Ihave 100% Isaac (twice) prior to repentance coming out. Still do daily runs (not every day not) and watch a lot of Isaac content. I've been excited for repentance to come to PS5. The way i see it, the DLC adds so much content that its bascially a new game. With that in mind i think i will tackle the DLC on PS4 first, then buy the PS5 version and start all over again. (by which time the price might have dropped from 50). Just interested if thats what the majority of players will be doing too?
Quick update, played it last night, died three times???? They have definately made some subtle changes, patterns, shot speed of enemies etc, tough to break that 1000hr+ muscle memory. Did unlock Bethany though :-)
Long framed by her critics as a pedantic prcieuse,Scudry has only recently attracted the interest ofprofessional philosophers. Critics have dismissed her lengthy novelsas unreadable, her famous Saturday salon as amateurish, and herphilosophical ideas as derivative and confused. In the recent feministexpansion of the canon of humanities, however, another Scudryhas appeared. In this reevaluation, the philosophical significance ofher writings has emerged. Her literary corpus presents a novel versionof the ancient philosophical method of dialogue; it also expressesoriginal, sophisticated theories concerning the ethical, aesthetic,and theological disputes of early modernity.
Born in Le Havre on November 15, 1607, Madeleine de Scudry wasborn into a minor Norman aristocratic family, often dismissed asbourgeois by her critics. Her later efforts to conquer thearistocratic and court society of Paris often appeared tied toinsecurity concerning her familial rank. Orphaned at the age of six,Scudry entered into the care of her uncle, an ecclesiastic whoprovided her with an extensive education. She studied reading,writing, drawing, painting, music, and dancing. She receivedinstruction in the practical arts of medicine, agriculture, anddomestic economy. Her most notable achievement was mastery of Spanishand Italian; the domestic library featured numerous volumes written ineach language. A voracious reader, she discovered the epic serialnovels which would become her preferred literary genre as an author.Scudry also began her philosophical initiation with thereading of Montaigne, who would influence her later sympathy withskepticism, and Plutarch (in the French translation by Jacques Amyot),who introduced her to the Stoic philosophy of reason, will, andvirtue.
One of the more unusual genres invented by Scudry is therhetorical oration used in Illustrious Women or HeroicHarangues (1642). In this series of discourses by famous women,Scudry creates fictitious diatribes pronounced by powerfulwomen in a moment of crisis, often on the verge of death. Prominentcharacters include Cleopatra and Sappho. Many of the haranguescriticize the reduction of women to silence by political oppressionand the need for women to express themselves forcefully through spokenand written speech. Placed in the mouths of socially prominent women,the orations also defend the right of women to exercise politicalauthority.
This argument will go on forever. The problem is so complicated. Anyresolution of it is beyond the power of the human mind. The resultwill always be an unstable mixture of half-truths and unanticipateddifficulties. This problem arises because philosophers generally tryto say something new rather than saying something true. [EM,1: 211]
True magnanimity as I consider it is a good opinion of oneself,founded on reason and on the solid merit of one who aspires to greatthings and contemns the petty. One cannot be truly magnanimous if onedoes not esteem oneself as much as is proper in comparison to thingsbeneath oneself. [CN, 1: 70]
Concerning our superiors, we do not exercise discretion; rather, weexpress respect. Concerning our inferiors, we do not exercisediscretion; rather, we exercise goodness and indulgence, especiallywhen we abstain from doing something pleasing to us but displeasing tothem. [MM, 2: 613]
Just as gossip damages court society, the discretion of the courtierstrengthens it. The variations on the exercise of discretion reflectthe stratification of the aristocratic society for whichScudry writes.
Kindness is the most essential quality for women. It reinforces thecharm of their beauty and of their mind. In fact, kindness is sonecessary for them that they cannot be admirable without possessing itin an eminent degree. [CN, 1: 233]
Ladies have glory when their mind exceeds their beauty and when theyhave so much moral merit that one can still love them when they havelost everything that made them physically beautiful. [CN, 2:563]
Notwithstanding the authentic moral value possessed by the naturalvirtues of classical antiquity, Christianity has elevated the naturalvalues through the work of grace. Modesty is exemplary. The properlyChristian virtue of humility has refined the generic virtue ofmodesty.
Although Scudry evinces little interest in the properlytheological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, she repeatedlyemphasizes the purifying role of grace in the transition from pagan tocontemporary Christian exercises of virtue.
Kindness, which is a peaceful and pleasant virtue, one necessary forsociety and rightly admired, becomes a vice if it lacks certainlimits. This virtue is different from others. There is only one sortof justice and there is only sort of generosity and of wisdom;however, there are a hundred sorts of kindnesses. [CDS, 1: 320]
In several dialogues Scudry examines the psychology animatingthe moral life. This psychology consists primarily of the interplaybetween personal temperament, largely determined by biologicalfactors, and the personal exercise of free will. In this theory,temperament shapes the moral tone of a particular personality butmoral character rests largely on how a moral agent exercises his orher personal freedom.
The variations in human personality derive largely from the differenttemperaments human beings possess. Contrasting temperaments conceivepain and pleasure in divergent ways; judgments concerning the worth ofa particular action or object naturally vary.
The humors often carry the mind away and seduce it according to theircaprices. This is what accounts for the great diversity of sentimentsamong the most reasonable people. Without the humors, all reasonablepeople would like equally everything meriting to be liked, whether inthe sciences, in the arts, or in simple pleasures. In fact, differenttemperaments, which reflect different humors, tend to prefer differentobjects, despite the weight of reason. This is what explains thisvariety of emotional inclinations of which society is full.[CN, 2: 458]
This differential in humor explains how equally rational human agentscan have very different experiences of and judgments concerning thesame external object or activity. It also explains the unusual powerof moods, such as ennui, on the moral perception and decisions of thehuman person.
We are born with the inclinations which heaven was pleased to give us,but we enter into the possession of praise or blame only at the momentwe begin to act through reason. Up to this point, nothing is truly upto us; after that point, we are responsible for everything we do,whether good or evil. Therefore, it is up to us to see whatinclinations we should follow and those we should change. Having knownthe true path of glory and virtue, we should walk in it despite allthe repugnance we might find within ourselves. [CN, 1: 319]
Excessive anger is the ordinary fault of all weak people. Asrepentance is the greatest manifestation of human reason, it isnecessary from the earliest moments to habituate oneself to overcome apassion which is practically always followed and which makes thebearer of it hated and despised. [MM, 1: 359]
Rather than abolishing the passions, a morally mature reasontransforms them. In the case of a choleric temperament, the flames ofanger are transformed into the sentiments of restraint, remorse, andrepentance for the damage inflected by excessive anger.
Many claims to knowledge are so doubtful that one can easily endorseskepticism as the proper position concerning knowledge itself. Theexperience of error and subsequent correction reveals how thin are thefoundations of all noetic claims.
I think sometimes that everything is so doubtful that one can onlysupport one position concerning knowledge. If I had to establish onesect in this area, I would like to start one where it would bepermitted to doubt everything. The one exception would be the thingsof religion. [CN, 1: 167]
Of Incertitude explores the psychological sources of thiswidespread doubt and error. Subjective emotions and social customconstitute major obstacles to the disinterested use of reason in thequest for objective knowledge.
Like Montaigne and Descartes, Scudry emphasizes how socialcustom can easily induce the noetic agent into error. But she alsostresses how the more interior and elusive powers of temperament andemotion can color noetic judgment and block the agent from objectiveperception of the external world.
Another limit to noetic certitude arises from the experiential natureof human knowledge. One can only know an object well through personalexperience of it. But personal experience entails an irreduciblesubjectivity of perception.
Experience is good for everything. Without it we would have only themost imperfect knowledge of anything. In my opinion, the only thing wecannot actually experience is death, because we can only die once.Consequently, we cannot know it very well. [EM, 1: 248]
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