Good morning,
The Judicial Committee is empowered to act, in Article 8 of the bylaws, under the following conditions:
2. The subject matter jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee is limited to consideration of only those matters expressly identified as follows:
a. suspension of affiliate parties (Article 5, Section 6),
b. suspension of officers (Article 6, Section 7),
c. suspension of National Committee members-at-large (Article 7, Section 5),
d. voiding of National Committee decisions (Article 7, Section 12),
e. challenges to platform planks (Rule 5, Section 7),
f. challenges to resolutions (Rule 6, Section 2), and
g. suspension of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates (Article 14, Section 5).
3. Within 90 days following the regular convention at which elected, the Judicial Committee shall establish rules of appellate procedure to govern its consideration of matters within the scope of its jurisdiction. ... unless denied by a 2/3 vote of the National Committee ...
After reviewing multiple previous versions of the Rules of Appellate Procedure going back over a decade, followed by deliberation and multiple amendments across email communications and an electronic meeting, the Judicial Committee has submitted its amended Rules of Appellate Procedure; therefore we have fulfilled our obligations under the bylaws and, barring a veto by 2/3rds of the LNC, have no additional obligations at this time.
If the LNC would like to ask questions about the proposed rules, I would suggest that the LNC designate one person to communicate with our committee, with the understanding and explicit caution that our communication will inherently be limited to prevent discussion of matters that may end up being part of any future adjudication.
As we are not otherwise empowered or otherwise obligated to act at this time, I would respectfully ask to be removed from this and future email chains outside the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee. Our members, almost all of whom have served on the LNC in the past, did not seek to be on the LNC this term for reasons that may include not wishing to be involved in the daily machinations of the LNC.
Thank you,
Ken Moellman
Judicial Committee Chair
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Chair, LNC, and members of the Judicial Committee:
A Judicial Committee exists to give Party members due process: a fair hearing, on the record, before a body that decides on the merits. The Rules of Appellate Procedure proposed for the 2026–2030 term do the opposite. They are built to let the Committee avoid deciding, avoid explaining, and avoid being seen. I concur fully with Alfa Shaw’s critique, and I will break down the worst of it.
Section 2.8 lets five members reject, strike, or refuse to publish any filing “without reaching the merits,” and throw out an entire petition as “sufficiently egregious.” The grounds are words the Rules never define: “clearly false,” “frivolous,” “language not suitable,” “decorum,” “not permitted in a judicial proceeding.” A body that can dismiss a case for being “clearly false” without ruling on whether it is true is not adjudicating. It is gatekeeping, on standards it writes for itself and applies to whomever it chooses. There is no defense whatsoever for this abject abuse of process and breach of our bylaws.
This is not a theoretical defect. Article 9, Section 2 charges the Committee with real duties: affiliate-revocation appeals, officer suspensions, member-at-large suspensions, where the Bylaws say the Committee shall hold a hearing and interested persons shall have the right to appear and submit evidence. Section 2.8 hands the Committee a tool to refuse the very hearings the Bylaws command. A procedural rule cannot override a Bylaws duty. To the extent 2.8 purports to, it is invalid.
The rest of the design points the same Kafkaesque direction. Members who never attend the hearing may still vote, up to ten days after it ends (Section 8.7), which means decision by people who never heard the case. Deliberations stay secret unless two-thirds vote to open them (Section 8.4). Nothing requires a written, reasoned opinion, so a bare ruling with no explanation will do. Redactions, publication, and even the case-management system itself sit under the Committee’s unchecked control (Sections 2.8, 5.1, 2.9). Each choice trades transparency for discretion and accountability for control.
These Rules are not a neutral housekeeping update. They equip a Committee to dismiss inconvenient petitions early, close its proceedings, bury its reasoning, and answer to no one. That is an offense to due process and to what this Party claims to stand for.
The LNC is not powerless here. Under Article 9, Section 3, these Rules take effect only if the LNC does not deny them by a two-thirds vote within sixty days of submission. I ask the LNC to consider what the JC presented and then exercise that power: deny these Rules and return them to the Judicial Committee for revision that restores merits-based decision, mandatory hearings, reasoned written opinions, and a real presumption of openness.
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Section 2.8, merits-blind rejection power. Five members can reject, strike, or refuse to publish any filing “without reaching the merits,” and dismiss an entire non-convention petition as “sufficiently egregious.” The grounds are undefined: “clearly false,” “frivolous,” “language not suitable,” decorum “not permitted in a judicial proceeding.” Worst because it lets the Committee refuse to decide cases the Bylaws (Article 9, Section 2) say it shall hear, on standards it writes for itself. This is the one with an actual ultra vires collision.
No mandatory written reasoned opinions. Section 9.3 requires that decisions be published, and Section 9.2 allows preliminary notification to be oral, but nothing requires the Committee to explain its reasoning or record its votes. A bare ruling suffices. This is what makes every other abuse unreviewable: you cannot challenge reasoning that is never stated.
Section 8.7, absent members vote up to ten days post-hearing. Members who never attended can still cast deciding votes within ten days. Decisions made by people who never heard the arguments, with a window open to post-hearing lobbying and no real-time scrutiny.
Section 8.4, deliberations secret by default. Deliberations occur in executive session unless a two-thirds vote opens them. The reasoning process, where the actual decision happens, is presumptively hidden, inverting the openness the Rules claim elsewhere.
Sections 2.6 and 2.7, executive session on subjective balancing. The JC may close proceedings at a petitioner’s request (privacy) or the LNC’s request (legal liability), weighing risk against openness with no defined criteria and no appeal. The LNC-liability carve-out is especially exploitable: the body being challenged can request closure.
Sections 2.4 and 2.5, burden of proof on submitters. Petitioners bear the full burden of proving signer eligibility and organizational authorization; the JC can reject signatures or entire filings if proof is deemed insufficient. A high, JC-judged bar that disadvantages grassroots and less-resourced petitioners. Compounds Section 2.8(j), which makes any such defect a rejection ground.
Section 7.1, amicus restricted to Sustaining members. Non-Sustaining members are cut out of amicus participation. Note: the claim that prior rules allowed broader filing is asserted in the comparison document but could not be verified against the 2022 text; treat the “rollback” framing as unconfirmed.
Section 3.3, JC defines who counts as a respondent. The Committee itself identifies any other member, affiliate, or committee “likely to be affected” as a prospective respondent, expanding or limiting the parties by its own judgment.
Section 2.9, optional, JC-controlled online system. The documentation system is discretionary and Committee-controlled, centralizing control over what is visible and when.
Section 8.6, oral argument fully discretionary. The JC may in its discretion offer oral argument “under such rules as the Committee shall specify,” controlling timing, format, and whether it happens at all.
Sections 2.3 and 6.1, timing asymmetries. Submissions must arrive before the hearing “except by leave of the Committee” (2.3); respondents get seven days or “promptly” at convention (6.1). Discretionary leave plus tight windows let the JC control whose late evidence comes in.
Self-policing, no external oversight of JC procedure. Nothing in the Rules provides a mechanism to challenge the JC’s own redactions, rejections, or procedural rulings beyond the JC itself. The only real external check is structural and sits outside the Rules: the LNC’s Article 9, Section 3 power to deny the Rules wholesale within sixty days of submission.
The catch-all in Section 2.8(j), rejection for any rules, format, or signature non-compliance, is what weaponizes the otherwise-minor procedural requirements above. It turns every formatting requirement into a dismissal “gotcha” to deny justice to anyone arbitrarily. This JC process, and presumably the members in it, seem more hostile to core LP principles like Due Process than the US government. The ranking above reflects due-process damage. If ranking instead by legal vulnerability, items 1 and 2 are where the ultra vires and Bylaws-duty arguments are strongest.
In short, these issues will lead to our decisions being vulnerable to court interventions and reversals. Instead of protecting internal governance decisions, this JC will open the LNC to serious legal risks which could also attach to individual officers for ultra vires acts or fiduciary breaches.
Mahalo for your consideration,
Austin Martin
R1
Ua mau ke ea o ka ʻāina i ka pono

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