Chicken Gun Private Server Download
Mina Spartin
I get that, at least notionally, the root servers handle ., and hand off .com., .gov., whatever to the right servers (though in practice this is all cached several levels down), but at some point, somebody has to know to ask the server at 216.239.32.10 for the A record of whatever.google.com. But how did resolvers figure that out in the first place, since you need to know the A of the NS to do that? (And for that matter, since we know it's an Internet NS and not, say, Chaos or something, why do you have to use a name rather than an address for the NS record?)
My nameservers have always had names that could be found by somebody upstream (eg, I hosted DNS for bar.com on foo.com, and my upstream handled foo.com), but I have never quite grasped how people like Google get over the chicken and egg problem of hosting the DNS for google.com under the name google.com.
For example, if the authoritative name server for example.org is ns1.example.org, a computer trying to resolve www.example.org first resolves ns1.example.org. Since ns1 is contained in example.org, this requires resolving example.org first, which presents a circular dependency. To break the dependency, the name server for the top level domain org includes glue along with the delegation for example.org. The glue records are address records that provide IP addresses for ns1.example.org. The resolver uses one or more of these IP addresses to query one of the domain's authoritative servers, which allows it to complete the DNS query.
In order to grab its configuration and its private certificate safely, the machine which boots through PXE should therefore already have a certificate that it could use when communicating with Apache server. This, however, doesn't look possible, as a machine which boots from PXE is either fresh new, or will format its disk anyway during the installation.
Everytime a host needs to be (re)provisioned, a short lived token gets generated and it's kept on the database coupled to the host. This token goes into an iso file with the ipxe binary and a script that downloads the kicstart file from the provisioning host only if it offers the right token as identifier. Once the host is provisioned, the token gets deleted. After a specific (tunable, out of the top of my head defaults to 60 minutes) the token is invalidated.
I want to encrypt the uploaded files to protect the data at rest while allowing the files to be shared by people who do not know the encryption password. The uploaded files are owned by the company that they belong too not by the user who uploads them.
To me this seems to be more secure than just storing the files on the server unecrypted a hacker who steals a copy of the data would not be able to read the files, since they would have to figure out the clear text passwords of the users before they could get at the user's private key.
The problem is dealing with password rests, since the users private key is encrypted with the users password if the user forgets their password and does a password reset they would loose their private key and thus access to the files they uploaded. Since I need to have a password rest feature in the application I am into a chicken and egg scenarios because how do I safely store the private keys of the users without end result being less secure than doing nothing?
With the assumption that an adversary control your system to the point of being able to read the RAM containing secret keys, you won't be able to define a secure system. The closest thing to a real practical solution is to bring in a trusted execution environment. HSMs (not the standard PKCS#11 breed, the programmable ones) can do that, and might allow you to be safe from a compromise of the rest of your system (with one important vulnerability that needs a fix: you should not "return the clear text of the file to the user", but instead encipher it for that user using a session key, all within the trusted execution environment). Smart Cards (again programmable, including Java Cards) could work in theory, but throughput considerations will most likely prevent doing the bulk of data encryption this way.
Notice that no matter what, the data can't be safe from the leakage of the credentials of any user that can access it, and this is likely to be a practical weakness offsetting vulnerabilities of the server. It might be possible to fix that partially, by limiting the amount of data a single user can obtain, or/and using a Smart Card on the user side.
However, let's step back and think about what a "password reset" really accomplishes. Basically, it's a mechanism that allows users to prove their identity and access their data using some proof of identity other than their usual password. For example, in the case of a password reset e-mail, the proof of identity is effectively access to a predesignated e-mail account, to which the password reset code is sent.
(There are various fundamental security concerns with that, as with most "password reset" schemes, but I'll ignore those for now and assume that having a password reset mechanism has been found necessary and desirable, and that the only issue is how to implement it. I do strongly recommend that the user should be able to opt out of any such mechanism in advance, if they wish to do so in order to minimize the attack surface for their account.)
So, instead of having the server send the user a single-use password reset code after the user has forgotten their password (which is impossible in this case), you could allow the user to request one in advance, to be saved in case they need it later. Indeed, you could even send one automatically (unless the user explicitly opts out) as part of the signup process, and resend a new one whenever the previous one has been used.
What should this back-up key contain, then? Well, obviously it needs to allow the server to access the user's internal key, just like a normal password would. It probably should not be the user's normal password, though, or anything related to it, just to avoid concerns about password reuse. Also, if you want the back-up key to be single-use, it should not simply be a copy of the internal key either.
One simple solution would be to just generate a random password (of sufficient length), encrypt the internal key with the password, save the encrypted key at the server and send the password to the user as their back-up key. Then the only difference between this back-up key and the user's normal password would be the actions the server takes when the user logs in with the back-up key (typically, request a new password, generate and send a new back-up key, and replace the old ones so that they can't be used again).
is actually yes. Simply store two copies of each private key - one encrypted with the user's password and one encrypted with the administrator's public key. Since "The uploaded files are owned by the company", there is no privacy issue with the fact the administrator can access all the uploaded files.
There is two advantages by using domain passwords (corp ldap). First every user will follow any company security policy (password requirements, password changes, etc). Secondly users changing their domain password will not interfere with users stored private key. Users can renew their password without affecting the system. Decryption only require a reauthentication.
Some might question admins access to the system password and that hey can access any encrypted data. You are of course right. The solution is not design to keep admins away. Admins/developers can assess everything anyways.
The best would of course be if all users could handle their public and private keys in a safe manner on the outside of the application. Lets face it. That would probably be a complete failure with missing keys and keys saved in every digital corner. Still admins would be able to intercept the private key whenever entered by users. The system can be seen as more vulnerable by having private keys stored in the database and the system password in memory at runtime but giving keys to all our users would probably be a greater security threat. Also it's an intranet application behind more firewalls and crypto units than I can count for.
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Stopped in for dinner with a colleague on a Tuesday evening - wow were they busy! A bustling atmosphere make the refreshing cocktails go down easy. We enjoyed the mussels - a full pound with delicious broth and crusty bread to soak it up...
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