On Mon, 2010-01-11 at 11:04 -0500, Dennis Putnam wrote:I want to enforce TLS but I don't care what certificate the receiveruses. Thanks.
Apart from the fact that enforcing TLS with SMTP is usually a bad idea,
setting the
smtp_tls_security_level = encrypt
should usually do what you mean, enforce TLS with the remote SMTP
server, but accept untrusted certs or even those with a wrong name.
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Cheers,
Chris.
Why is TLS w/ SMTP a bad idea?
--
Noah Sheppard
Assistant Computer Resource Manager
Taylor University CSE Department
nshe...@cse.taylor.edu
TLS with SMTP is a fine idea.
*Enforcing* TLS with SMTP is usually a bad idea. Many sites might not
support it, and if you require TLS, you cannot get their mail nor
send to them.
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Postfix client TLS settings are described in
http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html#client_tls
For a general-purpose MTA the main.cf setting should be "none"
or "may". To force encryption for a specific recipient
domain, see
http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html#client_tls_policy
If your mail is deferred due to certificate errors, this
implies you're using a security level above "encrypt". Don't
do that unless you have the proper root certificates installed.
If you need more help, please refer to
http://www.postfix.org/DEBUG_README.html#mail
and show us your "postconf -n" output, any related policy map
contents, and related logging.
-- Noel Jones
According to the example in
http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html#client_tls_policy
the policy table should contain
somedomain.tld encrypt
To include subdomains of somedomain.tld also include
.somedomain.tld encrypt
-- Noel Jones
> According to the example in
> http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html#client_tls_policy
> the policy table should contain
>
> somedomain.tld encrypt
>
> To include subdomains of somedomain.tld also include
>
> .somedomain.tld encrypt
And only when one's transport table or relayhost specifies a
nexthop of the form:
does the TLS policy table need an entry of the same form:
[gateway.example.com] encrypt|secure|fingerprint ...
For "[gateway]" nexthops there is no real difference between "secure"
and "verify", both test for the same nexthop address, unless "match"
values are specified explicitly.
In retrospect, it an interface design error to provide both levels,
just one would have been enough, with backwards compatibility for
tls_per_site provided via different "match" values for "verify" not a
different security level. Both, verify certificates using a slightly
different default set of match values. :-( The "damage" is fairly minor...
--
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