Gilson on Being and Some Philosophers

[Doug Mounce]

Happy Sunday All!

I just wanted to mention how much I am enjoying reading Gilson.  He is an expert at making his understanding seem simple, and then drawing this reader in deeper with the feeling that there are dangers here.  I regret that I neglected this study for so long simply because Lonergan was not inclined to recommend him.  Thanks to Hugh for that, but I can see by Gilson's style why Lonergan, in Verbum, made the reference in the way that he did.  In any case, I found it interesting that Gilson makes reference to, "the first whence and the last whither of the whole cosmic procession, in the second paragraph of his preface.

PS - still following discussion of Spirit in World.  I hope to hear more about his understanding of sensibility. 

~/

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[Hugh Williams]

Doug et al,

What is the reference to Gilson by Lonergan in Verbum of which you speak below? Where is it to be found? I looked but could not find any of significance …

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As for Rahner’s understanding of sensibility … this is a much more involved topic. Nonetheless, I’m finding his treatment pretty amazing. Not an easy undertaking as you know. But after several attempts at it, I’ve achieved a bit of a break through to where I’m understanding some of what he is up to a little better.

We can recall Lonergan’s Verbum Ch 2 on Judgment p.72 where he says that it is only in judgment that intellect both attains correspondence to its object but also reflects upon and assures that similitude. But then Lonergan presents us with the classic epistemological puzzle of representation, of which Thomas is largely thought to avoid the dilemma by admitting a standard or representation in judgment that is neither the thing in itself nor its representation in the mind, but rather a matter of intellectual principle which Lonergan says he will discuss later.

My complaint is that I do not find Lonergan actually discussing this ‘puzzle’ in any satisfactory manner, whereas Rahner in this section on Sensibility, Ch.2, especially at pp.85-91, lays out his interpretation of Thomas’ way of ‘avoiding the dilemma’. It is a treatment that goes to the heart of many discussions held here on this list about so-called naïve realism versus so-called critical realism, and as to which position might be more faithful to Thomas. Rahner does not seem to have any problem with Thomas’ so-called ‘naïve realism’ because he says that when one finally comes to understand and appreciate its fundamental metaphysical presuppositions then one will see that he is more critical than any critical realism.

Rahner attempts to articulate these presuppositions in this way –

• 1)     In external sense perception there is an (impressed) species; but this as such is not what is perceived.
• 2)     External perception forms no expressed species, so that the object is apprehended in its immediate, real self.
• 3)     An object can be apprehended immediately in its own self, that is, be intuited, only if it is in its own actuality an actuality of knowing itself.

Rahner admits that these statements all have different origins in Thomas’ corpus and so they may appear contradictory. Nonetheless, these statements have to be taken into account together where one begins to recognize how they mutually clarify one another yielding some rather amazing insights upon which Rahner proceeds to elaborate.

Just to give one example - when I am told of, and come to recognize the metaphysical origins of the third statement, i.e. its origins as pertains especially to Thomas’ very complex metaphysics of knowledge, and Rahner’s difficult discussion and development of this principle in CH 1 on Foundation, I find I do have to revise or reassess my presumptuous criticisms of that Chapter. It may very well be that we do not have another sophisticated modern subjectivism in Rahner, of which I am, with Gilson very suspicious, and in fact we may very well have here in SiW an extraordinary effort to overcome the underlying ‘subject-object’ dualism-dichotomy of the original epistemological puzzle referred to by Lonergan in Verbum.

And again, I would indicate that Rahner is gradually approaching in this extraordinary text, as near as I can tell, his first textual treatment of Thomas’ utilization of his elusive notion of esse, and he does so here in relation to sensible species.

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And if I can editorialize on this adventure in catholic thought, ... if nothing else, I see more clearly how Rahner, along with Johannes Metz, who provides the ‘forward’ to this amazing text, may have provided the philosophical-theological justification, or perhaps grounding, for Liberation Theology’s renewed and refreshed theological appreciation of, and for, the material conditions of people’s lives … something that is again much needed … but actually in these times quite hard to come by in any realistic sense in so many religious circles ...

So, it seems to me

Hugh  

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[Doug Mounce]

Hi Hugh and All, 

I got the impression that Lonergan's formal reference to "M." Gilson [Epilogue, Imago Dei, page 226, Robert Mollot Collection] was a bit sarcastic (in the way Gilson sometimes refers to scholars who exclusively pursue ideals of universal scope).  It may be that Lonergan was genuine in asking for, "some historian of the stature of M. Gilson to describe the historical experiment."  I interpreted that as secondary to Lonergan's aim of "settling a preliminary fact" of Aquinas' central psychology.  In other words, now that Lonergan has identified the principle, Gilson could follow and backfill the history that Lonergan doesn't have time to do!

I see now in the footnote that the editors only interpret respect:

"h historical experiment: Gilson in The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New
York: Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. vi, had called the philosophies he studied
there 'a series of concrete philosophical experiments'; Lonergan had had a
fascination with history since the 1930s, and it was natural for him to latch
onto this phrase in Gilson; in his review of Gilson's Being and Some Philosophers
he speaks of those 'who can learn a lesson from the experiments conducted
by history'; and in Insight he referred again to 'what M. Gilson would call the
experiment of history in ancient, medieval and modern philosophy' (p. 15).
[226]"

The first reference to Gilson in Verbum is on my page 62 in a footnote about the Scotus rejection of insight into phantasm, and a conceptualism that allowed Kant to assert his synthetic a priori judgments.

"the Aristotelian and the Thomist positions both consider the Kantian
assumption of purely discursive intellect to be false and, indeed, to be false,
not as a point of theory, but as a matter of fact. While M. Gilson (Archives d 'his-

toire doctrinaleet littéraire moyen âge l [1926] 6-128; 2 [1927] 89-149; 4 [1929]
5-149) has done splendid work on Scotist origins, there is needed an explana-
tion of Scotist influence [Gilson's articles: 'Pourquoi saint Thomas a critique
saint Augustin,' 'Avicenne et le point de depart de Duns Scotus,' and 'Les
sources Greco-Arabes de l'augustinisme Avicennisant']."

~/

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[Hugh Williams]

Doug et al,

I've always sensed that Lonergan had a general respect for Gilson's work

but that he does grow impatient with Gilson's firm and stubborn focus on Thomas'

metaphysics and his existentialist interpretation of this metaphysics.

It especially becomes tense for Lonergan over what is to have priority -

the epistemology (psychology) or the metaphysics (ontology).

and then you and I both know that when one gets entangled/absorbed in these complex questions

especially this one of trying to account for human knowledge there are these 'plaguing difficulties'

that arise and that continue to puzzle at least some of us ...

if fact as I indicated the philosophical questions of species and of matter were with Gilson until his final days ...

Hugh

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[Pierre Whalon]

I think it is important to note that Lonergan wasn’t working in isolation though he has a very original slant. He also admired Rahner though it is not so apparent that he returned the favor. 

Pierre

Envoyé depuis la toute nouvelle application AOL pour iOS

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[Hugh Williams]

Doug, Pierre, et al,

Reading Karl Rahner’s ‘Spirit in the World’: A Strange Report
I am continuing to read Rahner’s ‘Spirit in the World’ (SiW) and yes I’ve experienced a breakthrough of sorts. This, of course, does not mean that I now find the text an easy read. It is easier in some sense but not easy at all.
The strangest thought occurred to me in trying to communicate on what is involved in reading a text such as this. And I seek some analogy to express it …. There is a similarity in reading Rahner’s SiW to my first experience in being introduced to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. This was about 1970 in my early years at university. Kant’s text first appeared about 1787; this means my first attempt to read it (with the guidance of an able teacher) was nearly 200 years following its first appearance.
In the case of Rahner’s text SiW, it first appeared about 1957. This means that in 2024/25 I’m engaged in reading it only about 50 years after its first appearance.
So, in the matter of relative appearances among philosophical texts and the relative recognition of their respective importance, I think we can easily see by way of this analogy that recognizing the significance of Rahner’s achievement is at best in its early stages. At least this is the case in ‘my world’.
To try to get before people some sense of the significance of this text, at least in catholic circles (and perhaps beyond) I have spoken of how I see Rahner providing the philosophical-theological basis for Liberation Theology. Ratzinger certainly saw this and this is why in his ‘contrary’ moments he had Rahner in his sights as someone to be opposed theologically in certain key aspects. (In my view this was, in the Catholic world, a terrible mistake …)
In a more constructive light and pertaining to what remains of our efforts here to wrestle with this extraordinary theological text, I would offer that in some respects reading Rahner’s CH 2 on Sensibility can help one to better appreciate what Rahner is trying to do in CH 1 Foundation.
And the best way I can express it at this time is that Rahner by wrestling with the ‘unity in duality’ in Thomas' treatment of being (see pp.61-63), he also manages to find with his extraordinary reading of Thomas’ metaphysics of knowledge some amazing capacity for overcoming or going beyond much of the dualism, say between ‘matter and spirit’ that is present in scholastic thinking, and that lingers still in modern philosophy, and dare I say even in Lonergan …
So, just as in developing an adequate philosophical appreciation for the human subject, there is no shortcut around Kant, I do not believe that in ‘overcoming this dualism’ (as in actually grasping the ontological basis for any claim as to the isomorphism of knowing and being) there is any philosophical shortcut around Rahner’s difficult treatment of the question of being in SiW.
This means for me that Pierre’s brief allusion to what Lonergan and Rahner knew of one another, and perhaps more importantly what readers of Lonergan and readers Rahner actually know of one another, a very intriguing question worth exploring. So, I would ask others what they might know of this relationship? ... or was there any relationship at all?

Hugh

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[Hugh Williams]

As an addendum to my most recent email below ...

I found this interesting note when I asked 'google' about the relationship between Rahner and Lonergan.

It is an interesting note obviously with an obvious Lonerganian bias that, having read a good deal of both thinkers, I thoroughly reject ...

Hugh

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"They (Rahner and Lonergan) are both trying to update and adapt Thomas in light of modern philosophical developments, which accounts for many broad similarities, but they engage slightly different figures and traditions. Rahner is more conversant with existential philosophical traditions and with Heidegger. Lonergan is conversant with the philosophical tradition broadly but also economics and psychology. If I had to pinpoint the main difference between them, I’d put it this way: Lonergan has a worked out cognitional theory, which grounds his metaphysics; Rahner has a vague notion of how cognition works, which is grounded in his metaphysics. In Insight, Lonergan works out cognition and then posits being as that which is known through the dynamic cognitional structure of experience, understanding, and judgment. Metaphysics is worked out as isomorphic to knowing. Rahner essentially starts with a Thomistic metaphysics and then tries to correlate knowing to being by positing a kind of innate human anticipation of being (The Vorgriff, NB the Heideggerian resonances) that is articulated in terms that allow for negotiating Thomist debates on the natural desire for God via the supernatural existential. But because Rahner hasn’t worked out a cognitional structure, much of his epistemology is muddled. It also doesn’t help that Rahner is a confused writer and thus difficult to read and understand. Lonergan on the contrary is quite clear and organized. Its actually pretty interesting how both get lumped together as Transcendental Thomists. I have often thought it was a lazy mischaracterization mostly to contrast a kind of Balthasarian or du Lubac patristic ressourcement approach to catholic theology. Rahner and Lonergan both have great occasional pieces of theology and fantastic spiritual writings, but as a philosophical theologian, Lonergan is superior. PS I’m on mobile so sorry if the wall of text is not super duper clear."

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[jaraymaker]

Hugh,

 

The Rahner-Lonergan relationship was a rather complicated one. By googling 

 

            Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan relationship

 

one can read many facets of that relationship as investigated and described by many authors,

 

John

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[Doug Mounce]

Thanks Hugh, for keeping up with this challenging study.  I may have surrendered too soon, too early, but I think I lasted longer than Beards!  I read pages 60-65 and was reminded of how difficult it is to distil Rahner's work - he doesn't make it easy.  In addition, I have to wonder what I've missed, but I appreciate your choosing to highlight these. I expect you can explain or refer us to other areas as I had that experience with the Introduction where almost any reference deserved elaboration.

In any case, what I noticed first about this section was, of course, a favorite Rahner phrase - the World as the Whence.  Repetition also helps us hold key relations like "a fixed relationship between knowing and known insofar as both spring from a single ground."  Lonergan explained an isomorphism, and Rahner asks can we show how they are identical?

The starting point, he says, as it was for Thomas, is this paradox of our being in the world and wondering where we might start apart from that condition.  

"if he could determine by his
own choice this "nothing" which is the "whence" of his questioning,
he would already be with being in its totality in such a
way that he would have mastered it and would not have to
question any more."

And here we reach that point which was, I believe, your notice of Lonergan's question (and we might recall how much Lonergan and Rahner both refer to questioning), is there an intellectual intuition, only Rahner is asking can the intellect know anything without conversion to the phantasm.  As far as application, this starting point is similar to other modern observations like the analogy of being a puzzle piece.  I also feel that his configuration of sensibility with the role imagination plays will be useful.

One thing that bothers me a bit, but it's natural and Lonergan does it too, is the casual reference to the here and now as a general description of things.  I think it unconsciously denotes Kant's a priori space and time as real features whereas these categories formally prioritize the sense of sight and the rhythm of our heartbeat, but I don't have a better way to generally refer to real things and their relations as we find them.

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[Hugh Williams]

Doug et al,

It is in this study of Rahner, especially his 'Spirit in the World', that one (such as I) may have to acknowledge or confess the challenge in reading Kant properly. This is especially important and relevant if one grants that Rahner’s primary interlocutor (in addition to Thomas ...) is Kantian, and further … if one makes the mistake of characterizing Rahner’s philosophy as Kantian, one can fail fatally to recognize how different Rahner’s account of knowledge is from that of Kant.

Risking vulgar simplification, one may understand Kant as arguing that our objective knowing, though depending upon experience, ... because of the a priori structure of my experiencing, can construct the appearances of experience into an objective world having validity for everyone.

The subtle point of contention and controversy resides with the nature of this a priority … does it rest solely with the knowing subject’s mind or is it an a priority intrinsic to the ontological structure of being itself, both known and knowing in the deeper unity of being.

In Rahner “the a priori of knowledge does not conceal the nature of possible objects (the thing in itself ?), but has already and always revealed it.” (SiW p.98) It seems that in Rahner we have a very deep and complex account that nonetheless because of the principles (as foundations - see the three principles articulated way below in this thread from Feb 3's email) he has been able to draw out and clarify from Thomas’ corpus (metaphysics of knowledge), fundamentally, subjectivism is avoided or transcended …

… this it seems to me is very very important, and if it is as solid as it is beginning to seem to me, it is a major achievement in modern-contemporary philosophy.

Hugh

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[Doug Mounce]

Thanks for delving deeper, Hugh, and raising page 98 to our attention and "the a priori of knowledge".  Your post gave me inspiration to revisit Fiorenza's Introduction and Rahner's relation to Kant.  He begins with Kant's critique of the real and the ideal where, for example, there must be a greatest thing that exists because we exist, and ends with the transcendental relation where God is not known as an object of reality but as the principle of human knowledge and reality.  Has anyone ever complained that such a principle is an idealized feature from real experience?  In any case, I'll recall the three presuppositions in hopes that others might comment.

• 1)     In external sense perception there is an (impressed) species; but this as such is not what is perceived.
• 2)     External perception forms no expressed species, so that the object is apprehended in its immediate, real self.
• 3)     An object can be apprehended immediately in its own self, that is, be intuited, only if it is in its own actuality an actuality of knowing itself.

PS - I was also recently wondering why Rahner places imagination with the senses as sensibility.  I would think the natural (mind-centric) interpretation would be that the brain is imaginative, but it's an intriguing relation and Rahner wasn't sure about the place of imagination in sensibility (at least in his Introduction). 

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[Hugh Williams]

Subject:	Re: [lonergan_l] reading Karl Rahner's 'Spirit in the World': A Strange Report
Date:	Tue, 18 Feb 2025 18:04:05 -0400
From:	Hugh Williams <hwil...@nbnet.nb.ca>
To:	Doug Mounce <doug....@gmail.com>

Doug,

this is very good and very concise ...

i'll have to ponder this 'turtle paced' some more

as it hovers around something that seems to me to be uniquely Rahner

and a major contribution to the philosophical discussion

and as well as profoundly consequential ...

textually, it throws me back upon/into his discussion in 'Foundation' ...

where I've not yet been able to fully appreciate what he is trying to do

and so have perhaps been presumptuous in some of my comments ...

thanks again

Hugh

(i've ordered a work by Karen Kilby on Rahner to see if she can help ...)

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