Download Joseph Vincent Only You !!TOP!!
Gunvor Nazarian
Two priming experiments extending the work of Loftus (1973) and Loftus and Loftus (1974) were conducted to investigate retrieval from semantic memory. Subjects produced a letter-restricted instance from a semantic category on a prime trial, and then were asked to produce a second, different instance from the category on the target trial. The letter-restrictor for the target trial allowed a response that was either high- or low-related to the prime trial response. In addition, in Experiment 1 the dominance of the target response was varied, while in Experiment 2 the dominance of the prime response was varied. High prime-target response relatedness significantly improved target trial performance, but only in conjunction with high target dominance. Target performance was not affected by the dominance of the prime response. These results indicate that the priming of category exemplar retrieval is not simply a matter of category repetition; the interaction of exemplar dominance and its relatedness to a just-retrieved exemplar is an important determinant of retrieval performance. Two activation models are developed to account for the findings.
The defendant in error instituted an action for money had and received by the plaintiff in error, the defendant below. The declaration contained this count only, to which there was a plea of the general issue.
At petitioners' trial under 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846 for "conspir[ing]'' to "possess with intent to . . . distribute [mixtures containing two] controlled substance[s],'' namely, cocaine and cocaine base (i.e., "crack''), the jury was instructed that the Government must prove that the conspiracy involved measurable amounts of "cocaine or cocaine base.'' (Emphasis added.) The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, and the District Judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioner's illegal conduct involved both cocaine and crack. Petitioners argued (for the first time) in the Seventh Circuit that their sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack, because the word "or'' in the jury instruction meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine, which is treated more leniently than crack by United States Sentencing Guidelines 2D1.1(c). However, the court held that the judge need not assume that only cocaine was involved, pointing out that, because the Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy, the jury's belief about which drugs were involved-cocaine, crack, or both-was beside the point.
Held: Because the Guidelines instruct the judge in a case like this to determine both the amount and kind of controlled substances for which a defendant should be held accountable, and then to impose a sentence that varies depending upon those determinations, see, e.g., Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 132 L.Ed.2d 351, it is the judge who is required to determine whether the "controlled substances'' at issue-and how much of them-consisted of cocaine, crack, or both. That is what the judge did in this case, and the jury's beliefs about the conspiracy are irrelevant. This Court need not, and does not, consider the merits of petitioners' claims that the drug statutes and the Constitution required the judge to assume that the jury convicted them of a conspiracy involving only cocaine. Even if that were so, it would make no difference here. The Guidelines instruct the judge to base a drug-conspiracy offender's sentence on his "relevant conduct,'' 1B1.3, which includes both conduct that constitutes the "offense of conviction,'' 1B1.3(a)(1), and conduct that is "part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction,'' 1B1.3(a)(2). Thus, the judge below would have had to determine the total amount of drugs, whether they consisted of cocaine, crack, or both, and the total amount of each-regardless of whether he believed that petitioners' crack-related conduct was part of the "offense of conviction'' or "part of the same course of conduct, or common scheme or plan.'' The Guidelines sentencing range-on either belief-is identical. Petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims could make a difference if they could argue that their sentences exceeded the statutory maximum for a cocaine-only conspiracy, or that their crack-related activities did not constitute part of the "same course of conduct,'' etc., but the record indicates that such arguments could not succeed. Their argument, made for the first time on appeal, that the judge might have made different factual findings had he known that the law required him to assume the jury had found a cocaine-only conspiracy is unpersuasive. Pp. ____-____.
While erythropoietin (Epo) and its receptor (EpoR) have been widely investigated in brain, the expression and function of the soluble Epo receptor (sEpoR) remain unknown. Here we demonstrate that sEpoR, a negative regulator of Epo's binding to the EpoR, is present in the mouse brain and is down-regulated by 62% after exposure to normobaric chronic hypoxia (10% O2 for 3 days). Furthermore, while normoxic minute ventilation increased by 58% in control mice following hypoxic acclimatization, sEpoR infusion in brain during the hypoxic challenge efficiently reduced brain Epo concentration and abolished the ventilatory acclimatization to hypoxia (VAH). These observations imply that hypoxic downregulation of sEpoR is required for adequate ventilatory acclimatization to hypoxia, thereby underlying the function of Epo as a key factor regulating oxygen delivery not only by its classical activity on red blood cell production, but also by regulating ventilation.
df19127ead