In message <
0F3F9E7A-F0DA-400A...@valo.at>
As in "smtpd_sasl_auth_enable = no".
> --
> Christian
Plain and login AUTH are particularly dangerous since they send
passwords in the clear. See if you can find another method:
http://cyrusimap.web.cmu.edu/sasl/authentication_mechanisms.html
http://wiki.dovecot.org/Authentication/Mechanisms
With AUTH PLAIN LOGIN and no TLS, anyone logging in over public WiFi
(or non-switched ethernet, where such a thing still exists) is
exposing their user ID and password to others snooping on the WiFi.
That could be really bad for people who use the same password for
everything (terrible practice but all too common).
btw- Even with TLS, unless client certs are used anyone can connect
and try brute force password guessing, which is what appears to be
happenning. When presented with STARTTLS and no AUTH most attacks
just go away and don't keep retrying.
I suggest that if it won't break clients (if they can use TLS) use
"smtpd_tls_security_level = yes" on port 587 (which implies
"smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes"). Use "smtpd_sasl_auth_enable = no" on
port 25 even if it means clients have to change configs. Plus set
smtp_sasl_mechanism_filter to something more reasonable if it doesn't
break clients to do so (and/or change mech_list in cyrus sasl conf).
For example "smtpd_sasl_security_options = noanonymous, noplaintext".
Client certs would be nice but a large number of client certs can be a
headache to keep track of and hard to get into user's client MUAs.
Filters limiting access to port 587 can then be applied a lot more
strickly than filters on port 25 could be.
Curtis