query from Georg Greve of GNU about Debian's opinion of the FDL
Branden Robinson
> perhaps you want to follow up with Georg in private or somewhere.
[...]
> || On Tue, 8 Apr 2003 12:15:11 +0200
> || Christoph Hellwig <h...@lst.de> wrote:
>
> >> I was told that there was no official Debian policy decision
> >> against the GNU Free Documentation License the last time I
> >> inquired.
>
> ch> Well, the consensus is that a FDL document with invariants
> ch> sections or covert texts is not DFSG-free, although it's not
> ch> decided how to proceed with this docs yet.
>
> Could you please tell me where that decision has been made official?
When the FSF released the GNU FDL 1.2, we analyzed it on the
debian-legal mailing list. At that time, no one was willing to defend
it as a DFSG-free license if cover texts or invariant sections were
used.
See:
http://lists.debian.org/debian-legal/2002/debian-legal-200211/msg00285.html
http://lists.debian.org/debian-legal/2002/debian-legal-200212/msg00050.html
...and followups.
> Because the last time I asked Debian people about it, they told me
> this was a minority opinion and not official.
When did you ask? Who did you ask?
> ch> Umm, no. The problem with FDL is that RMS forgot his idea of
> ch> freedom about a chance of keeping GNU advocacy in the docs
> ch> without anyone having a chance of removing it.
>
> So you are ruling a license as non-Free because you don't like the
> person who wrote it and the opinion that is stated in the license?
No. Please don't put words in people's mouths.
> >From what I read about it, people seemed to think that because of the
> invariant sections, documents might be non-free. Which is a too
> literal-minded application of software criteria to documentation.
>
> First of all: documents and software are entirely different issues and
> should be treated differently.
The Debian Project does not, in general, appear to agree. See:
http://lists.debian.org/debian-legal/2002/debian-legal-200212/msg00027.html
...and followups.
> In reality, existance of invariant sections and the possibility to
> define them -- as given in the GNU Free Documentation License -- makes
> a document *more* free and legally secure. Let me explain why.
>
> In continental Europe we have to consider moral rights of the author.
>
> This means that certain modifications that an author feels to be
> infringing upon his or her moral rights can never be allowed. Much
> more so than in software, documents tend to contain parts where the
> author feels that way about them or where certain modifications will
> be percieved that way.
>
> There is no way any license or legal document could change the legal
> status of such parts and a license that tries to do so is potentially
> invalid.
>
> But the GNU FDL allows authors to mark such sections, consequently
> strengthening the argument that if the author did not make use of this
> feature, the author didn't consider that section to be needy of such
> restrictions.
>
> For another license that does not offer the capability of invariant
> sections, one has to assume that potentially the whole document is
> equally invariant and as such non-free regardless of the license.
Your analysis ignores the fact that the GNU FDL does not permit
Invariant Sections to be omitted entirely from the work when it is
redistributed. If the GNU FDL did that, it would take a giant step
towards DFSG-freeness.
Please followup to debian-legal.
--
G. Branden Robinson |
Debian GNU/Linux | Music is the brandy of the damned.
bra...@debian.org | -- George Bernard Shaw
http://people.debian.org/~branden/ |
Edmund GRIMLEY EVANS
> As to the question whether or not software and documentation should be
> treated alike, I'd like to say that I am very much in favor of a more
> differentiated approach.
>
> Mixing things that are in truth very different is one of the worst
> effects of the "intellectual property" terminology and has done a lot
> of harm. Remember that a lot of the less intelligent legal rulings
> regarding software have their roots in this unwarranted assumption.
>
> Now asking to treat documentation/books like software looks like
> inverse repetition of that mistake.
Now you're mixing things that are in truth very different by
pretending that treating software and documentation in the same way is
equivalent to failing to distinguish between copyright and patents.
Perhaps this is some kind of point-scoring exercise rather than a
serious discussion, because you're not really expecting anyone to
think that Debian believing that free software needs free
documentation will lead to bad legal rulings, are you?
> br> Your analysis ignores the fact that the GNU FDL does not permit
> br> Invariant Sections to be omitted entirely from the work when it
> br> is redistributed. If the GNU FDL did that, it would take a giant
> br> step towards DFSG-freeness.
> Interpretation B -- which you probably meant -- is already included in
> the analysis, as cutting out parts is also modification.
Cutting out all of the Invariant Sections is modification of the
Invariant Sections? This sounds a bit like John Cage's copyrighted
silence.
By the way, I was not at all convinced by your analysis. I would have
thought that the best way to defuse moral rights would be to have the
whole document be a mishmash of contributions from different authors.
Including an invariant and unremovable section by a single author
seems like a recipe for increasing the risk of moral rights affecting
the entire work.
Edmund
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Adam Warner
> As to the question whether or not software and documentation should be
> treated alike, I'd like to say that I am very much in favor of a more
> differentiated approach.
>
> Mixing things that are in truth very different is one of the worst
> effects of the "intellectual property" terminology and has done a lot of
> harm. Remember that a lot of the less intelligent legal rulings
> regarding software have their roots in this unwarranted assumption.
>
> Now asking to treat documentation/books like software looks like inverse
> repetition of that mistake.
(p "Code and data are not easy to distinguish. The same HTML markup that
people consider is data can be evaluated as function calls in a computer
program. One typically sees this in languages that allow code and data to
be merged, like Lisp. This string is an argument to the function named P
and can be evaluated within a computer program.")
(p "In a paradigm where code and data are indistinct it is imperative that
the licence for the data is compatible with the licence for the code.
Otherwise there may be no optimal way to merge documentation with the
computer program. Documents may remain lifeless and outside the system
as otherwise they could form part of a derived work that is illegal to
distribute due to conflicting licensing provisions.")
(p "The boon for GNU is that data becomes affected by the dynamic linking
claims of software licenses like the GPL. If the program that transforms
these functions into text, HTML, PDF, etc. is GPLed then the FSF may claim
that the documentation may only be distributed under the GPL.")
(p "The FSF is shortsighted in promoting any documentation licences that
are incompatible with the software licenses they also promote. If you
haven't already got the point that code and data/documentation can be the
same then I suggest you look at the source to my tentative software
adoption paper available at "
(a :href "https://macrology.co.nz/software-adoption.html?source")
". The source contains not only a computer model, equation and graph
generation code but the entire text of the document. The document is the
code and the code is the document. Since this is all my own work applying a
compatible software licence was not difficult. It would be unfortunate if
software developers couldn't use the source because the source was
documentation; or documentation developers couldn't use the source because
the source was code.")
(p "Regards," (br)
"Adam")
Steve Langasek
> >> First of all: documents and software are entirely different issues
> >> and should be treated differently.
> br> The Debian Project does not, in general, appear to agree. See:
> br> http://lists.debian.org/debian-legal/2002/debian-legal-200212/msg00027.html
> br> ...and followups.
> That may be so. I will accept your statement at face value; although
> my personal experience tells me that not always will the archives of a
> public discussion display true majorities.
> Not always is the loudest voice truly the vote of the majority.
In the case of Debian, license approval is not democratic. It is the
vaguely democratic consensus of the debian-legal mailing list (as seen in
the archives), together with the decisions of the ftp masters, that
determines whether a license is accepted as free or not.
> As to the question whether or not software and documentation should be
> treated alike, I'd like to say that I am very much in favor of a more
> differentiated approach.
> Mixing things that are in truth very different is one of the worst
> effects of the "intellectual property" terminology and has done a lot
> of harm. Remember that a lot of the less intelligent legal rulings
> regarding software have their roots in this unwarranted assumption.
I disagree wholeheartedly. The perceived goal of the GPL is to establish
a creative commons for the mutual benefit of all in the community. This
is not a goal that's inherently bound to the nature of software; one can
derive many of the same benefits from a creative commons built around
prose. However, the FDL (when invariant sections are invoked) has
something quite different from a commons as its aim.
--
Steve Langasek
postmodern programmer
Barak Pearlmutter
of slack. But the more I think about it, the less I like it.
One principle of a proper free license is that it doesn't allow the
thing it is protecting to be poisoned. In the case of the GNU FDL,
despite the laudatory goals, it basically makes a deal: here's the
text or code or whatever, and in exchange you have to give the author
a soapbox. Some advertising space, really.
New and contributing authors can add their own little soapbox
speeches, their own little bon mots. There's nothing to prevent a
manual from becoming rapidly covered with a hundred little impassioned
pleas. Once there are two, adding a third is irresistible. And each
one would be considered using a "marginal cost/benefit" analysis.
Each one would be little extra cost, so the benefit of added meat for
the document itself that comes along with each extra invariant blurb
could actually be pretty small.
This would be a bad result. It is not a road we should start down.
Don't get me wrong - I don't have a problem with RMS's impassioned
pleas for free software sitting on *my* machine. If he asked me, as a
personal favor, to let him put up a collection of his writings on each
machine in my lab, and make them all web servers, and put an FSF
billboard on the sign on the top of my car, and some FSF decals on my
luggage, I would. As a personal favor. Because I'm so grateful to
him for the wonderful things he's done.
But I do have a problem with forcing people who just want some
documentation to keep unrelated "invariant text" around. Especially
since it wouldn't have to be RMS's, it could end up also having some
advertising copy from IBM, and some more adds from a book publisher,
and a sad story from a native american about how his people were
screwed a hundred years ago, and another little bit about the horrors
of Waco, and something from the ACLU, and then an add for UNICEF, and
some gun nut screed of Eric Raymond's added by one of his disciples.
This is a very bad direction to go.
At heart, the FDL allows an add-space-for-usage deal. This is roughly
equivalent to licenses we've rejected, like link-on-your-web-page-ware.
I really hope the GNU project comes to its senses on this one.
(The technical argument - that the line between code & documentation
can be blurry and therefore the documentation should have something
GNU GPL compatible - also seems rather strong.)
Anthony Towns
> || On Mon, 14 Apr 2003 10:18:10 -0500
> || Steve Langasek <vor...@netexpress.net> wrote:
> sl> The perceived goal of the GPL is to establish a creative commons
> sl> for the mutual benefit of all in the community.
> I would agree to the sentiment, but I must say that I have some issues
> using the commons example and terminology as commons are traditionally
> established by sharing limited resources.
Skilled programmers are limited resources, and as such their output
is also limited. But in any event, it's not whether it's limited or
not that's the important factor in a commons -- it's that it's freely
usable by all. There's no conceptual difficulty with a commons that is
arbitrarily large.
> But unlike prose, most software derives its justification to exist
> From its function, not its aesthetics.
A lot of prose does the same -- it's written to persuade or to explain
or to record, rather than to entertain or amaze. Conversely, substantial
amounts of software derive its justification from aesthetics and it's
Debian's opinion that computer games should be free to go into main too.
> If I have a single word processor that I like, I usually have all the
> word processors that I need, only very few people will use more than
> one.
> If I have one piece of prose that I like, I usually do not have all
> the prose I need/want. The same goes for documentation or music. In
> fact hearing some piece of music usually motivates me to get more.
If you have a single rendition of Shakespeare's Hamlet, you usually have
all the copies of it you need/want. Sometimes you don't -- sometimes
you're an English professor and need to get some modernised versions,
or versions with commentary, or maybe a modern retelling.
Sometimes a single word-processor isn't enough either, and you need to
have access to a few to see how different features are accessed, or if
different documents are rendered differently, or to see which is more
accessible to your staff, or as some source material so you can get ideas
on how to implement some new program you want to write.
> So the patterns of distribution of software are mutually exclusive, [...]
Then you'll presumably have no problem with us treating the distribution
of GFDL documentation and free software as being mutually exclusive.
> From knowing the people who worked on it, I know that creating such a
> "commons" -- I will use your word despite its shortcomings I explained
> above -- is exactly what they had and still have in mind.
It's not what they've achieved. For a commons to exist, anything built
on that commons must be readily accessible to everyone to use or enhance
as they see fit. But the ability to arbitrarily add invariant sections
that no one else can remove stymies any chance of that happening, in
both a technical sense (you can't excerpt from the covered work), and a
political sense (you can be forced to distribute irrelevent, outdated
or highly disagreeable manifestos). These problems have already been
encountered by the wikipedia and FOLDOC folks, see [0,1].
Cheers,
aj
[0] http://www.wikipedia.org/pipermail/wikipedia-l/2002-June/002238.html
[1] http://www.wikipedia.org/pipermail/wikipedia-l/2001-October/000624.html
--
Anthony Towns <a...@humbug.org.au> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/>
I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred.
``Dear Anthony Towns: [...] Congratulations --
you are now certified as a Red Hat Certified Engineer!''
Mark Rafn
> But unlike prose, most software derives its justification to exist
> From its function, not its aesthetics.
I'm not sure whether prose or software is more shortchanged by this
"distinction". Both art and software are simultaneously functional and
aesthetic.
Even if I were to accept this as the difference between the two things
(which I very strongly do not), does this lead to the claim that invariant
sections are allowable in free software whose primary purpose (as defined
by the author, I guess) is aesthetic?
> That is because there is a significant difference between software and
> music, documents, prose or other things usually referred to as content
> by these people:
They're often created by different teams, and have different licensing
terms in the proprietary world. That's all I can read into the fact that
many people use different words for "software" and "content".
> If I have a single word processor that I like, I usually have all the
> word processors that I need, only very few people will use more than
> one.
This is simply wrong. I'll bet the average computer user will use dozens
of different word processors over her lifetime. Some will differ only in
minor ways, of course.
> If I have one piece of prose that I like, I usually do not have all
> the prose I need/want. The same goes for documentation or music. In
> fact hearing some piece of music usually motivates me to get more.
If I have one piece of software that I like, I usually do not have all the
software I need/want. In fact, running some piece of software usually
motivates me to get more.
> So the patterns of distribution of software are mutually exclusive,
> whereas the distribution patterns of works of art are mutually
> supportive.
Strongly disagree. Software (especially free software) is perhaps more
mutually supportive than is art.
> And unlike most works of art -- for which aesthetics or philosophical
> advancement is the use -- software derives its usefulness almost
> exclusively from its function.
I think you're very confused, or I am. There's a whole lot of software I
run ONLY because it brings me joy to do so. A significant number of books
I own do nothing for me aesthetically but are very functional. You
wouldn't believe how much my kitchen table used to wobble...
Even "pure art" is functional. I have a painting which is covering a hole
in my wall.
> I will gladly grant you that the GFDL is imperfect -- but in a
> real-world situation it is one of the most advanced licenses for
> documentation to create such a shared knowledge base that I know of.
I have yet to see a case where the GFDL is superior to the GPL for free
work. It's primary "advancement" seems to be the legitimization of
non-free author control of a work to the harm of creators of derived
works, and therefore users.
I have no doubt that the license authors had and have only good
intentions, but they completely missed the boat when deciding that
freedoms vital to software aren't needed by other sequences of bits.
--
Mark Rafn da...@dagon.net <http://www.dagon.net/>
iain d broadfoot
> A lot of prose does the same -- it's written to persuade or to explain
> or to record, rather than to entertain or amaze. Conversely, substantial
> amounts of software derive its justification from aesthetics and it's
> Debian's opinion that computer games should be free to go into main too.
as a software developer, i'd also propose that software can be
aesthetically beautiful in it's own right - a well-formatted perl
program can easily take the place of a piece of poetry! (excuse the
accidental alliteration...)
just as we cannot distinguish data from code, so we cannot
distinguish software from that software's documentation.
iain
(not a DD, just a very satisfied user)
--
wh33, y1p33 3tc.
"If sharing a thing in no way diminishes it, it is not rightly owned if it is
not shared." -St. Augustine
Barak Pearlmutter
http://www.wikipedia.org/pipermail/wikipedia-l/2001-October/000624.html
http://www.wikipedia.org/pipermail/wikipedia-l/2002-June/002238.html
> That doesn't make the situations dissimilar, however, as there are
> people complaining about not being able to take some pieces of GPL'ed
> code from one program and put them into their Free Software programs
> without adhering to the GPL.
This is not a valid comparison, because in *this* case the
inconvenience and damage is happening to not just to some random free
software developer (which is already a shame, and something to be
avoided if at all possible) but in fact to a developer of software
under the GNU GPL. In other words, J. Random Hacker, who is simply
following the recommendations of the FSF and putting his code and
documentation under the FSF-recommended licenses, the GPL and FDL, is
the one being hurt.
To my mind there is something very wrong with that scenario.
--Barak.
Anthony Towns
> But unlike prose, most software derives its justification to exist
> From its function, not its aesthetics.
> areas of law such as copyright, patents and trademarks under the
> "intellectual property rights" terminology are still careful enough to
> differentiate between software and what they call "content."
BTW, lumping things that are different isn't the only thing other people
do to come to unhelpful conclusions, separating things that are similar
in exactly the way that you have is too.
In particular, the above argument is the exact one people to use to say
that software is not a form of speech, and should not be given the strong
protections many expect to be given to speech. It's refuted by example
by Dravid Touretzky at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/Gallery/, fwiw.
It's obvious and trivial to claim that there are differences between your
average speech, or your average book, or your average picture and your
average program. It's not correct to go on from there to say that some
things deserve more protection than others. If you want to distribute the
GNU Manifesto in a non-free manner, that's fine and your choice. If you
want to distribute the glibc and gcc documentation in a non-free manner,
that's fine and your choice too. Trying to establish loopholes in what
the community accepts as "free" in order to avoid getting caught in a
double standard isn't fine, however, even if you don't realise that's
what you're doing, and you're doing it with the best intentions for the
long term interests of free software.
Cheers,
aj
Anthony DeRobertis
> [1] http://www.wikipedia.org/pipermail/wikipedia-l/2001-October/000624.html
"The rule is that the invariant section can contain anything as
long as it is not the subject matter of the article. In
particular, the invariant section can contain HTML code for
linking back to the article."
If this is the case, then it is another problem: I could not print a
book with this article (can't put HTML in a book); use it in a LaTeX
manual (no HTML in latex); convert it to PDF, etc.
Barak Pearlmutter
theoretically be an issue for free software in Europe is not an excuse
for the FSF to promulgate a license that itself has already caused
serious problems to people trying to build community commons free
documents, like that encyclopedia. I'm simply not following your
logic.
Here is the case against the FDL:
- it is obviously inappropriate for software
- the line between documentation and software is very blurry
- eg in the debian-bug.el example, if the FDL were in use it would be
to the detriment of free software
another case against it:
- used in the recommended fashion, by innocent people trying to
build a common free encyclopedia, it has *already* caused serious
problems
These are telling: the FDL, if used for documentation of free
software, damages the cause of free software; and when used for
non-documentation documents like an encyclopedia has damaged the cause
of free documents.
Conclusion: the FDL is a bad license.
Nathanael Nerode
to point out the following particular message from Richard Braakman:
http://lists.debian.org/debian-legal/2002/debian-legal-200212/msg00034.html
This appears to represent a consensus view of Debian:
* Some people believe that immutable sections are not acceptable in a free
document, but a majority of Debian seems to think that immutable sections are
free provided they consist of non-technical material.
* A large majority of Debian seems to think that *non-removable* immutable
sections (which GFDL "invariant sections" are) are an unacceptable
infringement of the right to modify, the sole exceptions being copyright
notices and the associated licence texts.
Several thought experiments have been worked out showing disturbing problems
with "Invariant Sections":
Perhaps the most impressive is the following: Suppose I wish to use large
sections of the Emacs manual in a treatise on free software. The GNU FDL
grants me *NO* rights to do so, because I must keep the invariant section
(the GNU Manifesto), but it would become an illegitimate invariant section
(because it is now on the main topic of the work). I'd better hope my use is
minimal enough to qualify under fair use principles.
A practical problem is invariant section bloat, under which each new project
developer adds a new invariant section until they begin to outweigh the main
material. Quite possible if the GFDL is promoted and invariant sections are
encouraged as the FSF's website current does.
Another practical problem is invariant section obsolescence. A fair part of
"Funding Free Software" is already considered obsolete by some people.
Suppose Stallman decides to issue "Funding Free Software in the 21st
Century". Non-FSF-owned forks of GCC will still have to carry around the
*old* version forever, and after merging FSF documentation in, will have to
carry around *both* versions!
Then there's the invariant section war: A developer, seeing an invariant
section he strongly dislikes, could add a new invariant section saying "The
previous invariant section is crap because....". The next developer may
disagree and write a third invariant section... and invariant section bloat
arrives, in a particularly unpleasant form.
Better to simply state "We would really like you to include this Immutable
Section; it's rude to remove it", rather than making non-removability a legal
condition and opening the can of worms.
--Nathanael Nerode
Nathanael Nerode
Georg said:
>Yes. But that is a question of Copyright law, not license.
>
>Given that a document is under a license that permits modification,
>any redistributor could add anything and then say that removing it
>would hurt his or her moral rights.
First of all, 'moral rights' don't exist in the US. In the UK, and all the
Commonwealth countries, I believe they are limited to the right to be
identified as the author. (All other similar rights are protected by libel &
slander law, anti-fraud law, etc., which operate quite differently and really
have no place in a copyright licence.) So your theory here is legally
invalid in, essentially, the entire English-speaking world.
Second, even in other countries, I assume that moral rights are limited to
something reasonable. A redistributor can *claim* that removing it would
hurt his moral rights, but it doesn't make it *true*. He could also *claim*
that removing it constitutes libel, slander, fraud, extortion, and theft, but
it's still not *true*.
I don't think that defending against the possibility of a quirk of Italian or
French law being abused by an irresponsible person is worth the very real
damage being done by 'invariant sections'.
>Any license trying to allow modification/removal of such sections
>would run a higher risk of being ruled invalid as a whole because
>these are inalienable rights.
As above, this is nonsense in most of the world.
>So by having no possibility for invariant sections in a documentation
>license, all you do is increase the possibility that it will one day
>be ruled to be invalid as a whole.
FUD, pure FUD. Has anything close to this ever *happened*? No.
Please listen to us. The GFDL is causing real damage to the cause of free
documentation for free software.
And don't forget that it's GPL-incompatible. (*Both ways* in fact. GPLed
code cannot be put into a GFDLed document, except through the 'fair use'
provisions of copyright law, which get narrower every day. Which would be a
serious flaw even if the GFDL was a free licence, which it's not.)
Nathanael Nerode
>I'm sorry, but if somebody wrote something into a document that was
>important to him and you didn't like it and removed it to distribute
>that as a newer version of the document, you'd be violating that
>persons Copyright. GNU Free Documentation License or no.
Sure. This is true of any copyrighted material -- unless the document was
licenced under a *free* license. Which the GNU FDL *isn't*. Are you
listening? We're saying that to be a *free* document (free as in speech, not
just free as in beer), we must have the right to reuse sections without
having other sections gratuituously dragged along.
The GNU FDL, applied with invariant sections, makes a *non-free* (as in
speech, not as in beer) document. That doesn't make it evil or anything. It
makes it *non-free*. Not everything needs to be free, but it's really
obnoxious for the FDL to call itself "free" when it's so far from free.
Are you speaking for the FSF as an organization? If so, I would like
explicit confirmation of the following:
* The FSF believes there is nothing wrong with GFDL documents containing
invariant sections.
* The FSF is not going to change the GFDL to allow the removal of invariant
sections.
* The FSF is going to continue to promote the usage of the GFDL for software
documentation.
* The FSF is going to continue to promote the usage of invariant sections
with the GFDL.
If we have confirmation of these four things, then we know that there will be
no agreement between Debian and the FSF. Debian can go ahead and put the GNU
Emacs manual, GCC manual, and Glibc manuals in non-free. The only reason
they're not there now is that Debian has been hoping that the FSF will get
the point.
I really hope someone at the FSF will get the point.
Nathanael Nerode
psg> It's copied from http://www.debian.org/Bugs/Developer#severities
psg> If that text were licensed with invariant sections, I'd have to
psg> include them in this one-page help screen.
Georg said:
>Right now you'd probably have to treat it as potentially invariant as
>a whole to be on the entirely safe legal side.
OK, I admit that that one's a bit odd (no licence listed). But suppose for
the sake of argument that it was licenced under the BSD licence.
Would you still make the same claim?
How about if it was licenced under the GPL, with the specification that the
text of the page constituted the source code?
If so, we have a bigger problem; the GPL is legally unsafe!
If not, then why do you need these clauses in the GFDL which aren't the GPL
or BSD licences?
I'm really trying to see your point here.
Mark Rafn
> * Some people believe that immutable sections are not acceptable in a free
> document,
Aye.
> but a majority of Debian seems to think that immutable sections are
> free provided they consist of non-technical material.
Woah. I don't think anyone has said that, let alone there being a
consensus. IMO, immutable text, just like immutable code, is not free.
Non-technical immutable text is still not free.
> * A large majority of Debian seems to think that *non-removable* immutable
> sections (which GFDL "invariant sections" are) are an unacceptable
> infringement of the right to modify, the sole exceptions being copyright
> notices and the associated licence texts.
Indeed. And removable immutable sections must be removed before the work
can be considered free.
[snipped practical examples which stem from non-freeness of a work]
These are all interesting points, and apply to both software and
documentation. However, the fundamental reason to call these things
"non-free" is because they aren't free.
> Better to simply state "We would really like you to include this
> Immutable Section; it's rude to remove it", rather than making
> non-removability a legal condition and opening the can of worms.
Almost. It would be free to state "please include this section without
modification". It's still not free to have an immutable section, even if
it can be removed. It can be made free by removal of that section.
--
Mark Rafn da...@dagon.net <http://www.dagon.net/>
Henning Makholm
> On Sun, 27 Apr 2003, Nathanael Nerode wrote:
> > but a majority of Debian seems to think that immutable sections are
> > free provided they consist of non-technical material.
> Woah. I don't think anyone has said that,
Truth to be told, I recently said something to that effect, upon which
I was told by several people that I was wrong. So it's probably fair
to say that if we have a consensus on the "non-technical invariant but
removable sections" question at all, it is not positive.
--
Henning Makholm "Jeg kunne ikke undgå at bemærke at han gik på hænder."
Nathanael Nerode
>Naturally, I'm more familiar with the European Copyright -- or Droit
>d'Auteur, rather -- systems, but since Europe is a very active region
>for Free Software, considering the European situation seems useful.
Please note that this system is contrary in its basis to the system in the
US, which is also used in some form in most common-law based countries (most
of the world). Under these systems copyright is a government-granted monopoly
and not a 'natural right'. The 'Droit d'Auteur' system is *much* more
hostile to free software, free documentation, free speech, fair use rights,
library privilege, the public domain, etc., etc., etc.
Note also that international copyright conventions, almost universally, grant
copyright in each country 'as if' the author lived and wrote in the
corresponding country. What is copyrightable in the first place is not
determined in any way by any international treaty, and varies from country to
country. What is fair use isn't internationally standard either. Your
copyright will expire at different times in different countries. (The
EU-formation treaties might be an exception, since they're rather more
invasive than the normal international treaties.)
I seem to have to repeat this every time someone talks about copyrights. :-)
--Nathanael Nerode
Nathanael Nerode
>Software and documentation are quite different according to the way
>they are treated by the legal system. Moral rights (on which this is
>based) are seen much more strongly for documentation.
Under *some* countries using the *minority* Droit d'Auteur system, perhaps.
This is certainly not an essential part of the system, anyway.
Under the system used in the majority of the world, there is no difference
under copyright law between software and documentation. This is a firmly
established legal fact in the US. Although it hasn't been tested in court in
a lot of countries, I expect that all the common-law based countries will end
up ruling effectively the same way, unless they decide that software is not
copyrightable.
The FSF is based in the US. The absolute worst that could happen if a free
documentation license without 'invariant sections' was 'broken' in a
continental European country on the basis of Droit-d'Auteur-specific rulings
would be that the affected documentation would be undistributable there. The
license would remain valid in all common law countries.
Furthermore, this whole scenario requires a deranged author to licence his
work under a free documentation licence (or modify and publish an existing
such work), and then to go sue someone who tries to modify his work in ways
he doesn't like! This deranged author would soon be shunned, and everything
containing his work removed from distribution. It's extraordinarily unlikely
that he could win monetary damages, unless someone really was out to get him
(in which case he could probably win libel, slander, fraud, or other such
cases anyway).
As it is you're causing pain to free software in the *entire world*.
As a final note, 'moral rights' are *not* 'copyrights', and a copyright
license should not attempt to have anything to do with them, any more than it
should have anything to do with patent rights, design rights, or trademarks!
(Or, for that matter, rights to trade secrets, merchandising rights,
advertising and likeness rights, or the right to privacy!) How about a simple
disclaimer: "This copyright licence does not pretend to affect the
inalienable moral rights of the author." That solves your legal problem,
without *any* trouble.
I'm beginning to suspect that the FSF isn't listening with their minds open.
:-( I still hope I'm wrong.
--Nathanael
Stephane Bortzmeyer
Nathanael Nerode <ner...@twcny.rr.com> wrote
> Under *some* countries using the *minority* Droit d'Auteur system, perhaps.
...
> Under the system used in the majority of the world,
I strongly object: Great Britain and its former colonies are not the
majority of the world, whatever your criteria (number of inhabitants,
GNP, etc) are.
Stephane Bortzmeyer
subject. Georg, I can suppress you from the Cc: if you wish so.]
On Sun, Apr 27, 2003 at 11:25:43PM -0400,
Nathanael Nerode <ner...@twcny.rr.com> wrote
a message of 29 lines which said:
> >Naturally, I'm more familiar with the European Copyright -- or Droit
> >d'Auteur, rather -- systems, but since Europe is a very active region
> >for Free Software, considering the European situation seems useful.
>
> Please note that this system is contrary in its basis to the system in the
> US, which is also used in some form in most common-law based countries (most
> of the world). Under these systems copyright is a government-granted monopoly
> and not a 'natural right'. The 'Droit d'Auteur' system is *much* more
> hostile to free software, free documentation, free speech, fair use rights,
> library privilege, the public domain, etc., etc., etc.
Can you explain the above? I do not see why and in which way the
"Droit d'auteur" system is more hostile to free software. There is
currently a lot of lobbying in Europe and in the world against this
"Droit d'auteur" system and pro-copyright and this lobbying is mostly
driven by the same companies that oppose free software...
Branden Robinson
> On Sun, Apr 27, 2003 at 11:47:57PM -0400,
> Nathanael Nerode <ner...@twcny.rr.com> wrote
> a message of 50 lines which said:
>
> > Under *some* countries using the *minority* Droit d'Auteur system, perhaps.
> ...
> > Under the system used in the majority of the world,
>
> I strongly object: Great Britain and its former colonies are not the
> majority of the world, whatever your criteria (number of inhabitants,
> GNP, etc) are.
I strongly object to your objection. The U.S., U.K., and other
countries using the "common law" legal system are important enough
within the domain of discussion (Free Software distributed by the Debian
Project) to be granted consideration.
Your sniping is a major distraction from the point of Mr. Nerode's
message.
In any event, if non-common law countries have legal frameworks that
technically render Free Software as conceived by the FSF and the Debian
Project impossible, then that's a problem for the citizens of those
countries to address. The influence of non-corporate foreigners will be
practically negligible.
--
G. Branden Robinson | Communism is just one step on the
Debian GNU/Linux | long road from capitalism to
bra...@debian.org | capitalism.
http://people.debian.org/~branden/ | -- Russian saying
Henning Makholm
> On Mon, Apr 28, 2003 at 12:31:42PM +0200, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
> > > Under *some* countries using the *minority* Droit d'Auteur
> > > system, perhaps. =20
> > > Under the system used in the majority of the world,=20
> > I strongly object: Great Britain and its former colonies are not the
> > majority of the world, whatever your criteria (number of inhabitants,
> > GNP, etc) are.
> I strongly object to your objection. The U.S., U.K., and other
> countries using the "common law" legal system are important enough
> within the domain of discussion (Free Software distributed by the Debian
> Project) to be granted consideration.
It is true that the common-law part of the world is important. That
does not make it a "majority", which was what Nathanael claimed it
was.
--
Henning Makholm "... and that Greek, Thucydides"
Nick Phillips
> Can you explain the above? I do not see why and in which way the
> "Droit d'auteur" system is more hostile to free software. There is
> currently a lot of lobbying in Europe and in the world against this
> "Droit d'auteur" system and pro-copyright and this lobbying is mostly
> driven by the same companies that oppose free software...
I guess the reason for that opposition is because it empowers the
original, human, author in such a way that the large publishing company
cannot possibly disenfranchise him by conning him into signing a
particularly vicious contract when he desperately needs their money.
The motivation of that company is evidently to make lots of money doing
whatever the hell they like with the author's work, having paid the author
a pittance in the first place. The fact that the author still has a degree
of control of the work makes the company's investment in distribution
more risky.
Our problem is not that we want to make lots of money, but that our
investment in distribution and in building other systems/documents
using the work in question as a starting point is more risky.
Both the nasty big company and the nice free software distributors
are at the mercy of the author's whim.
There are provisions in the law to mitigate that risk, but...
Cheers,
Nick
--
Nick Phillips -- n...@lemon-computing.com
You will feel hungry again in another hour.
Stephane Bortzmeyer
> Can you explain the above? I do not see why and in which way the
> "Droit d'auteur" system is more hostile to free software.
Since you did not reply, I take the liberty, in order to stop further
spreading of this FUD, to explain why there is no incompatibility
between the "droit d'auteur" and the common law's copyright system.
Background: IANAL but I studied the issue in depth and the legal
opinions expressed here comply with the work done by real lawyers
(references at the end). I'm French so I eat stinking cheese. My
English is far from perfect, sorry.
Definitions: "Droit d'auteur" (a French word meaning "author's right")
is commonly used to describe the legal system used in most
Europe. "Common law's copyright" is commonly used to describe the
legal system used in Great Britain and its former colonies. There is a
lot of fighting, specially between the USA and the European Union,
between these two systems. I will deal here only with the issue of
free software.
Differences: as far as free software is concerned, the big difference
between the two systems seems to be that, under the "Droit d'auteur",
the author has a "moral right" which can *not* be waived or granted to
anyone else. Such a "moral right" does not exist under "common law's
copyright". The author also has a right to exploit (financially or
not) its work, and this "exploitation right" ("droit patrimonial" in
French) can be granted to someone else (an employer, for instance).
At first glance, it seems that this "moral right" could be a problem
with free software licences where the author renounces to some of her
rights.
But it is not a real problem. Under the "droit d'auteur", the author's
right over *software* is quite limited, (unlike other work, such as
books). For instance, she cannot object to a change in the software by
the owner of the "exploitation right". She only keeps the right to be
identified ("Software written by Sue Foobar") and a limited right to
distribute her work.
At least for the GPL, the author does not revokes any of the rights
that he have under the "droit d'auteur". See [clement 1999] "Une
obligation positive : Le respect du droit moral de l'auteur".
So, there is no reason to oppose "droit d'auteur" and free
software. On the contrary, there is currently a lot of lobbying in
Europe and in the world against this "Droit d'auteur" system and this
lobbying is mostly driven by the same companies that oppose free
software...
References:
[clement 1999] Mélanie Clément-Fontaine "La Licence Publique Générale
GNU" <URL:http://crao.net/gpl/>. The reference in French: the author
concludes that the GPL (and probably other free software licences) is
perfectly compatible with the French law, including the issue of
"droit d'auteur".
[clement 2003] Mélanie Clément-Fontaine "Pluralité et singularité des
logiciels libres". With a different point of view, the same
conclusion, extended to other licences.
[sedallian 2002] Valérie Sédallian "Garanties et responsabilités dans
les logiciels libres"
<URL:http://www.juriscom.net/pro/2/da20020901.htm>
Stephane Bortzmeyer
Branden Robinson <bra...@debian.org> wrote
> > I strongly object: Great Britain and its former colonies are not the
> > majority of the world, whatever your criteria (number of inhabitants,
> > GNP, etc) are.
>
> I strongly object to your objection. The U.S., U.K., and other
> countries using the "common law" legal system are important enough
> within the domain of discussion (Free Software distributed by the Debian
> Project) to be granted consideration.
I never said to ignore them. I objected to an argument from Nathanael
Nerode saying in essence that the majority should prevail. Taking into
account common law is fine. Deciding that common law should have the
last word because of a (non-existing) majority is not.
> In any event, if non-common law countries have legal frameworks that
> technically render Free Software as conceived by the FSF and the Debian
> Project impossible,
Pure FUD. See my rebuke of Nathanael Nerode's message that I just
sent.
Stephane Bortzmeyer
Nick Phillips <n...@nz.lemon-computing.com> wrote
> I guess the reason for that opposition is because it empowers the
> original, human, author in such a way that the large publishing company
> cannot possibly disenfranchise him by conning him into signing a
> particularly vicious contract when he desperately needs their money.
Yes, and it seems to me a nice aim. This is why I oppose the "common
law copyright".
> Both the nasty big company and the nice free software distributors
> are at the mercy of the author's whim.
I disagree. See the detailed message I just sent to debian-legal, with
references.
Stephane Bortzmeyer
Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortz...@debian.org> wrote
> spreading of this FUD, to explain why there is no incompatibility
> between the "droit d'auteur" and the common law's copyright system.
Our smart readers certainly fixed that by themselves. I wanted to
write:
there is no incompatibility between the "droit d'auteur" and free
software.
:-}
Edmund GRIMLEY EVANS
> Differences: as far as free software is concerned, the big difference
> between the two systems seems to be that, under the "Droit d'auteur",
> the author has a "moral right" which can *not* be waived or granted to
> anyone else.
We already have "OT" in the subject, so may I ask whether this "moral
right" ceases with the death of the author, or whether a hostile
descendent can use it to prevent reproduction of the author's work?
Also, what does it mean to say that the "moral right" can not be
waived or granted to anyone else? I would guess it means that a
contract that tries to do so is unenforceable. However, presumably
that doesn't stop company X from paying a certain sum every month to
the author with the understanding that payments will cease if the
author tries to assert her moral rights, or the company not suing the
author so long as the author doesn't assert her moral rights. In these
cases there is no contract that needs to be enforced by the courts, so
any attempt by the legal system to prevent the "moral right" from
being waived through contract law is bound to fail.
Edmund
Stephane Bortzmeyer
Edmund GRIMLEY EVANS <edm...@rano.org> wrote
> We already have "OT" in the subject, so may I ask whether this "moral
> right" ceases with the death of the author,
For non-software, it was 50 years after the death of the author, it is
now 70 (corporations lobbied a lot for that). For software, I'm not
sure.
> or whether a hostile descendent can use it to prevent reproduction
> of the author's work?
Unfortunately, yes and it already happened. That 70-years rule is a
big problem.
> contract that tries to do so is unenforceable. However, presumably
> that doesn't stop company X from paying a certain sum every month to
> the author with the understanding that payments will cease if the
> author tries to assert her moral rights, or the company not suing the
> author so long as the author doesn't assert her moral rights.
And the Mafia can shoot you if you do not do what they want. Every
legal system has such limits.
> cases there is no contract that needs to be enforced by the courts, so
> any attempt by the legal system to prevent the "moral right" from
> being waived through contract law is bound to fail.
This is clearly wrong: authors win in court against their employers
often.
Edmund GRIMLEY EVANS
> > We already have "OT" in the subject, so may I ask whether this "moral
> > right" ceases with the death of the author,
>
> For non-software, it was 50 years after the death of the author, it is
> now 70 (corporations lobbied a lot for that). For software, I'm not
> sure.
Then put me down as someone who is opposed to moral rights. There's no
way I want someone else after my death using my moral rights to
override the licence I gave when I was alive.
Or is there perhaps a work-around? Would it be possibly to set up a
"moral rights non-enforcement organisation", which doesn't actually do
anything, and is indeed constituted so as to be incapable of ever
doing anything, and then have authors bequeath their moral rights to
this organisation? Or does the law prevent moral rights from being
held by a corporation even after the author's death?
> > contract that tries to do so is unenforceable. However, presumably
> > that doesn't stop company X from paying a certain sum every month to
> > the author with the understanding that payments will cease if the
> > author tries to assert her moral rights, or the company not suing the
> > author so long as the author doesn't assert her moral rights.
>
> And the Mafia can shoot you if you do not do what they want. Every
> legal system has such limits.
It is illegal for the Mafia to shoot or threaten to shoot me. However,
it is probably not illegal for a company to stop paying me a monthly
"donation".
> > cases there is no contract that needs to be enforced by the courts, so
> > any attempt by the legal system to prevent the "moral right" from
> > being waived through contract law is bound to fail.
>
> This is clearly wrong: authors win in court against their employers
> often.
However, in the absense of a contract I presumably cannot force a
former employer to continue paying me a monthly "donation".
Note: I'm not claiming that there is no difference between negotiable
and non-negotiable rights. I'm just pointing out a likely limitation
to non-negotiability which has nothing to do with your Mafia scenario.
Perhaps there is some way the law can overcome this limitation, but I
doubt it, because they've never managed to stop prostitution, for
which a comparable legal situation exists in many jurisdictions.
This is way off topic, so let's kill this subthread, but I would like
to know the answer to my question about inheritance of moral rights.
Edmund
Greg Pomerantz
> Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortz...@debian.org> wrote
>
> But it is not a real problem. Under the "droit d'auteur", the author's
> right over *software* is quite limited, (unlike other work, such as
> books). For instance, she cannot object to a change in the software by
> the owner of the "exploitation right". She only keeps the right to be
> identified ("Software written by Sue Foobar") and a limited right to
> distribute her work.
I am not an expert on droit d'auteur, but I see two seemingly
insurmountable problems with it from a free software perspective. If
you are saying that these rights don't apply to software (or that I
misunderstand them), then great:
1) The right of integrity. Quoting your paper: "The right of integrity
broadly protects works from being changed or used in ways that offend
the creators vision of the work." Is this an inalienable right of
an author to prevent certain uses of a piece of software, or to
prevent certain modifications (say, e.g. addition of DRM features)?
If so, then the right of integrity interferes with the desire of free
software authors to divest themselves of legal control over the future
development of a program.
2) Droit repentir, which is not universal in moral rights jurisdictions
but applies at least in France. It is the right of an author to withdraw
the original work from the public. Does this not apply to software? Or
is this merely a "you can use it, but remove my name and email address"
kind of thing?
Greg
Jeremy Hankins
> For non-software, it was 50 years after the death of the author, it is
> now 70 (corporations lobbied a lot for that). For software, I'm not
> sure.
Since there's been a lot of talk about the difficulty in making a
distinction between software and non-software, do you know how the law
you're referring to makes this distinction? Where would fonts,
javascript embedded in html, latex source, postscript, etc, fit into
this scheme?
--
Jeremy Hankins <no...@nowan.org>
PGP fingerprint: 748F 4D16 538E 75D6 8333 9E10 D212 B5ED 37D0 0A03
Henning Makholm
> We already have "OT" in the subject, so may I ask whether this "moral
> right" ceases with the death of the author, or whether a hostile
> descendent can use it to prevent reproduction of the author's work?
FUD. Moral rights do not allow a hostile descendant to prevent
reproduction, once the right to reproduce has been granted.
Here is my translation of the relevant section of Danish copyright
law:
§3. The author can demand to be identified in accordance to what
good practise requires, on copies of the work as well as when
it is made available to the public.
sub 2. The work must not be changed or made available to the public
in a way or in a context that violates the author's literary or
artistic reputation or character.
sub 3. The author cannot waive his rights according to this
section, except as regards uses that in limited circumstances or
quantities.
None of these is any problem for free software. Naming the author is
commonly demanded by licenses, even BSD-style ones. And I don't think
that the author of a piece of software has any "literary or artistic
reputation or character" connected with it. Anyway, by voluntarily
releasing his work under a free license, the author unmistakenly
states that his literary or artistic reputation cannot be considered
violated by any form of derived work.
--
Henning Makholm "And when we retire, we will write the gospels."
Mark Rafn
> Scripsit Edmund GRIMLEY EVANS <edm...@rano.org>
> sub 2. The work must not be changed or made available to the public
> in a way or in a context that violates the author's literary or
> artistic reputation or character.
>
> sub 3. The author cannot waive his rights according to this
> section, except as regards uses that in limited circumstances or
> quantities.
>
> None of these is any problem for free software.
sub 2 seems to be a large problem, as I read it.
> And I don't think that the author of a piece of software has any
> "literary or artistic reputation or character" connected with it.
You don't? I think that artistic reputation is among the common reasons
for releasing free software. It seems unlikely that Linus Torvalds's
reputation is completely unrelated to software he's written.
> Anyway, by voluntarily releasing his work under a free license, the
> author unmistakenly states that his literary or artistic reputation
> cannot be considered violated by any form of derived work.
Except he cannot actually grant this blanket permission under sub 3. If
he decided he didn't want the Linux kernel used for a cruise missile, it
sounds like he would have a pretty strong claim (in this jurisdiction, at
least).
--
Mark Rafn da...@dagon.net <http://www.dagon.net/>
Mark Rafn
> But it is not a real problem. Under the "droit d'auteur", the author's
> right over *software* is quite limited
Is this the basic point by which "moral rights" do not prevent software
from being free? They're not generally applied to software?
So, for the right to prevent "mutilation" of a work, which an author has
over her book, but not over her software: What if the software is
published as a book? What if the book is published as software (either as
an e-book or by using characters and storyline in a computer game)? What
about book-like content (help files, tutorials, etc) in software?
[back to the topic of the GFDL and free documentation]
Over and above the problems in distinguishing types of work, why
would I call a license which attempts to impose this system on me if I
don't live in such a place "free"?
If recognition of moral rights is a requirement for a free documentation
license, I propose the GPL be used with the notation that "none of these
terms is intended to infringe those rights over which an author cannot
grant permissions".
Is this sufficient to cover droit d'auteur jurisdictions without
limiting the right to modify in common-law areas?
--
Mark Rafn da...@dagon.net <http://www.dagon.net/>
--
Henning Makholm
> On Wed, 30 Apr 2003, Henning Makholm wrote:
> > And I don't think that the author of a piece of software has any
> > "literary or artistic reputation or character" connected with it.
> You don't? I think that artistic reputation is among the common reasons
> for releasing free software. It seems unlikely that Linus Torvalds's
> reputation is completely unrelated to software he's written.
It is not an artistic reputation.
> > Anyway, by voluntarily releasing his work under a free license, the
> > author unmistakenly states that his literary or artistic reputation
> > cannot be considered violated by any form of derived work.
> Except he cannot actually grant this blanket permission under sub 3.
He cannot grant a permission to violate. But since no violation is
possible, that does not matter.
> If he decided he didn't want the Linux kernel used for a cruise
> missile, it sounds like he would have a pretty strong claim
Not according to the law I quoted.
> (in this jurisdiction, at least).
Which is "this jurisdiction"?
--
Henning Makholm "Luk munden og se begavet ud!"
Steve Langasek
> Scripsit Mark Rafn <da...@dagon.net>
> > On Wed, 30 Apr 2003, Henning Makholm wrote:
> > > And I don't think that the author of a piece of software has any
> > > "literary or artistic reputation or character" connected with it.
> > You don't? I think that artistic reputation is among the common reasons
> > for releasing free software. It seems unlikely that Linus Torvalds's
> > reputation is completely unrelated to software he's written.
> It is not an artistic reputation.
I have a hard time accepting the argument that Droit d'auteur is not a
threat to Free Software on the grounds that it unduly discriminates
against forms of artistic expression that are also software.
--
Steve Langasek
postmodern programmer
Mark Rafn
> > > And I don't think that the author of a piece of software has any
> > > "literary or artistic reputation or character" connected with it.
> Scripsit Mark Rafn <da...@dagon.net>
> > You don't? I think that artistic reputation is among the common reasons
> > for releasing free software. It seems unlikely that Linus Torvalds's
> > reputation is completely unrelated to software he's written.
On Wed, 1 May 2003, Henning Makholm wrote:
> It is not an artistic reputation.
Ok, how about Tuomas Kuosmanen, the creator of a whole lot of fine icons
in various free software packages? Would his qualify as an "artistic
reputation"?
Would he be able, regardless of the fact that his icons are released
under GPL, to prevent his work from being included in an accounting
package he didn't like?
[note: I don't know anything about Mr. Kuosmanen except for his free
software work. There is no reason to believe that he dislikes
accountants.]
> > (in this jurisdiction, at least).
> Which is "this jurisdiction"?
Any place which disallows a permission to create derived works without
reservation. This seems to be the crux of droit d'auteur, unless I'm
missing the point entirely.
--
Mark Rafn da...@dagon.net <http://www.dagon.net/>
Anthony DeRobertis
> This appears to represent a consensus view of Debian:
> * Some people believe that immutable sections are not acceptable in a free
> document,
Aye.
> but a majority of Debian seems to think that immutable sections are
> free provided they consist of non-technical material.
Nay. If they are removable, then it is possible to make the document
free (by removing them)
>
> * A large majority of Debian seems to think that *non-removable* immutable
> sections (which GFDL "invariant sections" are) are an unacceptable
> infringement of the right to modify, the sole exceptions being copyright
> notices and the associated licence texts.
Aye.
> Perhaps the most impressive is the following: Suppose I wish to use large
> sections of the Emacs manual in a treatise on free software. The GNU FDL
> grants me *NO* rights to do so, because I must keep the invariant section
> (the GNU Manifesto), but it would become an illegitimate invariant section
> (because it is now on the main topic of the work). I'd better hope my use is
> minimal enough to qualify under fair use principles.
Ouch.
Anthony DeRobertis
> As a final note, 'moral rights' are *not* 'copyrights', and a copyright
> license should not attempt to have anything to do with them, any more than it
> should have anything to do with patent rights, design rights, or trademarks!
You are aware that the GPL deals with those, and that without dealing
with them, its copyleft would be easily defeated.
For example: I modify a GPL program adding a major new feature. Being an
Evil Software Conglomorate(sp?), I decide I really want to hold my
changes proprietary. So I patent them. Sure, you can have the source,
but you can't use it without a patent license from me!
Anthony DeRobertis
> sub 2. The work must not be changed or made available to the public
> in a way or in a context that violates the author's literary or
> artistic reputation or character.
So, I assume that if a work which has artistic or literary value is
licensed under the GPL, version 2, people living outside common-law
countries can't modify and distribute because of:
7. [...] If you cannot distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously
your obligations under this License and any other pertinent
obligations, then as a consequence you may not distribute the
Program at all.
Interesting.
/me wonders if there are more countries besides his own that need to be
no longer considered part of the free world. :-D
Edmund GRIMLEY EVANS
> > In any event, if non-common law countries have legal frameworks that
> > technically render Free Software as conceived by the FSF and the Debian
> > Project impossible,
>
> Pure FUD. See my rebuke of Nathanael Nerode's message that I just
> sent.
I think the truth is that some non-common-law countries (France?) have
laws relating to moral rights that might make it hard or impossible to
fully guarantee the DFSG-freedom of certain works, which may or may
not include works that would normally be described as "software". It's
a real problem, potentially, rather like the problem which may exist
in some common-law countries (Australia?) where contracts require
"consideration" and licences might be treated like contracts by the
courts. We probably don't need to change the GPL or the DFSG because
of these potential problems, but it's perhaps not a complete waste of
time to talk about them.
Edmund
Matthew Palmer
> Scripsit Mark Rafn <da...@dagon.net>
> > On Wed, 30 Apr 2003, Henning Makholm wrote:
>
> > > And I don't think that the author of a piece of software has any
> > > "literary or artistic reputation or character" connected with it.
>
> > You don't? I think that artistic reputation is among the common reasons
> > for releasing free software. It seems unlikely that Linus Torvalds's
> > reputation is completely unrelated to software he's written.
>
> It is not an artistic reputation.
Ooooh, I'd be mighty careful starting *that* little flamewar. Some people
consider their programming to be art; I've seen plenty of people whose code
certainly has no hallmarks of scientific method. Consider also the way some
programmers react when their code is criticised - like many artists get
defensive about their works...
Programming, writing a novel, and painting a picture are all, at their core,
creative endeavours. Perhaps "moral rights" in the EU specifically discount
writing software as an artistic endeavour (you may even have mentioned it
and I missed it). If "moral rights" do this, then you are perfectly
correct, and I'll keep quiet on the matter...
> > > Anyway, by voluntarily releasing his work under a free license, the
> > > author unmistakenly states that his literary or artistic reputation
> > > cannot be considered violated by any form of derived work.
>
> > Except he cannot actually grant this blanket permission under sub 3.
>
> He cannot grant a permission to violate. But since no violation is
> possible, that does not matter.
Can no violation take place because software is treated differently under
"moral rights" than other creative endeavours?
--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
#include <disclaimer.h>
Matthew Palmer, Geek In Residence
http://ieee.uow.edu.au/~mjp16
Bernhard R. Link
> On Wed, 2003-04-30 at 12:37, Henning Makholm wrote:
>
> > sub 2. The work must not be changed or made available to the public
> > in a way or in a context that violates the author's literary or
> > artistic reputation or character.
>
> So, I assume that if a work which has artistic or literary value is
> licensed under the GPL, version 2, people living outside common-law
> countries can't modify and distribute because of:
>
> 7. [...] If you cannot distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously
> your obligations under this License and any other pertinent
> obligations, then as a consequence you may not distribute the
> Program at all.
>
> Interesting.
I cannot see the problem here. Even if the quoted "sub 2" can be
applied, it may only disallow you making something available to
the public (i.e. some forms of distributing it).
The quoted "point 7" would only apply, if one wasn't allowed to
distribute copies with source and allowing the receiver everything
allowed by GPL. (As this are the mentioned obligations mentioned in
the GPL).
> /me wonders if there are more countries besides his own that need to be
> no longer considered part of the free world. :-D
Even extreme legislations for author's rights does not reduce the ability
to create free software (though those rights might only performed in
other countries), as long as law does not demand, that people have to
encode laws in contracts they make. (Things like "You are not
allowed to use this software to commit crimes". And I guess such
requirements will not exist in any sane (i.e. not 'common')
jurisdisction. After all, why should people be forced to forbid things
already forbid by law?)
Hochachtungsvoll,
Bernhard R. Link
--
Sendmail is like emacs: A nice operating system, but missing
an editor and a MTA.
Mark Rafn
> > On Wed, 2003-04-30 at 12:37, Henning Makholm wrote:
> >
> > > sub 2. The work must not be changed or made available to the public
> > > in a way or in a context that violates the author's literary or
> > > artistic reputation or character.
> * Anthony DeRobertis <a...@suespammers.org> [030501 12:56]:
> > So, I assume that if a work which has artistic or literary value is
> > licensed under the GPL, version 2, people living outside common-law
> > countries can't modify and distribute because of:
> > 7. [...] If you cannot distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously
> > your obligations under this License and any other pertinent
> > obligations, then as a consequence you may not distribute the
> > Program at all.
On Thu, 1 May 2003, Bernhard R. Link wrote:
> I cannot see the problem here. Even if the quoted "sub 2" can be
> applied, it may only disallow you making something available to
> the public (i.e. some forms of distributing it).
It says "changed _OR_ made available to the public". This restricts
private modifications as well. But even without that, the restriction on
"made available to the public ... in a context that violates the author's
literary or artistic reputation or character" is enough to prevent any
distribution under the GPL.
> The quoted "point 7" would only apply, if one wasn't allowed to
> distribute copies with source and allowing the receiver everything
> allowed by GPL. (As this are the mentioned obligations mentioned in
> the GPL).
Under droit d'auteur, you're not allowed to grant unqualified permission
to the reciever of a work to make modifications or to distribute the work.
You cannot fulfil the GPL requirements, so you cannot distribute the work.
> > /me wonders if there are more countries besides his own that need to be
> > no longer considered part of the free world. :-D
>
> Even extreme legislations for author's rights does not reduce the ability
> to create free software (though those rights might only performed in
> other countries), as long as law does not demand, that people have to
> encode laws in contracts they make.
This I heartily agree with. A work created in a droit d'auteur location
and released under the GPL is freely distributable and modifiable in a
common-law jurisdiction. It may be undistributable at all in it's home
country, though.
It's a very strong reason for NOT accepting a license which attempts to
enforce these rights under common-law copyright.
--
Mark Rafn da...@dagon.net <http://www.dagon.net/>
Bernhard R. Link
> On Thu, 1 May 2003, Bernhard R. Link wrote:
> > I cannot see the problem here. Even if the quoted "sub 2" can be
> > applied, it may only disallow you making something available to
> > the public (i.e. some forms of distributing it).
>
> It says "changed _OR_ made available to the public". This restricts
> private modifications as well. But even without that, the restriction on
> "made available to the public ... in a context that violates the author's
> literary or artistic reputation or character" is enough to prevent any
> distribution under the GPL.
First of all, it speaks of "changed or made available to the public
in a way, that ...", which clearly indicates, that changing is just
meant as special form of discrediting the author. (Also consider the
wording is the wording of a translation, so please read by meaning and
not by letter).
> > The quoted "point 7" would only apply, if one wasn't allowed to
> > distribute copies with source and allowing the receiver everything
> > allowed by GPL. (As this are the mentioned obligations mentioned in
> > the GPL).
>
> Under droit d'auteur, you're not allowed to grant unqualified permission
> to the reciever of a work to make modifications or to distribute the work.
> You cannot fulfil the GPL requirements, so you cannot distribute the work.
If author's rights would be introduced in the USA, this might be the
case. I do not know about denmark, but here in Germany I am allowed to
give any permissions I want. (People might not be able to do so, as
law or other people forbid them to exercise it, but this does not
limit me, as long as I do not formulate a incitement in the form of
a permission)
Just ask yourself: Are you allowed to grant a permission to someone
to use a piece of GPL'd software to drive a plane in an arbitrary
tower? If not, are you still allowed to distribute software under
the GPL?
> > > /me wonders if there are more countries besides his own that need to be
> > > no longer considered part of the free world. :-D
> > Even extreme legislations for author's rights does not reduce the ability
> > to create free software (though those rights might only performed in
> > other countries), as long as law does not demand, that people have to
> > encode laws in contracts they make.
> This I heartily agree with. A work created in a droit d'auteur location
> and released under the GPL is freely distributable and modifiable in a
> common-law jurisdiction. It may be undistributable at all in it's home
> country, though.
As stated before, such laws only limit ways of distribution, not
distribution at all. I guess here in Germany, law will allow you to
stop me, if I take any of your code and produce some movie where
an actor dressed as Hitler sits before a computer and types in your
code, if it is easily enough seen as attack on you.
Distributions not forbidden directly by law are not affected by this.
This is like those warrenty disclaimers or disassembling prohibitions
in many EULAs or licenses, that AFAIK just disappear in a puff of logic
when they pass the German border.
Hochachtungsvoll,
Bernhard R. Link
--
Sendmail is like emacs: A nice operating system, but missing
an editor and a MTA.
Nick Phillips
> Under droit d'auteur, you're not allowed to grant unqualified permission
> to the reciever of a work to make modifications or to distribute the work.
> You cannot fulfil the GPL requirements, so you cannot distribute the work.
You appear to be confusing things. The GPL places no restriction on the
original author, so the original author may obviously distribute their
own work. As a redistributor of a GPL'ed work, you are not involved in the
granting of rights in any way -- the rights are automatically granted by
the original author to a recipient at the point when the recipient receives.
The problem would only arise in a situation where you were the author of a
work which used a GPL'ed library and were in a position where you were
forbidden to license your work under the GPL. I don't see anything to that
effect here, merely that some portions of it may not be enforcible by
recipients who wish to redistribute if at some later point you decide that
your previous work now offends your newfound delicate moral sensibilities.
And that only if that element of the Droits d'Auteur were applied to software
(or if your work were not deemed to be software, but rather something more
"artistic" instead... what the f*** were the guys who thought this up smoking?)
Cheers,
Nick
--
Nick Phillips -- n...@lemon-computing.com
You will be Told about it Tomorrow. Go Home and Prepare Thyself.
Henning Makholm
> Ok, how about Tuomas Kuosmanen, the creator of a whole lot of fine icons
> in various free software packages? Would his qualify as an "artistic
> reputation"?
Perhaps.
> Would he be able, regardless of the fact that his icons are released
> under GPL, to prevent his work from being included in an accounting
> package he didn't like?
I don't think so. On the contrary, BECAUSE of the fact that he
voluntarily released his icons under GPL, it is an integral part of
the artistic character of the work that it can be used in any context
and with any modifications anyone pleases. Therefore, no actual use or
modification can conceivably violate that artistic character, so §3
subsection 2 can never apply to the work.
It might be a different story if he released them under GPL not
because of artistic vision but because someone paid him to do so.
> Any place which disallows a permission to create derived works without
> reservation.
Which Denmark is not, your inability to understand it (or my inability
to explain it) nonwithstanding.
--
Henning Makholm "De kan rejse hid og did i verden nok så flot
Og er helt fortrolig med alverdens militær"
Henning Makholm
> The main problem with moral rights seems to be inalienability. As far as
> I understand it, artists can decide at the time of the use of the work
> whether they believe it is prejudicial to their "honor and reputation."
That's a misunderstanding. It is not the artist who decides this.
Sure, the artist may have an *opinion* about it, but the law calls for
an *objective* judgement. And if the use does not objectively violate
the artistic character of the work, the artist's opinion will not help
him in court.
> They cannot promise to never raise such an objection. You seem to be
> implying that by applying the GPL to a work, the developer irrevocably
> divests herself from certain moral rights.
No. The moral rights still exist, but they must be interpreted in the
context of the particular work. If the particular work is created to
be free, the moral right becomes harder to violate.
> Can't a developer GPL a work today, but tomorrow decide that use in
> cruise missiles is not allowed?
He can decide whatever he wants for himself (we do have freedom of
thought), but it will have no effect at all on the decision whether
use in cruise missiles violates the work's artistic character.
> In other words, if that developer walked into court, would the judge ask
> what the artistic character of the work is today, or at the time of its
> initial creation?
That is the same thing - the artistic character of the work logically
cannot change because of the artist's later action.
> Second, I would imagine that a developer can argue or reinterpret
> their initial intent.
Possibly, but that is not a case of moral rights - it is just a matter
of conventional contract interpretation.
> For example, they may never have thought that a particular piece of
> code could find its way into a DRM system.
Stupidity does not create rights. (Opposite in some other parts of the
world where one can become rich simply by being too stupid to imagine
that coffee might be hot).
--
Henning Makholm "Hi! I'm an Ellen Jamesian. Do
you know what an Ellen Jamesian is?"
Greg Pomerantz
> voluntarily released his icons under GPL, it is an integral part of
> the artistic character of the work that it can be used in any context
> and with any modifications anyone pleases. Therefore, no actual use or
> modification can conceivably violate that artistic character, so §3
> subsection 2 can never apply to the work.
>
> It might be a different story if he released them under GPL not
> because of artistic vision but because someone paid him to do so.
In many cases of interest, works are released under the GPL because
they are derivative works of prior GPL'd works. Contributors to GPL'd
projects are required to license under the GPL and do not do so because
it expresses the artistic character of their work. Under your test, it
would appear that contributors would retain free-software-incompatible
moral rights over their contributions.
The main problem with moral rights seems to be inalienability. As far as
I understand it, artists can decide at the time of the use of the work
whether they believe it is prejudicial to their "honor and reputation."
They cannot promise to never raise such an objection. You seem to be
implying that by applying the GPL to a work, the developer irrevocably
divests herself from certain moral rights. Can't a developer GPL a work
today, but tomorrow decide that use in cruise missiles is not allowed?
In other words, if that developer walked into court, would the judge ask
what the artistic character of the work is today, or at the time of its
initial creation? If a developer convincingly argued that her reputation
was seriously harmred by a particular use, would a judge really say that
the application of the GPL in the past trumps that?
Second, I would imagine that a developer can argue or reinterpret
their initial intent. For example, they may never have thought that a
particular piece of code could find its way into a DRM system. Can't
they argue that they GPL'd the work years ago, but never intended the
work to be used for some particular evil use (for example because they
never imagined that particular use)?
Best regards,
Greg Pomerantz
Mark Rafn
> > to the reciever of a work to make modifications or to distribute the work.
> > You cannot fulfil the GPL requirements, so you cannot distribute the work.
On Fri, 2 May 2003, Bernhard R. Link wrote:
> If author's rights would be introduced in the USA, this might be the
> case. I do not know about denmark, but here in Germany I am allowed to
> give any permissions I want. (People might not be able to do so, as
> law or other people forbid them to exercise it, but this does not
> limit me, as long as I do not formulate a incitement in the form of
> a permission)
>
> Just ask yourself: Are you allowed to grant a permission to someone
> to use a piece of GPL'd software to drive a plane in an arbitrary
> tower? If not, are you still allowed to distribute software under
> the GPL?
I understand this point, but it's a pretty important difference. If I
grant permission to use my GPL software to drive a plane into a tower, it
is not I, but the tower inhabitants, who would attempt to prevent such
use. And they would not use copyright law to do so, I expect.
Still, enough people far more knowledgeable than I have asserted that
droit d'auteur does not prevent distribution of a derived work of a GPL'ed
work, so I'll stop looking for edge cases.
I do maintain that a license which attempts to impose such restrictions
explicitly is non-free.
--
Mark Rafn da...@dagon.net <http://www.dagon.net/>
Greg Pomerantz
> > I understand it, artists can decide at the time of the use of the work
> > whether they believe it is prejudicial to their "honor and reputation."
>
> That's a misunderstanding. It is not the artist who decides this.
> Sure, the artist may have an *opinion* about it, but the law calls for
> an *objective* judgement. And if the use does not objectively violate
> the artistic character of the work, the artist's opinion will not help
> him in court.
Thanks for the clarification.
> > They cannot promise to never raise such an objection. You seem to be
> > implying that by applying the GPL to a work, the developer irrevocably
> > divests herself from certain moral rights.
>
> No. The moral rights still exist, but they must be interpreted in the
> context of the particular work. If the particular work is created to
> be free, the moral right becomes harder to violate.
>
> > Second, I would imagine that a developer can argue or reinterpret
> > their initial intent.
>
> Possibly, but that is not a case of moral rights - it is just a matter
> of conventional contract interpretation.
Yes, but a free software developer cannot walk into court and argue
that they did not intend to grant the right to redistribute -- free
software licenses are clear on that point, but generally silent on moral
rights issues. At the very least, the GPL and most other free software
licenses are be problematic in moral rights jurisdictions simply because
the developer's intentions with respect to moral rights are not made
clear by those licenses. The trouble is, developers choose free software
licenses for all kinds of reasons, including legal necessity (e.g. when
they derrive from a GPL'd work).
> > For example, they may never have thought that a particular piece of
> > code could find its way into a DRM system.
>
> Stupidity does not create rights. (Opposite in some other parts of the
> world where one can become rich simply by being too stupid to imagine
> that coffee might be hot).
Say hypothetically that the LAME developers have an artistic vision to
allow music fans to freely (as in freedom) rip music from the CDs the
purchase. Universal Records uses LAME to make copy protected CDs (see
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-277197.html). How is it stupid if the LAME
developers walk into a moral rights jurisdiction and ask Universal to
stop?
Best regards,
Greg Pomerantz
Edmund GRIMLEY EVANS
> Stupidity does not create rights. (Opposite in some other parts of the
> world where one can become rich simply by being too stupid to imagine
> that coffee might be hot).
Punitive damages are a stupid concept (does any country other than the
USA have them?) but that case, although famous, isn't the best example
to show it:
http://www.denbar.org/docket/2002/september/mccoffee.htm
Richard Braakman
> Stupidity does not create rights. (Opposite in some other parts of the
> world where one can become rich simply by being too stupid to imagine
> that coffee might be hot).
Can we put this legend to rest? I realize this is off-topic, but I
hate seeing such claims go unrefuted.
1. The coffee in question was *much* hotter than coffee is normally served.
It was far too hot to be drinkable, which is not something you'd expect.
2. The lady in question didn't deliberately spill coffee over herself
because she thought it wouldn't be hot. She accidentally squeezed
the mug while trying to get the lid off. This has nothing to do
with stupidity.
3. If the coffee had been at normal temperature, she would have gotten
some blisters and an embarrassing memory. Instead, she got third-degree
burns and needed reconstructive surgery.
4. The corporation that served the coffee was aware that the temperature
was a problem, and had quietly settled 700 burn claims in the previous
decade.
5. All she initially asked for was enough money to pay for the medical
bills. The jury awarded punitive damages because they considered
the corporation to be willfully putting its customers at risk.
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America has a page about the case:
http://www.atlanet.org/consumermediaresources/tier3/press_room/facts/frivolous/McdonaldsCoffeecase.aspx
Richard Braakman
Henning Makholm
> On Fri, May 02, 2003 at 05:48:23PM +0200, Henning Makholm wrote:
> > (Opposite in some other parts of the world where one can become
> > rich simply by being too stupid to imagine that coffee might be hot).
> 1. The coffee in question was *much* hotter than coffee is normally served.
Coffee is made by pouring *boiling water* through a medium of ground
roasted coffee beans. Yes, boiling water causes burns.
> 2. The lady in question didn't deliberately spill coffee over herself
> because she thought it wouldn't be hot.
No non-stupid person will hold a flimsy styrofoam cup between one's
*knees* while attempting to manipulate a tight-fitting lid, unless
they think that the liquid inside is not hot.
> 3. If the coffee had been at normal temperature,
The normal temperature of boiling water is 100 °C. See (1).
> 4. The corporation that served the coffee was aware that the temperature
> was a problem,
What the corporation thinks does not excuse being stupid. See (2).
> 5. All she initially asked for was enough money to pay for the medical
> bills.
I'll withhold my opinion about a country where having accidents
entails "medical bills" that one needs to extract from the innocent
provider of some agent that happened to be involved in the accident.
> The jury awarded punitive damages because they considered
> the corporation to be willfully putting its customers at risk.
Yet none of the "debunkers" offer any coherent explanation of why on
earth McDonalds would have the *will* to do so. It doesn't scan. But
then again I'm not buying into the common theory that McDonalds
*willfully* makes the "food" they sell taste like cardboard.
> The Association of Trial Lawyers of America has a page about the case:
Aren't they the ones who get rich by getting half of the spoils?
Naturally they'd conclude that nothing at all is wrong.
--
Henning Makholm "I've been staying out of family
conversations. Do I get credit for that?"
Henning Makholm
> Yes, but a free software developer cannot walk into court and argue
> that they did not intend to grant the right to redistribute
Exactly my point.
> At the very least, the GPL and most other free software licenses are
> be problematic in moral rights jurisdictions simply because the
> developer's intentions with respect to moral rights are not made
> clear by those licenses.
Of course they are. The fact that the author intends for his work to
be free is made very explicit by applying the GPL to it. Since moral
rights are about protecting the author's intentions with creating the
work, there cannot, logically, be any conflict between moral rights
and freedom.
(That is, unless the author was bribed into using a free license, for
example by offering the opportunity to reuse legacy code in return.
Then there might be problems. One might conclude that BSDis licensed
code is more unambigously free in jurisdictions that recognize moral
rights, as the BSD license does not offer such a bribe.)
> Say hypothetically that the LAME developers have an artistic vision to
> allow music fans to freely (as in freedom) rip music from the CDs the
> purchase. Universal Records uses LAME to make copy protected CDs (see
> http://news.com.com/2100-1023-277197.html). How is it stupid if the LAME
> developers walk into a moral rights jurisdiction and ask Universal to
> stop?
It is stupid if they released their software under a free license
without realizing what freedom means.
--
Henning Makholm "Detta, sade de, vore rena sanningen;
ty de kunde tala sanning lika väl som någon
annan, när de bara visste vad det tjänade til."
Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet
> If author's rights would be introduced in the USA, this might be the
> case.
Author's rights, or at least the "moral rights" idea therein, are
already in US law. 17 US Code article 106A says, for example, that
the author "shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her
name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to
his or her honor or reputation."
This is basically what it says in article 6bis of the Berne Convention.
Note that the "distortion or mutilation" has to hurt the
honor or reputation of the author. Here in the Netherlands
this is the case if the owner of a house decides to put up
new blinds in a color the architect does not like.
Arnoud
--
Arnoud Engelfriet, Dutch patent attorney - Speaking only for myself
Patents, copyright and IPR explained for techies: http://www.iusmentis.com/
Nathanael Nerode
> [This is starting to shift away from the GFDL so I modified the
> subject. Georg, I can suppress you from the Cc: if you wish so.]
>
> On Sun, Apr 27, 2003 at 11:25:43PM -0400,
> Nathanael Nerode <ner...@twcny.rr.com> wrote
> a message of 29 lines which said:
>
>
>>>Naturally, I'm more familiar with the European Copyright -- or Droit
>>>d'Auteur, rather -- systems, but since Europe is a very active region
>>>for Free Software, considering the European situation seems useful.
>>
>>Please note that this system is contrary in its basis to the system in the
>>US, which is also used in some form in most common-law based countries (most
>>of the world). Under these systems copyright is a government-granted monopoly
>>and not a 'natural right'. The 'Droit d'Auteur' system is *much* more
>>hostile to free software, free documentation, free speech, fair use rights,
>>library privilege, the public domain, etc., etc., etc.
>
>
> Can you explain the above? I do not see why and in which way the
> "Droit d'auteur" system is more hostile to free software. There is
> currently a lot of lobbying in Europe and in the world against this
> "Droit d'auteur" system and pro-copyright and this lobbying is mostly
> driven by the same companies that oppose free software...
Interesting. I've never heard of any of this and I do keep up on these
issues. Perhaps you are thinking of a campaign to make moral rights
alienable, which is really a much more specific matter? The corporate
copyright interests are certainly not interested in promoting the idea
that copyright is a government-granted monopoly rather than a natural
right! Consider the statements to the effect that copyright violation
is "theft" -- this actually has a legal basis under the Droit d'Auteur
system.
Basically, it's a free speech issue. The concept that authors and their
heirs have inherent rights of control over their writings, in eternity
(which is the basic concept of the system) is effectively in opposition
to freedom of speech, as it requires all ideas to be recast so as to
avoid the use of the forms used by anyone else, throughout history.
Historically, the system has been tempered by limits on copyright
length, establishment of fair use rights, and so forth, but the *basis*
of the system denies such things and treats them as unusual exceptions
to the general rule that authors have total, eternal control over their
works, based on the "sweat of the brow" they put into it. There is
really no reason, under a true Droit d'Auteur copyright system, why
copyrights should not be eternal, why authors (or their heirs) should
not have the ability to revoke copyright licences at will, why authors
should not be allowed to write copyright licences with arbitrary biases
("this work may not be sold to black people"), why compilations of
arbitrary data should not be copyrightable, etc. The revokable license
issue is certainly an issue for free software, and the protected
database issue is another anti-free problem originating directly from
the European system.
I am not referring, per se, to "moral rights". I am referring to the
treatment of copyright as being based in the "right of the author".
The treatment of copyright under common law systems is generally that it
is a government-granted monopoly. In the US, this is explicit, and it
is specified that the monopoly is for the purpose of promoting the
progress of knowledge. Historically, this has been seriously *abused*
in the US, to the point where the system as implemented comes close to
the European system.
So in *implementation* there's not that much of a difference. In the
*basis* of the system, however, the Continental European system is
fundamentally opposed to free information, and the US system is
fundamentally in favor of it. If you believe that "code wants to be
free", well, the Continental system says "Code wants to be owned by its
author and his heirs and assigns in eternity".
At least this is my well-informed understanding. I am not a lawyer, or
I'd be making more money.
--Nathanael
Nathanael Nerode
> On Wed, 30 Apr 2003, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
>
>
>>But it is not a real problem. Under the "droit d'auteur", the author's
>>right over *software* is quite limited
>
>
> Is this the basic point by which "moral rights" do not prevent software
> from being free? They're not generally applied to software?
That would make sense. :-) Thanks to Stephane for informing me of this
point....
> If recognition of moral rights is a requirement for a free documentation
> license, I propose the GPL be used with the notation that "none of these
> terms is intended to infringe those rights over which an author cannot
> grant permissions".
>
> Is this sufficient to cover droit d'auteur jurisdictions without
> limiting the right to modify in common-law areas?
This seems wise...
Changing the subject again, it might be nice if Debian put up a FAQ on
"free licencing issues for non-software", just to catch all of this
stuff in one place...
Branden Robinson
> It is stupid if they released their software under a free license
> without realizing what freedom means.
Well, the realization of "what freedom means" does in fact appear to be
escaping some advocates of the GNU FDL...
--
G. Branden Robinson | Never attribute to malice that
Debian GNU/Linux | which can be adequately explained
bra...@debian.org | by stupidity.
http://people.debian.org/~branden/ |
Branden Robinson
It looks like Republican notions of "tort reform"[1] might have a lot of
support in Europe.
[1] Before being appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, William Rehnquist
*defined* judicial conservatism as being a technique for reading the
law such that criminal defendants and civil plaintiffs are
disadvantaged. _The Rehnquist Choice_, John W. Dean, New York: The Free
Press, 2001.
--
G. Branden Robinson | I just wanted to see what it looked
Debian GNU/Linux | like in a spotlight.
bra...@debian.org | -- Jim Morrison
http://people.debian.org/~branden/ |
Branden Robinson
> Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortz...@debian.org>:
>
> > > In any event, if non-common law countries have legal frameworks that
> > > technically render Free Software as conceived by the FSF and the Debian
> > > Project impossible,
> >
> > Pure FUD. See my rebuke of Nathanael Nerode's message that I just
> > sent.
>
> I think the truth is that some non-common-law countries (France?) have
> laws relating to moral rights that might make it hard or impossible to
> fully guarantee the DFSG-freedom of certain works, which may or may
> not include works that would normally be described as "software".
Now, now, he already dismissed my statement as FUD. Don't go pointing
out that he did so incorrectly. That just embarrasses people. We don't
have time for closely-reasoned arguments when we're touting the
superiority of the French legal system.
--
G. Branden Robinson |
Debian GNU/Linux | Music is the brandy of the damned.
bra...@debian.org | -- George Bernard Shaw
http://people.debian.org/~branden/ |
MJ Ray
Hash: SHA1
And now, a short clarification statement:
I was recently mentioned in a discussion on debian-legal, but the
cited emails are unpublished. I assure you that I did not claim to
speak for the Debian project or call the debian-legal list a minority
opinion. I did say that I could find no Debian policy about GFDL and
that is how the message to debian-legal should be interpreted. I
apologise for any confusion.
And now, for something completely different:
- --
MJR
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Henning Makholm
> On Fri, May 02, 2003 at 08:11:02PM +0200, Henning Makholm wrote:
> > It is stupid if they released their software under a free license
> > without realizing what freedom means.
> Well, the realization of "what freedom means" does in fact appear to be
> escaping some advocates of the GNU FDL...
Point taken.
--
Henning Makholm "What a hideous colour khaki is."
Branden Robinson
> And now, a short clarification statement:
> I was recently mentioned in a discussion on debian-legal, but the
> cited emails are unpublished. I assure you that I did not claim to
> speak for the Debian project or call the debian-legal list a minority
> opinion.
I don't think anyone made such a charge, so don't worry about it.
--
G. Branden Robinson | No math genius, eh? Then perhaps
Debian GNU/Linux | you could explain to me where you
bra...@debian.org | got these... PENROSE TILES!
http://people.debian.org/~branden/ | -- Stephen R. Notley
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> sub 2. The work must not be changed or made available to the public
> in a way or in a context that violates the author's literary or
> artistic reputation or character.
And this is the number one lose for this bogus sort of copyright
regime.
For example, Marcel Duchamp would have been prohibited.
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> Of course they are. The fact that the author intends for his work to
> be free is made very explicit by applying the GPL to it. Since moral
> rights are about protecting the author's intentions with creating the
> work, there cannot, logically, be any conflict between moral rights
> and freedom.
Moral rights "protect" things even when they are *not* the author's
intention.
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> Note that the "distortion or mutilation" has to hurt the
> honor or reputation of the author. Here in the Netherlands
> this is the case if the owner of a house decides to put up
> new blinds in a color the architect does not like.
Since people will know this wasn't the architect's design, how does it
damage his honor or reputation?
Henning Makholm
> Henning Makholm <hen...@makholm.net> writes:
> > Of course they are. The fact that the author intends for his work to
> > be free is made very explicit by applying the GPL to it. Since moral
> > rights are about protecting the author's intentions with creating the
> > work, there cannot, logically, be any conflict between moral rights
> > and freedom.
> Moral rights "protect" things even when they are *not* the author's
> intention.
Did you read the exact wording I posted? It very specifically protects
exactly the author's intention. Nothing more.
--
Henning Makholm "PROV EN FORFRISKNING FRISKLAIL DEM"
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> Scripsit Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> > Henning Makholm <hen...@makholm.net> writes:
>
> > > Of course they are. The fact that the author intends for his work to
> > > be free is made very explicit by applying the GPL to it. Since moral
> > > rights are about protecting the author's intentions with creating the
> > > work, there cannot, logically, be any conflict between moral rights
> > > and freedom.
>
> > Moral rights "protect" things even when they are *not* the author's
> > intention.
>
> Did you read the exact wording I posted? It very specifically protects
> exactly the author's intention. Nothing more.
What if the author's intention is that anyone do whatever they want
with the work, and explicitly says "I hereby waive any of my so-called
moral rights"?
In that case, his heirs can *still* come back and say "no waiver is
possible", and "your modification of the work makes his artistic
integrity look bad", and it will be their judgment and the court's
that controls.
James Miller
you need legal advice, see an attorney. I am licensed to
practice in the District of Columbia and no other
jurisdiction.] IAAL
Interesting thread, I'm going to step through a few points
that caught my eye--hope they may be useful clarifications
of the law. I provide some citations to works that should
be in any Anglo library--full cites toward the end. It's
unlikely that you'll find them anywhere else, but I'm
happy to followup if people have more questions. Also the
"author intention" point is interesting and I recal having
reviewed some cases on this point some years ago but don't
recal to discuss here. Maybe followup later if there's
interest.
First, remember on a breach of the distribution terms of
an original work, courts will apply the domestic law of
the country where protection is sought, under
international copyright principles of "national
treatment." See Paul Edward Geller, 1-INT International
Copyright Law and Practices
§ 6(2)(a) (2000) (discussing the application of
contract-copyright conflicts of law analysis and stating
the principles of national treatment are the central
rule).
Also consider that the law of moral rights is less uniform
than has been suggested. Indeed the French influence in
the doctrine is important but moral rights protections are
not so much a single doctrine as a collection of
protections jurisdictions tend to mix and match. Moreover
one could argue the trends of regional and international
property agreements to deny protection for Moral Rights
require some attention. (The TRIPS agreement absolved
states of obligations to protect moral rights while even
Berne Convention signatories are pretty spotty on their
implementations--the U.S. being one that basically extends
no rights). Also consider these "dilutions" and
harmonizations have been going on since the beginning of
international protections for copyright. Look at
Ricketson, infra note below, at 40-41 (discussing that the
stricter continental traditions may have experienced a
dilution of protection in response to harmonization in
early days of Berne);
Some jurisdictions apply their Moral Rights jurisprudence
to computer software as they apply to any other work,
without special limitations. See Sterling at 288
(describing Germany's general treatment and lack of
restrictions of applying moral rights to software). Other
jurisdictions extend no Moral Rights to software authors.
See Sterling at 289 (noting the United Kingdom's lack of
any moral rights protections for software).
However, the majority of countries fall in-between and
apply some limitations to Moral Rights protections for
software, as has been discussed. See Sterling at 291
(describing France and Japan's treatment of moral rights
for software by limiting the application of the right of
integrity by prohibiting invoking the rights against
changes by users for compatibility).
I think I had compiled a user friendly index comparing
some various jurisdictions a couple years ago I could dig
up if it's useful to you guys.
The important differences, in my view, for FOSS authors
relate to the scope of the integrity right, how the right
of attribution may be exercised, and how employment
affects the vesting of rights.
In the end, though, consider that moral rights might
actually be the most elegant way of protecting FOSS. What
are you really wanting to protect? Your right to prohibit
derivative works without a license? rights to copy
without paying you a bunch of money? Not likely if you're
licensing your code under the GPL...
Your right to be know as the hacker of some given code
[paternity], and the right to ensure others have the
rights you want for them, without someone being able to
take your gift to them away [integrity], flow naturally
from a moral rights perspective.
Feel free to forward this around but I'd appreciate a
note. now sleep..
--
Most sources cited and discussed in more detail at
http://www.nihonlinks.com/JamesMiller/OpenSourceMoralRights/
Berne Convention art. 6bis.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 152, at art. 9(1)
(absolving states of obligations and rights regarding
moral rights).
Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-1986 3-5, 39, 49-55
(1989) (discussing the origins of domestic copyright laws
without exception in a crown entitlement to publishers
with the later ratification in civil or statutory law and
international protections via the Berne convention
emerging to remedy the chaos of binational arrangements).
See J.A.L. Sterling, LL.B., World Copyright Law,
Protection of Author's Works, Performances, Phonographs,
Films Video, Broadcasts, and Published Editions in
National, International and Regional Law 308, 322-27
(1998) (surveying the rights of adaptation and
distribution in the economic rights context from national
and international legislative and case law sources).
Stig Stromholm, Copyright Comparison of Laws 16-18 (1990)
(presenting the national treatment of adaptations).
Laura Lee Van Velzen, Note, Injecting a Dose of Duty into
the Doctrine of Droit Moral, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 629, 636 &
n.33 (1989) (reviewing the disharmony among jurisdictions
and the Berne Conventions generally weaker protections and
citing the weak protections in Berne as the reason authors
must accept less protections than they might otherwise
enjoy).
See Thomas P. Heide, The Moral Right of Integrity and the
Global Information Infrastructure: Time for a New
Approach?, 2 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 211, 245 n.152
(1996) (discussing the intertwined nature of moral and
economic rights in civil law context);
--- Branden Robinson <bra...@debian.org> からのメッセ
ージ：
> ATTACHMENT part 2 application/pgp-signature
--
James Miller
jami...@yahoo.co.jp
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! BB is Broadband by Yahoo!
http://bb.yahoo.co.jp/
Adam Warner
> I think I had compiled a user friendly index comparing some various
> jurisdictions a couple years ago I could dig up if it's useful to you
> guys.
I have also been following this discussion with interest. I'm attempting
to understand the copyright laws of the various jurisdictions and how they
interact--and your expositions have been most helpful.
I would greatly appreciate it if you could locate this index you compiled
that compares various jurisdictions. But regardless, thanks for all the
information you have already provided!
Regards,
Adam
Henning Makholm
> Henning Makholm <hen...@makholm.net> writes:
> > Did you read the exact wording I posted? It very specifically protects
> > exactly the author's intention. Nothing more.
> What if the author's intention is that anyone do whatever they want
> with the work, and explicitly says "I hereby waive any of my so-called
> moral rights"?
He cannot do that. But his action of releasing the work under a free
license will have the coincidental effect that it becomes impossible
to violate the artistic integrity of the work, because the integrity
consists exactly in the work being free.
> In that case, his heirs can *still* come back and say "no waiver is
> possible",
The moral rights cannot be waived, but they can become irrelevant,
which is the situation we're taling about here.
> and "your modification of the work makes his artistic
> integrity look bad", and it will be their judgment and the court's
> that controls.
The heirs' judgement controls nothing at all. The court's does, of
course, but the unless the court purposefully misunderstands the
intent of the law and the author's intention [1] it will of course
rule in favor of the author's explicit wishes.
[1] In which case every bet is off. But in that case the problems
arise IN SPITE OF to the law, not BEACAUSE of it.
--
Henning Makholm "... not one has been remembered from the time
when the author studied freshman physics. Quite the
contrary: he merely remembers that such and such is true, and to
explain it he invents a demonstration at the moment it is needed."
Edmund GRIMLEY EVANS
> He cannot do that. But his action of releasing the work under a free
> license will have the coincidental effect that it becomes impossible
> to violate the artistic integrity of the work, because the integrity
> consists exactly in the work being free.
I'm not sure whether that argument would work in practice. However,
even if it did, what about the "droit repentir" that was mentioned
earlier?
Edmund
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> The heirs' judgement controls nothing at all. The court's does, of
> course, but the unless the court purposefully misunderstands the
> intent of the law and the author's intention [1] it will of course
> rule in favor of the author's explicit wishes.
>
> [1] In which case every bet is off. But in that case the problems
> arise IN SPITE OF to the law, not BEACAUSE of it.
The heirs certainly matter because it would be they who bring suit.
If nobody brings suit, the court says nothing.
The court might well say "he certainly couldn't have intended a change
that was defamatory of him", and declare that essentially irrebutable.
The whole European concept of "author's rights" makes me sick; it's
bad enough that it exists. The fact that it's *irrevocable* in any
way makes it a jillion times worse.
If you, the artist, don't want someone destroying your work, then
dammit, don't sell them the painting. It's bad enough that if an
artist sells a painting (or an architect sells a house) he retains a
permanent right to control what you do with it. It's extremely horrid
that there is no way for him to relinquish that control.
Henning Makholm
> The whole European concept of "author's rights" makes me sick;
If you insist on misunderstanding the concept in the face of sevral
attempts to explain to you that you're misunderstanding it, then it is
certainly your democratic right to let your own delusions about a
concept you refuse to understand make you sick.
I have no further comments.
--
Henning Makholm "Hvorfor skulle jeg tale som en slave og en tåbe? Jeg
ønsker ikke, at han skal leve evigt, og jeg ved, at han ikke
kommer til at leve evigt, uanset om jeg ønsker det eller ej."
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> Scripsit Thomas Bushnell, BSG
>
> > The whole European concept of "author's rights" makes me sick;
>
> If you insist on misunderstanding the concept in the face of sevral
> attempts to explain to you that you're misunderstanding it, then it is
> certainly your democratic right to let your own delusions about a
> concept you refuse to understand make you sick.
What, exactly, is supposed to be the content of the right, the part
that an artist *cannot* renounce?
You are saying that the artist can, in fact, renounce everything, when
the law says that somethings cannot be renounced. Which is it?
As I read the law, it says that there are some rights over the work
which the artist *cannot* renounce. You would have it that if the
artist uses a certain form of license, the rights have been
effectively renounced. If that were a correct interpretation, then
there would be nothing that cannot be renounced.
The purpose of the law is, for example, to say that if an artist sells
a painting, the purchaser cannot tear it up, destroy it, sprinkle more
paint across the surface, and the like. A recent post also gave the
example of an architect, who can prevent the homeowner from making
changes that violate the "integrity" of his work.
Now the law says that the artist *cannot* relinquish this right. He
has a *permanent* right to prevent such things being done with his
work, and that this *permanent* right is one that his heirs can
inherit. The law says that the artist *cannot* sell this right. He
has it *no matter what*.
Now you are saying that if the artist releases the work under a free
software license, he has in effect relinquished those rights which the
law says he cannot.
Henning Makholm
> However, even if it did, what about the "droit repentir" that was
> mentioned earlier?
I don't know about that. It is certainly not part of Danish law.
--
Henning Makholm "Der er ingen der sigter på slottet. D'herrer konger agter
at triumfere fra balkonen når de har slået hinanden ihjel."
Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet
> Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet <gala...@stack.nl> writes:
> > Note that the "distortion or mutilation" has to hurt the
> > honor or reputation of the author. Here in the Netherlands
> > this is the case if the owner of a house decides to put up
> > new blinds in a color the architect does not like.
>
> Since people will know this wasn't the architect's design, how does it
> damage his honor or reputation?
People that pass by the house do not know whether the blinds
were the architect's design or not. They might remember that
the house was designed by him, and then conclude that he was
very stupid for putting those ugly blinds on the house. And
that thus harms his reputation.
It's extremely silly but that's the argument. Dutch lawyers may
want to look it up: Gerechtshof 's Hertogenbosch 24 feb 1993,
AMI 1994, 116. The court noted that demolishing the house would
not violate the architect's moral rights. This has been used
in some cases to force architects to accept certain changes.
Arnoud
--
Arnoud Engelfriet, Dutch patent attorney - Speaking only for myself
Patents, copyright and IPR explained for techies: http://www.iusmentis.com/
Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet
> As I read the law, it says that there are some rights over the work
> which the artist *cannot* renounce. You would have it that if the
> artist uses a certain form of license, the rights have been
> effectively renounced. If that were a correct interpretation, then
> there would be nothing that cannot be renounced.
Moral rights indeed cannot be renounced. The motivation is that
if they could, every author would be forced to renounce them
every time.
Moral rights are restricted in that the courts must find the
violation must harm the author's honor or reputation. This is
not the same as being able to restrict all forms of reuse. I
would say that with free software, a modified verison of the
program adds to the author's honor, since honor and reputation
in the free software community are based on your code and
its reuse.
> The purpose of the law is, for example, to say that if an artist sells
> a painting, the purchaser cannot tear it up, destroy it, sprinkle more
> paint across the surface, and the like. A recent post also gave the
> example of an architect, who can prevent the homeowner from making
> changes that violate the "integrity" of his work.
If it harms the author's reputation, he has the right to
stop the modification. The basis of author's rights is
that an author is the "owner" of a work. It's not just
a government-granted temporary monopoly, but a natural
right to control a work.
> Now the law says that the artist *cannot* relinquish this right. He
> has a *permanent* right to prevent such things being done with his
> work, and that this *permanent* right is one that his heirs can
> inherit. The law says that the artist *cannot* sell this right. He
> has it *no matter what*.
As far as I know, the heirs must follow the author's intentions
when applying the inherited moral right. They cannot decide
for themselves whether *they* like the change, they must guess
whether the now deceased author would have liked it.
Heirs unfortunately sometimes do things to works that the author
probably would not have liked (like publishing unpublished works
he considered not good enough). Strangely enough no one can do
anything about that.
> Now you are saying that if the artist releases the work under a free
> software license, he has in effect relinquished those rights which the
> law says he cannot.
By giving a copyright license you don't give up your moral
rights. It would be unreasonable to say that if you license
a work for publication, you could then assert your moral
right to stop that publication. I would argue that if the
publication license were general like with free software,
you couldn't stop any further publication.
The interesting case of course is with modifications. Free
software can be incorporated in new (free) software that
has an entirely different purpose. If you make some library
and I incorporate it in a program that makes child pornography
or is used for nazi propaganda, you couldn't do anything
about that by using your free software license. But I think
you could assert your moral right if being associated with
child pornographers or nazis would hurt your honor or
reputation. And thus you could stop me from distributing the
program.
Arnoud
--
Arnoud Engelfriet, Dutch patent attorney - Speaking only for myself
Patents, copyright and IPR explained for techies: http://www.iusmentis.com/
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> People that pass by the house do not know whether the blinds
> were the architect's design or not. They might remember that
> the house was designed by him, and then conclude that he was
> very stupid for putting those ugly blinds on the house. And
> that thus harms his reputation.
>
> It's extremely silly but that's the argument. Dutch lawyers may
> want to look it up: Gerechtshof 's Hertogenbosch 24 feb 1993,
> AMI 1994, 116. The court noted that demolishing the house would
> not violate the architect's moral rights. This has been used
> in some cases to force architects to accept certain changes.
This is exactly why the concept of unrenouncable authors' "moral
rights" offends me.
If the architect wants the right to review any proposed changes, then
that should be part of the contract of sale, and he will get a little
less money, because he's imposing a restriction of such a sort.
I believe that there *have* been cases where the owner of a work of
art was told that outright destruction of the work would also violate
the author's supposed moral rights.
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> As far as I know, the heirs must follow the author's intentions
> when applying the inherited moral right. They cannot decide
> for themselves whether *they* like the change, they must guess
> whether the now deceased author would have liked it.
But the author is dead. And people all the time guess wrong. For
example, imagine a closeted gay author who died fifty years ago. His
heirs are homophobic, and oppose the publication of any biography that
accurately describes the man's life. And accordingly they oppose any
use of his works in the biography.
But the man himself might well, if he were alive today, rejoice in the
more tolerant atmosphere we now share, deplore the bigotry of his
heirs, and happily agree to publication.
What the person thinks is defamatory, and what the heirs think, are
simply not the same thing. Even if the heirs do their very best job,
the whole point of the set up is that you *discount* what the author
says, because the author *cannot* be deemed to be renouncing the
right. If the heirs can convince a court, it won't matter at all
whether they are right.
> Heirs unfortunately sometimes do things to works that the author
> probably would not have liked (like publishing unpublished works
> he considered not good enough). Strangely enough no one can do
> anything about that.
Strangely? THE MAN IS DEAD. Dead men have no rights. How hard is
this?
> By giving a copyright license you don't give up your moral
> rights. It would be unreasonable to say that if you license
> a work for publication, you could then assert your moral
> right to stop that publication. I would argue that if the
> publication license were general like with free software,
> you couldn't stop any further publication.
I don't think that you *have* any such moral rights. I think it's a
crazy and insane concept, and I will fight it tooth and nail.
Among other things, it totally contradicts the notion of free
software, especially given that these rights cannot be renounced.
Thomas
Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet
> Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet <gala...@stack.nl> writes:
> > As far as I know, the heirs must follow the author's intentions
> > when applying the inherited moral right. They cannot decide
> > for themselves whether *they* like the change, they must guess
> > whether the now deceased author would have liked it.
>
> But the author is dead. And people all the time guess wrong. For
> example, imagine a closeted gay author who died fifty years ago. His
> heirs are homophobic, and oppose the publication of any biography that
> accurately describes the man's life. And accordingly they oppose any
> use of his works in the biography.
Then they're not doing what the law says they must. Not much
you can do about that, other than hoping the judge will see
it differently.
> What the person thinks is defamatory, and what the heirs think, are
> simply not the same thing. Even if the heirs do their very best job,
> the whole point of the set up is that you *discount* what the author
> says, because the author *cannot* be deemed to be renouncing the
> right. If the heirs can convince a court, it won't matter at all
> whether they are right.
If the author does not complain, then it's reasonable to assume
his moral right isn't harmed. And if after his death his heirs
do complain, then the court is faced with the question whether
this is in line with what the author would have wanted. Of course,
if the heirs are good liars and/or the court is gullible, then
you can arrive at something that's totally contrary to the
author's wishes.
> > Heirs unfortunately sometimes do things to works that the author
> > probably would not have liked (like publishing unpublished works
> > he considered not good enough). Strangely enough no one can do
> > anything about that.
>
> Strangely? THE MAN IS DEAD. Dead men have no rights. How hard is
> this?
When he died, his copyright and moral rights went to his heirs.
It is now their responsibility to manage those rights in the
way the deceased author would have wanted. I think it is strange
that this responsibility does not extend to, say, publishing
something the author wanted to keep a secret.
> > By giving a copyright license you don't give up your moral
> > rights. It would be unreasonable to say that if you license
> > a work for publication, you could then assert your moral
> > right to stop that publication. I would argue that if the
> > publication license were general like with free software,
> > you couldn't stop any further publication.
>
> I don't think that you *have* any such moral rights. I think it's a
> crazy and insane concept, and I will fight it tooth and nail.
I think you'll find this concept is very much embedded in
European copyright law. In fact it's in the Berne Convention
from the very beginning. That's why it's called author's rights
and not just copyright (as is the case in the USA).
> Among other things, it totally contradicts the notion of free
> software, especially given that these rights cannot be renounced.
To clarify: the right to object to mutilations of the work
that harm the honor or reputation of the author cannot be renounced.
Arnoud
--
Arnoud Engelfriet, Dutch patent attorney - Speaking only for myself
Patents, copyright and IPR explained for techies: http://www.iusmentis.com/
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> Then they're not doing what the law says they must. Not much
> you can do about that, other than hoping the judge will see
> it differently.
The copyright laws in the US do *not* say that the heirs are
restricted to what the author wants. But even so, that's not the
point.
In my example case, the heirs *think* they are doing what the author
wants, but they are wrong, because the author is not as bigoted as
they are.
"Not much you can do about that"? Hardly--you could, for example,
*not have the whole bogus concept in the first place*.
> If the author does not complain, then it's reasonable to assume
> his moral right isn't harmed. And if after his death his heirs
> do complain, then the court is faced with the question whether
> this is in line with what the author would have wanted. Of course,
> if the heirs are good liars and/or the court is gullible, then
> you can arrive at something that's totally contrary to the
> author's wishes.
Or if the heirs are simply mistaken.
Your first sentence, however, is false. Suppose you were right: that
if the author does not complain, his right can't possibly be
violated. Then the author would be able to cede his right, right? He
could say "I promise not to complain". And a free software license is
just that, isn't it?
If the author can say "I promise not to complain" then he can cede his
right. But the law says he cannot cede his right, so he cannot
promise to complain.
Which means, in turn, that he cannot validly give away his software
under a free software license, because, whether he wants it or not,
the law *preserves* his right, such that if he later changes his mind,
he can insist that his "inalienable author's rights" be respected.
> When he died, his copyright and moral rights went to his heirs.
> It is now their responsibility to manage those rights in the
> way the deceased author would have wanted.
No. When property lands in the hands of heirs, they manage it however
they want. That's the way normal property does. The author's rights
say that it must not be defamatory of the author, but nothing in that
says that it is the *author's* determination of "what is defamatory"
which counts. And in many cases, great harm can be wreaked by
well-meaning, *not* dishonest, but still incorrect, guesses about what
"the author wanted".
And since the *author* has the permanent, inalienable right to change
his mind, that right itself also passes to the heirs, does it not?
> I think it is strange that this responsibility does not extend to,
> say, publishing something the author wanted to keep a secret.
Not me. But then US law is nowhere near as censorious as what
Europeans seem happy to put up with.
> I think you'll find this concept is very much embedded in
> European copyright law. In fact it's in the Berne Convention
> from the very beginning. That's why it's called author's rights
> and not just copyright (as is the case in the USA).
The Berne Convention is very carefully ambiguous, permitting both the
European and the US versions of copyright. If it were not for that,
the US wouldn't have gone along at all.
> To clarify: the right to object to mutilations of the work
> that harm the honor or reputation of the author cannot be renounced.
Right. And the author *cannot* renounce that. No matter *what* he
says.
And if ten years after he dies, his heirs think something is
defamatory, then they can sue, even if the author says "no changes to
this work will count as defamatory", precisely because that statement
by the author is an attempt to renounce something that *cannot* be
renounced.
Thomas
Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet
> In my example case, the heirs *think* they are doing what the author
> wants, but they are wrong, because the author is not as bigoted as
> they are.
Isn't that always a problem when you can't ask the person himself
anymore?
> "Not much you can do about that"? Hardly--you could, for example,
> *not have the whole bogus concept in the first place*.
Why do you think the concept is bogus? In principle I think it's
a good idea to have something that prevents others from mutilating
my work. The implementation sucks greatly though.
> > If the author does not complain, then it's reasonable to assume
> > his moral right isn't harmed. And if after his death his heirs
> > do complain, then the court is faced with the question whether
> > this is in line with what the author would have wanted. Of course,
> > if the heirs are good liars and/or the court is gullible, then
> > you can arrive at something that's totally contrary to the
> > author's wishes.
>
> Or if the heirs are simply mistaken.
>
> Your first sentence, however, is false. Suppose you were right: that
> if the author does not complain, his right can't possibly be
> violated.
I did not say that. I said it would be reasonable to assume that
it's OK if the author does not complain. Otherwise I cannot do
anything even if I have a license.
> If the author can say "I promise not to complain" then he can cede his
> right. But the law says he cannot cede his right, so he cannot
> promise to complain.
Indeed.
> Which means, in turn, that he cannot validly give away his software
> under a free software license, because, whether he wants it or not,
> the law *preserves* his right, such that if he later changes his mind,
> he can insist that his "inalienable author's rights" be respected.
He can only insist that a particular modification be retracted
because it damages his honor or reputation. And the court has to
be convinced that it does damage him. If the work is not modified
it would be very difficult for him to assert his moral rights.
> > When he died, his copyright and moral rights went to his heirs.
> > It is now their responsibility to manage those rights in the
> > way the deceased author would have wanted.
>
> No. When property lands in the hands of heirs, they manage it however
> they want. That's the way normal property does.
In the US view, copyrights are property rights. Author's rights
are in the European view not property but natural rights. In some
cases they are treated as property rights for reasons of
convenience. But you cannot argue using the law of property how
author's rights are treated.
> The author's rights
> say that it must not be defamatory of the author, but nothing in that
> says that it is the *author's* determination of "what is defamatory"
> which counts. And in many cases, great harm can be wreaked by
> well-meaning, *not* dishonest, but still incorrect, guesses about what
> "the author wanted".
Well, in first instance it would be the author who feels harmed
by the modification of course. He's the only one with standing
to sue. And then he has to convince the judge that it is really
harmful to him. So I guess there is some kind of objectivity
in the system, if you consider "what the judge thinks" to be
objective.
> > I think you'll find this concept is very much embedded in
> > European copyright law. In fact it's in the Berne Convention
> > from the very beginning. That's why it's called author's rights
> > and not just copyright (as is the case in the USA).
>
> The Berne Convention is very carefully ambiguous, permitting both the
> European and the US versions of copyright. If it were not for that,
> the US wouldn't have gone along at all.
True. But the BC was drafted by author's rights supporters. That's
why it has "life plus 50" for example. And that's also why you have
the moral rights (article 6bis). The USA simply copied those
provisions and carefully does not pay any attention to them.
> > To clarify: the right to object to mutilations of the work
> > that harm the honor or reputation of the author cannot be renounced.
>
> Right. And the author *cannot* renounce that. No matter *what* he
> says.
Correct.
> And if ten years after he dies, his heirs think something is
> defamatory, then they can sue, even if the author says "no changes to
> this work will count as defamatory", precisely because that statement
> by the author is an attempt to renounce something that *cannot* be
> renounced.
Indeed. But if he had said that, someone relying on that could
conceivably use that statement to argue that the change did not
harm the author's reputation. The author apparently regarded
changes like that to be right.
I'll see if I can get some European copyright law scholars interested
in this topic.
Arnoud
--
Arnoud Engelfriet, Dutch patent attorney - Speaking only for myself
Patents, copyright and IPR explained for techies: http://www.iusmentis.com/
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> > "Not much you can do about that"? Hardly--you could, for example,
> > *not have the whole bogus concept in the first place*.
>
> Why do you think the concept is bogus? In principle I think it's
> a good idea to have something that prevents others from mutilating
> my work. The implementation sucks greatly though.
We already have that concept. "Ownership". We even have an extra
thing: "Copyright". Both of these, under US law, are fully sufficient
to prevent others from "mutilating" your work without your consent.
If you don't want it mutilated, don't sell it. Or sell it subject to
a contract that prevents unauthorized modification.
The European system *forces* you to have such a "contract".
> > Which means, in turn, that he cannot validly give away his software
> > under a free software license, because, whether he wants it or not,
> > the law *preserves* his right, such that if he later changes his mind,
> > he can insist that his "inalienable author's rights" be respected.
>
> He can only insist that a particular modification be retracted
> because it damages his honor or reputation. And the court has to
> be convinced that it does damage him. If the work is not modified
> it would be very difficult for him to assert his moral rights.
We have seen the claim that a change in the color of curtains
constitutes a damage to honor or reputation.
It's not too far to say that a change which implements a protocol the
original author hated would be a damage to honor or reputation. Or a
change which alters the look and feel of an interface, given the heavy
artistic content that really is a part of such things.
> > No. When property lands in the hands of heirs, they manage it however
> > they want. That's the way normal property does.
>
> In the US view, copyrights are property rights. Author's rights
> are in the European view not property but natural rights. In some
> cases they are treated as property rights for reasons of
> convenience. But you cannot argue using the law of property how
> author's rights are treated.
I understand that. My point is that author's rights are going to be
interpreted by people after the author is dead, who, even if they are
doing their very best, might get it wrong. That's no harm to free
software, except that the author is *prohibited* from relinquishing
this right, and so the author *cannot* guarantee that his heirs and
the court won't conclude that some change really does harm his honor.
Even if you say "I hereby regard all changes as such things as cannot
harm my honor and reputation", that's no good. The whole point of the
law is to prohibit author's from making such statements.
Why this restriction on the rights of authors is called "authors'
rights" is beyond me.
> Well, in first instance it would be the author who feels harmed
> by the modification of course. He's the only one with standing
> to sue. And then he has to convince the judge that it is really
> harmful to him. So I guess there is some kind of objectivity
> in the system, if you consider "what the judge thinks" to be
> objective.
Right, but the point is that the author can't--can't--can't promise
not to sue. A free software license is, at core, just such a
promise. But in Europe, the author can, at any time, rescind it, and
say "you are violating my authors' rights".
Since changing the color of curtains violates the rights of an
architect, it's hard to imagine any significant change to any piece of
software that would not wreak similar harm to "honor and reputation"
if the author decided to complain: "That totally violates my original
vision; it never occurred to me that anyone would so horribly damage
my program", and bingo--license revoked.
> > And if ten years after he dies, his heirs think something is
> > defamatory, then they can sue, even if the author says "no changes to
> > this work will count as defamatory", precisely because that statement
> > by the author is an attempt to renounce something that *cannot* be
> > renounced.
>
> Indeed. But if he had said that, someone relying on that could
> conceivably use that statement to argue that the change did not
> harm the author's reputation. The author apparently regarded
> changes like that to be right.
Except: if that were really true, then the law would be dead, because
an author could effectively renounce his rights.
If the law means anything, it means that the author *cannot* renounce
certain rights, one of them is the right to complain later. Free
software *depends* on the author promising "I won't complain later".
These seem to be hopelessly contradictory.
I have little objection to legal protection for contracts, and even
things which swing the bar somewhat to make it "harder" for authors to
renounce such rights. But the notion that they *cannot* be renounced
is ludicrous, and totally kills a jillion freedoms.
Again, it doesn't just kill free software. It kills Marcel Duchamp
too. And what about the marvelous Berstein recording of Beethoven's
9th in Berlin after the wall fell? That would be out under this
regime, since Berstein changed Schiller's "Freude" to "Freiheit".
Whoops! Violating Schiller's poem, isn't that a violation of
Schiller's rights? And here Bernstein thought the concert was a
testament to freedom, when actually it was a horrible degradation of
Schiller. Isn't something wrong with this?
Thomas
Edmund GRIMLEY EVANS
acquired by the state of Bavaria, who use it for suppressing the book.
If and when the copyright expires (2015 if the duration is not further
extended; in many EU countries copyright was extended from 50 to 70
years in 1995, with the effect that "Mein Kampf" was out of copyright
for 3 months before disappearing for another 20 years) it will be
interesting to see whether Bavaria tries to use moral rights to
further suppress the book, arguing that in this day and age Adolf
Hitler certainly wouldn't want to be associated with a book that
promotes fascism!
Edmund
Stephane Bortzmeyer
Thomas Bushnell, BSG <t...@becket.net> wrote
> Since changing the color of curtains violates the rights of an
> architect, it's hard to imagine any significant change to any piece of
> software that would not wreak similar harm to "honor and reputation"
> if the author decided to complain: "That totally violates my original
> vision; it never occurred to me that anyone would so horribly damage
> my program", and bingo--license revoked.
As I already explained several days ago, the right to prevent
modifications does NOT exist for SOFTWARE. Author's rights on SOFTWARE
are quite limited, even in Europe.
Of course, many issues are still open:
* what's the lawyer's definition of "software", any way?
* what about artistic work published under a GPL or GFDL licence?
But your example is wrong: wether the author wants it or not, he
cannot oppose a change in his/her program.
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> As I already explained several days ago, the right to prevent
> modifications does NOT exist for SOFTWARE. Author's rights on SOFTWARE
> are quite limited, even in Europe.
Right, that's why this is all OT. ;)
What I'm saying is why "authors' rights" is a sucky concept, and how
(if it were freely extended to software) it would kill the possibility
of free software.
It already kills "free architecture", and "free painting". Marcel
Duchamp, is he no longer the hero of French artists?
Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet
> years in 1995, with the effect that "Mein Kampf" was out of copyright
> for 3 months before disappearing for another 20 years) it will be
> interesting to see whether Bavaria tries to use moral rights to
> further suppress the book, arguing that in this day and age Adolf
> Hitler certainly wouldn't want to be associated with a book that
> promotes fascism!
The moral rights expire together with the economic rights, so
that won't fly. But I guess they'll try to come up with something.
Arnoud
--
Arnoud Engelfriet, Dutch patent attorney - Speaking only for myself
Patents, copyright and IPR explained for techies: http://www.iusmentis.com/
Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet
> As I already explained several days ago, the right to prevent
> modifications does NOT exist for SOFTWARE. Author's rights on SOFTWARE
> are quite limited, even in Europe.
Moral rights are excluded for software? Can you please give
me a citation for that? As far as I can tell, the Berne
Convention nor any of the WIPO treaties say anything like this.
Arnoud
--
Arnoud Engelfriet, Dutch patent attorney - Speaking only for myself
Patents, copyright and IPR explained for techies: http://www.iusmentis.com/
Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet
> Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet <gala...@stack.nl> writes:
> > Why do you think the concept is bogus? In principle I think it's
> > a good idea to have something that prevents others from mutilating
> > my work. The implementation sucks greatly though.
>
> We already have that concept. "Ownership". We even have an extra
> thing: "Copyright". Both of these, under US law, are fully sufficient
> to prevent others from "mutilating" your work without your consent.
If I transfer my copyright, I can not stop you from harming
my reputation. That's why the law has the extra provision that
helps me protect my moral rights.
> If you don't want it mutilated, don't sell it. Or sell it subject to
> a contract that prevents unauthorized modification.
This approach means that authors will be forced to accept
any kind of modifications, even those that directly go against
their artistic wishes. The US system thinks this is OK since
you got paid. The European system thinks this is not OK.
> > He can only insist that a particular modification be retracted
> > because it damages his honor or reputation. And the court has to
> > be convinced that it does damage him. If the work is not modified
> > it would be very difficult for him to assert his moral rights.
>
> We have seen the claim that a change in the color of curtains
> constitutes a damage to honor or reputation.
Indeed. And the court awarded that claim, so I suppose the judge
found some merit in the claim.
> It's not too far to say that a change which implements a protocol the
> original author hated would be a damage to honor or reputation. Or a
> change which alters the look and feel of an interface, given the heavy
> artistic content that really is a part of such things.
I suppose maybe Theo de Raadt could use his moral rights
against people adding buffer overflows to his code, but
otherwise it might be difficult to come up with this type
of claim. You have to argue something that shows how your
reputation is harmed.
> Why this restriction on the rights of authors is called "authors'
> rights" is beyond me.
The author always retains the right to object to mutilations
of the work. It's his natural right.
> > Well, in first instance it would be the author who feels harmed
> > by the modification of course. He's the only one with standing
> > to sue. And then he has to convince the judge that it is really
> > harmful to him. So I guess there is some kind of objectivity
> > in the system, if you consider "what the judge thinks" to be
> > objective.
>
> Right, but the point is that the author can't--can't--can't promise
> not to sue.
Indeed. But the question is, would he be likely to win such
a suit?
> A free software license is, at core, just such a
> promise. But in Europe, the author can, at any time, rescind it, and
> say "you are violating my authors' rights".
No, he cannot rescind the license. He can object to a particular
modification on the grounds that that modification harms his
reputation, if he can argue this harmfulness. The license remains
as valid.
> Since changing the color of curtains violates the rights of an
> architect, it's hard to imagine any significant change to any piece of
> software that would not wreak similar harm to "honor and reputation"
> if the author decided to complain: "That totally violates my original
> vision; it never occurred to me that anyone would so horribly damage
> my program", and bingo--license revoked.
That's not how it works. First, the "curtains change" thing was
harmful because it radically changed the design/look of the
house. Second, a mere assertion by the author is not sufficient.
There has to be some kind of argument as to *why* there is damage
to his reputation.
> I have little objection to legal protection for contracts, and even
> things which swing the bar somewhat to make it "harder" for authors to
> renounce such rights. But the notion that they *cannot* be renounced
> is ludicrous, and totally kills a jillion freedoms.
The motivation for making them unrevokable is to prevent
authors from being forced to accept unconditional surrender
of their works. Then they could be made to look like total
fools by the person acquiring their copyright, and they could
not do anything about it. And yes, they could theoretically
negotiate a transfer on the condition the other guy would not
do that; but given the way copyright licensing works in practice
the chance of that working is practically nil.
Arnoud
--
Arnoud Engelfriet, Dutch patent attorney - Speaking only for myself
Patents, copyright and IPR explained for techies: http://www.iusmentis.com/
Peter S Galbraith
> Thomas Bushnell, BSG wrote:
> > Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet <gala...@stack.nl> writes:
> > > Why do you think the concept is bogus? In principle I think it's
> > > a good idea to have something that prevents others from mutilating
> > > my work. The implementation sucks greatly though.
> >
> > We already have that concept. "Ownership". We even have an extra
> > thing: "Copyright". Both of these, under US law, are fully sufficient
> > to prevent others from "mutilating" your work without your consent.
>
> If I transfer my copyright, I can not stop you from harming
> my reputation. That's why the law has the extra provision that
> helps me protect my moral rights.
If I transfer my copyright to you, you can't (IMHO) damage my reputation
by doing silly things to my work. You can damage _your_ reputation by
doing that.
> > If you don't want it mutilated, don't sell it. Or sell it subject to
> > a contract that prevents unauthorized modification.
>
> This approach means that authors will be forced to accept
> any kind of modifications, even those that directly go against
> their artistic wishes. The US system thinks this is OK since
> you got paid. The European system thinks this is not OK.
I think it's okay. If you no longer hold copyright, how can it affects
your reputation?
> > > He can only insist that a particular modification be retracted
> > > because it damages his honor or reputation. And the court has to
> > > be convinced that it does damage him. If the work is not modified
> > > it would be very difficult for him to assert his moral rights.
> >
> > We have seen the claim that a change in the color of curtains
> > constitutes a damage to honor or reputation.
>
> Indeed. And the court awarded that claim, so I suppose the judge
> found some merit in the claim.
Courts follow the law, however silly the law may be.
This is _not_ a legal argument. It's a common sense argument.
Unfortunately some laws don't make sense.
Peter
Steve Langasek
> Thomas Bushnell, BSG wrote:
> > Arnoud Galactus Engelfriet <gala...@stack.nl> writes:
> > > Why do you think the concept is bogus? In principle I think it's
> > > a good idea to have something that prevents others from mutilating
> > > my work. The implementation sucks greatly though.
> > We already have that concept. "Ownership". We even have an extra
> > thing: "Copyright". Both of these, under US law, are fully sufficient
> > to prevent others from "mutilating" your work without your consent.
> If I transfer my copyright, I can not stop you from harming
> my reputation.
No? What can the new copyright holder do to harm your reputation that
you aren't protected from under other laws? They can't claim that the
work is "Copyright Arnoud Engelfriet" if it isn't; nor can they try to
claim that you're the sole author if you aren't, or that you endorse
certain uses of the work if you don't. There are already libel and
slander laws to prevent damaging a person's reputation through
falsehoods.
> That's why the law has the extra provision that helps me protect my
> moral rights.
It has a superfluous provision that unnecessarily restricts the author's
freedom to form contracts. It is as idiotic and misguided as the
attempts to criminalize the circumvention of technological safeguards in
the US.
> > Why this restriction on the rights of authors is called "authors'
> > rights" is beyond me.
> The author always retains the right to object to mutilations
> of the work. It's his natural right.
What a funny use of the term "natural" right.
> > I have little objection to legal protection for contracts, and even
> > things which swing the bar somewhat to make it "harder" for authors to
> > renounce such rights. But the notion that they *cannot* be renounced
> > is ludicrous, and totally kills a jillion freedoms.
> The motivation for making them unrevokable is to prevent
> authors from being forced to accept unconditional surrender
> of their works.
I can think of plenty of more effective ways to prevent authors from
being *forced* to accept unconditional surrender of their works.
Providing authors with a better education when it comes to contract law,
for example, or promulgating alternate vectors for the publication of
works that don't involve currently-standard copyright contract terms.
> Then they could be made to look like total fools by the person
> acquiring their copyright, and they could not do anything about it.
> And yes, they could theoretically negotiate a transfer on the
> condition the other guy would not do that; but given the way copyright
> licensing works in practice the chance of that working is practically
> nil.
And why should the artist's short-sightedness be inflicted on everyone
else?
--
Steve Langasek
postmodern programmer
Glenn Maynard
> authors from being forced to accept unconditional surrender
> of their works. Then they could be made to look like total
So the only way to prevent this is to remove my right to do it at all?
That's ludicrous. Rights are not preserved by revoking other rights.
--
Glenn Maynard
Bernhard R. Link
> > That's why the law has the extra provision that helps me protect my
> > moral rights.
>
> It has a superfluous provision that unnecessarily restricts the author's
> freedom to form contracts. It is as idiotic and misguided as the
> attempts to criminalize the circumvention of technological safeguards in
> the US.
It's assumed to be a right. Basic thing about rights (at least in German
law, as far as I understand it) is that rights cannot be transfered.
You can not tranfer your right to vote, your right to not be hurt nor
any other right. Even your "copyright" can not be sold. The German
analogon to a tranfer of copyright is a exclusive licence.
> > The author always retains the right to object to mutilations
> > of the work. It's his natural right.
>
> What a funny use of the term "natural" right.
Natural is a quite common description for something seen as so
evident, that it needs no justification. So one can argue, if it
is a natural right, but after I saw people pretending a right to
own weapons this one is not funny at all.
> I can think of plenty of more effective ways to prevent authors from
> being *forced* to accept unconditional surrender of their works.
> Providing authors with a better education when it comes to contract law,
> for example, or promulgating alternate vectors for the publication of
> works that don't involve currently-standard copyright contract terms.
I think the direct and natural way to avoid damnifing contracts is to make
them void. Laws need to be enforceable to be useful.
Though German law is often broken and tends to become more so due to
corporation lobiism, some aspects are still nice. I like a system making
warrenty statements void at all, that restricts warenty to much or
doing such bubbling as "as permitted by applicable law".
Hochachtungsvoll,
Bernhard R. Link
--
Sendmail is like emacs: A nice operating system, but missing
an editor and a MTA.
Bernhard R. Link
> > As I already explained several days ago, the right to prevent
> > modifications does NOT exist for SOFTWARE. Author's rights on SOFTWARE
> > are quite limited, even in Europe.
>
> Moral rights are excluded for software? Can you please give
> me a citation for that? As far as I can tell, the Berne
> Convention nor any of the WIPO treaties say anything like this.
Software is normally treated specially in Europe. In Germany I was told
a necessary condition for something to be protectable by copyright law
(or "Author's Rights", as the verbatim translation for its German word),
is to be made by human (in contrast to animals or computers) OR beeing
software. They said this was introduced to make the USA sign
international copyright treaties.
While I think copyright on sourcecode can be an accaptable thing, I think
protection of binaries is very unnatural.
Hochachtungsvoll,
Bernhard R. Link
--
Sendmail is like emacs: A nice operating system, but missing
an editor and a MTA.
Steve Langasek
> It's assumed to be a right. Basic thing about rights (at least in German
> law, as far as I understand it) is that rights cannot be transfered.
> You can not tranfer your right to vote, your right to not be hurt nor
> any other right.
Yes, this is entirely reasonable. Natural rights should be unalienable.
> Even your "copyright" can not be sold. The German
> analogon to a tranfer of copyright is a exclusive licence.
This, however, is an unfortunate defect of European legal theory.
Intellectual property is not property, and all rights pertaining to
ideas and their expression are artificial rights. The limited
monopolies granted to creators are sometimes socially useful, but that
does not justify the claim that a person can *own* an idea.
> > > The author always retains the right to object to mutilations
> > > of the work. It's his natural right.
> > What a funny use of the term "natural" right.
> Natural is a quite common description for something seen as so
> evident, that it needs no justification. So one can argue, if it
> is a natural right, but after I saw people pretending a right to
> own weapons this one is not funny at all.
It is not evident at all to me that anyone has a *right* to a positive
reputation; nor is it evident to me that protecting one's work from
alteration is the most effective way to ensure a good reputation.
Censoring all criticism of the work is certainly far more effective, so
why not regard "freedom from criticism" as a natural right?
> > I can think of plenty of more effective ways to prevent authors from
> > being *forced* to accept unconditional surrender of their works.
> > Providing authors with a better education when it comes to contract law,
> > for example, or promulgating alternate vectors for the publication of
> > works that don't involve currently-standard copyright contract terms.
> I think the direct and natural way to avoid damnifing contracts is to make
> them void. Laws need to be enforceable to be useful.
This law does so at the expense of other, valid motives -- such as Free
Software.