious entity.

The bottom line is that I just don't see how raising the complexity level allows the hardware to do something as fundamentally new and different as consciousness.  At the very least, if the materialists are right, then our knowledge of physics is woefully less complete than we like to think.

[Kip Ingram]

Jim, from the article you linked me to:

Of course, as Harvey points out, it makes little sense to ask whether such a machine is really conscious, because the only thing that matters—or at least the only thing that can be observed or tested—is whether it acts conscious. 

That's Dennett's view in a nutshell.  He says all that matters is how I behave - how you can observe me behaving from the outside.  And that if we make a machine that behaves in the same way, it's as conscious as I am.  I absolutely beg to differ.  I can observe my own consciousness, from within.  I can't prove to you in any way what I'm observing - all I can do is appeal to you to contemplate your own consciousness - I assume you feel on the inside much as I do.  But Dennett absolutely rejects that.  He's correct that it falls outside the bounds of science, because science is all about third party validation etc. etc.  But he's wrong in claiming that makes my internal observation nonexistent.  He just sounds like a fool to me when he carries on that way.  It's a cheap cop out to dodge out of having to explain something.  The critics who say his book should have been titled Consciousness Explained Away are absolutely on-point. 

[Kip Ingram]

Jim, let me pose a situation.  Say your spaceship crash-landed on a remote planet, but one you could live on.  You discover that you are the only sentient being on the planet.  Do the methods of science become unavailable to you because there are no other beings there to serve as "third parties" in the scientific method?  Of course not.  You can still apply the methods of science, and in a situation like that anything you can perceive is fair game for that process.  Including your perception of your own consciousness.  Certainly you may be more likely to err, without any sort of peer review process.  But the methodology itself is still completely valid.

Now say someone else shows up.  To make the claim that some of the things you could perceive before that person's arrival become "out of bounds" just because there's another person around seems silly to me.  Honestly, my own self-awareness is the one thing that I'm more certain of than anything else, because everything else gets filtered through my senses before I get to interpret it.

[Jim Cross]

Kip,

A couple of things.

In current science to explain something scientifically requires a mapping of some sort between what you are explaining and physical processes. So back to the original question posed by this thread, to prove scientifically that consciousness cannot arise from physical processes you need something equivalent to Godel's theorem or Turing Halting Problem proof for consciousness - in other words, a proof that consciousness could never be mapped to physical processes. It would be proving a negative. Penrose actually uses Godel and Turing to argue for quantum mechanisms for consciousness; however, quantum reality in my view is physical so I don't think that accomplishes the question posed in this thread. If we had a proof as I suggest, what exactly that would tell us isn't clear because it would be implicitly acknowledging that there are physical processes unless it also proved that physical processes derive from consciousness (the idealist position). However, proving physical processes derive from consciousness would not be science, it would be its opposite because science is about mapping what you are explaining to physical processes. 

So such a scientific proof would be impossible unless some sort of new science overthrew the existing paradigm. That is something like what Goff suggests could be possible in Galileo's Error but it sorely lacking in details.

Of course, with philosophy, all things are possible...

Where I am coming from in all of this is the idea that consciousness is physical and electromagnetic in nature. 

https://broadspeculations.com/2019/12/01/em-fields-and-consciousness/

[Ilyass]

Thanks, jim and kip.
My original aim is to end this debate, " can consciousness arive from matter? " .
I personaly thinks that's impossible, what is about matter that can give consciousnes? What is matter in the place? And how if consciousness is physical process how can ohysical process give rise to non-physical objects?

Kip, can you tell me why you think that if we progress in physical science and form new theories we can understand consciousness is physical?
The hard problem is insoluble, why do you it can be solved?
Jim, penrose and hameroff model is just seeing consciousness physical correlates.

[Kip Ingram]

Ilyass - that isn't what I'm saying.  What I am saying is that our current physical theories cannot show that consciousness is physical - my contention is that there is no place for consciousness in our current theories.  So, IF we hypothesize that consciousness is physical, then I think we need a whole new set of physical theories that do make room for consciousness.  I am most definitely NOT saying that "if we discover new physics, it will turn out that consciousness is physical."  It might, but it also might not.  Honestly, I think our physics theories are on the right track, and I don't think we will ever prove consciousness is physical.  I just don't think it IS physical.

Jim, I agree with most of what you just said, but honestly I'm just not wound up over the matter of explicit, rigorous proof.  I've studied physics a lot, and I just don't see a plausible route to material consciousness.  That's good enough for me - I decided some years back that consciousness is something separate / different.  Whether both material and mental exist (dualism) or only mental exists (idealism), I'm not 100% sure.  BK's work makes a fairly plausible case for idealism, but more work is required.

[Jim Cross]

Illyass

penrose and hameroff model is just seeing consciousness physical correlates.

I think that was what I said. 

But your question "What is matter in the place?" really goes to the root of the problem. If we really don't know what matter is, how do we know it cannot account for consciousness. When you say you think it is impossible consciousness can arise from matter, you are only thinking of your current concept of matter - the concept that derives from the subject/object split that suggests there is something different about what is out there from what is inside.

There is much in the physical world we can observe the effects of and measure but is not "solid" like the matter of common experience - for example,  waves and fields, which are closer to what matter really is than that "solid" stuff we think we perceive. 

[RHC]

Jim, from the article you linked me to:

Of course, as Harvey points out, it makes little sense to ask whether such a machine is really conscious, because the only thing that matters—or at least the only thing that can be observed or tested—is whether it acts conscious.

 That's Dennett's view in a nutshell.  He says all that matters is how I behave

Exactly and this is both idiotic and monstrous thinking.  Literally Cargo Cultism and  maybe the ultimate example of obliterating the essentially real with the abstract.  Eliminative materialism is the metaphysical equivalent of the ideology of The Party in Orwell's 1984. A form of blind worship as fundamentalist as the craziest religion. What could be more fundamentalist that choosing to defend the least reasonable set of possible starting assumptions because they are the most nihilistic of the set of possible alternatives.

In current science to explain something scientifically requires a mapping of some sort between what you are explaining and physical processes. So back to the original question posed by this thread, to prove scientifically that consciousness cannot arise from physical processes you need something equivalent to Godel's theorem..

This entire argument is circular reasoning and strawmaning based on how you are using the word physical.

The 2nd sentence in what I have quoted is essentially wrong because its sets up an irrelevant question.  Its at least conceivable that empirical evidence for Survival could meet scientific standards of proof in which case materialism would be scientifically dis proven.  Ie  The statement: "To the best of our knowledge, consciousness survives death and therefore cant be generated by the brain." would be the working scientific position.

Now one could still claim even trancendental realms all the way back to God itself are physical and save materialism though goal post moving, which I have no doubt will continue to happen, but for the rest of us who aren't quite as invested in our religious position, if anything catalogued in "Irreducible Mind" is what it appears be, then materialism ceases to be the least likely to be wrong position.

[Kip Ingram]

RHC - 

What could be more fundamentalist that choosing to defend the least reasonable set of possible starting assumptions because they are the most nihilistic of the set of possible alternatives.

EXACTLY.  I have felt for a long time that many of the materialist champions have lost their way.  They are no longer scientists - they are warriors in a self-declared war against religion.  They give themselves away by letting their anger show in their condemnation of non-materialist ideas.  It's no longer objective science for them - it's personal.

Also, I don't see materialism as the "least likely to be wrong" position - I've stared at the foundations of physics for many years, and really just see no hope for consciousness there.  Something fundamental would have to change in our materialist theories before I think they can house consciousness.  On the other hand, if consciousness is fundamental then that problem goes away, and you have to explain either 1) a way for the mental to affect the physical (dualism) or 2) how our perceptions of the material world (behaving the way we observe it to behave) arises from the mental (idealism).  I think either of those is more plausible than material-based consciousness. 

[Jim Cross]

 Its at least conceivable that empirical evidence for Survival could meet scientific standards of proof

That would prove zero as far as the question of whether or not consciousness is physical because the survival could be physical too. 

Besides that, survival of death as best I can tell has nothing to do with BK's position on anything. The alter dissolves at death. It doesn't continue to exist as an entity but is reabsorbed into the M@L.

[Kip Ingram]

Jim - I put the burden of proof on materialism.  Materialists need to show exactly how consciousness arises from the physical.  Not hand waving "then a miracle occurs" arguments, but a solid demonstration like they mount for any other theory.  Something that is testable and falsifiable - if it's not testable and falsifiable, then it's not science and they can't lay claim to having explained anything.

Where I sit, consciousness from material physics looks implausible, whereas some other arguments like BK's at least look somewhat plausible.  They face a burden of "proof" too, but as far as I'm concerned they are in the lead currently.

[Jim Cross]

You can place the burden of proof anywhere you like but show me what scientific results idealism has produced.

It adds nothing of value to materialistic science except to provide a cozy refuge for those who want to believe in the supernatural and life after death. 

[Ilyass]

Jim,

If consciousness is immaterial then materialist science cannot do the job.

and I see what you mean supernatural, but I don't think all people here in the forum because they want to believe in the supernatural, you don't need proof to believe in the supernatural .

Jim, do you believe in god? afterlife?soul( I mean self, not consciousness)?

[Kip Ingram]

Jim - I have no idea whether there is life after death or not.  I'm not familiar enough with BK's work to know what he has said about that, but just off the cuff I would assume that when a body dies the dissociative boundary between that alter and the universal consciousness vanishes.  So I assume that alter would be... gone, right?  And yet I find BK's proposal rather persuasive.  So I guess I'm not motivated by a craving for life after death.

My motivation is simple: I don't see any reasonable prospect for an explanation of consciousness from materialism, therefore it must come about in some other way.  For that reason I am open minded to the idea that consciousness may be fundamental.  Material might be fundamental too - which would give us dualism.  But I don't consider that a certainty - it's also possible that our perceptions of material things arise in some purely mental way.

Materialism DOES NOT HAVE A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION, so I'm unable to believe it's a full picture of reality.  I'm an engineer by training and have always loved science.  So I mostly started off as a materialist, and only turned away from it when it proved unable to give me a satisfying explanation for my own mind.

[Lou Gold]

Yikes Jim. 

Thanks for revealing yourself clearly as a hard core materialist.

... show me what scientific results idealism has produced.

Idealism does not produce results. It just allows for them slightly better than does materialism. For example, dreams leading toward results are taken more seriously. Of course, when the results are established according to the canons of modern science, there's no difference between the two philosophies. It's just, "whatever works," which is where shamanism starts and why I prefer it to philosophy.

[Ilyass]

Kip,

After thinking for some time about life after death, I could say that ourselves will probably disappear but consciousness will, I identify 'I' as the observer of everything.

even in some materialist models to explain consciousness, they say life after death is possible, like Penrose and Hameroff.

But to be honest no one, and I mean no one knows what happens after death.

[Jim Cross]

Kip,

alter would be gone

That matches my understanding of BK's view. 

Materialism DOES NOT HAVE A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION

What would constitute a plausible explanation? 

Idealism doesn't have an explanation either. It just asserts consciousness is primary.

I think you have declared something immaterial (consciousness) then say you can't explain it with the material. But you have no actual evidence that consciousness is immaterial.

[Kip Ingram]

Ilyass - exactly; we don't know.  I'm enjoying life, and (more importantly) I feel good about what I've done in life - I have five daughters, and raising them and contributing to their happiness and stability in the world represents my greatest achievement.  I look forward to relaxing in retirement, and just... thinking about things.  Things like this stuff we're discussing here.  When it is time for me to go, I will go - if there turns out to be something on the other side that will at least be interesting.  We'll see.  But no one knows, and the arrogant certainty that materialists project on that front is just pretty laughable.

[Jim Cross]

Lou,

Idealism does not produce results

Exactly.

But this post is about proving scientifically that consciousness cannot come from matter.

I would say if you want to be an idealist, believe in the supernatural, or whatever that's fine, but why are you bothering trying to find justification for it with science? 

[Lou Gold]

Kip,

When it is time for me to go, I will go - if there turns out to be something on the other side that will at least be interesting.  We'll see.  But no one knows, and the arrogant certainty that materialists project on that front is just pretty laughable.

Laughable from all sides except individual Revelation. Generalized, only agnosticism is justified. Personalized, faith is extremely powerful. One cannot judge another's experience. One can only say whether that experience aligns with or is somehow useful to one's own process. 

[Ilyass]

So true Kip,

the arrogance that materialists lead them to ridicule those who believe in the afterlife, although both who believe certainly are wrong with the way they see these things.

Jim, tell something material about consciousness.

Yes, I start with consciousness being material because I don't think it can be material, and this is what this discussion aims for.

I literally want to prove that consciousness cannot arise from matter, because I don't see even the slightest sign that my consciousness is physical.

materialism has to explain how consciousness arises from matter, but idealism doesn't have to do that because it takes consciousness as the base of all reality.

If you are a physicalist then explain to me the laws of physics.

[Ilyass]

Lou,

the position I take is : 

1- I cannot know for sure.

2- There are possibilities.

3- I think some possibilities have a better chance of being true.

4- Therefor I believe that God CAN exist, and life after death CAN be true. and the opposite is true.

[Lou Gold]

Jim,

Neither idealism or materialism produce results. Trial and error produces results. Idealism allows for all the material results plus a few more, for example, talking with plants. Therefore, it's more plausible and will lead toward broader trial-and-error called "research."

[Jeff Falzone]

Jim, I know you are smarter than me in most ways, but I am surprised you still believe that the metaphysics called materialism has made discoveries. I honestly am surprised each time you imply that. 

[Ilyass]

Jim,

You are a very important voice here because you always remind us of other possibilities.

However, I disagree with what you said, HUMANS CANNOT EXPLAIN EVERYTHING

We just cannot.

I'm not saying we all sit down and have some bear because we can't explain those things, I just want to remind you all that there in every position things that SHOULD be the ground of everything else.

In physicalism, it is the laws of physics.

In idealism it is consciousness.

In duality, it is both.

in religion it is God.

[Jeff Falzone]

As a side note, I take a strange comfort that so many big brained thinkers (much smarter than me) can't see the assumption they make when they talk about materialism being the driving force behind all the wonderful patterns science has uncovered regarding the regularities of nature. It somehow gives me hope regarding how quickly new and better insights can emerge. I'm not super bright, but I don't struggle. 

[Jim Cross]

IIyass,

I start with consciousness being [im]material because I don't think it can be material

I assume you meant immaterial.

But here's the problem.  You are asking for scientific proof. 

You don't see the irony in asking materialistic science to validate your beliefs that consciousness is not material.

[Jeff Falzone]

Jim refers to a certain kind of patterned experience as 'materialistic science.' 

I don't get why. 

[Ilyass]

Jim,

I think that the only way material science can give us information about the immateriality of consciousness is by not finding it, which I guess science is good at.

I understand what you are trying to type right now, and yes science still researching, but still don't find anything material about consciousness, and that validates my point about consciousness being immaterial. Do you think it's wise to research physical consciousness FOREVER?

And you ignored the above: If you are a physicalist then explain to me the laws of physics.

[Ilyass]

It's like God, God is something beyond material science, but I'm agnostic because I don't any proof that it exists.

However the case is different when it comes to consciousness, it's the only thing I have in life, I am consciousness.

[Jim Cross]

Where do get the idea I believe in a metaphysics called materialism?

I don't "believe" in any metaphysics. I'm a pragmatist.

[Lou Gold]

Ilyass,

Yours is a perfectly reasonable position and it seems to fit you well. I have no reason to challenge it. 

My position is that I know because I received the gift of faith. But my gift was personal and includes no reason to push it onto others. In regard to others it only gives me a sense of the value of being kind, helpful, happy and grokking a bunch of stuff a bit more deeply. 

[Jeff Falzone]

No, I'm saying that you often refer to patterned experience as 'materialism,' and you seem to think that 'materialism' makes predictions that other metaphysics don't make. 

[Lou Gold]

Jim,

"Whatever works" is a nice club. I'm very comfortable in it.

Where do get the idea I believe in a metaphysics called materialism?

Good correction! Perhaps my error. But one is attached to metaphysics in the sense that one feels compelled to argue with it. It can be let go of, freeing one to focus on making more of "whatever works."

[Jim Cross]

In my view science looks for patterns and correlations between what phenomena that are measurable and usually in common experience. It is a more rigorous discipline for what all organisms capable of learning do regularly to survive. 

Since it works with the measurable, it aligns more naturally with physicalism. In my view, however,it is not a metaphysical physicalism but rather a pragmatic one. 

It can be agnostic on the underlying nature of reality. It can even regard the question is useless and possibly unanswerable as I do. 

It only cares about, as you say, whatever works. Its models of reality are tentative, temporary, not absolute or eternal. It justifies no metaphysics.

[Ilyass]

Jim,

You have just said that you prefer to use the scientific method to look for anything, and then you said your position is agnostic of metaphysics and rather a pragmatic one.

Apart from metaphysics, I am the same as you.

However, you seem to underestimate metaphysics.

but wait a second what are you doing at - Metaphysical Speculations - if you don't care about metaphysics anyways?

Also, your position is to live one's life and doesn't try to think about things like consciousness and existence, because this thinking isn't pragmatic.

  why does it align with physicalism? I mean you can be in a simulation or in one mind and still discover patterns and correlations.

[Jeff Falzone]

Right, Jim. That's all I'm saying. You are in agreement with every idealist I know regarding what science is. 

You disagree with them in your claim that the concept of 'matter' somehow 'aligns' more easily with the process of observation and thought. Obviously, I think that mind aligns better with observations and thought. But, most importantly, yes, you agree with Bernardo (and almost everybody) that science is done wonderfully by folks who believe all sorts of different things about the fundamental nature of reality. Materialism has nothing to do with causing this pattern of experience called science. 

When you say things like, "You don't see the irony in asking materialistic science to validate your beliefs that consciousness is not material."

It isn't clear what you mean by materialistic science. Maybe you just mean only those scientist who do science AND who have believes about 'matter' being the cause of everything. 

[Jeff Falzone]

Jim, I know you are a pragmatist. So is Bernardo and so is almost anybody who feels they are just looking for best explanations. 

It is only when you seem to think that our most reliable findings regarding nature somehow support the notion of 'matter' as causing everything...that's the part of your conversations that I always want to ask about. You sometimes speak about 'materialistic science' as if it is different than the science being done by people who are Christians or Woo Woo or critical idealists. 

What I've noticed is that a wonderful discovery regarding a pattern in nature is just as wonderful when discovered by a person holding any ontology. 

[Jim Cross]

IIlyass,

I came upon this site initially because I was interested in Donald Hoffman and there seemed to be some discussion going on here regarding his Interface Theory of Perception.

At one point I was even starting to think along the lines of his world of conscious agents which would be most idealistic version of ITP. 

Hoffman, however, is a scientist which was part of my interest in his ideas.

I might also add that you look back over the older posts on my web site Broad Speculations you will find quite a bit compatible with many of the ideas expressed here.

Although the site is called Metaphysical Speculations, there are frequently posts that somewhat afield from metaphysics. Various people (RHC in particular) post links to articles that I find interesting.

As time has passed, however, I've gradually refined my own views and essentially come to the conclusion that the big metaphysical questions are probably not answerable. But some of the little questions are still interesting.

[Jeff Falzone]

Jim said:

"As time has passed, however, I've gradually refined my own views and essentially come to the conclusion that the big metaphysical questions are probably not answerable. But some of the little questions are still interesting."

This seems to be the most common opinion most people hold, especially once you drill down past their immediate argumentative response. I know that Bernardo often speaks about the fact that he isn't giving any kind of absolute answer, just looking at which arguments can account for patterns in nature making the least amount of unnecessary moves. 

I agree that we aren't talking about being certain regarding ontologies. We are just noticing what claims a person is making about reality and then seeing how they justify it.

Since we know experience is part of reality, I'm fine if there are good ways of arguing that it is fundamental, especially once we keep in mind that we don't need to anthropomorphize mind-at-large by assuming it shares our core characteristics (distracted, angry, emotional, trying desperating to keep the alter intact, etc.). 

We definitely agree on this.

[Ilyass]

Jim, 

It looks like we are similar.

What do you think of the Hoffman model?

his model is a version of idealism.

I'm interested a lot in his theory and would like to see him prove it with mathematics and combine it with RT and QM.

But when you say metaphysical questions are unanswered, there is some truth to that you know, we may be all wrong, but do you it's pragmatic to not even offer solutions -although not absolute solutions-?

[Scott Roberts]

On Wednesday, January 8, 2020 at 7:50:02 AM UTC-10, Ilyass wrote:

But to be honest no one, and I mean no one knows what happens after death.

You can't say that no one knows. Consider all the NDE cases where the experiencer says they now know they will survive. One can be skeptical about their claim, but I am just pointing out that we don't know that no one knows, and there is the real possibility that some do know.

And though you and I do not know, we can investigate the question. There is a mountain of anecdotal evidence for post-mortem continuance, and the only reason I can see to ignore it is because of a commitment to materialism, which if true means that all that evidence must be lies or delusion, which strikes me as implausible.

 

[Jim Cross]

Jeff,

I actually said: "Since it works with the measurable, it aligns more naturally with physicalism."

Many people equate physicalism and materialism. For all practical purposes in modern physics, matter doesn't really exist in any form as it was traditionally thought to be. What was formerly known as matter is bundles of fields and energies glommed together.

Hence, my emphasis on the measurable and what is part of common experience, meaning it can be verified by others and not subjective.

You and I can take a yardstick and place it next to a piece of lumber and agree the lumber is 25 inches long for example. That doesn't say anything about what the lumber actually is but it is a piece of information that we could use to build something requiring a piece of wood of that size.

Knowing that the piece of wood is actually composed of excitations of consciousness in the mind at large doesn't add anything of pragmatic value to what use we might make of the piece of wood.

Consciousness is not measurable in the same way and it certainly can't be verified in common experience. I find Goff's distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic properties useful here.

Of course, a scientist could have any of a wide variety of metaphysical views but, if they are doing science, they are working in the realm of the measurable and verifiable common experience.

[Jeff Falzone]

Yes, Jim I understand that you talked about what is 'measurable.' Haven't you read Bernardo's work? He also explains why 'measurable' aligns with idealism (better than physicalism because you get all the scientific results without positing another ontological category). 

I understand that you believe measurement somehow supports or is more in tune with physicalism. 

And everybody agrees with you that you can measure a piece of wood without believing in physicalism or idealism. 

It's only when you imply that somehow science comes from a given ontology that I ask you for clarification. 

Everyone agrees on those more general points regarding the non-metaphysical nature of experiencing patterns in nature. Every great scientist is having an experience of perception and thought. It's fun! 

[Jim Cross]

Jeff,

I know you keep saying that all of the patterns and correlations we find in science are accepted by idealism too but that isn't an argument for it.

It just makes idealism a fifth wheel. Idealism doesn't add any additional value or information to the measurable. It doesn't generate new scientific hypotheses on its own.

IIlyass,

I've grown a little more skeptical of Hoffman's model, particularly the PDA loop. I alluded to some my reservations in another thread.

I may post a topic here or a link to something on my web site when I finish work on it.

Basically I think he is wrong that evolution is selecting at all for perceptions, particularly as we move to organisms with more complex nervous systems. Evolution is selecting for more general capabilities like learning and memory. Perceptions and consciousness arise from learning and memory.

[Sci Patel]

The problem of matter is it is defined by Physicalism as not having any mental characteristics.

You cannot get something from nothing, so that definition - so long as it applies - means matter will never create consciousness.

That is the point of Ross' Immaterial Aspects of Thought and Goff's Other Problem of Mary essays.

I'll post more stuff, but so long as one realizes you cannot get Something from Nothing materialism is obviously false.

[Ilyass]

Jim,
You said it yourself how can you expect idealism to add value to science when the latter is about studying matter behaviour.

Consciousness arise from learning and memory? Jim are you kidding?
So I wasn't conscious until I learned about life.
I respect you jim but this is absurd.

[Kip Ingram]

Sci Patel - I agree with that - your "can't get something from nothing" is my "differential equations don't think."  I think we're both saying basically the same thing, and both wind up with "materialism just won't explain mind."

[Kip Ingram]

I also agree with the other thoughts posted above that the spectacular success we've had with science in no way tells us whether matter is "material" vs. "matter is mental perception."  Even if matter is just our perception of the universal consciousness, all that science tells us is how our perceptions behave in relation to one another.  The materialism vs. idealism is "under that radar" and science doesn't give an opinion on the matter.

[RHC]

First Statemment: Ideally and thankfully often enough to be useful.

You can not be so naive as to actually believe the rest of this Mythology.  No reasonable person can deny that the materialist worldview many scientists work from acts like a big filter on the questions and data that are considered legitimate to scientific inquiry. There are countless examples of this. If Science was metaphysically pragmatic or neutral, that is truly radically empirical we wouldnt be having discussions like this.

One can reasonably argue that an Idealist based Science would ask different kinds of questions about some topics and would eventually lead to own kinds of institutional bias and dogmatism; but its not reasonable that it would add no value. 

[Sci Patel]

Kip,

 Yes I think we're looking at the same issue with Materialism/Physicalism from different angles. I like your statement as well, because it highlights a deeper problem in that the measures of physics are supported by mathematical proofs - but proofs have no validity in Physicalism b/c Logic is a mental - or at the least non-physical - attribute.

 This is better explained in Peter Sjöstedt-H's Why I am not a Physicalist: Four Reasons for Rejecting the Faith ->

If one accepts, as even Papineau suggests, that there exists what the logician Frege called “the third realm”[16] (beyond physicality and mentality) of objective truths—such as the truth of modus ponens, the properties of Pi, the Pythagorean theorem, or the Form of Beauty—truths that exist whether or not they are discovered, meaning that they are in essence neither mental nor physical (as there can be no neural correlates of non-existent mental events), then it implies that their existence has an effect upon the physical through their discovery. For example, the discovery of the golden ratio had an effect upon the bodies of its discoverers in terms of their expression of it, and subsequently upon mathematics, aesthetics, architecture, and upon me in writing this essay. Thus the existence of such universal truths implies the falsity of one of physicalism’s key tenets: the causal closure of the physical. Universals crack open the causal closure principle of physicalism, which is to say they crack open physicalism itself.

Of course, a physicalist could deny the existence of such universals, such objective truths. But in doing so, he would destroy the underlying assumptions of his position and thus succumb to inconsistency regardless. If physicalism considers itself to be a logical position, it must maintain the underlying truths of the laws of logic, such as the law of non-contradiction, formal fallacies, and so on. But these laws are not the laws of physics, which as such can be established through empirical observation or through modelling. Thus emerges another predicament for physicalism: the dilemma of logical objectivity.

[RHC]

>That would prove zero as far as the question of whether or not consciousness is physical because the survival could be physical too.

I actually agree with you in a way (at some point more of extended reality might be usefully addressed by the scientific method), but its still goal post moving.  You personally might have a more open minded perspective on what materialism might encompass, but more often than not a materialist worldview is used as a kind of Inquisitional roadblock to free, truly empirical inquiry.  Its just to inherently and not usefully limiting a basis for Inquiry at this point in time IMO.  Thats really the main motivation behind my interest in using what I have learned to debunk it.

Also Jim Im sympathetic to your position that large metaphysical questions are not answerable in a what so far is a scientific way.  But Im convinced its useful to explore them. You dont know what you dont know.  All kinds of interesting questions and changes in perspective, leading to more interesting questions come from thinking about this stuff in an open and non-defensive way (yes im looking in a mirror : )  )  Clearly one can learn to think better, across domains from engaging in these questions. They tend to bring out and push cognitive limitations and biases like nothing else.  Also I think for many people metaphysical inquiry can open spiritual validation of all kinds.  So I think its worthwhile.  I think you do as well or you wouldn't be here.

[Sci Patel]

RHC said: "I think you [Jim] do as well or you wouldn't be here."

But Jim has explicitly bragged on the comment section of his blog about why he is here - to play thought police, pretending (sometimes I guess) to be a Physicalist in order to correct our thinking.

The humor of this is that Jim vomits the same poor arguments over and over -> trying to identify the success of physics as a reason to favor Physicalism the philosophy for example. One only needs to read the anti-Physicalist flavored writings of several of the "Quantum Fathers" to see how silly that is.

[Jeff Falzone]

Jim, I didn't say that. This is your major blindspot. All I'm pointing out is that your term "materialistic science" is very unclear and seems caused by your odd notion of "alignment" to physicalism.

[Jim Cross]

Consciousness arise from learning and memory? 

Absolutely. What were you conscious of before you learned about life? 

Of course, we are dependent on the basic sensory equipment but the processing of the input from the senses is learned.

Even basic things like vision are learned.

Actually one of Hoffman's examples demonstrates this well. It's the example of the prism glasses that invert everything. People adjust to it over several weeks. They relearn how to see with a new set of inputs.

https://www.theguardian.com/education/2012/nov/12/improbable-research-seeing-upside-down

Monkeys with genetically engineered light cones began to distinguish red and green dots they couldn't previous see.

https://www.livescience.com/21275-color-red-blue-scientists.html

Basically the brain does general information processing and the representations of consciousness are learned.

Moreover, much of what we have traditionally
thought to be “hard-wired” in cortical processing is
actually learnt. This has been well demonstrated by the
research of Mriganka Sur, which shows, for example,
that redirecting visual input from occipital cortex to
auditory cortex (in ferrets) leads to reorganization of
the latter tissue to support completely competent vision (for review, see Sur & Rubinstein, 2005). Cortical
perception, therefore, no less than cortical cognition, is
rooted in memory processes. 

https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~karl/The%20Conscious%20Id.pdf 

[Sci Patel]

I'm not convinced that consciousness is information processing.

As Searle points out in the essay I linked above, biological explanation need not bring up "information processing".

But even accepting "information processing" this wouldn't explain, say, the qualitative aspects that forever escape physical measurement and thus physics or the logical aspects of mentality I mentioned above.

[Kip Ingram]

I believe a ton of information processing happens in our brains, as the flood of sensory data is filtered and prepared for our perception, but I don't think that's what consciousness is.  How does an information process give rise to pain?  Or sadness, or fear, or ...

[Sci Patel]

What is Information anyway?

Is there a valid definition that doesn't ultimately bring in Mentality?

[Kip Ingram]

I don't know - I'm not too fancy with these philosophical arguments.  If consciousness is the only fundamental thing then everything would wind up at mentality, I suppose.  But if I know the state of a system that has N possible states, then that knowledge represents log2(N) bits of information.

[Sci Patel]

Kip,

 I think the very mention of representation is telling - "information" encoding is always information *for* someone. To quote Peter Sjöstedt-H:

The reading a thermometer gives neither is, nor generates, the heat. Applied to Gallimore’s examples, if we, for instance, analyse what the energy level (N) of an electron is, we realize that it is a reading that merely points to the actual reality: energy. The energy is represented by information, but the information is not the reality—just as the thermometer reading is not the heat. Energy is not a number; in fact, its concrete reality is still unknown us.

Information itself is merely abstraction. It can only exist in relation to: (i) the object for which information is acquired, (ii) the data that the object emits, (iii) the interface that can convert that data into varieties of information,[10] and (iv) the recipient or subject that becomes informed. If there is no object, there can be no information about it, and the same object can provide infinite information according to the interface.[11] Moreover, we should not assume that the data emitted extrinsically by an object is a sufficient, complete description of that object.

Additionally, from Lowe's There are no Easy Problems of Consciousness:

Whatever a computer can do by way of information processing, storage and retrieval is not by any means to be confused with what a thinking human being does who reasons, remembers and recalls. And here I note a particularly serious inadequacy in the (essentially Shannonian) notion of information which Chalmers deploys in attempting to characterize aspects of human cognition.This notion of information is appropriate enough for describing the activities of com­puting machines, but is wholly inappropriate for characterizing the cognitive states —beliefs, thoughts and judgements — of human beings. And the reason, once again, has to do with conceptual content. An informational state in Chalmers’ sense is not, essen­tially, a state possessing conceptually articulated content; but the beliefs, thoughts and judgements of human beings most certainly do possess such content essentially. A sim­ple, if somewhat timeworn, example will serve to bring out this distinction. Consider the pattern of rings exposed by a horizontal cut through a tree’s trunk: such a ring pat­tern is, in the sense of ‘information’ deployed by Chalmers, an informational state of the tree — it carries ‘information’ about the tree’s age, amongst other things. Clearly,though, it is not a state with conceptual content: it would be ludicrous to suggest that the ring pattern somehow embodies the concepts of number and time (concepts which are themselves involved in the analysis of the concept of a tree’s age). By contrast, one cannot properly ascribe to a person a belief that a certain tree is so-and-so many years old without simultaneously ascribing to that person concepts of number and time. And,once again, I would appeal to the Kantian principle that our conceptual capacities —even those relating to such relatively abstract concepts as those of number and time —are intimately related to our capacities for perceptual experience, in order to explain what the relevant difference between a human being and a tree is in this regard. That a tree can merely carry (Shannonian) ‘information’ about its age, whereas a human being can believe that, or think that, it has a certain age is intimately related to the fact that human beings can, whereas trees cannot, enjoy conscious perceptual experiences with phenomenal character.

Unnecessarily skeptical w.r.t the consciousness of a tree, but that a tree may have a conscious essence of course does nothing to help the "information processing" argument.

[Lou Gold]

Who and what is the Shannonian drift?

[Sci Patel]

Claude Shannon.

[Jim Cross]

Imagine, if it is possible, you have no senses and no memory which would probably follow from no senses in this or any other life (if you want to argue for reincarnation).

What would you be conscious of? Of what would your consciousness consist?

If you want to argue for some pure consciousness without object, well maybe. But that wouldn't be anything like the consciousness you presently experience.It would not be anything like an alter.

Our consciousness consists of matching current sensory data with memories of past sensory data. This is a learning process that guides the decision-action part of Hoffman's loop. The perceptions arise only partially from selection on evolutionary time scales and arise mostly on real time scales. Evolution selected for learning and memory, not perceptions per se, to permit faster developing and more complex adaptive behavior.

Since our perceptions can change quickly based on new conditions, our perceptions are likely more veridical than Hoffman's suggests.

[Ilyass]

So when I remember how sweet was the dessert I ate at 3 years old, and I suppose that it was the first time I experienced such thing, how can that be about learning?

am I learning now how to experience things? Am I learning how to experience colors? I mean I saw colors and experienced them before knowing their names.

learning and comparing data to old that happens within consciousness.

[Jim Cross]

Ilyass,

Obviously you are not going to see "red" if you lack the cones in your eyes for "red". There might be something similar with sweetness. 

But in the case of the monkeys, where did the perception of "red" reside before the equipment to distinguish red was put into their eyes? How did "red" become a perception except through learning about red?

Certainly you learned to associate that dessert with sweetness and have an expectation that other desserts will be sweet which will be validated or modified with future learning experiences.

So there might be some basic equipment tied to evolution and biology but with more complex organisms decision and actions are not guided by evolved perceptions but by learning and memory.

Let say you have never seen a wolf or know anything about a wolf but you do know about dogs.

If you see a wolf, you might first think it is a type of dog. However, you begin to notice differences. It's bigger. It doesn't wag its tail. Maybe you see it attack your best friend. At that point, your decisions and actions are not governed by an evolved perception of a wolf but by your learning and experience with a wolf. 

[Kip Ingram]

I want to "re-point-out the obvious" here.  Our laws of physics explain how our perceptions behave.  We INVENTED all of the sub-structures in order to refine that model.  All the things we can't see, like molecules and atoms and quarks and so on.  What science tells us is that the world BEHAVES AS THOUGH THOSE THINGS EXIST.  It does NOT tell us, with rigorous certainty, that they do exist.  All of that stuff is a MODEL we made to organize our knowledge of how our PERCEPTIONS behave.

There is NO absolutely undeniable proof that those things exist.  We regularly overlook this because our theories work so well.

[Brian Wachter]

This post recalls for me the statements of Bohr and Heisenberg to the effect that their study of QM was not of reality itself but of our interpretation of reality.

[Sci Patel]

Kip,

 Good point - what we have are observations made with our consciousness (so Mentality) that can be made applicable through our use of Mathematics (also Mentality).

 Really Jim's argument that physics should be associated with Physicalism boils down to the latter having "physics" in the name. It's not a serious argument at all.

 Similarly, we obviously learn through consciousness, rather than consciousness (as in Subjectivity/Intentionality/Rationality) coming from learning. Another non-serious and frankly terrible argument.

[Ilyass]

I was in math exam today, during some questions came to my mind about your position jim.
I admit it's chaos, mental hurrican.

1)How can we know that there is a red? Objective red.
2)How can we even begin to descrive color?
Some experience can be described but when the more we get down the more it's harder and harder to describe it, until yoj finally cannot.
3)Is there an objective measurement of seeing red? Even if there is brain scans, every brain is different .
4)Why consciousness exist in the first place? We could've unconscious beings and still brains would be able to process information .
5)there is a possibility that my red isn't your red, as weird as it is.

And that's what my was thinking about while soving differential equations 😂😂😂.

[Jim Cross]

Ilyass,

Actually in that article about the monkeys the researchers argues that your red is probably not the same as my red. I think the argument is that our red is just the representation you or I seized on when we first learned red. I'm not sure that is correct because our brains are similar enough that even if the representation is learned it might be learned in the same way for each of us.

It goes back to the question for the monkeys of where did the representation for red exist before they were able to see it.

Regarding the reason for consciousness, I think it does go to the question of learning and memory. 

Learning and memory permit a hugely expanded repertoire of behavior. It was what allows us to predict things in the world, to recognize predators and dangers, to take actions for our own benefit. There is no evidence for unconscious learning for anything with the slightest complexity.

That is why I would say that the process of consciousness and the process of learning are either very closely related or are, in fact, the same. Our conscious lives are an ongoing and continual process of discovery and learning. During sleep we apparently consolidate the learning of the day (and the previous weeks) saving what is new and useful and discarding the redundant. That is the evolutionary advantage consciousness provides.