Is all causation, in some way, mental causation?

[Sci Patel]

Obviously this is true if everything is a conscious entity or in consciousness, but I wonder if it holds even for those who want a non-Idealist account of reality.

Philosophers, and some scientists, speak of non-mental reality as being determined or random, by which they mean that when the relevant conditions are identical same thing always happens or mysteriously one thing out of a set of options is selected. But to say any reality where change happens is in actuality determined or random seems like the reifying of what is, in truth, just a projection of probability assignments? Determined events are modeled by functions with an input set and a known output set, random events are modeled with Random Variables where each outcome is given a portion of the expected probability.

Consider a unique event, say a metallic sphere appears suddenly between your face and the computer/phone screen. After startling you and allowing to apprehend its existence, it vanishes. Is this a determined event, or a random one? The only way to know would be for the performance to repeat, preferably a few hundred to a thousand times.

Yet even if you figured out enough about the causal priors that lead to this mini-miracle, and made the assignment of it being determined or random, that would give you no knowledge of its cause. And isn't this how physics works, observing events and making predictions, but saying little to nothing about cause. The equations are relations, but the relata - the thing in itself - is not known as per Smolin's Time Reborn:

"We don't know what a rock really is, or an atom, or an electron. We can only observe how they interact with other things and thereby describe their relational properties. Perhaps everything has external and internal aspects. The external properties are those that science can capture and describe - through interactions, in terms of relationships. The internal aspect is the intrinsic essence, it is the reality that is not expressible in the language of interactions and relations. Consciousness, whatever it is, is an aspect of the intrinsic essence of brains."

(Interesting how Consciousness and Causation concern relata, things of themselves, rather than relations...and that for the 1st Person POV decisions are always unique events due to memory...but this is not meant to be a (direct) post re: Free Will)

Digging deeper, we can see more about the missing causal picture by looking at the brute fact assertion that matter is bound by a supposed "Law of Nature". This concept seems like a nice way to explain why only certain things happen, but it actually is quite problematic as seen in Tablott's Do Physical Laws Make Things Happen? ->

The conviction that laws somehow give us a full accounting of events seems often to be based on the idea that they govern the world's substance or matter from outside, "making" things happen. If this is the case, however, then we must provide some way for matter to recognize and then obey these external laws. But, plainly, whatever supports this capacity for recognition and obedience cannot itself be the mere obedience. Anything capable of obeying wholly external laws is not only its obedience but also its capability, and this capability remains unexplained by the laws.

If, with so many scientists today, we construe laws as rules, we can put the matter this way: much more than rule-following is required of anything able to follow rules; conversely, no set of rules can by themselves explain the presence or functioning of that which is capable of following them.

It is, in other words, impossible to imagine matter that does not have some character of its own. To begin with, it must exist. But if it exists, it must do so in some particular manner, according to its own way of being. Even if we were to say, absurdly, that its only character is to obey external laws, this "law of obedience" itself could not be just another one of the external laws being obeyed. Something will be "going on" that could not be understood as obedience to law, and this something would be an essential expression of what matter was. To apprehend the world we would need to understand this expressive character in its own right, and we could never gain such an understanding solely through a consideration of external laws.

So we can hardly find coherence in the rather dualistic notion that physical laws reside, ghost-like, in some detached, abstract realm from which they impinge upon matter. But if, contrary to our initial assumption, we take laws to be in one way or another bound up with the world's substance — if we take them to be at least in part an expression of this substance — then the difficulty in the conventional view of law becomes even more intense. Surely it makes no sense to say that the world's material phenomena are the result — the wholly explained result — of matter obeying laws which it is itself busy expressing. In whatever manner we prefer to understand the material expression of the laws, this expression cannot be a matter of obedience to the laws being expressed! If whatever is there as the substance of the world at least in part determines the laws, then the laws cannot be said to determine what is there.

For Idealists Laws are mental entities binding other mental entities, so no real problem in terms of dualist interactionism. Coleridge in fact noted the mentality of laws and how they hinted at a mental component to all things:

“Long indeed will man strive to satisfy the inward queries with the phrase, 'laws of nature'. But though the individual may rest content with the seeming metaphor, the race cannot. If a law of nature be a mere generalization, it is included...as an an act of the mind. But if it be other and more, and yet manifestable only in and to an intelligent spirit, it must in act and substance be itself {mental}; for things utterly heterogeneous can have no intercommunion.”

For everyone else, and possibly at least some Idealists, there remains the question - if events cannot be bound by Laws of Nature, then for every observation where something happens we are left with a profound mystery, namely why didn't something else happen? One of the obvious places this crops up is in respect to the indeterminacy of particles as noted by Feynman & Penrose:

Try as we might to invent a reasonable theory that can explain how a photon “makes up its mind” whether to go through glass or bounce back, it is impossible to predict which way a given photon will go.

I am not going to explain how the photons actually “decide” whether to bounce back or go through; that is not known. (Probably the question has no meaning.)

-Feynman, QED

As we probed the deeper implications of Penrose’s theory about consciousness, it wasn’t always clear where to draw the line between the scientific and philosophical dimensions of his thinking. Consider, for example, superposition in quantum theory. How could Schrödinger’s cat be both dead and alive before we open the box? “

An element of proto-consciousness takes place whenever a decision is made in the universe,” he said. “I’m not talking about the brain. I’m talking about an object which is put into a superposition of two places. Say it’s a speck of dust that you put into two locations at once. Now, in a small fraction of a second, it will become one or the other. Which does it become? Well, that’s a choice. Is it a choice made by the universe? Does the speck of dust make this choice? Maybe it’s a free choice. I have no idea.”

-Penrose, from this interview

But this indeterminacy of state shoots through every event, not just the quantum ones, because seemingly "deterministic" events also leave hanging the question of why something else didn't happen. "Determinism" is merely a probability projection, not a true explanation of the causal sequences. We could speak of constraining forces, but what is a force but another term papering over a lack of causal understanding? "Force" is known by measurement of change, to say it explains change is to engage in circularity. See also "Energy".

Yet the indeterminacy must be resolved, because otherwise there would be none of the change which we observe. So possibilities must be selected for at the level of every event, and the only possibility selector we know of is our own mental causation.

Beyond that, if we consider consciousness and causality, we see the requirements of what is required for the latter to enable change is possessed by the former. This gets into the excellent work of Gregg Rosenberg, and excerpts of his book can be found here along with other supplementary materials. In short, causation needs effective properties and receptive properties. For a brick to go through a window, the brick has to have effective properties that the window is receptive to. But receptivity (Whitehead's prehension?) is very much akin to our experiencing, just as effectiveness mirrors our own causal will.

This isn't necessarily an argument for Panpsychicism with regards to Matter, or Monadic Idealism. Substances themselves don't need to be conscious, but Someone - or so it seems to me - has to make the decisions for what the ends - aka Final Causes - of any event are...

[Lou Gold]

Sci Patel,

Nice description of the dilemma.

I've been asserting via my recent posts that determinacy or indeterminacy (two stories packed with meanings) will most likely be found in the sociocultural context.

[Sci Patel]

Lou,

Definitely agree its contextual -> Determinism/Randomness is a story you tell yourself. It's an expression of confidence about the future, not a binding dichotomy on actual reality.

Besides that, for materialists/physicalists at least Determinism is just randomness of a special kind. Take away the "Laws of Physics" escape clause and they have no explanation for why a brick thrown at a window doesn't sometimes turn the window into a flock of butterflies, why a computer doesn't explode into glitter when running a certain program, etc...

[Lou Gold]

Sci,

Yes. However, the physicalists have a powerful story in context of occupants of physical bodies. When the student tells the master, "it's all consciousness" the master twists his nose and asks, "why did you say 'ouch'?" As an Idealist, what is the contextually compelling answer? My persistent rant (as an idealist) is that though a critique of physicalism is necessary, it is not sufficient.

[scurv...@aol.com]

Lou
Alan Watts spoke about the pain response being a kind of learned experience. Could past (subconscious) memories enfluence present pain response ?
Could Mind have imparted the oringinal pain response to manesfested minds for self preservation purposes as in removing ones hand from a hot stove top ?

[Sci Patel]

Lou,

 Totally agree criticism of physicalism is not in itself an adequate argument for idealism.

 However, I think physicalism having a Hard Problem of Consciousness, a Hard Problem of Matter (as Smolin asks, what is the electron beyond its relations), and a Hard Problem of Causation does show that a new onotology is needed. :-)

[Lou Gold]

scurv,

Sure. Sheldrake speaks of evolution's role in forming morphic fields and Hoffman speaks of the evolutionary survival choices benefitting adaptive behavior in the formation of alter consciousness.

Can it be transcended? Christ demonstrated it on His Way to the Cross. Buddhism suggests "pain is real but suffering is optional." Ramana Maharshi sat calmly as cancer ravished his body as his disciples looked on in horror. I know this truth in minor ways through participation in shamanic sacred rituals of ordeal. More generally, many people have demonstrated that it is possible to walk barefoot across ten meters of hot coals, provided there is trust. 

However, the Bodhisattva Vow of not attaining personal enlightenment until everyone does is a practical acknowledgement of the power of habits formed by evolutionary adaptation for survival. The acceptance of this leads one to focus on compassionate action to reduce suffering, which is why many now focus on the search for healing. More often than not, I find myself in this camp.

[Lou Gold]

Sci Patel,

I previously asserted that, just as there is a "hard problem" for the physicalist, there may also be one for the idealist. This may be a difficult leap for an ontologist but it's a turn-on for me. Can ontology pivot somehow from truth-seeking to way-showing?

How can humans maintain their balance upon the slippery earth? This situation and question jointly constitute the problematic which functions as the defining framework for Nahua philosophy. Morally, epistemologically, and aesthetically appropriate human activity are defined in terms of the goal of humans maintaining their balance upon the slippery earth. All human activities are to be directed towards this aim. At bottom, Nahua philosophy is essentially pragmatic.

Because of this I suggest Nahua philosophy is better understood as a "way-seeking" rather than as a "truth-seeking" philosophy. "Way-seeking" philosophies such as classical Taoism, classical Confucianism, and contemporary North American pragmatism adopt as their defining question, "What is the way?" or "What is the path?". In contrast, "truth-seeking" philosophies such as most European philosophies adopt as their defining question, "What is the truth?"

~James Maffie on Aztec Philosophy at https://www.iep.utm.edu/aztec/#SH2g

[Lou Gold]

To explore my question, I would search for a triune ontology of Truth, Goodness and Beauty -- Truth for Essence, Goodness for Relationship and Beauty for Meaning. Embracing the three with one model might be like a finger pointing to the three phases of the moon enclosed in the one and thus deliver alter existence from disorder to integration. Perhaps the Lady in the Moon will reveal Her story.

[Scott Roberts]

On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 9:24:32 AM UTC-10, Lou Gold wrote:

 Can ontology pivot somehow from truth-seeking to way-showing?

No. It is like the difference between science and engineering. Without engineering, nothing gets done. On the other hand, without science, engineering is haphazard and inefficient. So one needs both, but it is important to understand what the function is of both. Ontology, by sticking to truth-seeking (like good science), provides way-showing with a rational basis, allowing, for example, the ability to distinguish between superstition and useful practice.

 

[Lou Gold]

Scott,

So marvelously logical, but quite within the existing cultural consensus of physical "bridge-building" in a world largely disenchanted by virtue of the dominance of materialism. Another view, an increasingly broadly available option I believe, might be to build a bridge to the Imaginal Creativity as Becca Tarnas suggests, the "engineering" of which might be found along the path of the Archetypal Astrology of her father Richard Tarnas or via the Archetypal Psychology offered by James Hillman or via deep inner work with ayahuasca, which is profoundly archetypal. Jeremy Narby has asserted that there is profound wisdom in the shamanic approach that seems to me very present in the article on Aztec philosophy, which the author usefully describes as both similar to and very different from the European philosophical tradition. The Aztec test favors the more pragmatic "what works" over the more abstract "what's logical" although at some level both dimensions are probably present. I believe this might be why BK, in the most recent interview with Jeffrey Mishlove, says that the next deep work of consciousness will probably be via depth psychology.  But (I should say, BUT) such approaches may be quite limiting of the enormous human power unleashed by the materialist separatist view and therein lies the rub.

Perhaps, the elitist view (and I mean that descriptively rather than politically) of the evolution of knowledge and wisdom may itself be in a process of transformation. For example, the Brazilian anthropologist Fernando LaRoque has described Santo Daime as movement from the earlier form of individually specialized shamanism toward a more collective shamanism in which anyone can receive the teachings via revealed hymns, which are then incorporated into the common ritual practice.

I don't know if anyone here at the forum disagrees with the article I've linked but the Copernican Revolution has often been touted as an example of how a paradigm shift might change our practical world. Perhaps, too loosely touted, I suspect, and that's why I posted this article.

[Lou Gold]

Scott,

My error! Somehow, I looped in an old dialogue between us about the need to make sure the bridge does not collapse. But you did not introduce it here. However, I hope you grok my main drift that a new kind of ontology, science and technology might be necessary to travel back and forth between here and "the other shore." 

My hope is as I stated,...

To explore my question, I would search for a triune ontology of Truth, Goodness and Beauty -- Truth for Essence, Goodness for Relationship and Beauty for Meaning. Embracing the three with one model might be like a finger pointing to the three phases of the moon enclosed in the one and thus deliver alter existence from disorder to integration. Perhaps the Lady in the Moon will reveal Her story.

[Scott Roberts]

On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 4:23:37 PM UTC-10, Lou Gold wrote:

My hope is as I stated,...

To explore my question, I would search for a triune ontology of Truth, Goodness and Beauty -- Truth for Essence, Goodness for Relationship and Beauty for Meaning. Embracing the three with one model might be like a finger pointing to the three phases of the moon enclosed in the one and thus deliver alter existence from disorder to integration. Perhaps the Lady in the Moon will reveal Her story.

Well, my two main influences are Coleridge (as interpreted in Barfield's What Coleridge Thought) and Nishida Kitaro (as interpreted in Wargo's The Logic of Nothingness). Coleridge famously put Imagination as a central feature of his philosophy, so he was hardly ignoring Beauty. Nishida's first book was called An Inquiry into the Good. And in his later "logic of place", he gives an elaborate 3 by 3 developmental structure in which one axis, so to speak, is, at the highest level, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, going upwards in that order.

But at the end of the day, an ontology is just a philosophical text, which is to say, a product of a truth-seeking endeavor. What else can it be? 

[Lou Gold]

Yeah! I'm clearly out of the box(es).

But at the end of the day, an ontology is just a philosophical text, which is to say, a product of a truth-seeking endeavor. What else can it be?

It can be a bridge for the "dissociated disorder" to arrive at the "integrated diversity", a bridge into the imaginal creativity and more. Perhaps the bridge will have no name but if found I know it will be traveled often.  

[Scott Roberts]

On Wednesday, February 27, 2019 at 12:05:23 PM UTC-10, Lou Gold wrote:

It [ontology] can be a bridge for the "dissociated disorder" to arrive at the "integrated diversity", a bridge into the imaginal creativity and more. Perhaps the bridge will have no name but if found I know it will be traveled often.  

There are thousands of books describing such bridges. It is not ontology's job to write another one. Instead, it is ontology's job to provide a theory which (if it is an idealist/nondualist ontology) indicate, for those who need such an indication, why such bridges might lead somewhere.

 

[Lou Gold]

OK! It sounds to me like ontology's job might be dissociated.

[Lou Gold]

The name of the bridge is reality.