Thanks for reporting. I believe this is due to restrictions placed on the iframe by the tool that generates its markup. The password protection feature relies on cookies to work properly, and when the iframe is sandboxed in a way that prevents setting cookies, the behaviour you describe might appear.
Django does not store raw (clear text) passwords on the user model, but onlya hash (see documentation of how passwords are managed for full details). Because of this, do not attempt tomanipulate the password attribute of the user directly. This is why a helperfunction is used when creating a user.
These permissions will be created when you run manage.py migrate; the first time you run migrate after addingdjango.contrib.auth to INSTALLED_APPS, the default permissionswill be created for all previously-installed models, as well as for any newmodels being installed at that time. Afterward, it will create defaultpermissions for new models each time you run manage.py migrate (the function that creates permissions is connected to thepost_migrate signal).
When you have both django.contrib.admin and django.contrib.authinstalled, the admin provides a convenient way to view and manage users,groups, and permissions. Users can be created and deleted like any Djangomodel. Groups can be created, and permissions can be assigned to users orgroups. A log of user edits to models made within the admin is also stored anddisplayed.
User passwords are not displayed in the admin (nor stored in the database), butthe password storage details are displayed.Included in the display of this information is a link toa password change form that allows admins to change user passwords.
When I embed a private model in a wordpress blog with the sketchfab plugin i am asked for the password as expected, but when i enter the correct password and press Enter or click on Ok nothing seems to happen.
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A Post to =0&autospin=&controls=1&transparent= is made and returns Statuscode 200 but im still presented with the input box where i can enter the password:
This is not the case when i have a regular embeded viewer (via oembed). What is funny however is, that setting the password seems to work. Because as soon as i open the same password protected model in another browser tab in a regular ebmbeded viewer it shows the model. So i suppose the auth cookies have been set. Once i have seen the model in the second tab i can reload the first tab (with the wordpress plugin) and the model is showing.
@print_your_mind it seems this has to do with certain browser settings blocking third party cookies. Could you try this: visit sketchfab.com first, then return to your page and enter the password. Does that unlock it?
Tries to authenticate username with password by callingUser.check_password. If no usernameis provided, it tries to fetch a username from kwargs using thekey CustomUser.USERNAME_FIELD. Returns anauthenticated user or None.
It would be great to have the opportunity to lock models with a password, so that without password it is not possible to make any changes on the model or/an it is impossible to measure the models dimensions. I am an engineere designing my projects in SketchUp; I would like to give my clients the models but want to prevent that they can measure everything out and start to analyse and copy my designs. Maybe it would be valaubale if Trimble is making an password lock in SketchUp 2016.
Read-Only Mode and/or Encrypted-Read-Only Modes would be fantastic, for sure. Clients and collaborators are becoming increasingly adamant that they have our SU models, which is causing issues when they start making changes.
With Flash, it's possible to read the contents of the clipboard, so there's a small opportunity there where passwords might be leaked. (Though JavaScript has access to the clipboard, it can't read the contents without the user selecting paste.)
This is, of course, opinion-based, because I'm not a KeePass developer, but my belief is that the only reason there exists the other method to input a password (i.e. keyboard emulation) has nothing to do with threat models.
The main purpose of keyboard emulation is most likely to overcome those outdated (or, in some cases, braindead) enterprise policies which prevent password paste (in direct violation of NIST guidelines on passwords). Here's an example.
Second, I have the app on my phone and cannot sign in. I do not remember my password. I want to change it and am having serious trouble doing that. It takes me to another URL that never gets me to a "change passwrod" screen.
2. the password recovery feature has a flaw. that flaw? if you didn't set it up, it still asks the questions but there isn't a right answer. So if it wasn't setup, you don't know the password, or you don't know the answers to the questions, then to get back into the extender, you'd need to factory reset it. that gets you back to the default login and password.
Whenever a Windows application wants to do something requiring administrator privileges, my screen goes black and a prompt comes up, asking if I want to grant administrator privileges. I understand this security model: it relies on the user having control over the keyboard and mouse. Privileges go to whoever has control of input. If an application gains control of input while the security prompt is up, then it gains control of administrator privileges, even if it doesn't know my password.
In contrast, on Linux, the sudo command is the equivalent. When an application requests privileges, it prompts me to enter in my password. Thus, stealing input is insufficient to gain full privileges; an application must steal my password instead. However, I do not understand this model. It seems that this model just makes it easy to steal my credentials, because I am giving out my password constantly. What's stopping a malicious application from putting up a fake prompt and stealing my password, thus gaining privileges forever?
If you happen to be do this all on a virtual machine, and in particular using vagrant, then you would typically be logged in as user-name "vagrant" which, by default will have a password of "vagrant".
Sorry it is not working. The "Enter Password" prompt is coming from the kim-api-v1-collections-managment utility, which uses what you enter to do various "sudo xxxx" commands. So, it should be the user account password that is needed... What does the utility say after you enter a password?
Sorry it is not working. The "Enter Password" prompt is coming from the
kim-api-v1-collections-managment utility, which uses what you enter to do
various "sudo xxxx" commands. So, it should be the user account password that
is needed... What does the utility say after you enter a password?
New to BW and password managers. To help me set up my account with the right balance of security/usability, it would help to better understand how BW security features (such as the master password and login email) relate to threat models. To start, I would like some advice regarding the choice of a master password/passphrase and my login email account:
(2) You questions about master password security are good ones - the strength of that password determines how likely it would be for someone to hack your secrets if they were able to obtain your encrypted vault (e.g., data breach at Bitwarden or someone hacks your computer and finds an encrypted backup). My personal opinion is that you must have a unique and un-guessable password so that a hacker would need to use brute-force methods to find your password. If you make that password at least 13 characters long using a combination of upper & lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters, it is highly unlikely that a hacker could brute-force it in your lifetime. Below is a good chart that illustrates this:
So how strong should my master password be to prevent such a leaked vault from being cracked using brute force, dictionary attacks, and other sophisticated cracking strategies? How much time would be required per attempt, given the 200,000 PBKDF2 iterations that would have to be performed for each candidate?
However, the table in this 1password blog post suggests that with 1,000 PBKDF2 iterations, using a GPU-based cracking tool, a 77-bit passphrase would require 3.5 billion years to crack. Since Bitwarden uses 200,000 iterations, this is equivalent to a 7-bit increase in entropy (log2200 = 7.6) compared to cracking the same passphrase iterated only 1,000 times. Thus, a 6-word passphrase seems like overkill.
If you make that password at least 13 characters long using a combination of upper & lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters, it is highly unlikely that a hacker could brute-force it in your lifetime. Below is a good chart that illustrates this:
Your 1Password account password is your defense in case your data is stolen from your devices. We wanted to know just how much effort an attacker needs to put in to crack an account password, so we invited people to try. After paying out more than...
CODEpassphrase Note This calculator assumes the passphrase was randomly generated by a computer. Avoid picking your own master password, let a computer do it for you. It also assumes you're not reusing this passphrase anywhere else; you should...
The login email must be associated with your vault, because it is used as a salt in the hashing algorithm that allows your master password to protect the encryption key that is used to encrypt and decrypt your vault.
Most web applications provide a way for users to reset their forgotten passwords. Rather than forcing you to re-implement this by hand for every application you create, Laravel provides convenient services for sending password reset links and secure resetting passwords.
Note
Want to get started fast? Install a Laravel application starter kit in a fresh Laravel application. Laravel's starter kits will take care of scaffolding your entire authentication system, including resetting forgotten passwords.