The Consent Axiom

[Trevor Watkins]

THE CONSENT
AXIOM

----------------------------------
By
Trevor Watkins

I believe that the basis for successful human coexistence can be
reduced to a single statement, a single concept. This statement is the
Consent Axiom:

NO ACTION WITHOUT
CONSENT

This statement is as brief and uncompromising as the biblical 5th
commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”. Like most 4 word sentences, some
further elaboration is required for better understanding.

PRINCIPLE
=========

This statement is a principle. It describes how you ought to behave.
It does not proscribe how you will behave. It is not changed by
circumstances. It does not vary relative to prevailing conditions. It
does not take utility or the greatest good into account. It says that
you may take no action against another human being without their full
and informed consent. Period.

ACTION
======

Like Newton, we must define the meaning of the term “action” quite
carefully. For an action against another to require the consent of the
other, then that action must be immediate in time and space, must
have significant consequences for the other, and must have physical
reality.

1. IMMEDIATE IN TIME AND SPACE:
the request for consent and the action must be within a reasonable
time and distance of each other. Consent given now does not imply
ongoing consent into the future. Consent given in one place does not
imply consent in all places. Consent for an action is not required
from people far removed from the consequences of that action, in space
or time.

2. SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES:
daily life involves many actions which have insignificant consequences
for those around us, and do not require their consent. These actions
are largely covered by the ordinary rules of civility and manners.
However, both the action and the predictable consequences of that
action must be considered. While a gentle shove at the top of a cliff
may not be considered murder, the consequences at the bottom certainly
are. I believe you must take responsibility for the immediate but
unintended consequences of any deliberate action, even when lawful in
terms of the consent axiom.

3. PHYSICAL REALITY:
actions requiring consent must have a physical reality. Looking at
someone, talking about or to someone, thinking evil thoughts about
them, these actions do not require consent. Screaming in their ear
would require their consent.

CONSENT
========

Consent must be
1. Freely given
2. Full and informed
3. Specific
4. Clearly and accurately communicated
5. Applicable only to the individual in question
6. Preferably witnessed

Consent, once given,
1. cannot be changed or revoked
2. Is contractually binding
3. Is limited in time and scope

EXCEPTIONS
==========

The consent axiom only addresses relationships between human beings.
Everything else, including animals and the environment are considered
as property, either of individuals, or unowned.

Some human beings, such as very young children or the insane or
unconscious, are incapable of informed consent. In that case they are
considered as the property of a consenting individual, or unowned. If
ownership is challenged (by anyone), the decision on ownership must be
taken by a duly appointed jury. If an individual is considered
unowned, by themselves or by anyone else, then they must rely on the
charity and intervention of their peers.

Some actions are considered so overwhelmingly good for society that
their performance overrides any individual objections (for example,
vaccination, environmental preservation (eg global warming), terrorist
apprehension). This argument is inevitably the top of a slippery
slope, on which all manner of further consent violations are
justified. This argument should be rejected.

In a democracy, the decisions taken by a majority are considered
binding on the minority, with or without there consent. In a
consenting society this silly concept simply would not apply.

In some cases, such as an accident, a request for consent from the
victim has no meaning. In such cases, the person responsible for the
accident, even if unintentional, must take responsibility for the
consequences of the action precipitating the accident.

Some members of a society may not consent to be bound by the consent
axiom and its implications. As described below under disputes, both
victim and violator have rights to a trial by jury under the consent
axiom. If a non-consenting consent violator gives up that right, then
the violator’s guilt must be automatically presumed, and punishment
must follow.

AN EXTREME EXAMPLE
==================

Imagine you have spotted a young girl in an Iraqi market wearing an
oddly bulging outfit under which you have clearly seen wires and
straps. The consent law says you OUGHT to ask her consent, or at least
wait until she makes some unambiguous threatening action, before
acting. Since the consequences of her threatening action may be coming
at you at several thousand feet per second, you may well decide to
take pre-emptive action and shoot her first. However, if you do this,
YOU must now bear the consequences of your unlawful act (and for the
sake of order in society, this must always remain an unlawful act). If
the 12 year old girl you shot with little or no warning turns out to
be a spina bifida sufferer, with wires and straps up and down her poor
tortured body, then you can expect a jury of your peers to be quite
harsh. If there was more semtex than child under the robe, you might
yet get a medal. Its not fair, its just how it is.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
=========================

Every action has unpredictable and unintended consequences. Who would
have thought the invention of the atomic bomb would ensure world peace
for 70 years? Who would have thought a message of love and peace would
result in the crusades and the inquisition? Who knows how many
deserving microbes you kill every time you breath? Are you responsible
for the unintended consequences of your actions? Well, if not you,
then who? God? Fate? Both are difficult to sue. I believe you must
take responsibility for the immediate but unintended consequences of
any deliberate action, even when lawful in terms of the consent
axiom. . However, these consequences must be immediate both in time
and place.

SOCIETY
=======

A consenting society is that group of people who acknowledge and
respect the consent axiom as the basis of their social interactions.
Members of such a society will understand their mutual obligation to
resist and punish consent violations, and to provide jury members for
dispute resolutions.

DISPUTES
========

As with all human endeavours, disputes will arise. I believe that the
resolution of these disputes is a task for a jury of your peers when
other avenues such as compensation and apology have failed.

The size and composition of the jury must be consented to by both
parties to the dispute. If agreement on a jury cannot be reached in a
reasonable time (7 days, for example), both sides select six jurors,
and a foreman with a casting vote is chosen by random lottery of the
jury members. Jury decisions are made by a simple majority vote. Any
jury decision may be appealed to another jury until one side or the
other has 3 identical decisions in its favour. Thereafter the jury
decision becomes binding upon both parties to the dispute, and is
added to the set of legal precedents for that society which defines
the common law.

THE JURY
========

The members of the jury alone determine the rules for the hearing.
They may be guided by well-established rules of legal procedure and
evidence, but they are not bound by it. They may appoint a judge or
judges to guide them, they may invite or allow lawyers to represent
the parties, they may call witnesses, conduct investigations, seek
the opinion of experts, or do whatever is required to reach a
decision. They will be funded equally by the parties to the dispute
during the hearing, but may finally decide on any allocation of costs
they see fit.

Because it is a matter of chance as to which side obtains the casting
vote on the jury, it will be important for both sides to select jurors
committed to acting on the merits of the case, rather than jurors
blindly supporting the side which appointed them. I believe that a
class of professional, impartial jurors will arise whose primary asset
will be their reputation for fair decisions. This class of jurors will
provide the pool from which most parties to a dispute will make their
jury selection.

CONSENT VIOLATIONS
==================

If someone does take action without consent, then that action is
unlawful and should be punished. Who will punish such a violation?
In the first instance, the victim of the violation, if capable, is the
most obvious candidate for exacting judgement and punishment. The
punishment may vary from an apology, or compensation, through to
capture and removal from the consenting society. Failing this, in the
second instance, members of the victim’s social network, such as
family, friends and colleagues will assist in exacting judgement and
punishment against a consent violator. If this second group is not
capable, then in the final instance, the unrelated members of the
consenting society must take responsibility for the consent violation,
as a cost and obligation that they bear by virtue of their membership
of that society. It is likely that formal structures, such as police
forces and judiciaries, would be setup by most societies to fulfil
this obligation, funded by consenting members of that society.

It is likely that any response by a victim or society against a
consent violator may not enjoy the violator’s consent. In this case,
the original violator may declare a dispute and the matter would be
decided by a jury, as described above. In other words, responses to
consent violations are themselves subject to the consent axiom, and
must not violate a jury’s sense of reasonableness.

PUNISHMENT
==========

What punishments may a jury impose on a convicted consent violator? It
is my belief that a jury may impose any punishment it pleases (subject
to later appeal), except one. A jury may not decide to take the life
of any individual under any circumstance. Generally, a jury would be
guided by existing precedents for crimes and punishments.

My personal suggested scale of punishments is as follows:

* Apology - the violator apologises to the victim
* Compensation - the violator compensates the victim
* Humiliation - the violator is humiliated before the victim and
society
* Incarceration - the violator’s freedom of movement is restricted for
a period
* Removal - the violator is removed from the society, by exile or
internal imprisonment

MORALITY
========

Morality arises from choice, not coercion. I believe there are
discoverable "absolute" moral values. Such an absolute value would
optimise the success (survival, comfort, wealth, happiness) of its
adherents in the majority of environments, whether they be humans,
microbes or aliens from Alpha Centauri. I believe the consent axiom
represents such an absolute moral value or proposition.

For example, it has been shown mathematically using game theory that
the optimum strategy for survival in a competitive environment is the
so-called "tit for tat" strategy. Both the "trust everyone" and "trust
no one" strategies are inferior.

CONCLUSION
==========

I would describe the consent axiom as the definition of a minimum
ethical consensus. It is that smallest set of ethical considerations
on which a useful number of individuals may agree, which are
nevertheless sufficient for producing a peaceful and productive
society.

The implications of this axiom incorporate most libertarian beliefs in
a non-contradictory manner, viz

* Prohibition on the initiation of violence (unless consented to eg in
contact sports)
* Property rights
* Contracts
* Appropriate response to violations
* Primacy of the individual
* Dispute resolution
* Limits on governments and groups
* Freedom of speech and belief

The consent axiom here described says that the rights of the
individual are paramount, but that disputes between individuals must
be resolved by a group.






SOME DEFINITIONS (FROM WIKIPEDIA)
=================================

BELIEF is usually defined as a conviction of the truth of a
proposition without its verification; therefore a belief is a
subjective mental interpretation derived from perceptions,
contemplation(reasoning), or communication.

An AXIOM is a sentence or proposition that is not proved or
demonstrated and is considered as obvious or as an initial necessary
consensus for a Theory . Therefore, it is taken for granted as true,
and serves as a starting point for deducing and inferencing other
(theory dependent) truths.


RIGHTS serve as rules of interaction between people, and, as such,
they place constraints and obligations upon the actions of individuals
or groups. A right does not represent a guarantee, a surprising
mistake made by many. A right is an agreement amongst humans - one has
no rights relative to gravity. Rights may come into conflict, in which
case a mechanism is needed for resolving the conflict.

[Leon Louw]

Good one Trevor.

I sometimes say anyone can tell in my absence where I stand, just ask "Did
all concerned consent to what was done to them / their property?" If yes,
I'm for it.

[Jim Peron]

On Aug 1, 2009, at 7:15 PM, Leon Louw wrote:

> I sometimes say anyone can tell in my absence where I stand, just
> ask "Did
> all concerned consent to what was done to them / their property?"
> If yes,
> I'm for it.

Leon:
To say, "If yes, I'm for it" implies approval of the action. The
consent axiom doesn't imply approval or disapproval. It is neutral in
that sense. It merely says that if agree it is no one else's business.

[Leon Louw]

Come on Jim. this is pedantic semantics at it's worst.  Most people have difficulty understanding what's being said; you're battling not to understand.

 

I am for whatever people consent to.

 

I'd hoped it unnecessary to delve into what I mean by each word in a Popperian infinite regress.  By "I" I mean ... .  By "am" I mean ... . And so on.  Through "for" by which I mean being for the right to undertake the action, by which I mean against coercive 3rd party interference and ... .  By "right" I mean ... .  By "coercive" I mean ... . By "consent", I mean ... having mens rea, not being under undue influence, being informed etc.  By "Informed" I mean being conscious with reasonable accuracy of the import of the consent concerned .... .  By "Import" I mean ... .

 

And so on through the entire English lexicon, and some Latin, French, German et al where English is lacking.

[Jim Peron]

Leon:

In the US the term, "I'm for it" implies a rather enthusiastic endorsement of something. If it does not mean that in South Africa then I was unaware of the difference, for that I'm sorry. And in the US people would "understand" it that way with very little difficulty. Again, that may not be the case in South Africa. 

Either way the response was unduly and uncharacteristically harsh (or perhaps sarcastic, it is hard to tell without the verbal nuances of the spoken word.) 

[Bryan Lever]

Hi Trevor

You wrote:

Morality arises from choice, not coercion. I believe there are
discoverable "absolute" moral values. Such an absolute value would
optimise the success (survival, comfort, wealth, happiness) of its
adherents in the majority of environments, whether they be humans,
microbes or aliens from Alpha Centauri. I believe the consent axiom
represents such an absolute moral value or proposition.

"Choice," here when it involves an "absolute" value, can surely only mean to choose to either conform to this value or not to conform. "Absolute" in my understanding, means inviolate such as in the law of gravity.  Therefore, it cannot mean, under the constraint of an "absolute' moral value, that people can choose their own moral values which may well differ from other's choices (which is Jim Harris' philosophy).

Second, by "Absolute" value do you mean that this is universal and that every cognisant human being has a basic understanding of what is right and wrong - even the most heinous of criminals?

Hitler might have believed he was right in his attempt to wipe out non-arian races justifying this on his belief that the all white arian race was superior and entitled to wipe out all those considered beneath them. The acid test of absolute morality is the question - would he have consented to have been tortured to death in a gas chamber himself? The answer is clear and it fits the golden rule of "Do unto others as you would have done unto yourself". 

I agree there is an "absolute" moral law. I also hold that for every law there is a law-giver. So, Trevor where, in your mind, does the "absolute" value come from - why should it be there at all? Why aren't we like Jim Harris who chooses to make his own moral laws which are, I believe he would say, not absolute. (Jim, if you are reading this, please correct me if I have misinterpreted you).

The Consent Axiom can only work if there is adherence to the biblical golden rule which I would go to say is exactly the same as your Consent Axiom. It has been in existence for nearly 2000 years and yet mankind has not followed it. What chance is there of your modern precis of the same rule being followed?

By the way the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki certainly did not usher in 70 years of peace. Count the number of wars and deaths ensuing as a consequence in the world in that same period since that event!!!

Just as another aside, did you know that when the iconic portrait of Einstein was captured, it was at a moment just after he had reflected to the photographer on how saddened he was that his E=mc2 formula resulted in that same nuclear event. The silent poignancy of that reflective moment is what the photographer captured.

Bryan 

--
Bryan Lever
PO Box 199, Fontainebleau, 2032 South Africa
Cell: 082-414-5690
Visit my website:
http://www.bryanleverstudios.ws

[Leon Louw]

Sorry for seeming harsh and/or sarcastic.  Mostly I participate in these exchanges for fun.  I like Humor as a means of communicating views.  The problem is, of course, that it doesn't always work when such deep philosophy as Popper's essentialism is under consideration.

 

So here's a simply rewording.  I know that it too could be subjected to harsh linguistic scrutiny, but anyway:

"I'm for that to which people consent being lawful."

There does seem to be a shade of difference between US and SA English here, of which I'll be mindful henceforth.

 

Having said that, you have me wondering if I am against anything consensual (in the US sense).  Nothing comes immediately to mind. 

 

Were you to ask me whether I'd prefer X and Y not to have done so-and-so, I can think of very few so-and-sos I'd prefer not to have happened, and they're mostly very personal, like preferring my daughter not to tattoo purple marijuana leaves all over her body and face, and my wife not to have an affair with the village idiot. 

 

On a larger scale, it's much harder to think of examples.  I suppose I'd rather people tell fewer lies and listen to more tonal than atonal music, but such preferences are really very marginal and hard to think of.  I'm not even sure why I have these inclinations.  Part of me says the spontaneous non-coercive order of people doing things I "disapprove" of may be better than the alternatives.  I have great difficulty caring about what other people do in the absence of coercion.

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Jim Peron

To: li...@googlegroups.com

Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2009 1:25 PM

Subject: Re: [SPAM] Re: [SPAM] [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

Leon:

In the US the term, "I'm for it" implies a rather enthusiastic endorsement of something. If it does not mean that in South Africa then I was unaware of the difference, for that I'm sorry. And in the US people would "understand" it that way with very little difficulty. Again, that may not be the case in South Africa. 

Either way the response was unduly and uncharacteristically harsh (or perhaps sarcastic, it is hard to tell without the verbal nuances of the spoken word.) 

On Aug 2, 2009, at 3:38 AM, Leon Louw wrote:

Come on Jim. this is pedantic semantics at it's worst.  Most people have difficulty understanding what's being said; you're battling not to understand.

 

I am for whatever people consent to.

 

I'd hoped it unnecessary to delve into what I mean by each word in a Popperian infinite regress.  By "I" I mean ... .  By "am" I mean ... . And so on.  Through "for" by which I mean being for the right to undertake the action, by which I mean against coercive 3rd party interference and ... .  By "right" I mean ... .  By "coercive" I mean ... . By "consent", I mean ... having mens rea, not being under undue influence, being informed etc.  By "Informed" I mean being conscious with reasonable accuracy of the import of the consent concerned .... .  By "import" I mean ... .

[Stephen vJ]

... that should read "e=Δmc^2", since only the mass actually consumed is converted to energy.

 

;-)

 

In case "Δ" is converted to garbage by the mail server - it's a delta sign.

 

S.

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Bryan Lever

To: li...@googlegroups.com

[Garth Zietsman]

Trevor I haven't read all of this yet but I promise I will.  I couldn't however resist offerig some immediate thoughts.

 

Point 1

 

Right at the start you say, or imply, that the consent axiom is the only basis for successful human coexistance.  I imagine that behind that claim is the view that consent handles disagreements in the way the market handles exchanges where there is no agreement on exchange values, i.e. no deal.  That is logically consistent, efficient and seemingly no-one loses.  Other ways require someone to lose and that appears by definition to be an unsuccessful coexistance - at least to the loser.   

 

But what if some people think what you consent to is not enough i.e. that a moral person would always consent to some things or that successful human coexistance requires everyone to consent to a list of things they may not want to?  For example what if a large fraction of the population believes that randomness, or accident, is a major factor in who ends up with what, and that it isn't just a matter of free individual choices and application?  They may then reasonably say that a certain level of redistribution from the lucky to the unlucky is fair because part of what you have is undeserved (and may involve accidental transfer from the unlucky to the lucky).  They may say that successful cooperative human existance is impossible so long as some of the lucky can refuse to go along with it. 

 

What if it can be shown that the radical no-deal principle leads to so little actually being done that all sides do face a net loss over time?  I have in mind some game theory examples like the prisoner's dillemma where the rational individual solutions lead to a less than the optimum available result.  It has been argued that some enforced cooperation at market and political levels results in a bigger overall cake than trying to rely on strict bottom up concent would do.  I don't say that these claims are correct (although I think them plausable) but that what if they were.

 

You would not have a basis of successful coexistance if some were allowed to deny action on these beliefs.  What I am trying to argue is that successful coexistance requires a large majority buy in to the basis principles and that there is reason to believe that consent to your radical formulation of the consent axiom will be rather small.

 

I believe the problem of successful coexistence with those who don't believe in the radical concent axiom (which I think are the vast majority) will require allowing some limited violations of the consent axiom, and that this will require some additional axioms.  

 

Point 2

 

The radical consent axiom is incoherent when you have a real dispute.  Eventually there will be a dispute that will have to be settled in violation of the consent of one or both parties.  In other words the radical consent axiom requires fantasy levels of agreement if you are to avoid violating somewhere.

 

Garth

[Trevor Watkins]

Replies annotated <Trevor> below

Trevor Watkins - Base Software
bas...@gmail.com 083 44 11 721 - 042 293 1405 - (fax)0866 532 363
http://sketchesbyboz37.blogspot.com www.libertarian.org.za
PO Box 3302, Jeffreys Bay, 6330

2009/8/3 Garth Zietsman <garth.z...@gmail.com>

Trevor I haven't read all of this yet but I promise I will.  I couldn't however resist offerig some immediate thoughts.

 

Point 1

 

Right at the start you say, or imply, that the consent axiom is the only

 

<Trevor - Not the ONLY basis, but a sufficient>  basis for successful human coexistance.  I imagine that behind that claim is the view that consent handles disagreements in the way the market handles exchanges where there is no agreement on exchange values, i.e. no deal.  That is logically consistent, efficient and seemingly no-one loses.  Other ways require someone to lose and that appears by definition to be an unsuccessful coexistance - at least to the loser.   

 

But what if some people think what you consent to is not enough i.e. that a moral person would always consent to some things or that successful human coexistance requires everyone to consent to a list of things they may not want to?  For example what if a large fraction of the population believes that randomness, or accident, is a major factor in who ends up with what, and that it isn't just a matter of free individual choices and application?  They may then reasonably say that a certain level of redistribution from the lucky to the unlucky is fair because part of what you have is undeserved (and may involve accidental transfer from the unlucky to the lucky).  They may say that successful cooperative human existance is impossible so long as some of the lucky can refuse to go along with it.

 

<Trevor - everyone is richer than someone else, and poorer. There is no limit to the redistribution required for perfect equality. It is simply not a viable target for society. Its one reason why socialism fails.> 

 

 

What if it can be shown that the radical no-deal principle leads to so little actually being done that all sides do face a net loss over time?  I have in mind some game theory examples like the prisoner's dillemma where the rational individual solutions lead to a less than the optimum available result.  It has been argued that some enforced cooperation at market and political levels results in a bigger overall cake than trying to rely on strict bottom up concent would do.  I don't say that these claims are correct (although I think them plausable) but that what if they were.

 

<Trevor - if it became clear that withholding consent leads to a net loss, we can expect rational people to start giving consent, even in situations of imperfect knowledge. Perfect rationality leads to impasse in game theory - some randomness is required for optimum results.>

 

You would not have a basis of successful coexistance if some were allowed to deny action on these beliefs.  What I am trying to argue is that successful coexistance requires a large majority buy in to the basis principles and that there is reason to believe that consent to your radical formulation of the consent axiom will be rather small.

<Trevor - size isn't everything. I define a consenting society, I don't speculate on its size.  However, if a consenting society is more successful than others, I confidently expect the  society to grow.>

 

I believe the problem of successful coexistence with those who don't believe in the radical concent axiom (which I think are the vast majority) will require allowing some limited violations of the consent axiom, and that this will require some additional axioms.  

<Trevor - I take your point - I haven't given much thought to how a consenting society would  cope if embedded within a non-consenting society. Removal from and isolation from nonconsenting societies would probably be the best bet. >

 

Point 2

 

The radical consent axiom is incoherent when you have a real dispute.  Eventually there will be a dispute that will have to be settled in violation of the consent of one or both parties.  In other words the radical consent axiom requires fantasy levels of agreement if you are to avoid violating somewhere.

<Trevor - the issue of disputes is dealt with at some length. Of course, in a dispute, it is highly likely that one or other of the parties will suffer an action to which they do not consent. I try to define a due process before that event occurs.>

 

Garth

[Garth Zietsman]

 

<Trevor - everyone is richer than someone else, and poorer. There is no limit to the redistribution required for perfect equality. It is simply not a viable target for society. Its one reason why socialism fails.> 

 

Garth: There is no reason why redistribution needs to aim for equality.  No one thinks outcomes are totally random so most societies aim for no more than progressive tax.  

 

 <Trevor - if it became clear that withholding consent leads to a net loss, we can expect rational people to start giving consent, even in situations of imperfect knowledge.

 

Garth: That's a good point.

 

Perfect rationality leads to impasse in game theory - some randomness is required for optimum results.>

 

Garth: My view is that its a narrow view of rationality that leads to impasses.

 

I believe the problem of successful coexistence with those who don't believe in the radical concent axiom (which I think are the vast majority) will require allowing some limited violations of the consent axiom, and that this will require some additional axioms.  

<Trevor - I take your point - I haven't given much thought to how a consenting society would  cope if embedded within a non-consenting society. Removal from and isolation from nonconsenting societies would probably be the best bet. >

 

Garth: I've argued this point with Jim for ages.  Isolation won't help.  Nonconsenters will arise within your group - probably your kids.

 

<Trevor - the issue of disputes is dealt with at some length. Of course, in a dispute, it is highly likely that one or other of the parties will suffer an action to which they do not consent. I try to define a due process before that event occurs.>

 

Garth: I have no problem with due process.  My point is that any dispute resolution process necessarily involves some other principle that isn't consent.  In other words you need at least one other axiom for a successful coexistence.  I should make it clear I do think the consent axiom should be one of the axioms.

[Trevor Watkins]

Replies labelled <Trevor> below

Trevor Watkins - Base Software
bas...@gmail.com 083 44 11 721 - 042 293 1405 - (fax)0866 532 363
http://sketchesbyboz37.blogspot.com www.libertarian.org.za
PO Box 3302, Jeffreys Bay, 6330

2009/8/2 Bryan Lever <obl...@gmail.com>

Hi Trevor

You wrote:

Morality arises from choice, not coercion. I believe there are
discoverable "absolute" moral values. Such an absolute value would
optimise the success (survival, comfort, wealth, happiness) of its
adherents in the majority of environments, whether they be humans,
microbes or aliens from Alpha Centauri. I believe the consent axiom
represents such an absolute moral value or proposition.

"Choice," here when it involves an "absolute" value, can surely only mean to choose to either conform to this value or not to conform.

<Trevor - by "absolute" I mean objective, unconditional, complete in itself, not relative, independent. However, it does not mean "one of a kind", or "the only one". The consent axiom is not the only  basis for successful coexistence, it just happens to be a good one.>

"Absolute" in my understanding, means inviolate such as in the law of gravity.  Therefore, it cannot mean, under the constraint of an "absolute' moral value, that people can choose their own moral values which may well differ from other's choices (which is Jim Harris' philosophy).

Second, by "Absolute" value do you mean that this is universal and that every cognisant human being has a basic understanding of what is right and wrong - even the most heinous of criminals?

<Trevor - Yes, an absolute moral value  would be like a universal constant (such as the speed of light) in that it would be true (lead to success, as defined) for all species in all places at all times. It may be provable theoretically, like game theory's tit for tat, but is more likely to be empirically observed. I do not say anything about whether a particular human being understands this concept.

Hitler might have believed he was right in his attempt to wipe out non-arian races justifying this on his belief that the all white arian race was superior and entitled to wipe out all those considered beneath them. The acid test of absolute morality is the question - would he have consented to have been tortured to death in a gas chamber himself? The answer is clear and it fits the golden rule of "Do unto others as you would have done unto yourself". 

<Trevor - Your "golden rule" is flawed, in that it imposes my desires and expectations on not necessarily willing others. I like people to fire leather balls at me at speed (playing volleyball), but not everyone does.> 

I agree there is an "absolute" moral law. I also hold that for every law there is a law-giver. So, Trevor where, in your mind, does the "absolute" value come from - why should it be there at all? Why aren't we like Jim Harris who chooses to make his own moral laws which are, I believe he would say, not absolute. (Jim, if you are reading this, please correct me if I have misinterpreted you).

The Consent Axiom can only work if there is adherence to the biblical golden rule which I would go to say is exactly the same as your Consent Axiom. It has been in existence for nearly 2000 years and yet mankind has not followed it. What chance is there of your modern precis of the same rule being followed?

<Trevor - Well, a much better chance if it is clearly and unequivocally stated, then debated and improved, then disseminated. Humanity does appear to improve over time, but not continuously. I cannot say that the world's religions have contributed significantly to this improvement.> 

By the way the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki certainly did not usher in 70 years of peace. Count the number of wars and deaths ensuing as a consequence in the world in that same period since that event!!!

<Trevor - the world had 2 devastating wars involving 5 of the 7 continents in a space of 30 years. Then no continental war for 70 years, following the abrupt end to the 2nd world war using nuclear weapons. After Nagasaki, no human being has been killed by the deliberate deployment of nuclear weapons. You do the math.> 

Just as another aside, did you know that when the iconic portrait of Einstein was captured, it was at a moment just after he had reflected to the photographer on how saddened he was that his E=mc2 formula resulted in that same nuclear event. The silent poignancy of that reflective moment is what the photographer captured.

<Trevor - I didn't know that - interesting piece of info about one of my favourite people. Of course, even Einstein did not appreciate the full import of what he had discovered (eg he never fully accepted quantum theory which arose from general relativity.> 

[Trevor Watkins]

Replies in <Trevor - > below.
Trevor Watkins 

Garth: I've argued this point with Jim for ages.  Isolation won't help.  Nonconsenters will arise within your group - probably your kids.

<Trevor - Consent from kids is not required while they are considered property, up to about the age of 4 when informed consent becomes possible. Prior to this, their parents or guardian's consent is required. However, any action (including those against a child) can be challenged (by anyone) and subjected to the dispute mechanism. Most children adapt to the ethical environment in which they find themselves, challenging it as they enter puberty. A consenting societies rite of passage for young adults would probably involve their formal acceptance of the consent axiom, or their departure to seek another system. A consenting society would require adherence to the consent axiom, or constant dispute resolution followed by appropriate sanction. > 

 

<Trevor - the issue of disputes is dealt with at some length. Of course, in a dispute, it is highly likely that one or other of the parties will suffer an action to which they do not consent. I try to define a due process before that event occurs.>

 

Garth: I have no problem with due process.  My point is that any dispute resolution process necessarily involves some other principle that isn't consent.  In other words you need at least one other axiom for a successful coexistence.  I should make it clear I do think the consent axiom should be one of the axioms.

<Trevor - I take your point - perhaps the Jury approach to dispute resolution should be considered a second axiom.> 

[Garth Zietsman]

On Tue, Aug 4, 2009 at 10:05 AM, Trevor Watkins <bas...@gmail.com> wrote:

Replies in <Trevor - > below.
Trevor Watkins 

Garth: I've argued this point with Jim for ages.  Isolation won't help.  Nonconsenters will arise within your group - probably your kids.

<Trevor - Consent from kids is not required while they are considered property, up to about the age of 4 when informed consent becomes possible. Prior to this, their parents or guardian's consent is required. However, any action (including those against a child) can be challenged (by anyone) and subjected to the dispute mechanism. Most children adapt to the ethical environment in which they find themselves, challenging it as they enter puberty. A consenting societies rite of passage for young adults would probably involve their formal acceptance of the consent axiom, or their departure to seek another system. A consenting society would require adherence to the consent axiom, or constant dispute resolution followed by appropriate sanction. >

 

Garth: I meant when they have grown up and may wish to stay where they grew up.  On the other hand I categorically reject the idea that kids are property.  That notion makes abuse permissible.  That's another long standing argument with Jim.  I also reject the idea of totally informed consent as an either or concept.  Information is always incomplete, and if you say that kids can't know what's good for them because they don't have the cognitive and emotional development or experience with which to make reasonable judgements about their own preferences (which is probably right), then you must also admit that the same holds for adults - some more than others.

 

On another point I don't believe there are such things as objective morals.  There are perhaps ought type rules which when followed with produce desired outcomes but this is squarely a utilitarian argument.  It says nothing about why you should persue that outcome in the first place.  If you mean objective in the sense that something is right or wrong in itself (apart from consequences) as in religious rules or Kant's categorical imperitive or Rand's objectivism then I think you are mistaken.

[Leon Louw]

Garth I'm mainly with Trevor here, and think you're confusing concepts.  You're not distinguishing between principles and application. 

 

I assume you agree with the anti-rape principle.  Whether or not there's a rape is another matter, a complex jurisprudential problem entailing sophisticated time-honoured aspects of due process, evidence, forensics, psychology and more.  What should be done if the is rape is an additional complex problem, entailing the above and more, such as social norms, culture, prison conditions, assessment of damages, psychological assessments etc.

 

The sole purpose of the first set is concerned with a single simple principle:  was there consent?

 

For libertarians, as opposed to people of all other persuasions, this should always be decisive.

 

But libertarianism per se has no view on how to establish the truth and what to do about it (other than that the complex processes should preferably not themselves violate the consent principle.)

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Garth Zietsman

To: li...@googlegroups.com

Sent: Tuesday, August 04, 2009 11:07 AM

Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

[Garth Zietsman]

Leon I take your point.  I do understand this distinction and maybe I should have marked where I changed from principle to application.  However it isn't true that jurisprudential concerns haven't been an issue among Libertarians.  It was a serious bone of contention between Jim and me whether I had the right to come over his fence if I thought he was abusing his kids.  I said if his kids asked me to intervene I had every right - under the assumption that they hadn't consented to the abuse and had consented to my intervention.  Jim believed his kids were property and had no capacity to deny or extend consent.  I'm sure he thought I was a statist and I believed I was as being as consistently Libertarian as he - except that we differed on children being property (where he has complete rights of use and disposal) or people with at least some capacity and 'right' to consent.  He thought they were HIS kids not mine, and I thought they were their own people.

 

Since the central Libertarian principle is consent, surely they should put more weight on reliable methods for checking for consent than those who don't hold that principle?  I'm saying Libertarains should be as obsessed with the detection of consent as they are with promoting it as a standard.  [I am not sure of that point at all but it seemed worth thinking about.]

 

Also the matter of the capacity for consent isn't just a jurisprudential issue about judging whether there was consent in a particular case or not.  The fuzziness isn't just in an outsider being unsure whether there was consent or not.  The capacity for consent is itself variable and fuzzy in principle.  It is essentially zero at birth and increases to some unknown extent as we get older.  Perhaps it shrinks when we get very old.  It probably never reaches the same peak in everyone.  The difference is that the child has say 10% capacity and the adult say 80-90%, and the jurisprudential issue is to ask whether whatever capacity they had was fully exercised.

 

If peak capacity for consent in adults is in principle unequal then that has implications - for principle.  At the very least it means we need at least one more central principle. You may not agree that capacity for consent is unequal in adults in their normal state, but what if it is?  Do we ever intervene?  What principle(s) ought to guide intervention when we think capacity for consent is limited?

[Trevor Watkins]

All good points to consider, Garth.

Children as property. We routinely describe children as belonging to their parents, implying ownership. If full dependants are not property, then what are they? They are not independent entities, their choices are constrained by their dependency, they live at the pleasure of someone else. My criterion for application of the consent axiom is that the consentee is capable of forming an intelligible and unambiguous declaration of intention, which appears to occur between the ages of 2 and 4 for most humans. Prior to this, interpretation of intention must be made by the dependant's parents, guardian, minder, owner - call it what you will. As I state in my document, ANY action by anyone can be disputed, leading to a decision by a jury.

Capacity for consent.  Having satisfied the criterion above for consent, I do not believe this remains an issue. All the consentee needs to do is communicate their intention - they do not need to justify it. Even if their choice is irrational, harmful to themselves, blatantly stupid, it must be respected, or consequences will flow. The consentee needs to be just intelligent enough to communicate his/her intention based on his/her available information.

Trevor Watkins - Base Software
bas...@gmail.com 083 44 11 721 - 042 293 1405 - (fax)0866 532 363
http://sketchesbyboz37.blogspot.com www.libertarian.org.za
PO Box 3302, Jeffreys Bay, 6330

2009/8/5 Garth Zietsman <garth.z...@gmail.com>

[Garth Zietsman]

Nice answer Trevor.

 

All good points to consider, Garth.

Children as property. We routinely describe children as belonging to their parents, implying ownership. If full dependants are not property, then what are they? They are not independent entities, their choices are constrained by their dependency, they live at the pleasure of someone else.

 

Garth: They are people who someone has agreed to support.  They are not slaves.  I don't think you are entitled to abuse them - even if consent doesn't apply and you think you have full property rights over them.  I don't think the non-applicability of consent plus ownership outlaws abuse at all.  You need an additional principle or axiom.

 

My criterion for application of the consent axiom is that the consentee is capable of forming an intelligible and unambiguous declaration of intention, which appears to occur between the ages of 2 and 4 for most humans. Prior to this, interpretation of intention must be made by the dependant's parents, guardian, minder, owner - call it what you will. As I state in my document, ANY action by anyone can be disputed, leading to a decision by a jury.

 

Garth: This is completely reasonable in my opinion.   I would assume though that as soon as our 2-4 year old can declare their intention or preference unambiguously - e.g. I don't wish to be hit daddy, I want someone else to look after me, etc - the consent axiom believing parent is then bound to listen?  Do the property rights immediately fall away?  

 

Capacity for consent.  Having satisfied the criterion above for consent, I do not believe this remains an issue. All the consentee needs to do is communicate their intention - they do not need to justify it. Even if their choice is irrational, harmful to themselves, blatantly stupid, it must be respected, or consequences will flow. The consentee needs to be just intelligent enough to communicate his/her intention based on his/her available information.

 

Garth: I am talking about 'the ability to form and unambiguously declare their intention or preference' - not the rationality or whatever of the intention/preference itself.  I mean do all adults have an equal capacity to unambiguously know and/or communicate their own intentions/preferences?  It may seem that the answer must be yes but if you admit that new born kids have vastly less than full capacity for this then it is in principle possible that development of this capacity may not be equally complete in all adults.

 

What is your view of the drunk friend who wants to drive?  According to your view he has full capacity to form and unambiguously declare his intention.  Do you intervene?  If so on what grounds?  Is it because he temporarily isn't himself?  Is it because his intentions must be overriden even if he is fully himself? 

 

If you argue that his more inclusive intentions i.e. taking into account what he would intend if sober, would ask you to stop him, then I will argue that people differ quite substantially in their ability to know and communicate their more inclusive/representative intentions, because the capacity to grasp that has an element of reasoning ability to it.

 

If you argue that you must not intervene, then I suspect you will often have great difficulty in accepting the outcome of the principle.  I personally accept that you must allow people to be themselves and actualise their intentions even if they are stupid - but I also think there is a limit to just how much stupidity they should suffer before I think it time to act against them for their own good.  I say that apart from my wish to personally not suffer from their stupidity.  I guess I have an additional axiom that good sense is to be valued more than bad sense, and a principle that one should have compassion. 

 

You can therefore declare me a non-libertarian if you wish but I know my sympathies are profoundly libertarian.  I am fairly Randian in my trying to balance reason and consent but since I don't believe in objectivism I am not not a Randian.  Anyway this discussion has just given me a better explicit understanding of myself and my political views and for that I thank you.  

[Jim Peron]

On Aug 6, 2009, at 1:38 AM, Trevor Watkins wrote:

Children as property. We routinely describe children as belonging to their parents, implying ownership. If full dependants are not property, then what are they? They are not independent entities, their choices are constrained by their dependency, they live at the pleasure of someone else. My criterion for application of the consent axiom is that the consentee is capable of forming an intelligible and unambiguous declaration of intention, which appears to occur between the ages of 2 and 4 for most humans. Prior to this, interpretation of intention must be made by the dependant's parents, guardian, minder, owner - call it what you will. As I state in my document, ANY action by anyone can be disputed, leading to a decision by a jury.

Guardianship does not imply ownership. If children are property, one of the most abhorrent positions I've heard in a long time, then they may be treated like property. They may be roasted for lunch, raped as a pasttime, etc. Property does not have rights. Nor can property develop rights. I can't think of a statement more likely to convince people that all libertarians are insane than to promote the idea that children are property. 

[Garth Zietsman]

Garth: Exactly my position - only much better put. 

 

What's your take on the consent axiom Jim?  Is it sufficient in your view?

[Leon Louw]

On kid's rights, as in all matters, I'm keen on universally applicable principles and minimal room for discretion and arbitrary criteria.  Accordingly, I don't like distinctive laws/rules applying to children.  I see children as indistinguishable from incapacitated adults.  Identical constraints arise for adults in a host of circumstances eg -

• an unconscious person in an operating theater where a surgeon finds a condition which, unless fixed without consent, will kill the patient
• a drunk or drugged person
• retards
• people having fits
• primitive people in advanced conditions
• someone who unknowingly risks their lives - the stepping in front of a bus idea
• You see a flame about to ignite your absent neighbour's house (so trespass to save it)
• You see the flame about to cross your boundary into your explosives factory (so trespass to stop it)
• etc

My view is that no special law/rule is necessary.  The basic consent axiom suffices for all these situations.

 

The implications of regarding children are bizarre even if the raison d'etre is clear.  If one owns one's children, is there a cut-off date/age.  Consistent non-arbitrary non-discretionary principles say no, which means a 90 yr old owns their 70 yr old child and can beat the hell out of them, or sell them into slavery.

 

I prefer the view that people never own children, not even pre-birth, and can no more abuse them than they can any of the adults above.  Not only am I for the law permitting me to defend Jim's kids from his abuse, but I'd do it regardless of the law.  As an aside, Jim is ambiguous about such concepts as "law".  I is, as I've pointed out for law, and just doesn't call what he's for "law", just as communist anarchists are for property, but just don't call their kind of appropriation "ownership".

 

No, Garth, I don't think there can or should be such a thing as "libertarian" jurisprudence.  I don't think the consent axiom - that's libertarianism consists of - suggests eg a preference for juries, the right to cross-examine or a presumption of innocence.  It is for the rule of law by default in that the rule of law is for universal application.

 

I see libertarianism as literally one word: consent.  (When my shock at Walter Block asserted this subsided, I decided he's right).

 

All the law needs to say is that doing things to people requires their consent.  It's then up to other domains to decide how that applies in practice.

 

And yes. people do have unequal "capacity", by which I assume you mean something like knowledge, rationality or IQ.  That's not a problem, it's a fact, by which I mean it's not something for which we need a solution, just as we don't seek a solution to some being taller or shorter, or to the fact the some have a sharper sense of taste. 

 

Fortuitously, spontaneous orders of free societies rescue "inferior" folk from being losers; actually turns them into winners - they get to enjoy mass production, language, advanced technology, cheap excellent music, fantastic health care, easily accessible food, staggeringly cheap and diverse clothing etc etc.  Their greatest disadvantage is when the market (ie the consent axiom) is curtailed.

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Garth Zietsman

To: li...@googlegroups.com

Sent: Wednesday, August 05, 2009 10:59 AM

Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

[Jim Peron]

On Aug 6, 2009, at 5:01 AM, Jim Peron wrote:

> Guardianship does not imply ownership. If children are property, one
> of the most abhorrent positions I've heard in a long time, then they
> may be treated like property. They may be roasted for lunch, raped
> as a pasttime, etc. Property does not have rights. Nor can property
> develop rights. I can't think of a statement more likely to convince
> people that all libertarians are insane than to promote the idea
> that children are property.

I wanted to say a bit more on this, mainly because the idea is
atrocious. I also wanted to say more last night but had to go to bed.

The idea that children are property because they are dependent is
certainly not one I would expect from a libertarian. Alas, over the
years I have found Trevor taking positions that I never associated
with libertarian thinking per se.

The premise seems to be that they are property because they are
dependent, at least dependency was the factor mentioned. Also
dependent are people in comas (temporary or long-term), people who are
handicapped in particular ways (such as those paralyzed, those
severely retarded, those with severe autism, those who are "insane",
etc.), and many elderly people. Are all these classes of people
"property"?

Property is normally considered a class of objects that are owned by
individuals, can be traded among individuals, and devoid of all
rights. Most is inanimate objects, the exception is animals which are
considered not to possess rights per se. Other than Trevor's odd
example of children, no property can acquire rights. The rights reside
with the property owner. I have the right to drive the car, the car
doesn't have any rights per se.

When we realize that dependency can come and go, under Trevor's theory
a piece of property can gain rights (and cease to be property) but
lose rights and return to the status of property. In his theory, a
child is property, grows up and ceases to be property. Same child can
have a fever and go into a coma, at which point he returns to the
status of property due to dependency. He gets better, comes out of the
coma, and ceases to be property. He now grows up, happily owns
property (who he stupidly calls children instead of property). He gets
old, very old, and becomes dependent on his children, at which point
he becomes the property of his children. (Apparently a good time for
them to get even, I guess.)

Humans are not property. I know of no libertarian theorist of any
stature who would say so. (I exclude Trevor from this category). To be
property is not to be human. Slavery didn't make people property, it
just treated people like property, they remained human no matter how
they were treated. In the theory we have been presented people start
out as property and can return to the status of property or,
conversely, they be non-human, become human, and then return to the
status of human.

In many cultures slaves were dependent on their masters because the
system made them so. In many welfare states everyone is dependent on
the state for many aspects of life. Does this mean the state owns
them? Does this make the citizens property of the ruling elite? If so,
then in theory, a welfare state can't violate the rights of people
because property doesn't have rights.

[Stephen vJ]

Leon wrote;

...Accordingly, I don't like distinctive laws/rules applying to children.  I see children as indistinguishable from incapacitated adults.  Identical constraints arise for adults in a host of circumstances eg ... My view is that no special law/rule is necessary.  The basic consent axiom suffices for all these situations.

 

Law is not my field of expertise, but I recall a lecture during varsity in a course on commercial law where the professor (who's name I can't recall now) discussed the 5 criteria for a valid contract. On the criteria of capacity, he pointed to being over 21 or not certifiably dotty or sober (not under the influence of a substance) or...

 

Two interesting things I recall him mentioning were that a cafe would not refuse selling a loaf of bread to a 10-year old even though that transaction is a effectively a verbal contract with a minor, and that even the craziest of people occationally have what is called "a bright moment".

 

The court would consequently not consider a contract invalid based purely on the capacity of the minor / crazy person / drunkard. The lack of consent by the parent / curator / guardian does not in itself make the contract invalid either.

 

This did not make complete sense to me at the time, but later when we got to the module on representative law, it made more sense. The way I understood it, Roman law considered children, drunkards and people of dodgy capacity to still be in charge of their own decisions, aided by curators, guardians, etc. who filled the role of representatives, but most definitely not owners of those they represent.

 

Representatives act on behalf of someone, but that someone could still act on their own behalf in some cases where their actions could be considered sensible and within their capacity i.e. buying a loaf of bread. They could also take action agains the representative if actions initiated by the representative was not in their best interest or outside the specified limits of representation. Also, representation could be terminated and modified - unlike property.

 

I particularly liked the Roman approach, since another one of the 5 criteria for a valid contract was mutual consent. Of course it goes a lot further than that, but in my view, the Romans were on to something.

 

S.

 

[Trevor Watkins]

Upon reflection I agree with you, Garth, that a second axiom is required (this is a slippery slope, and soon we will be discussing a 17th axiom).

I suggest there is a PRE-ACTION axiom, which is the consent axiom as described. This axiom (rule, directive) applies before any action is taken, and requires consent before action for the action to be considered legal.

Then there is a POST-ACTION axiom, which might be described as the Jury axiom, which describes how disputes arising from illegal actions will be resolved. This is described as a corollary to the Consent axiom in my article, but I think it stands as an axiom in its own right. (There are many ways of resolving disputes, the Jury axiom proposes one way without justifying its specific choice, but taking it as a given).

The jury axiom, as described in my article, includes a general limitation, "no jury may decide to take a human life". This, of course, is another area of wide disagreement.

regards

Trevor Watkins - Base Software
bas...@gmail.com 083 44 11 721 - 042 293 1405 - (fax)0866 532 363
http://sketchesbyboz37.blogspot.com www.libertarian.org.za
PO Box 3302, Jeffreys Bay, 6330

2009/8/6 Garth Zietsman <garth.z...@gmail.com>

[Trevor Watkins]

One can see why the concept of PROPERTY gets communists so fired up - it even makes some of us non-communists quite bitchy.  

Jim Harris was the first to suggest that children might be considered as property, up until the age of 21. I duly responded with shock-horror at the time, but have realised on reflection that inconsentible (a new word meaning people that are incapable of informed consent) persons share many of the characteristics of property, and therefore may be described as such (despite the offence this may give to the more delicate-minded).

I seem to remember Leon describing your property as that which you may "alienate", ie, dispose of as you will.

Bearing in mind 2 critical points from my Consent Axiom article, (1)anyone may raise a dispute for any action, and (2)no jury may decide to take a human life,

I suggest that most libertarians will agree that

(1)no guardian is bound by law to care for a dependant against the guardian's will (ie the guardian may "walk away" from the dependant without censure. In this case, some other element of society must take up the dependant's case, or the dependant may wither away.)

(2)a guardian may sell a dependant in a willing buyer-willing seller situation (adoption for money, surrogate motherhood)

(3)a guardian may discipline an unruly dependant, within limits defined by the local society (ie a local witness raising a dispute on behalf of the dependant.) Similar limits would apply to cruelty to animals, damage to the environment, etc. (And of course, concerned individuals declaring disputes would punish rape, torture and all the other stuff that some people think the local society might not notice, pretty much like we do now).

(4) a guardian may attempt to recover the investment in care in some fashion (getting an adult dependant to do some form of work, for example), or using them when begging or requesting charity.

Do libertarians believe a dependant's body parts may be harvested for use or profit? This is the subject of a current movie on circuit (My Sister's keeper), which I have not yet seen.  From the trailer it seems that the dependant must go to court to preserve her organs, in our current legal system.

From the above, allowing for the restrictions on killing, and local society limits, it seems that inconsentible dependants are pretty close to property, at least to me.  This fact won't go away just because we think the term "property" is politically incorrect when applied to cuddly little kiddies.

As I said in my article, if inconsentible dependants are not property of their guardians, then what are they? 

Trevor Watkins - Base Software
bas...@gmail.com 083 44 11 721 - 042 293 1405 - (fax)0866 532 363
http://sketchesbyboz37.blogspot.com www.libertarian.org.za
PO Box 3302, Jeffreys Bay, 6330

2009/8/8 Stephen vJ <sjaar...@absamail.co.za>

[Stephen vJ]

Trevor wrote: ... From the above, allowing for the restrictions on killing, and local society limits, it seems that inconsentible dependants are pretty close to property, at least to me.  This fact won't go away just because we think the term "property" is politically incorrect when applied to cuddly little kiddies. As I said in my article, if inconsentible dependants are not property of their guardians, then what are they?

 

I live in a house and I call it "my house", but in fact it is rented. I have full control and use of the entire house and my use of it is protected by law, even from the owner, provided that I keep paying the rent. I can alienate myself from it by ending my contract, etc., etc. That's not ownership...

 

A guardian or custodian or representative or whatever is not the owner of another person just because he acts on that person's behalf. The child still belongs to no-one but himself (as does an adult of diminished capacity).

 

If he did not and was in fact property of the parent, I would consider any interference in what the parent did as a property rights violation, even if that interference was to the child's benefit... but of course it is not so, because this is not a relationship of property, more like representation.

 

S.

 

[Garth Zietsman]

I suggest that most libertarians will agree that

(1)no guardian is bound by law to care for a dependant against the guardian's will (ie the guardian may "walk away" from the dependant without censure. In this case, some other element of society must take up the dependant's case, or the dependant may wither away.)

Garth: Yes

 

(2)a guardian may sell a dependant in a willing buyer-willing seller situation (adoption for money, surrogate motherhood)

Garth: Yes

 

(3)a guardian may discipline an unruly dependant, within limits defined by the local society (ie a local witness raising a dispute on behalf of the dependant.) Similar limits would apply to cruelty to animals, damage to the environment, etc. (And of course, concerned individuals declaring disputes would punish rape, torture and all the other stuff that some people think the local society might not notice, pretty much like we do now).

Garth: There you go - you admit another principle is needed to suppliment the consent axiom.

 

(4) a guardian may attempt to recover the investment in care in some fashion (getting an adult dependant to do some form of work, for example), or using them when begging or requesting charity.

Garth: Yes

 

But none of the above implies that childen are property.  They more likel imply an implicit contract.

Do libertarians believe a dependant's body parts may be harvested for use or profit? This is the subject of a current movie on circuit (My Sister's keeper), which I have not yet seen.  From the trailer it seems that the dependant must go to court to preserve her organs, in our current legal system.

Garth: No - absolutely not.  Not without the consent of the dependent. This is a perfect example of what the notion of children as property logically permits.

From the above, allowing for the restrictions on killing, and local society limits, it seems that inconsentible dependants are pretty close to property, at least to me.  This fact won't go away just because we think the term "property" is politically incorrect when applied to cuddly little kiddies.

Garth: But its not a fact Trevor. I contest and reject it on intellectual grounds, and not because it disturbs my sensibiliies.  Lord knows I'm not afraid to take positions that offend sensibilties - recall my defense of the gang rape example. 

 

I subscribe to the consent axiom partly for emotional reasons though.  I recall being insensed that my will as a child was simply ignored by a whole host of agents - particularly my parents.  For example I was told what I could and couldn't buy with pocket money I had earned through odd jobs. That feeling drives my embracing the consent axiom.  To be sure if the consent axiom involved contradictions I would reluctantly give it up - but it doesn't.

 

Jim (Peron) and I have detailed our intellectual objections so I'm not going to repeat them.  Suffice to say they were not only expressions of distaste.  The central objection is that the notion of people as property denies the consent axiom itself.

As I said in my article, if inconsentible dependants are not property of their guardians, then what are they?

Garth: I'll repeat what I said before - dependents are people in their own right (usually with the capacity to consent) in an implicit contract.  Being unable to earn an independent living (often because consent to work is denied children) doesn't make you incapable of consent.  Your argument implies that anyone who agrees to support another, automatically acquires a slave. That denies your own consent axiom.  I see no reason why the child shouldn't be given the choice of accepting obedience as a condition of dependence, or have the right to revoke that agreement at any time.  For people who are unconscious when a decision needs to be made, the decision made must take into account both the best guess at what the unconscious individual would have wanted, and the willingness of the potential supporters to pay/do the work.

 

In short, when it appears that a person is incapable of consenting, instead of trying to extend the consent axiom by making a serious attempt at guessing what they would have consented to, you prefer to abandon the consent axiom altogether and declare them to be property/slaves/body part resources.  Quite frankly, because I'm not willing to do that, I think I am a more radical advocate of the consent axiom than you.  Put another way - you abandon the consent axiom in the face of jurisprudential difficulties, and I do not.

[Trevor Watkins]

Trevor Watkins: 

I used to say that a child enjoys all the rights of a human being from the moment its umbilical cord is cut (Prior to that it was an appendage of the mother). I was seeking a justiciable situation devoid of contradictions for the thorny problem of women and children. I then realised this was a cop out, from the child's perspective. The child's rights to life and reasonably humane treatment are already protected by the "jury" axiom as previously stated. However, the consent axiom cannot apply to an inconsentible person, by definition. So they are a special case, much like animals. This is the reality I seek to expose by labeling them as property. 

I assume that you do agree that you own your own body, that it is your property to do with as you see fit. Your use of your own body is unconstrained, as it is assumed you have consented to this use by yourself.

I further assume you agree that owned animals (such as pets, sheep, cattle) are the property of the person who owns them - ie they have property rights (sell, use for profit) and responsibilities (socially acceptable treatment) in law relating to their ownership of such animals.

When a guardian makes a consent decision on behalf of an inconsentible person, what constraints are imposed upon that decision? We already have 2 - life, and socially acceptable treatment. What other constraints need to be added? I can think of none that would distinguish an inconsentible person from an animal considered as property. 

You have suggested that the guardian should consider the likely choice of the inconsentible person. Both of us know this is an impossible, unjusticiable requirement. In the case of the child, there is no precedent for any decision. In the case of an adult, what penalty would you suggest for guessing wrong?

Garth has said "dependents are people in their own right (usually with the capacity to consent) in an implicit contract.  Being unable to earn an independent living (often because consent to work is denied children) doesn't make you incapable of consent."  Being owned does not change your nature - no one is suggesting it does. A sheep remains a sheep, whether it is owned or not. Being unable to earn an independent living does not make you inconsentible, being unconscious does.

You are effectively owned by your employer for certain periods of the day, due to a contract to which you have consented. Your consent is no longer required for acts/instructions covered by the contract. I guess I am saying that property is not subject to the consent axiom, and that if you are not subject to the consent axiom, then you are property.

Garth has said "when it appears that a person is incapable of consenting, instead of trying to extend the consent axiom by making a serious attempt at guessing what they would have consented to, you prefer to abandon the consent axiom altogether and declare them to be property/slaves/body part resources." All law reduces to trying to define what acts are illegal and therefore punishable. I am trying to understand how the law should apply to the guardians of inconsentible persons, since this seems to be a serious grey area within the provisions of the consent axiom.

[Leon Louw]

Interesting discussion.  I repeat two jurisprudential points (made before and repeated because it's so easy to lose sight of them):

1. Principle vs Procedure - Establishing a principle is one thing (legitimately libertarian), and deciding how, if at all, it should be interpreted and applied/enforced is another (not libertarian).
2. Child vs Adult - There is nothing special about children, not even inter-utero; all the same considerations applicable to adults apply to kids (incl. dependency, lack of consensual capacity etc).

People vs Animals - Cruelty to animals is a really tough issue for libertarians (along with a few others generally avoided).  Whilst not, for now, suggesting a librarian 'solution', I stress the importance of not muddling fundamentally separate issues (people vs property) by conflating them into a single discussion.  The reason people may not be abused is because they are people.  If there are to be anti-cruelty laws for animals the raison d'etre has to be derived from distinctive principles.

 

For what it's worth, a principle of Roman-Dutch common law is that what's contra bonus mores isn't allowed.  Torturing animals is a case in point.  A problem with the principle is that it entails prohibition of unambiguously libertarians rights, such as gambling debts, prostitution and pyramid schemes.

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Trevor Watkins

To: li...@googlegroups.com

Cc: jmha...@acenet.co.za

Sent: Wednesday, August 12, 2009 3:08 PM

Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

[Leon Louw]

Below ...

----- Original Message -----

From: Garth Zietsman

To: li...@googlegroups.com

Cc: jmha...@acenet.co.za

Sent: Wednesday, August 12, 2009 9:11 AM

Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

I suggest that most libertarians will agree that

(1)no guardian is bound by law to care for a dependant against the guardian's will (ie the guardian may "walk away" from the dependant without censure. In this case, some other element of society must take up the dependant's case, or the dependant may wither away.)

Garth: Yes

 

(2)a guardian may sell a dependant in a willing buyer-willing seller situation (adoption for money, surrogate motherhood)

Garth: Yes

 

(3)a guardian may discipline an unruly dependant, within limits defined by the local society (ie a local witness raising a dispute on behalf of the dependant.) Similar limits would apply to cruelty to animals, damage to the environment, etc. (And of course, concerned individuals declaring disputes would punish rape, torture and all the other stuff that some people think the local society might not notice, pretty much like we do now).

Garth: There you go - you admit another principle is needed to suppliment the consent axiom.

Leon: I see no additional principle here, except perhaps regarding animals to which it's not germane - save to say that it says you may not do anything to me or my property without my consent.  Do you mean that interveneing to protect an abused animal is violating the consent axiom?  The point about the axiom is that it defines liberarianism.  Other desirable principles/axioms, such as not farting and burping in post office queues, not abusing animals, judicial due process, keeping battery acid out of your diet, and the Ten Commandments aren't libertarian.  That doesn't negate them.  No one (as far as I know) has ever suggested consent axiom to the exclusion of other virtues.

 

(4) a guardian may attempt to recover the investment in care in some fashion (getting an adult dependant to do some form of work, for example), or using them when begging or requesting charity.

Garth: Yes

 

But none of the above implies that childen are property.  They more likel imply an implicit contract.

Do libertarians believe a dependant's body parts may be harvested for use or profit? This is the subject of a current movie on circuit (My Sister's keeper), which I have not yet seen.  From the trailer it seems that the dependant must go to court to preserve her organs, in our current legal system.

Garth: No - absolutely not.  Not without the consent of the dependent. This is a perfect example of what the notion of children as property logically permits.

From the above, allowing for the restrictions on killing, and local society limits, it seems that inconsentible dependants are pretty close to property, at least to me.  This fact won't go away just because we think the term "property" is politically incorrect when applied to cuddly little kiddies.

Garth: But its not a fact Trevor. I contest and reject it on intellectual grounds, and not because it disturbs my sensibiliies.  Lord knows I'm not afraid to take positions that offend sensibilties - recall my defense of the gang rape example. 

 

I subscribe to the consent axiom partly for emotional reasons though.  I recall being insensed that my will as a child was simply ignored by a whole host of agents - particularly my parents.  For example I was told what I could and couldn't buy with pocket money I had earned through odd jobs. That feeling drives my embracing the consent axiom.  To be sure if the consent axiom involved contradictions I would reluctantly give it up - but it doesn't.

 

Jim (Peron) and I have detailed our intellectual objections so I'm not going to repeat them.  Suffice to say they were not only expressions of distaste.  The central objection is that the notion of people as property denies the consent axiom itself.

I agree with JP.  Inability to consent doesn't in any sense I can think of convert people into (quasi-)property.  Being unable to consent ('informed' consent) to a the suggestion that I gibbleflobblebabblegloop with you because I have no idea what that is, doesn't make me your property.

[Trevor Watkins]

Hi Jim,

Lovely answer. How do you remember all these things?

That's 4 of us in general agreement on the consent axiom (You, me, Garth, Leon) - is this a world record?

Do you want to weigh in with some defense of children as property - I'm taking some strain in that area.

I'm pleased to know theres a really big name for what I try to do - transcendental institutionalism, sounds vaguely like a big building full of dentists.

I am wary of the perfect becoming the enemy of the good (used to get into trouble suggesting that good enough software on time and budget was better than perfect software in the expensive future). However, I do believe one needs some idea of what is good, better and best, or one tends to settle for the status quo.

regards

Trevor Watkins - Base Software
bas...@gmail.com 083 44 11 721 - 042 293 1405 - (fax)0866 532 363
http://sketchesbyboz37.blogspot.com www.libertarian.org.za
PO Box 3302, Jeffreys Bay, 6330

2009/8/12 JIM HARRIS <jmha...@acenet.co.za>

<(Trevor) I am trying to understand how the law should apply to the guardians of inconsentible persons, since this seems to be a serious grey area within the provisions of the consent axiom.>

I was just reading that Euclid set out several fundamental concepts (‘axioms’ and ‘postulates’) that cannot be proved but which can be accepted as true by intuition, such as that non-parallel lines (in a plane) meet at a point. I do think consent is axiomatic for a certain type of libertarian such as me. Maybe for others it’s a hypothesis or goal or bungee rope or something.

Richard Reeves reviews Amartya Sen’s book The Idea of Justice and says inter alia:

‘Most modern political philosophies are concerned with finding the right rules, institutions and social contracts for a just society. This school of thought – dubbed ‘transcendental institutionalism’ by Sen – found its greatest 20^th-century exponent in John Rawls, who built on foundations laid by Kant and Rousseau.

Sen characterises the institutionalists as engaged in a “long-range search for perfectly just institutions”, and a hunt for “spotless justice”. For Sen, these philosophies are ultimately regressive, because societies full of actual human beings will never agree on a final, perfect set of institutions and rules. He quotes his old friend Bernard Williams, who wrote that “disagreement does not necessarily have to be overcome”. More immediately, the search for a perfect set of arrangements for society can distract us from tackling real-life, immediate injustices such as access to education for women in the developing world or action on climate change. The perfect becomes the enemy of the good.’

Also

‘Freedom, in Sen’s eyes, does not consist merely of being left to one’s own devices. It also requires that people have the necessary resources to lead lives that they themselves consider to be good ones. The focus on the individual has led some critics to accuse Sen of “methodological individualism” – not a compliment. Communitarian opponents, in particular, think that Sen pays insufficient regard to the broader social group. Sen – usually an unfailingly courteous writer – becomes a bit cross. He points out that “People who think, choose and act” are simply “a manifest reality in the world”. Of course communities influence people, “but ultimately it is individual valuation on which we have to draw, while recognising the profound interdependence of the valuations of people who interact with each other”.’

Also

‘Liberty has priority, Sen insists, but not in an absurdly purist fashion that would dictate “treating the slightest gain of liberty – no matter how small – as enough reason to make huge sacrifices in other amenities of a good life – no matter how large”.’

Not a libertarian, then, as I see him. J…j

 

 

 

[Leon Louw]

Spell-checked version ...

----- Original Message -----

From: Leon Louw

To: li...@googlegroups.com

Cc: jmha...@acenet.co.za

Sent: Wednesday, August 12, 2009 4:41 PM

Subject: Re: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

Below ...

----- Original Message -----

From: Garth Zietsman

To: li...@googlegroups.com

Cc: jmha...@acenet.co.za

Sent: Wednesday, August 12, 2009 9:11 AM

Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

I suggest that most libertarians will agree that

(1)no guardian is bound by law to care for a dependant against the guardian's will (ie the guardian may "walk away" from the dependant without censure. In this case, some other element of society must take up the dependant's case, or the dependant may wither away.)

Garth: Yes

 

(2)a guardian may sell a dependant in a willing buyer-willing seller situation (adoption for money, surrogate motherhood)

Garth: Yes

 

(3)a guardian may discipline an unruly dependant, within limits defined by the local society (ie a local witness raising a dispute on behalf of the dependant.) Similar limits would apply to cruelty to animals, damage to the environment, etc. (And of course, concerned individuals declaring disputes would punish rape, torture and all the other stuff that some people think the local society might not notice, pretty much like we do now).

Garth: There you go - you admit another principle is needed to suppliment the consent axiom.

Leon: I see no additional principle here, except perhaps regarding animals to which it's not germane - save to say that it says you may not do anything to me or my property without my consent.  Do you mean that intervening to protect an abused animal is violating the consent axiom?  The point about the axiom is that it defines libertarianism.  Other desirable principles/axioms, such as not farting and burping in post office queues, not abusing animals, judicial due process, keeping battery acid out of your diet, and the Ten Commandments aren't libertarian.  That doesn't negate them.  No one (as far as I know) has ever suggested consent axiom to the exclusion of other virtues.

[Garth Zietsman]

My philosophy is very close to that of Amartya Sen's - so I guess you wouldn't call me a Libertarian.  I still consider myself a Libertarian though because freedom and consent remain my primary values.

 

Saying that the reason why we don't abuse people is because they are people is specie-ist.  Specie-ism is in principle the same as racism.  Other than soul-superstition, I can think of no justification for specie-ism that wouldn't also apply to racism.  I would  ban cruelty on the grounds of sentience rather than group membership.  Some animals - like chimps - are unquestionably capable of consent so why shouldn't Libertarian philosophy apply to them too.

[Leon Louw]

Libertarians agreeing!  That's not allowed, Trevor.  Never suggest such a thing, and if ever it seems so in a weak moment, suspend you judgment until you've had less to drink or smoke.

 

The so-called 'oldest libertarian joke' is something like:  Q: What do you get if two libertarians meet? Ans: 3 newsletters, 4 arguments and 5 factions.

 

Sen's quote at the end in instructive and challenging:  "Liberty has priority, Sen insists, but not in an absurdly purist fashion that would dictate 'treating the slightest gain of liberty – no matter how small – as enough reason to make huge sacrifices in other amenities of a good life – no matter how large' ".

 

I suppose everyone would draw the line somewhere, rendering the proclivity for liberty a matter of degree.

 

I assume Jim would merrily trespass on another's property to retrieve his baby about stumble into a pool and drown, or initiate violence against someone about to step in front of a bus by tapping them on the shoulder to warn them.

 

The common law approach is 'de minimus non curat lex' (the law ignores trivialities), which amounts to agreeing with Sen (or he with it), in that liberty strictly defined is compromised when costs are trivial and benefits substantial.  Jurisprudence has many examples.

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Trevor Watkins

To: JIM HARRIS

Cc: Leon Louw ; Garth Zietsman ; Neil Emerick ; LibertarianSA

Sent: Wednesday, August 12, 2009 4:42 PM

Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

[Leon Louw]

Yep, I'm specie-ist, a fully-fledged HCP (human chauvinist pig).  I'm for animals being owned and even eaten ... without their consent ... neither of which I espouse for people ... regardless of race ... or even gender, hair colour and music preference.

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Garth Zietsman

To: li...@googlegroups.com

Cc: jmha...@acenet.co.za

Sent: Wednesday, August 12, 2009 6:02 PM

Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

My philosophy is very close to that of Amartya Sen's - so I guess you wouldn't call me a Libertarian.  I still consider myself a Libertarian though because freedom and consent remain my primary values.

[Garth Zietsman]

I too have no problem with owning and eating say cattle, sheep, pigs, poultry etc but I would find chimpanzees problematic. 

 

There is a fair amount of overlap in intellect between humans and chimps.  The mean chimp IQ (yes it can be measured) is around 50.  That's the bottom 1 in 1000 for humans.  Several million people globally have less savvy than the average chimp - let alone the bright ones.

 

I saw a program where a chimp that had been taught sign language at a university lab had ended up in a military research institute.  The person who taught the chimp sign language visited the chimp in the military institute where the chimp begged him to take him out. 

 

Apart from the obvious capacity to feel and communicate personal suffering and joy, chimps do form political alliances and recognisable cultures. 

 

Now taking into account the above facts I have trouble seeing why the consent axiom doesn't apply to the chimp when it does apply to less able humans. 

 

There is a non-trivial philosophical problem Leon.  You are without doubt a specie-ist, and not a racist, but this has to be arbitrary.  You cannot have a good justification for it - unless of course 'thats what floats my boat', or the soul-superstition, seems like a good enough reason to you.  It wouldn't for me.  One has to draw the line between the best humanity has to offer and amoebas somewhere, but it isn't clear that there is a compelling reason why everyone should draw it in the same place.  One can see the problem more clearly if homo-erectus still existed.  Humans would have been able to interbreed with them. 

 

The following will be offensive to some but don't take it seriously cause its speculative and I don't believe it myself.  I just want you to consider the consent axiom and the issue of property IF it were true.  DNA studies show the San to be the oldest continually existing human group.  Pigmies may be almost as old.  DNA studies also show that the division of archaic and modern humans occurred AFTER the split from the San and Pygmies.  There is therefore the possibility that the San are more closely related to homo-erectus than the rest of us - they could be partially, rather than fully, homo sapien sapiens.    If so, would that mean they ought to be ownable and that the consent axiom shouldn't apply to them?

 

Obviously if you just say Libertarians are those who choose the cut-off line between humans (inclusive of archiac types) and
non-humans, then that's what they are and I can't argue with the definition.  I can argue about the choice of cut-off making sense though.

 

Leon made the point that Libertarians are those who believe in the principle of consent but that this doesn't exclude believing in other principles too.  I think this is a good point.  It does however mean that there are a variety of Libertarian types, depending on the other principles they subscribe to.  One type distinction among Libertarians could be made according to their degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness with respect to the consent axiom and property status.  In principle a racist could be a Libertarian in the sense that he believes in the consent axiom but makes his consideration cut-off within humanity rather than its edge.  [I don't expect that any of you will accept the racist's Libertarian bona fides though.]  Similarly those who exclude young children and incompetent or unconscious adults from consideration could also be Libertarian if they apply the consent axiom to all within their sphere of consideration.  I just prefer a more inclusive ambit than many.

 

I disagree with Trevor's view that we cannot say what a neonate or unconscious would consent to so we must exclude them from the consent axiom.  I think we can clearly say that they wouldn't consent to anything Trevor's jury would exclude e.g. abuse, torture, taking their savings, etc.  We know that babies need certain basic things - food, liquid, being cleaned, affection - and are likely to choose to have them over not having them.  If we knew the adult well we could make much more sweeping guesses at what they would consent to.  Even if we don't know them well it is more likely than not that an unconscious woman would not consent to being shagged by drunk strangers in that state.  I think its clear that we can know at least something of what others would consent to and that a Libertarian ought to make an attempt to take that knowledge into consideration.  I don't believe its reasonable to ignore it because you aren't sure of it.

[Trevor Watkins]

Trevor Watkins - I am saying that a guardian cannot be held responsible for not having perfect knowledge of an inconsentible persons wishes, and therefore cannot be punished for inadvertently contradicting them, and therefore cannot be bound by the consent axiom, but may be subsequently judged by a jury. 

For example, an unconscious person bleeding profusely is brought into a casualty ward. In the absence of anyone else, the doctor in charge assumes the role of guardian, and prescribes a blood transfusion. Upon recovery, the patient announces he is a Jehovah's Witness, the blood transfusion is against his belief and wishes, and sues the doctor for a consent violation. Should he win the case? I say - No.

Its not a matter of ignoring an inconsentible persons wishes - most of us would do our best to accommodate them - its a matter of liability if you get it wrong.  

2009/8/13 Garth Zietsman <garth.z...@gmail.com>

[Garth Zietsman]

I agree with you that liability for getting consent guesses wrong is something a wise and impartial jury should decide Trevor.

 

What I am stressing is that the Libertarian guardian must take a best guess at what his charge's wishes would be, and take them into consideration.  Being a guardian doesn't entitle you to impose your own wishes regardless.  A Libertarian (in my view anyway) would not deprive their kids the option of opting out of being their dependents but they may make dependency conditional on accepting their best judgements about what's good for them.  I would go further and say that a Libertarian wouldn't unilaterally impose those judgements. I think the guardian should seek to persuade i.e. get consent, rather than impose decisions e.g. persuade kids who don't want to go to school that going to school is good rather than ordering them to attend.

 

The physician in casualty can't be faulted for deciding to give blood.  Indeed this illustrates my point.  Should he avoid giving blood simply because of the slight possibility that the patient is a Jehovah's Witness or should he take a best guess on what the patient would want?  He might reason that Jehovah's Witnesses are rare and not all of them would refuse blood when it came to them dying anyway so its much more likely than not that the patient would consent to a transfusion.  Your arguments on the other hand lead to one of two possibilities - either refrain from giving blood on the grounds that you don't know for sure what someone would consent to or decide according to your preferences because they can't say what they want. 

[Leon Louw]

The problem of consent is very old in jurisprudence.  It arises often in many contexts.  Law has developed the concept of "implied consent".  You may surgically treat an unconscious Jehovah's Witness thereby violating their rights and wishes.  The law protects you according to the reasonable person test, with which libertarians wouldn't necessarily agree, and which I think is correct.

 

It gets more complicated.  You dowse the flames of your neighbor's burning house by hosing thousands of gallons of his water onto it, only to find he wanted it to burn down, and now sues you for trespass and wasted water, let alone that he now can't let builders on site as contracted, and has all sorts of other 'consequential' damage.

 

My specie-ism, Garth, is like my libertarianism: it's my predisposition. 

 

I happen to think humans are hard-wired for it.

 

As always there are deviants, so we have people for animal rights.  They are usually for only the rights of cute animals, like seals.  Some, like you and Frances, are more concerned about intelligent animals like chimps and pigs.  There are people for the rights of all mammals (though they tend to exclude rodents), and then there are those for all animals having rights, though they tend to exclude insects.  No one I'm aware of cares about very small animals, especially much-maligned germs.  Since humans engage without conscience in germicide, I'm thinking of starting a virus rights movement - someone has to stand up for the cute little critters.  Finally, there are a few people for plant rights.  They carry on about the auras of injured plants, how they respond to TLC in Findhorn, and so on.  I'm unaware of it, but assume if we searched hard enough we'll find someone worried about the lack of respect for rock rights.  Buddhists, like Ian Player, anguish about sand rights, and do such things as mount successful campaigns to protect sand rights in primary dunes at St Lucia.

 

Steven Hawking warns against making contact with extra-terestials because they will see us as animals and may catch, enslave and/or eat us, maybe farm us in feedlots.  And we'll see them as animals.  That's how aliens are seen in many sci-fi stories/movies - with humans feeling free to capture and experiment with them.  Or mate with them if you're a lucky woman in an abduction.

 

All of which gets me back to where I started:  I'm for human liberty, ie consent.  I'm also for all sorts of other things, like being kind to animals, remembering Granny's birthday, and not burping in post office queues.

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Garth Zietsman

To: li...@googlegroups.com

Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2009 9:48 AM

Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

[Garth Zietsman]

My specie-ism, Garth, is like my libertarianism: it's my predisposition. 

 

I happen to think humans are hard-wired for it.

 

Garth: In that case I can't argue with you.  Its not my predisposition and I'm not happy letting the matter be reduced to a matter of predispositions.  I want to establish a defensible principle of deciding such isms.  I don't want a racist defending himself by saying he is just predisposed to be racist.  I want to be able to say he is full of shit even if that is his predisposition in the same way I want to be able to tell a socialist he is wrong to argue for government control of the economy even if he is genetically predisposed to favour top down control.

 

I have confidence that this issue isn't beyond rational debate.

 

 

Steven Hawking warns against making contact with extra-terestials because they will see us as animals and may catch, enslave and/or eat us, maybe farm us in feedlots.  And we'll see them as animals.  That's how aliens are seen in many sci-fi stories/movies - with humans feeling free to capture and experiment with them.  Or mate with them if you're a lucky woman in an abduction.

 

All of which gets me back to where I started:  I'm for human liberty, ie consent.  I'm also for all sorts of other things, like being kind to animals, remembering Granny's birthday, and not burping in post office queues.

 

Garth: Which brings me back to saying if that's how you define Libertarianism its beyond argument.  The only question qua consent is whether children, morons, the very elderly and unconscious people are 'human' (perhaps human adult) enough to have the consent axiom apply to them.  I understand you (Leon) to say that they are but I am not so confident that others think so. 

 

I suppose in terms of your intellectual categories I'm trying to fit Libertarianism within a larger more comprehensive moral ystem, just as I want to talk about a concept of freedom which contains liberty (the Libertarian concern) as one constituent of freedom among many.

[Jim Peron]

On Aug 13, 2009, at 1:25 AM, Trevor Watkins wrote:

> am saying that a guardian cannot be held responsible

Guardianship is the correct word and it most certainly does not imply
ownership. Guardians care for something, but they don't own it. The
thing, or person, they care for, is not property.

If you mean guardian then there is no ownership involved. If you mean
ownership then guardian is the wrong term.

[Peter Kidson]

> Garth: ...

> I don't want a racist defending himself by saying he is
> just predisposed to be racist.  I want to be able to say he
> is full of shit even if that is his predisposition in the
> same way I want to be able to tell a socialist he is wrong
> to argue for government control of the economy even if he is
> genetically predisposed to favour top down control.
>
> I have confidence that this issue isn't beyond rational debate.

A [plea for / belief in] objective political correctness?

[Garth Zietsman]

Gosh I suppose it is.  I don't like political correctness but if you are going to argue for it then I would hope to see solid reasons backing it (not quite objectivity but at least reasoned).  As many will tell you my IQist views aren't politically correct.

 

What I was getting at is it doesn't help if people confront each other with nothing but predispositions to back up their positions.

[Leon Louw]

OK, let's start by applying your logic to yourself:  firstly, give me a 'reasoned' argument for why I should regard you're (pre-)disposed against predisposition.

 

Whilst at it, secondly, give me reasoned arguments for your other (pre-)dispositions, such as preferring tea to coffee (or vice versa), or enjoying/not enjoying body massages, or preferring classical to rap (or vice versa), and so on.

 

Are you (pl) really saying you approach issues (like slavery-liberty; racism; art; habits/mannerisms) with an open mind, equally open to slavery or liberty, and going either way purely on the basis of evidence/arguments you encounter?

 

I am predisposed against racism, despite having been brought-up in an intensively racism community/family and having bee exposed overwhelmingly to remarkably compelling arguments/evidence for it. I can think of no good reason for me not embracing it other than an innate predisposition.

 

Ex post facto I' developed the standard litany of 'reasoned arguments.

 

Now, thirdly, give me your sans predisposition process.

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Garth Zietsman

To: li...@googlegroups.com

Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2009 8:18 PM

Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

[Garth Zietsman]

On Thu, Aug 13, 2009 at 9:52 PM, Leon Louw <leon...@gmail.com> wrote:

OK, let's start by applying your logic to yourself:  firstly, give me a 'reasoned' argument for why I should regard you're (pre-)disposed against predisposition.

 

Garth: Not quite sure I grok this question.  Predispositions are ok until they clash with opposing predispositions in others.  Then the solutions tend to involve methods that destroy rather than build.  If some people have predispositions towards morbid obesity they would be better off overcoming their predisposition in the interest of their health and ability to do a wide range things. 

 

Whilst at it, secondly, give me reasoned arguments for your other (pre-)dispositions, such as preferring tea to coffee (or vice versa), or enjoying/not enjoying body massages, or preferring classical to rap (or vice versa), and so on.

 

Garth: Sure.  Tea is healthier and cheaper than coffee.  The pleasure of massage is a sign of its healthy benefits.  I have learned to seek out the pleasure for this reason.  This doesn't imply that pleasure is a good sign in every circumstance - sometimes its the opposite.  The degree to which Classical music is liked is linearly and positively related to IQ and Rap linearly and negatively related to IQ - in both black and white samples.  According to my Smart Vote method this implies that there is something like an objective or better answer when it comes to musical preferences.  Before I discovered this, I thought that classical music engages the intellect more than rap, and that an exercised intellect has a wide range of benefits.  I can gradually acquire a taste for stuff that I decide are good for me.

 

Are you (pl) really saying you approach issues (like slavery-liberty; racism; art; habits/mannerisms) with an open mind, equally open to slavery or liberty, and going either way purely on the basis of evidence/arguments you encounter?

 

Garth: I try Leon.  You know I have seriously considered the merits of colonialism for example.  I have seriously looked at the Spartan system, Plato's Republic and Nietzsche's idea that the justification for the existance of most people is to serve the purposes of the Ubermench.  I have looked at Marxism, Libertarian anarchism, pinko Liberalism, middle of the road Conservatism, even religion.  Yes Leon I am saying that.  But I do admit I am swayed by my predispositions - particularly my preference for freedom - which means I look harder for reasons that serve my preferences than those that don't - much like anyone else.

 

I am predisposed against racism, despite having been brought-up in an intensively racism community/family and having bee exposed overwhelmingly to remarkably compelling arguments/evidence for it. I can think of no good reason for me not embracing it other than an innate predisposition.

 

Garth: I don't understand this.  Are you saying you can't think of a good reason not to embrace BEE - other than some predisposition against it?

 

Ex post facto I' developed the standard litany of 'reasoned arguments.

 

Now, thirdly, give me your sans predisposition process.

 

Garth: No argument is sans predispositions.  If you understood me to mean that I think the grounds for human morality can be 100% rational then I didn't unpack my view properly.  However some views are more examined for inconsistencies, clashes with other preferences, likely consequences, etc than others.  That's what I mean by giving reasons - attempting consistency and comprehensiveness rather than trying to establish a non-predisposition base.

[Leon Louw]

Sorry, typo "... give me a 'reasoned' argument for why I should regard your (pre-)disposition against predisposition as a manifestation of reason rather than predisposition?"

 

Stated differently, I don't share your view, tell me why I should.

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Garth Zietsman

To: li...@googlegroups.com

Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2009 11:35 PM

Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

On Thu, Aug 13, 2009 at 9:52 PM, Leon Louw <leon...@gmail.com> wrote:

OK, let's start by applying your logic to yourself:  firstly, give me a 'reasoned' argument for why I should regard you're (pre-)disposed against predisposition.

 

Garth: Not quite sure I grok this question.  Predispositions are ok until they clash with opposing predispositions in others.  Then the solutions tend to involve methods that destroy rather than build.  If some people have predispositions towards morbid obesity they would be better off overcoming their predisposition in the interest of their health and ability to do a wide range things. 

 

Whilst at it, secondly, give me reasoned arguments for your other (pre-)dispositions, such as preferring tea to coffee (or vice versa), or enjoying/not enjoying body massages, or preferring classical to rap (or vice versa), and so on.

 

Garth: Sure.  Tea is healthier and cheaper than coffee.  The pleasure of massage is a sign of its healthy benefits.  I have learned to seek out the pleasure for this reason.  This doesn't imply that pleasure is a good sign in every circumstance - sometimes its the opposite.  The degree to which Classical music is liked is linearly and positively related to IQ and Rap linearly and negatively related to IQ - in both black and white samples.  According to my Smart Vote method this implies that there is something like an objective or better answer when it comes to musical preferences.  Before I discovered this, I thought that classical music engages the intellect more than rap, and that an exercised intellect has a wide range of benefits.  I can gradually acquire a taste for stuff that I decide are good for me.

 

These are (mostly) ex post explanations and/or validations, not ex ante reasons d'etre.  Some miss the point: tea-coffee, for instance, the question is why you like one more than the other, why you prefer the tatse/feeling.  Are you suggesting that your logic, once presented, should have me changing my prefrence for the tatse of coffee to preferring tea tatse?

 

Are you (pl) really saying you approach issues (like slavery-liberty; racism; art; habits/mannerisms) with an open mind, equally open to slavery or liberty, and going either way purely on the basis of evidence/arguments you encounter?

 

Garth: I try Leon.  You know I have seriously considered the merits of colonialism for example.  I have seriously looked at the Spartan system, Plato's Republic and Nietzsche's idea that the justification for the existance of most people is to serve the purposes of the Ubermench.  I have looked at Marxism, Libertarian anarchism, pinko Liberalism, middle of the road Conservatism, even religion.  Yes Leon I am saying that.  But I do admit I am swayed by my predispositions - particularly my preference for freedom - which means I look harder for reasons that serve my preferences than those that don't - much like anyone else.

 

I am predisposed against racism, despite having been brought-up in an intensively racism community/family and having bee exposed overwhelmingly to remarkably compelling arguments/evidence for it. I can think of no good reason for me not embracing it other than an innate predisposition.

 

Garth: I don't understand this.  Are you saying you can't think of a good reason not to embrace BEE - other than some predisposition against it?

I'm saying my predisposition overrides the evidence, my self-interest, my familial/social relationships and more.  The preponderance of logic, reason and evidence at my disposal then - maybe even now - suggests racism.  Racism makes rational sence for most people.  Why shouldn't whites have been racist when they had power, just as blacks are racists now that they have power?  People almost always respond rationally according to their interests, which predispose them to positions they adopt.

 

Also, give me reasons for not telling lies, stealing, raping, cheating etc when expected benefits exceed costs.  I regard the Ten Commandments to refelct innate human predispositions rather than reason - I am, after all Darwinian ...

 

Ex post facto I' developed the standard litany of 'reasoned arguments.

 

Now, thirdly, give me your sans predisposition process.

[Garth Zietsman]

On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 12:09 AM, Leon Louw <leon...@gmail.com> wrote:

Sorry, typo "... give me a 'reasoned' argument for why I should regard your (pre-)disposition against predisposition as a manifestation of reason rather than predisposition?"

 

Stated differently, I don't share your view, tell me why I should.

 

Garth: Would you call every reason a predisposition at bottom?

 

I don't think I can convince you to share my view but I do think I should try.  I don't think we should agree to disagree.  I don't think so because it isn't a matter of indifference whose predispositions dominate.  The new atheists argue that religion is organised ignorance, and that some of its core beliefs require activities so dangerous in today's world that we can't afford to tolerate it.  On the other hand if theists are right there will be rough consequences for unbelievers.  Belief or unbelief is probably highly dependent on genetic predispositions, but nevertheless at least one side is certainly wrong and it is clearly important to decide who.  How do we decide if not by attempting a prove the other side incoherent?

 

Oh I thought of something else.  Some people notice that virtually everyone follows the religion or politics they were raised in, and enjoys the music of their ingroup and hates that of their outgroup.  When they notice that, some of them in turn start to think that their denomination, ideology and music tastes may to some extent be arbitrary.  Some deliberately open themselves to alternatives.  Some of those in turn do acquire new preferences.  That's definitely true of healthy food.  You start eating it like its medicine and you crave junk food, but within 3 months you come to prefer healthy food to junk food. That's taste or preference acquired on the grounds of some reason rather than a predisposition.

[Stephen vJ]

Garth: The degree to which Classical music is liked is linearly and positively related to IQ and Rap linearly and negatively related to IQ...

 

I have noticed that particularly academics seem to have a preference for classical music... as a member of Mensa, I find this fascinating. I don't particularly like classical music and have an active dislike in opera. I don't care much for rap either, but I think my playlist will still stand out at any Mensa meeting. Favourite musos are (according to iTunes most played list) Violent Femmes, Eels, Radiohead, Karen Zoid, Skunk Anansi, Green Day, Blood Sweat and Tears, The Who, All American Rejects, Flaming Lips... was my entrance test a fluke or is hard rock the new classical ?

 

;-)

 

S.

 

[Garth Zietsman]

I on the other hand like classical, love opera and like some rap (mainly Emenem).  Like actual IQ items the relationship to full IQ is statistical, not all or nothing.  Liking for hard rock has a zero correlation with IQ.

[Leon Louw (mweb)]

Thx Stephen, I recognise one, maybe two, in your list.  Be extrapolation to the others I now have a convenient short list of what to avoid to save my sensibilities from being mangled.

 

I dunno about IQ and music preference, but I do know that hi-IQ people - academics - prefer socialism in all its ghastly manifestations, so don't presuppose that IQ is a predictor of what's preferable or rational.

 

I happen to like almost very genre of music, and a list of what I don't like is mercifully short: African, boere, atonal (post-modern classical), rap and hard rock (which I assume includes heavy metal).  I often try groups/artists/genres randomly, which is how I discovered great ethnic music of many kinds (Indian, Chinese and Japanese being best-known of many).

 

Oh, for what it's worth. Stephen, it may be true (if Garth is to be believed on this) that there's 'zero correlation' between hard rock and IQ, but be warned, the correlation is deceptive - a classic static analysis illusion - it's because average hard rock likers start with average IQs of 120 and end up with 80.  That's not as bad as atonal, which drives IQs down from 140 to 65.  African music is one of the least harmful, making only a 5 point difference, from 80 to 75.  Being a reformed boer saved mine from cascading towards those levels from the upper 150s.

 

More seriously, Garth, have you looked into the Mozart Effect, which supposedly increases IQ, at least temporarily and contextually?

 

Also more seriously, I assume the lack of hard rock-IQ correlation means they're 100 on average - that's no comfort for Stephen ... and given the danger to which he's exposing his fine brain, he needs reliable information.

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Garth Zietsman

To: li...@googlegroups.com

Sent: Saturday, August 15, 2009 5:20 PM

Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom

[Jim Peron]

On Aug 15, 2009, at 10:25 AM, Leon Louw (mweb) wrote:

I dunno about IQ and music preference, but I do know that hi-IQ people - academics - prefer socialism in all its ghastly manifestations, so don't presuppose that IQ is a predictor of what's preferable or rational.

As was discussed here, only a week or so ago, studies show that commitment to libertarianism rises with IQ, especially if we ask questions of policy, not ask people about labels. Many who say they are "liberal" (in the US, modern sense of the word) are in fact libertarian, or libertarian leaning.

I do thiink that more academics are socialists than would be typical of the middle class or the lower classes. 

There is an interesting problem, one I've not seen discussed but others may have know of such discussions. That is the types of fallacies people commit changes with the level of intelligence (at least as I see things this is true). Dumb people commit different sorts of fallacies than intelligent people. Intelligent people are more likely to fall for what Hayek called "the fatal conceit," the idea that one can rationally, and intelligently, plan an economy. While they seem quite capable of understanding the ways that complex, spontaneous order can come about in nature, they seem less capable of seeing how the same sort of complex, spontaneous order is possible in an economy -- hence their call for an intelligent designer. The less intelligent tend to deny such intelligent design in economic areas but embrace it enthusiastically for nature. BTW: I tend to think their tendency to oppose to intelligent design in economic terms is not due to their grasping the possibility of spontaneous, complex orders at all. It is the result of the tendency of the dumb of the world to distrust the intelligent of the world in general. 

This doesn't mean the dumb embrace liberty. They don't. They do yearn for someone to take care of them. That creates a conflict in that being taken care of usually implies being ordered about and the dumb tend to resent that as well. So we get the populist types who yearn for big government to take care of them but don't want the largess of government to come attached with strings. They want a freer economy but also enjoy watching the engines of production, the intelligent, punished through soak-the-rich levels of taxation -- while demanding lower taxes for themselves.  These are all contradictory positions of course, but that doesn't phase them.

The intelligent, on the other hand, commit a similar but different fallacy. They do believe that the dumb need to someone to care for them and they fell obliged to be the care givers. They tend to think they are smart enough to plan economies and to run the lives of others. The dumb, BTW, also believe that in some ways the lives of people can be run by others, but they want to limit it to areas where God tells people how to live. They don't trust the intelligent to decide what rules to impose but do think if some old book, that purports to be divine, lays down the rules, that makes sense to them.

I just find the contrasts and similarities between the fallacies of the dumb and  those of the intelligent, to be worthy of study and discussion. But can't remember seeing such a discussion, not one that explicitly covered the topic, anywhere. It is hinted at or briefly touched upon in various places, but I can't remember a full fledged discussion in print. If anyone here knows of such a discussion I'd appreciate being pointed to it. It is something I've thought of rather solitarily, which leads to errors of its own, and I'd like to see what others said to help clarify my thoughts -- and perhaps correct them. 

[Stephen vJ]

Thx Stephen, I recognise one, maybe two, in your list.

 

I just can't resist... I guess "The Who" and "Blood, Sweat & Tears". I also enjoy reggae which is often about freedom. There is a new song out by Asa (who I believe is from Ghana) called "Jailer" which is absolutely brilliant. I'll play it to you when we meet again.

 

... and hard rock (which I assume includes heavy metal).

 

That sounds about right, although I'm more towards the punk / grunge side of that scale. Metal is a bit too much now that I have kids in the house.

 

... it's because average hard rock likers start with average IQs of 120 and end up with 80.

 

As long as the decline is non-linear, I should be okay... uhm, what were we talking about again ?

 

Also more seriously, I assume the lack of hard rock-IQ correlation means they're 100 on average - that's no comfort for Stephen ... and given the danger to which he's exposing his fine brain, he needs reliable information.

 

Oooh, now that's a compliment. Thanks. Let me quote some lyrics about freedom from fine memory and then challenge anyone to do the same with Mozart's lyrics (aside from that whole thing about "leading bravely from the rear" in that satirical war opera of his)

 

"I'll tell you what it takes to reach the highest high

You'll laugh and say nothing's that simple

I've told you many times before

Messiahs pointed to the door

but no-one has the guts to leave the temple

    [lots of drum and guitar]

I'm free... I'm free..." - The Who

 

S.

 

[Garth Zietsman]

Garth: What he said!

 

Jim I will unpack what I know about fallacy differences by IQ tomorrow. 

[Garth Zietsman]

Fallacies by IQ

Alfred Binet constructed the first IQ test to pick out French school children who wouldn’t cope with normal education.  One of the people who helped him later was the developmental cognitive psychologist Jean Piaget.  Piaget was fascinated that the kinds of mistakes made by kids were not th same for all ages.  He went on to develop a stage theory of cognitive development.  According to this view human cognition goes through a set of invariant stages that are not merely quantitatively different but qualitatively different too. 

One interesting thing is that the pace with which children progress through Piaget’s stages (and the highest stage reached) have been found to reflect nothing but psychometric g (measured best as IQ).  Piaget identified 6 stages.  Most relevant for our purposes are the stages of Concrete Operations and Formal Operations.  Concrete Operations corresponds to logical thinking with concrete simple facts but an inability to cope with abstractions i.e. being able to see the essential principle uniting a set of concrete facts.  It is a middling stage which corresponds to an IQ of 85 if it is the final stage in adulthood.  At the Formal Operations stage abstract thinking is possible.   Not all adults reach the Formal Operations stage.  It corresponds to an IQ of around 115 – 1^st yr university level.

Another group of authors discovered that Piaget’s stage of Formal Operations isn’t the final stage.  There are at least 2 more.  The first involves being able to integrate several abstract principles into a comprehensive system (an IQ of about 148ish – encompassing the majority of Nobel Laureates) and the second involves seeing that several different abstract systems can be built from the abstractions and an ability to integrate these into a meta-system (an IQ of around 172ish).

We can therefore expect qualitatively different mistakes (fallacies) at different IQ levels - as one moves through one cognitive stage to another.

People stuck in the Concrete Operations (IQ < 105) i.e. most people, either cannot, or will have trouble, grasping abstract principles.  They will think of economic and political issues in terms of the concrete superficial situation around them.  They will have trouble understanding that government job creation involves opportunity costs to private enterprise, and a net loss of jobs overall.  They will have trouble understanding that minimum wages cause unemployment.  They will have trouble grasping that protectionism will cost rather than preserve wealth and jobs.  They will not understand interest rates and the like.  They can’t look beyond the concrete behaviour of people like themselves for social norms and consequently will be intolerant of difference cultures and social choices.  They do not feel up to political and economic leadership themselves so tend to look for guidance from above.  In other words they are ripe for ideologies like fascism, simple socialism/communism and big man politics and patronage that offer to make laws to compel employment or high wages, restrict trade and outlaw social choices like same sex marriage.  

People above the stage of Formal Operations are capable of comprehending all the above but their system building or pattern spotting abilities lead them astray when the world is random or simply unpredictably complex.  In statistical terms they overfit their intellectual models – they find convincing explanations that fit nonsense data.  They are also more prone than lower IQ people to stick with the first explanation that seems to fit, and close their minds to alternatives. Furthermore, being arrogant about their abilities they often feel tempted to actualise their intellectual systems i.e. indulge in social engineering.  In other words while their understanding leads them toward Libertarianism, their arrogance, or desire to build systems, is just as likely to lead them to ideologies that promise social engineering, like the intellectual side of Marxism, Keynesianism etc.

You see socialism/communism appeals to both low and high IQ groups – but for very different reasons.  Libertarianism only appeals to high IQ groups.  So when there is a difference of opinion along IQ lines it is likely to point to Libertarianism – socialist academics notwithstanding.

Interestingly Conservatism tends to occupy the narrow middle range of IQ.  This is the range of the more able Concrete Operation, and less able Formal Operation, stages.  They will be attracted to principled ways of doing things, but their principles will be inherited, superficial and potentially inconsistent (blind tradition) rather than personal and integrated into a consistent system.  Their most common mistake is that they are prone to stick to principles that often don’t apply very well.

[Erich]

Trevor, what happens when I don't consent to your right to life by denying you medical treatment because you cannot remunerate me? Do I then really have a right to life?

On Saturday, August 1, 2009 at 3:22:01 PM UTC+2, Trevor Watkins wrote:

                                                          THE CONSENT
AXIOM
 
----------------------------------
                                                                By
Trevor Watkins

I believe that the basis for successful human coexistence can be
reduced to a single statement, a single concept. This statement is the
Consent Axiom:

                                              NO ACTION WITHOUT
CONSENT

This statement is as brief and uncompromising as the biblical 5th
commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”.  Like most 4 word sentences, some
further elaboration is required for better understanding.

PRINCIPLE
=========

This statement is a principle. It describes how you ought to behave.
It does not proscribe how you  will behave. It is not changed by
circumstances. It does not vary relative to prevailing conditions. It
does not take utility or the greatest good into account. It says that
you may take no action against another human being without their full
and informed consent. Period.

ACTION
======

Like Newton, we must define the meaning of the term “action” quite
carefully. For an action against another to require the consent of the
other, then that action  must be immediate in time and space, must
have significant consequences for the other, and must have physical
reality.

1. IMMEDIATE IN TIME AND SPACE:
the request for consent and the action must be within a reasonable
time and distance of each other. Consent given now does not imply
ongoing consent into the future. Consent given in one place does not
imply consent in all places. Consent for an action is not required
from people far removed from the consequences of that action, in space
or time.

2. SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES:
daily life involves many actions which have insignificant consequences
for those around us, and do not require their consent. These actions
are largely covered by the ordinary rules of civility and manners.
However, both the action and the predictable consequences of that
action must be considered. While a gentle shove at the top of a cliff
may not be considered murder, the consequences at the bottom certainly
are. I believe you must take responsibility for the immediate but
unintended consequences of any deliberate action, even when lawful in
terms of the consent axiom.

3. PHYSICAL REALITY:
actions requiring consent must have a physical reality. Looking at
someone, talking about or to someone, thinking evil thoughts about
them, these actions do not require consent. Screaming in their ear
would require their consent.

CONSENT
========

Consent must be
1. Freely given
2. Full and informed
3. Specific
4. Clearly and accurately communicated
5. Applicable only to the individual in question
6. Preferably witnessed

Consent, once given,
1. cannot be changed or revoked
2. Is contractually binding
3. Is limited in time and scope

EXCEPTIONS
==========

The consent axiom only addresses relationships between human beings.
Everything else, including animals and the environment are considered
as property, either of individuals, or unowned.

Some human beings, such as very young children or the insane or
unconscious, are incapable of informed consent. In that case they are
considered as the property of a consenting individual, or unowned.  If
ownership is challenged (by anyone), the decision on ownership must be
taken by a duly appointed jury.  If an individual is considered
unowned, by themselves or by anyone else, then they must rely on the
charity and intervention of their peers.

Some actions are considered so overwhelmingly good for  society that
their performance overrides any individual objections (for example,
vaccination, environmental preservation (eg global warming), terrorist
apprehension). This argument is inevitably the top of a slippery
slope, on which all manner of further consent violations are
justified. This argument should be rejected.

In a democracy, the decisions taken by a majority are considered
binding on the minority, with or without there consent. In a
consenting society this silly concept simply would not apply.

In some cases, such as an accident, a request for consent from the
victim has no meaning. In such cases, the person responsible for the
accident, even if unintentional, must take responsibility for the
consequences of  the action precipitating the accident.

Some members of a society may not consent to be bound by the consent
axiom and its implications.  As described below under disputes,  both
victim and violator have rights to a trial by jury under the consent
axiom. If a non-consenting consent violator gives up that right, then
the violator’s guilt must be automatically presumed, and punishment
must follow.

AN EXTREME EXAMPLE
==================

Imagine you have spotted a young girl in an Iraqi market wearing an
oddly bulging outfit under which you have clearly seen wires and
straps. The consent law says you OUGHT to ask her consent, or at least
wait until she makes some unambiguous threatening action, before
acting. Since the consequences of her threatening action may be coming
at you at several thousand feet per second, you may well decide to
take pre-emptive action and shoot her first. However, if you do this,
YOU must now bear the consequences of your unlawful act (and for the
sake of order in society, this must always remain an unlawful act). If
the 12 year old girl you shot with little or no warning turns out to
be a spina bifida sufferer, with wires and straps up and down her poor
tortured body, then you can expect a jury of your peers to be quite
harsh. If there was more semtex than child under the robe, you might
yet get a medal. Its not fair, its just how it is.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
=========================

Every action has unpredictable and unintended consequences. Who would
have thought the invention of the atomic bomb would ensure world peace
for 70 years? Who would have thought a message of love and peace would
result in the crusades and the inquisition? Who knows how many
deserving microbes you kill every time you breath? Are you responsible
for the unintended consequences of your actions? Well, if not you,
then who? God? Fate? Both are difficult to sue. I believe you must
take responsibility for the immediate but unintended consequences of
any deliberate action, even when lawful in terms of the consent
axiom. . However, these consequences must be immediate both in time
and place.

SOCIETY
=======

A consenting society is that group of people who acknowledge and
respect the consent axiom as the basis of their social interactions.
Members of such a society will understand their mutual obligation to
resist and punish consent violations, and to provide jury members for
dispute resolutions.

DISPUTES
========

As with all human endeavours, disputes will arise. I believe that the
resolution of these disputes is a task for a jury of your peers when
other avenues such as compensation and apology have failed.

The size and composition of the jury must be consented to by both
parties to the dispute.  If agreement on a jury cannot be reached in a
reasonable time (7 days, for example), both sides select six jurors,
and a foreman with a casting vote is chosen by random lottery of the
jury members.  Jury decisions are made by a simple majority vote. Any
jury decision may be appealed to another jury until one side or the
other has 3 identical decisions in its favour. Thereafter the jury
decision becomes binding upon both parties to the dispute, and is
added to the set of legal precedents for that society which defines
the common law.

THE JURY
========

The members of the jury alone determine the rules for the hearing.
They may be guided by well-established rules of legal procedure and
evidence, but they are not bound by it. They may appoint a judge or
judges to guide them, they may invite or allow lawyers to represent
the parties,  they may call witnesses, conduct investigations, seek
the opinion of experts, or do whatever is required to reach a
decision. They will be funded equally by the parties to the dispute
during the hearing, but may finally decide on any allocation of costs
they see fit.

Because it is a matter of chance as to which side obtains the casting
vote on the jury, it will be important for both sides to select jurors
committed to acting on the merits of the case, rather than jurors
blindly supporting the side which appointed them. I believe that a
class of professional, impartial jurors will arise whose primary asset
will be their reputation for fair decisions. This class of jurors will
provide the pool from which most parties to a dispute will make their
jury selection.

CONSENT VIOLATIONS
==================

If someone does take action without consent, then that action is
unlawful and should be punished.  Who will punish  such a violation?
In the first instance, the victim of the violation, if capable, is the
most obvious candidate for exacting judgement and punishment. The
punishment may vary from an apology, or compensation,  through to
capture and removal from the consenting society.  Failing this, in the
second instance, members of the victim’s social network, such as
family, friends and colleagues will assist in exacting judgement and
punishment against a consent violator. If this second group is not
capable, then in the final instance, the unrelated members of the
consenting society must take responsibility for the consent violation,
as a cost and obligation that they bear by virtue of their membership
of that society.  It is likely that formal structures, such as  police
forces and judiciaries, would be setup by most societies to fulfil
this obligation, funded by consenting members of that society.

It is likely that any response by a victim or society against a
consent violator may not enjoy the violator’s consent. In this case,
the original violator may declare a dispute and the matter would be
decided by a jury, as described above. In other words, responses to
consent violations are themselves subject to the consent axiom, and
must not violate a jury’s sense of reasonableness.

PUNISHMENT
==========

What punishments may a jury impose on a convicted consent violator? It
is my belief that a jury may impose any punishment it pleases (subject
to later appeal), except one.  A jury may not decide to take the life
of any individual under any circumstance.  Generally, a jury would be
guided by existing precedents for crimes and punishments.

My personal suggested scale of punishments is as follows:

* Apology - the violator apologises to the victim
* Compensation - the violator compensates the victim
* Humiliation - the violator is humiliated before the victim and
society
* Incarceration - the violator’s freedom of movement is restricted for
a period
* Removal - the violator is removed from the society, by exile or
internal imprisonment

MORALITY
========

Morality arises from choice, not coercion. I believe there are
discoverable "absolute" moral values. Such an absolute value would
optimise the success (survival, comfort, wealth, happiness) of its
adherents in the majority of environments, whether they be humans,
microbes or aliens from Alpha Centauri. I believe the consent axiom
represents such an absolute moral value or proposition.

For example, it has been shown mathematically using game theory that
the optimum strategy for survival in a competitive environment is the
so-called "tit for tat" strategy. Both the "trust everyone" and "trust
no one" strategies are inferior.

CONCLUSION
==========

I would describe the consent axiom as the definition of a minimum
ethical consensus. It is that smallest set of ethical considerations
on which a useful number of individuals may agree, which are
nevertheless sufficient for producing  a peaceful and productive
society.

The implications of this axiom incorporate most libertarian beliefs in
a non-contradictory manner, viz

* Prohibition on the initiation of violence (unless consented to eg in
contact sports)
* Property rights
* Contracts
* Appropriate response to violations
* Primacy of the individual
* Dispute resolution
* Limits on governments and groups
* Freedom of speech and belief

The consent axiom here described says that the rights of the
individual are paramount, but that disputes between individuals must
be resolved by a group.






SOME DEFINITIONS (FROM WIKIPEDIA)
=================================

BELIEF  is usually defined as a conviction of the truth of a
proposition without its verification; therefore a belief is a
subjective mental interpretation derived from perceptions,
contemplation(reasoning), or communication.

An AXIOM is a sentence or proposition that is not proved or
demonstrated and is considered as obvious or as an initial necessary
consensus for a Theory . Therefore, it is taken for granted as true,
and serves as a starting point for deducing and inferencing other
(theory dependent) truths.


RIGHTS serve as rules of interaction between people, and, as such,
they place constraints and obligations upon the actions of individuals
or groups. A right does not represent a guarantee, a surprising
mistake made by many. A right is an agreement amongst humans - one has
no rights relative to gravity. Rights may come into conflict, in which
case a mechanism is needed for resolving the conflict.

[Jaco Strauss]

Hi Erich

Perhaps you should explain your understanding of "a right to life". Do you for example see it as a positive or negative right?

I suspect you would find little support for so-alled "positive rights" around here, so why should your negative right to life become some other non-contracted party's problem?

J

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Jaco Strauss
Kaapstad

[Stephen van Jaarsveldt]

What Jaco is saying, is that you, Erich, have a life (at least, we strongly suspect that you do). It is yours and you have the right to keep it, if you want to. We do not have the right to take it from you, at least not without your consent.

That is all. If some 3rd party or a force of nature or your own propensity for munching on pork chops all day or whatever, puts that life at risk, then it has nothing to do with us. Your right to keep your life imposes no obligation on us to protect your life, aside from not taking it from you without your consent.

There is no obligation whatsoever to save the drowning baby. As humans, we have compassion and will most likely help you / save the baby, but we cannot be morally or ethically compelled to do so or be held accountable for not doing so, should we choose not to help.

Our right to keep our property (incl. money, healthcare and money for healthcare) trumps your right to claim from us damages which was caused by something / someone other than us. Our corresponding obligation to your right to life does NOT extend beyond not taking it from your without your consent.

Similarly, if someone else - let's say Colin - threatens Jaco's property rights (i.e. his healthcare / money / money for healthcare), then Jaco will not expect you, Erich, to sacrifice your life to defend his property against Colin, which is the same thing as your right to life, just in reverse.

You might give your life to defend Jaco's property against Colin out of compassion and then you will be hailed a hero afterwards, but you cannot be jailed for not giving your life in defense of Jaco's property rights against the thievery by Colin. For the same reason, we cannot be compelled to give our property to save your life.

S.

[Trevor Watkins]

Trained you well, have I, little grasshopper. I really can't think of anything to add.

Trevor Watkins - Base Software

bas...@gmail.com 083 44 11 721 - 0631 949394 - Skype base37 -  (fax)0866 532 363 - libsa.wordpress.com

PO Box 3302, Jeffreys Bay, 6330

[Gavin Weiman]

This of course assumes anarchism type "libertarianism" under which rights exist solely as a consequence of contracts which are only enforceable by moral sanction.

Libertarianism that does 

Gavin

Sent from my iPhone

[Stephen van Jaarsveldt]

No... because:

a) There are no assumptions - the consent axiom is an axiom. It is apriori.

b) There is no "anarchism type libertarianism", since libertarianism taken to its logical conclusion is anarchism. The two are one and the same, like the worm is to the butterfly.

c) Rights presupposes enforcement and thus I reject rights per se and used the word only loosely below within the context of answering Erich's question - in reality there is no such thing as a right under libertarianism, only a more desired state of coexistence i.e. we would achieve a more desirable state of existence if we all observed the consent axiom.

d) Contracts need not be the foundation and in my view is almost as bogus a concept within the libertarian context as rights are - there is human nature, reputations, beard growing and butt-sniffing, all of which trumps the contract as a mode of guiding proper human behaviour.

e) Enforceable and moral do not belong in the same sentence. Unenforceable & moral, enforceable & immoral or even unenforceable & immoral are valid combinations.

f) Sanction remind of JJ Roussouw and the Social Contract, something which is the polar opposite of libertarianism. Individualists have no need for sanction.

S.

[Stephen van Jaarsveldt]

I missed "course", "exist" and "only"... my brain is a bit fuzzy with flu today, sorry. ;-)

S.

[Garth Zietsman]

I agree with Gavin on this one.  Anarchism is only libertarianism taken to its logical conclusion if you you assume libertarianism is anarchism in the first place.  Minarchism taken to its logical conclusion is minarchism.

I don't know how you propose to deal with disagreements and predatory people without sanction and enforcement.

Garth

[Trevor Watkins]

At https://libsa.wordpress.com/the-consent-axiom/ it states

To live freely and in peace, individuals who gather together by mutual consent should confer certain “rights” upon each other which all agree to respect:

Rights only exist by contract and agreement. There are no rights in the jungle, nor in a back street of Hillbrow. In a libertarian society, mechanisms for dealing with disagreements and predatory people are agreed up front between consenting individuals, and these mechanisms are exercised as needed. This does not require the intervention of a "government", and hence could be described as an anarchy. The fact that the resulting mechanisms may (or may not) end up looking like a government, or a minarchy, does not imply that a government was necessary for their creation.

Trevor Watkins

[Jaco Strauss]

See the subject line.  This discussion is supposed to be about "rights"  under the "consent axiom"....

[Stephen van Jaarsveldt]

By means of fight, flight or freeze, obviously. More advanced specimens may also choose to negotiate, discuss, bribe, persuade or even contract.

S.

On 1 June 2015 at 15:39, Garth Zietsman <garth.z...@gmail.com> wrote:

[Stephen van Jaarsveldt]

Yes, that.

S.

[AHN]

So Garth,
Do those that believe in minarchism have the right to force their ideas on those citizens in their minarchist societies who do not?
Does your minarchist government have a government police force to keep the anarchists in line?
Albert Nelmapius

[Garth Zietsman]

A minarchy can be formed in the manner Trevor suggests.  It need not be imposed from outside.  However once it is in place those joining or born into it will obviously have it forced on them.  A minarchy may well have a police force but may also have private security in place and simply be the justice of last resort.  Anarchists would be no problem unless they violated someone's liberty.

Predatory or dishonest fellows will either not be party to any prior agreements or they will happily violate them.  From where I sit it is obvious that even competing private mechanisms for dealing with disagreements will require enforcement of some kind at some point.

Anyway my main point was that the logical conclusion of minarchy is minarchy not anarchy, and minarchy is definitely libertarianism.

Garth

[Stephen vJ]

We already have minarchism. As any good commie will tell you, the government controls scarcely one fifth of the country. The other four fifths - by far the biggest part - is privately controlled. That is a very small government, decidedly minarchist. This minarchism is NOT libertarian, as any libertarian argues daily. :-p

S.

Sent from an electronic device.

[AHN]

Garth,
For the sake of this argument I don't think it matters how a minarchist society is formed., or how they handle predatory or dishonest fellows (other than themselves- who will judge the judges?)

I think minarchists (once their society is formed) want to allow a sovereign person or body to retain certain powers over mere citizens. (usually the argument advocates national defense and law enforcement... but again details are not important.) I believe this leaves an open ended, ever expanding gap that cannot be cured with minarchist philosophy. Surely you are not going to tell me your guys are able to write a watertight constitution that will be binding on all future generations?

So some person or group will have the "final say"
Which is another way of stating that they will be granted monopoly powers in certain areas.
An "Official" of the state will be allowed to enter your house, gather evidence, confiscate suspect equipment. But you innocent citizen, will be barred from enering the house of the ruling class and examine their equipment for incriminating evidence.
The argument will be made that you will only appoint angelic and fair people. How will you find and test those?
How will this "final say" power prevent them from determining how future ruling class members are elected /appointed, to give themselves the edge. If there is no competition, only coercion by those who were granted power remains.
That creates a privileged class and removes competition and creative destruction in whichever categories you choose to exempt - like law enforcement and defense. Why is creative destruction the most desirable philosophy except for two or three or four categories that are exempt???

Sure there will be private agencies too but there will have to be some uber agency - Gestapo/CIA/FBI/NSA that outranks them.
This agency will have to be paid by taxes- which supposes a Internal Revenue bureaucracy that has as its duty to generate money for the coffers out of which they themselves and the Royal class or the ruling class gets paid. It is like being the referee and the competitor in the same game. These taxes will be extracted from all citizens, those that voted for the leadership and those that didn't. After a while the cronies will get more exemptions and exceptions to taxation and prosecution and the losing political party will be forced to carry the majority of the burden.

It again removes competition and creative destruction and it perpetuates opportunity for corruption, because some citizens are going to be more equal than others.

You call it a " justice of last resort." 
Why do we then not appoint a "charity of last resort" and a Drug Enforcement Agency of last resort, and a medical insurance of last resort, and a school board of last resort and a .... these are the age old arguments for ever intrusive government.

Questions that interest me more are what about the right of secession? Will your minarchist citizens have the right to secede? If there is no right of secession you do not have a libertarian society.
If there is, can I secede the day before my taxes are due? Or a nincompoop is elected president? If so this is an anarchist society. If not it is not a libertarian society and is guaranteed to crawl along the "Road to Serfdom" as described by Hayek. (Yes I know Hayek was a minarchist but anarchist philosophy had not been well developed in his day.)

If there is no public property, everything is privately owned, and each citizen is sovereign, cannot be taxed against his will... you will have an anarchist society. Individuals can choose to group together and form Marxist societies or minarchist societies with rules that only apply to their members- perfectly fine. But none of these groups can enforce their laws or tax citizens who did not join their society. Competing ideas will be able to coexist. My system will survive and thrive without the need for angelic judges and police. It is the only system that does not require an angelic class to rule. The invisible hand rules over saint and sinner equally.

In your minarchist society, the anarchists will be under the force of your state and will be obliged to comply with your courts and your taxes and your police force. Competing ideas will be prosecuted out of existence.

Albert Nelmapius

[Dewald Pieterse]

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Dewald Pieterse

"A democracy is nothing more than mob rule, where fifty-one percent of the people take away the rights of the other forty-nine." ~ Thomas Jefferson
http://www.jonathangullible.com/mmedia/PoL.English.The.Philosophy.of.Liberty.swf
“A ’chocolate king’ has no power over the consumers, his patrons. He provides
them with chocolate of the best quality and at the cheapest price. He does
not rule the consumers, he serves them. The consumers ... are free to stop
patronizing his shops. He loses his ’kingdom’ if the consumers prefer to
spend their pennies elsewhere.” Ludwig von Mises, Human Action

[Stephen vJ]

Exactly. So let me repeat my original statement; libertarianism taken to its logical conclusion is anarchism. Minarchists and even traditional libertarians are just anarchists who have not yet figured out how a few remaining functions performed by government can be done without government. They are all positions on the same scale, where communists are at one end and anarchists on the other. That is why Mises could shout to a group of minarchists that they are all a bunch of socialists - because from his vantage point, minarchists are to the socialist side of him on the scale, even if they are to the anarchist end of the scale compared to everyone else.

S.

Sent from an electronic device.

<minarchist_meme.jpg>

[Leon Louw (gmail)]

What's missing for me in this excellent discourse juxtaposing libertarian minarchy and anarchy, is a definition of "government".

What libertarian anarchists have in mind is that nobody should be coerced (the consent axiom). What minarchists (and all statists) have in mind is that some people should be allowed to coerce -- ie act against people or their property without their consent -- and that these people should be called "government". Government means, by necessary definition, people endowed with a right denied others, that right being the right to initiate non-consensual aggression, coercion and.or force. 

Why minarchists call themselves "libertarian" is perfectly simple and legitimate, namely that they, like anarchists, want liberty. Where they differ is that they think the way to maximise liberty in the real world is to exempt a few people (called "government") from the need to get consent from people against whom they aggress. What's libertarian about this view -- what distinguishes it from all forms of satism -- is that coercion is allowed only to protect and promote liberty. Libertarian anarchists must concede, I submit, that minarchists are true libertarians. It is disingenuous sophistry to argue that they have anything in common with people who want to achieve imposed orders by means of governments. 

Many libertarians, especially Objectivists, who call themselves minarchists, say they oppose all coercion; that government can be entirely voluntary. Such a government cannot, by any coherent definition, be called government. Voluntary government is a contradistinction in terms -- it would be a voluntary organisation like any other in a state of libertarian anarchy.

The bottom line has less to do with whether there are people called government, than with the extent to which favoured people may legitimately initiate non-consensual force. Everything more than zero can technically be called statism, but only as a matter of semantics, not substance. Very little statism -- enough for the sole purpose of protecting victims of other people's coercion -- is libertarian minarchy. Somewhat more -- enough for, say, basic infrastructure and welfare -- is classical liberalism or limited government. Lots more is a "mixed" economy or social market. Still more is socialism in one of its many incarnations. Lots of socialism is communism. At the opposite extreme from libertarian anarchy is totalitarianism.

From a liberty perspective, there is a kind of binary continuum from the presence of unambiguous liberty to its unambiguous absence.

I think this dialogue will be more fruitful if participants agree that both positions are fully libertarian. The useful thing to interrogate is whether liberty would be maximised with a libertarian government or zero government.

Much as we libertarians hate the idea of compromising on pragmatic/utilitarian grounds, we accept all sorts of circumstances where coercion is legitimate. Force is initiated constantly under conditions all libertarians endorse, eg helping unconscious accident victims, or plucking drowning babies from ponds. All libertarians condone trespassing to put out a fire that would burn a neighbour's house down. And so on -- it's easy to think of countless examples.

We achieve nothing by saying people who legitimately coerce are, at the time, government. Minarchists could produce a long list of contexts in which coercion would be consistent with liberty, or a justified departure from it, but they will never anticipate every eventuality. The best they can do is develop rules of general application (common law) of the kind Gavin elaborated. This is not, as he suggested, preferable to the consent axiom. The axiom is, as participants pointed out, a preference, indistinguishable from any other preference, such a preferring tea to coffee. What this discourse could usefully explore, along his lines, is which institutions are likely to maximise liberty (ie consent). Coffee-lovers legitimately ponder how to get best-value coffee, not whether they ought to prefer tea. Although I am inclined towards anarchy, I recognise the case for minarchy as being no less libertarian than the case for anarchy. I reject the delusional tendency of fellow anarchists to present themselves as more libertarian than minarchists, as if they occupy higher moral ground. 

Leon Louw

work:  +27-11-884-0270

mobile:  +27-84-618-0348

www.freemarketfoundation.com

If you want to know who has power over you, ask who you cannot criticize.

[Trevor Watkins]

Thanks Leon for that excellent analysis. I totally agree that we must avoid contests for libertarian "purity" based on how much coercion you would permit in your perfect society. The consent axiom expects there to be constant consent violations, for good and bad reasons. The girl in the Iraqi marketplace is just such an example. As you suggest, the issue is how we deal with such violations.

Gavin and Garth may suggest that we establish a set of predefined rules which cover acceptable consent violations, call this the common law, and set in place agencies allowed to police such consent violations with force. Trevor, Stephen and Albert would probably say this is the thin edge of a constantly expanding wedge, which stops roughly where we are today. Instead of attempting to define the conditions for acceptable consent violations, and putting in place a force to pre-empt such violations, we suggest a process for dealing with such  violations AFTER they have occurred. This would be a trial by jury as proposed in the consent axiom essay, or similar.

So, the fundamental difference between minarchists and anarchists (to label the 2 sides badly) is a matter of timing - minarchists want active prevention BEFORE a violation occurs, anarchists are content to pick up the pieces and apportion blame AFTER the violation has occurred. Minarchists would limit individual freedom of action to limit potential harm, anarchists would allow potential harm in the name of freedom.

By this definition, I remain a consenting anarchist.

Trevor Watkins

[AHN]

Thanks Leon,
I agree that none of us are pure enough to exclude any other individual
from being called a Libertarian. We all believe in a large degree of
liberty.
I still maintain that a society that prohibits secession is not
libertarian- being held captive does not cut it no matter how many other
liberties they throw in the pot.

Trevor ,
I am with you on everything you say as it pertains to today's flawed
society. Given the status quo, libertarians might consider whether they
want to apply laws before or after.

But in an ideal society, after public property has been eliminated, the
market will decide. There are too many trillions of permutations of
exceptions to the rule for one central planning committee to EVER
codify. Millions of little experiments will appear on millions of
private properties, and they will be allowed to coexist.
Some might think of their farm or their compound as being anarchist or
minarchist libertarian, but they will insist that on their enclave there
will be no abortion or death penalty and that good Samaritans saving
accident victims and drowning babies will be exempted from prosecution.
Other societies might have the opposite rules, and every permutation in
between. People will know the rules for each property and choose to live
under them or secede.
There will be various forms of trial or arbitration, some by jury, some
not. But freedom of choice will determine if criminals are more likely
to move to places that have minimal governments and violent police
forces or places where you sign a contract that on my property you will
be expelled or imprisoned or fined, if you coerce against anybody . Will
murderes move to properties that condone the death penalty? Nobody
knows. Time will tell.
No central authority will enforce their will inside private property.
People with opposite views are allowed to practice it, they just may not
force me to submit to their rules on my land. Market forces like higher
insurance or fewer tourist rands for crime ridden areas will be the
deciding factors, not central planners.
Albert Nelmapius

[Stephen van Jaarsveldt]

Leon: "What's libertarian about this view -- what distinguishes it from all forms of satism -- is that coercion is allowed only to protect and promote liberty."

Sorry, I'm going to need an example or something, because I don't see how coercion can be allowed or how coercion can protect & promote liberty. Like if we kill off all the commies ?

Leon: "Everything more than zero can technically be called statism, but only as a matter of semantics, not substance. Very little statism -- enough for the sole purpose of protecting victims of other people's coercion -- is libertarian minarchy."

That's what I said: statism = libertarian minarchy. ;-p     Ok, I'm being deliberate here. ;-)

Leon: "... Still more is socialism in one of its many incarnations. Lots of socialism is communism. At the opposite extreme from libertarian anarchy is totalitarianism."

Well, I called the opposite end of the spectrum communism and you call it totalitarianism... but that is approximately the continuum that I had in mind.

Leon: "Libertarian anarchists must concede, I submit, that minarchists are true libertarians."

I still don't see why, sorry. Sure, minarchists are different from people who are statists and socialists and communists, but that merely makes them minarchists, not libertarians.

Leon: "The useful thing to interrogate is whether liberty would be maximised with a libertarian government or zero government."

100% agreed... but that is what I thought we were doing. Garth said some and I said zero - I'd like to hear why Garth says not zero.

Leon: "Much as we libertarians hate the idea of compromising on pragmatic/utilitarian grounds, we accept all sorts of circumstances where coercion is legitimate. Force is initiated constantly under conditions all libertarians endorse, eg helping unconscious accident victims, or plucking drowning babies from ponds. All libertarians condone trespassing to put out a fire that would burn a neighbour's house down. And so on -- it's easy to think of countless examples."

Ah, but hang on, I get those examples and find it quite natural for people to occasionally infringe on each other's property and liberty out of concern and good intentions. No problem with that - they can go settle it in court (under common law) afterwards... the question when it comes to libertarianism / minarchism / anarchism is whether or not (and if whether, how much of it) can be institutionalized and done impersonally. So if I see my neighbour's house burning, I might trespass to help put out the fire and if I inadvertently caused him damage because he was burning down his house deliberately in order to make the clean-up before a planned re-build easier, then he can sue me for the damages. The problem comes in when we institutionalize and impersonalize the infringement of property and liberty, for example, having a publicly funded fire brigade who will put out any and all fires whether we like it or not and / or without appeal or exception. There is a difference between my neighbour breaking down my door out of concern for what might be going on inside my house and a policeman doing so. The one is government and the other is not. I don't see any justification for institutionalizing force and coercion, even privately.

Leon: "I reject the delusional tendency of fellow anarchists to present themselves as more libertarian than minarchists, as if they occupy higher moral ground. "

Sorry, that was not my intention. Apologies to you and anyone else I might have offended.

S.

On 2 June 2015 at 15:54, Leon Louw (gmail) <leon...@gmail.com> wrote:

[Stephen van Jaarsveldt]

I agree with every word except "jury", but that is a minor technicality, which I can happily live with. I note also the absence of "contract" here, which I agree with.

S.

[Stephen van Jaarsveldt]

Much like right now, where I submit to one set of rules when I am at work, another when I am on the road and yet another when I am at home. Not only will / should there be competition, but also there could be overlap... so I can choose to work in Trevor's jury, post-action law, consent land because it has the highest economic growth and by a short commute sleep in Garth's smart-judges, pre-action law, private police land because it is slightly safer. Or any other combination one might imagine. To a large extent, we already have this though... except that some choices are forced upon us by one of the organizations in existence. Which choices, how much of it and what we call the organization, is in my view somewhat less important than asking if it or any other such organization can do so legitimately. I don't think so, but disagreeing with Leon and Garth is usually a losing proposition, so I look forward to further debate.

S.

[Gavin Weiman]

Hi Leon,

I must confess that I had concluded from our last exchanges on the consent axion that you were an anarchist libertarian.

I am also heartened by the fact that you refer (emphasised by italics) “in the real world”

What ‘consent’ or ‘non-aggression’ anarchists forget is that we usually have to take the world as we find it. We cannot be ‘constructivists’ (in Heyek’s meaning) and simple create a great anarchy and hope people are polite enough to ‘live and let live’ if this is how people actually acted in the world we would not even be having this discussion. We could also hope that people might be ingenious enough to have David Freeman’s insights and allow markets to create a machinery of freedom. But again as actual history teaches us this is not how the world as we now find it has evolved.

In fact markets of the kind and of the nature as now exist in the world really only evolved after the industrial revolution. Dirigisme (of the more communist variety) also evolved after the industrial revolution. Before this with swords, arrows and pidgins for mail and the speed of horse power, dirigisme of this ilk was rather constrained to a few ‘bad barons’ who did not honour their oaths to protect their liegemen.

I have a character in a novel I hope to finish one day, who created habitats in space, and is not only able to find subcontractors to supply an eco-sysytem he is also able to find subcontractors to supply legal and social systems and he sells space in this habits subject to agreements by the purchasers to comply with eco and legal rules, that they must indemnify the habitat providers against non compliance by their children when their children reach the age of 18 they must agree or leave. If they refuse to leave they are thrown out of the airlock. This of course is a "minarchy for sale” on other habitats you can fine "anarchies of sale”

Unfortunately, the views of anarchies libertarians are as much a ‘subjective fantasy’ as the imaginary scenarios on my prospective novel.

In the real word we find that governments have in fact evolved. In History anarchist  groups have tried to destroy states in the hope of rebooting this system. The Spanish anarchist I think are an example.

The kind of debate you suggest - which would result in more freedom in the real world is really just more speculative type argument.

That libertarians can influence politics, get privatisation and deregulation going to some extent shows that minarchism is about a billion times more plausible in the real world that ‘lets all play nice together’

Having said all this I like Stephens view that even with all the alleged dirisgm that the SA ungoverment intends, it really hold sway over very little in the real would - I know millions of people who don’t bother paying taxes or complying with regulations and the government is powerless to do anything about it. To a very large extent we already live in an anarchy. In fact I once heard you Leon, use the phase (at some Libsem) a ‘Constitutional Anarchy” paradoxical as it may seem this corrupt ungoverned country is very close to an anarchy and when the lights go out (as I suspect the may soon) we will not have John Galt the thank but ANC affirmative ungovernment.

I’m not sure the South African Spring and looting that is likely to follow will be a good example of a ‘peaceful anarchy’ or an example of several warlords trying to be the new government. But if people were naturally inclined to sovereign individualism I would expect us not to try to reestablish governments yet for some reason we always do.

The communists said their system was good but human nature to rotten to practice it - Anarchists have the same lament. Rand (and this is not to endorse her ‘voluntary government ideas which I concede cannot be an absolute) said you should check your promises and consider that its is your theory or system (anarchism or communism) that is flawed. You Leon have often said (and you say it here again_ that except for totalitarianism (which can never exist) and anarchism (which I believe can also never exist) every other system is a ‘third way’ and there is an spectrum of such third ways. Only third ways are possible in this world (in my humble opinion and I have thought on why this is so) and all we can do is try try move towards a third way closer to anarchism - but like the ‘speed of light’ it will never be reached. Statists will try to nudge the third way closer to totalitaiansim (but this way lies death and they will never live achieve it)

Anyway — I seem to have come back into as discussion where we are at least willing to consider ’sane and sensible libertarians’ to actually BE libertarians - when last I was in this conversation I was told that the consent axion WAS libertarianism and it was denied that I had the right to call myself a libertarian - I should say I’m for minarchism or classical liberalism (both of which I assert ARE libertarianism) Of course it would now be gentlemanly of me to say that I also consider Anarchist to be libertarians - since it has been so passionately argued that anarchism is libertarianism carried to its logical conclusion. 

Unfortunately I must be ungentlemanly and state that anarchism is not the logical conclusions of liberty. More of something is not necessarily better. In medicine you take the minimum effective dose if you take more there is no real benefit, There is a maximum amount of freedom conductive to a good society exceed that dose and every thing seems to unravel into chaos. Theoretically, to some, it seems that this does not have to be so, but since it always does there is something wrong with the theory. So sorry Anarchists! I think your whole theory is simply a mistake - there are fundamental factual issues about human nature that confound your theory. So I don’t really recognise anarchy as a form or libertarianism only minarchy and classical liberalism. Let me know if you have an interest why I conclude this.

Regards

Gavin

[Stephen van Jaarsveldt]

Naturally, I disagree. Government is a very new thing. All through human history there have been communities, countries, nations, whatever who were to a large extent either free or under the control of a council of elders, a baron, a king or some such authoritarian figure / council of figures. What they did was rarely defense of their people and often plundered... actually plundered, not taxed. For huge swaths of history, the authoritarian dictators were the church and was oppression dealt out in the name of some god, who at least in Christianity took merely 10% of your crops. It was not until the 1800's that the world got what can be rightly called "government" and even then it was rather small and practically impotent. Only towards the end of the 1800's / early 1900's did governments really become a force to be reconed with and only in the 1950's did they really start to tax in the proper sense of the word - before that, taxed by government were much lighter than "taxes" levied by the churches and barons that preceded it. The history of man IS a history without government. The great behemoth that is government is an unnatural, unnecessary and historically abnormal. It may resemble some of the elements of its predecessors, like the all seeing nature of god in the church being like the CIA spy drones, but those are not the defining features of government. There will always be authoritarian types of people, but to say that life without government is fiction, is to misread history. Authoritarianism, violence, war, slavery, rape, plunder and oppression might be human nature, but government is most certainly not.

S.

[Stephen vJ]

Also:

Government is not medicine that we overdosed on, it is poison that we took some of. There is no benefit to humanity in any part of government. I am yet to see any remotely plausible evidence to the contrary.

Even if a little bit of government were to be netto beneficial, that would still be a utilitarian argument, which does not make government any more or less moral. The use of force is immoral, regardless of utility.

Anarchism does NOT assume a utopian outcome or depend on the good nature of other people. Under anarchism I fully expect to receive devious letters informing me of fake lottery winnings in exchange for a small handling fee and to be snowed in under Ray Ban and Viagra spam. People are nasty, devious and dishonest... which is why I want as few of them in power as possible.

S.

Sent from an electronic device.

[AHN]

Gavin, Gavin, Gavin,
If you equate modern day anarcho- capitalism with "anarchism" in general or with the Spanish anarchists, you clearly have not done your homework and your opinion has to be discarded with the disdain it deserves.--- on this subject at least.

• History does NOT teach us that governments create peace and prosperity in fact quite the opposite.
  
• I agree that free markets (in a relative sense) mostly evolved after the industrial revolution- and that period of relative liberty with relatively less government interference was the greatest economical ans sociological advance the world has ever seen- not because of, but in spite of government. As the reach of government expanded that prosperity slowed.
  
• I defy you to give me an example of an educated well read modern day anarcho-capitalist that advocates violent overthrow of government.
• General "anarchists" like Occupy Wall-street types as well as your Spanish anarchists were much more akin to Marxists than any of our philosophies.
  
• We do NOT have to "take the world as we find it". Just like medieval serfs did not have to take totalitarian rule by kings or bishops and cardinals of the church. Or by conquerors in wars.  Unfortunately violent  "liberators" just turned into tyrants of their own. The solution (then and now) was NOT to find a "workable" compromise with tyrants, clipping their wings here and there.  It was to grant the citizens alternate programs that set them free from tyranny. 
• At one time overturning the power of the king or the pope was considered laughable and "really just more speculative type argument". Nobody could imagine life without those status quo institutions.
  
• "That libertarians can influence politics, get privatization and deregulation going".... like you state is laughable. It is like saying we will elect a kinder and gentler Mafia boss next time, we will limit his power to drugs and prostitution and we will make him promise to not extort. I am sure he will be equally fair to all of us.--- A leader being equally fair to everybody is impossible. Only individual choice can be equally fair.

Albert Nelmapius

[Erich]

So correct me if I am wrong here. Should I be involved in an accident which was not of my doing, and you as a doctor come past and see me dying, knowing that I cannot pay for your help, you refuse to offer any kind of assistance.

What kind of right to life do I actually have now? Probably none at all.

To put it another way, this is not the kind of society that I would want to live in.

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[Jaco Strauss]

So you prefer the kind of society where claims could be made on your perceived ability to save lives of others unrelated to you?

Put differently: 

Should I be down-and-out and through none of my doing and face extreme life threatening weather conditions, you as a relatively well-off person could easily address, but because I cannot pay for your help, you refuse to offer any kind of assistance??

"What kind of right to life do I actually have now?" 

To put it another way, if this is not the kind of society that you would want to live in, I am surprised you are sitting there participating in philosophical debates rather than being out in the townships handing out warm clothes and blankets.... or are you waiting for Government to enforce such "altruism" first?

[Stephen vJ]

Yes, but why would you not want to live in such a society ? The doctor is a human with compassion - we know this from the fact that he studied medicine, presumably not to work exclusively with cadavers, in which case you are just unlucky. So we can safely assume that the doctor will help you, out of his regard for his own abilities, inclinations and good nature. Would you rather live in a society where the doctor would be compelled by some system of "rights" to help you ? Really ? I wouldn't ! Have you been to a doctor motivated by fear of external authority rather than from the inside ? The gods help us all.

S.

Sent from an electronic device.

[Gavin Weiman]

Hi S

As to your comment - I think you and I are on the same page more or less. I agree that modern government or nations states are a fairly recent phenomenon. As to the violence of fudal barons - since technology really contained them they did send extreme messages as you say. I agree that Leviathan is an anomaly and the the Classical Liberal State that gave rise to markets and their rapid expansion should be where we should try to turn our future. When (and if) we arrive at that future  then we can try push a more voluntarist government.

G

G

[Leon Louw (gmail)]

@2 June 2015 at 18:02, Stephen van Jaarsveldt 

I thought I'd replied, but don't see it here, so here are quicker less satisfying responses -- I hate redoing stuff -- never the same the second time.

On 2 June 2015 at 18:02, Stephen van Jaarsveldt <sjaar...@gmail.com> wrote:

Leon: "What's libertarian about this view -- what distinguishes it from all forms of satism -- is that coercion is allowed only to protect and promote liberty." 

Sorry, I'm going to need an example or something, because I don't see how coercion can be allowed or how coercion can protect & promote liberty. Like if we kill off all the commies ?

 

I gave the example of libertarian coercion eg saving an unconscious accident victim, or a drowning infant, without consent. (As an aside, in such cases consent my be implied, but that's another matter.)

I'm surprised you ask, and suggest that you'd think of many examples easily yourself. Og all that flood through my thoughts, how about warding off imminent coercion -- in each case I initiate coercion in order to promote liberty -- ie stop coercion prior to an actual physical violation :

1. I see Gavin finally deciding to rid himself of your subversive thoughts, to which end he seizes by loaded rocket-launcher, aims it at your head from point-blank range, and starts pulling the trigger. I leap forward and bump him so the the missile misses your head by 1.347 mm.
2. I see a gang with cultural weapons stalking a woman about to be ethnic-cleansed by them, so I leap in front and ward them off menacingly, thus violating their freedom of movement in order to promote liberty.
3. I see religious fanatics selecting a baby from a group of cribs for ritual slaughter. Before they actually lift the chosen one, I cast a spell over them and they cannot move.
4. Julius Malema sees a group of boere, including you and Piet. He can't resist temptation, so he does a u-turn in his top-of-the-range turbo-charged BMW, aims at you and puts his foot flat. I toss a brink in his path, which makes his car veer to the left and you all run safely for cover.

I'll stop there, because I know you, you won't read all my 50,000 examples.

The notion of "preemptive" strikes is easy to dismiss until you narrow it down reduction ad absurdum. My fist is flying towards your nose in a fit of rage, my you block it? Thus you physically aggress. I've done marshal arts and I might have stopped, as we were trained to do, a millimeter short. 

Leon: "Everything more than zero can technically be called statism, but only as a matter of semantics, not substance. Very little statism -- enough for the sole purpose of protecting victims of other people's coercion -- is libertarian minarchy."

That's what I said: statism = libertarian minarchy. ;-p     Ok, I'm being deliberate here. ;-)

Leon: "... Still more is socialism in one of its many incarnations. Lots of socialism is communism. At the opposite extreme from libertarian anarchy is totalitarianism."

Well, I called the opposite end of the spectrum communism and you call it totalitarianism... but that is approximately the continuum that I had in mind.

Leon: "Libertarian anarchists must concede, I submit, that minarchists are true libertarians."

I still don't see why, sorry. Sure, minarchists are different from people who are statists and socialists and communists, but that merely makes them minarchists, not libertarians.

Minarchists want a government to preserve liberty, and think there'll be more of it with minimal government than zero. That makes them, in their view, more libertarian than anarchists.  

Leon: "The useful thing to interrogate is whether liberty would be maximised with a libertarian government or zero government."

100% agreed... but that is what I thought we were doing. Garth said some and I said zero - I'd like to hear why Garth says not zero.

All the the debates I've seen that address this question are pragmatic, not philosophical. That's as it should be -- assuming both sides are fully-fledged libertarians.

Leon: "Much as we libertarians hate the idea of compromising on pragmatic/utilitarian grounds, we accept all sorts of circumstances where coercion is legitimate. Force is initiated constantly under conditions all libertarians endorse, eg helping unconscious accident victims, or plucking drowning babies from ponds. All libertarians condone trespassing to put out a fire that would burn a neighbour's house down. And so on -- it's easy to think of countless examples."

Ah, but hang on, I get those examples and find it quite natural for people to occasionally infringe on each other's property and liberty out of concern and good intentions. No problem with that - they can go settle it in court (under common law) afterwards... the question when it comes to libertarianism / minarchism / anarchism is whether or not (and if whether, how much of it) can be institutionalized and done impersonally. So if I see my neighbour's house burning, I might trespass to help put out the fire and if I inadvertently caused him damage because he was burning down his house deliberately in order to make the clean-up before a planned re-build easier, then he can sue me for the damages. The problem comes in when we institutionalize and impersonalize the infringement of property and liberty, for example, having a publicly funded fire brigade who will put out any and all fires whether we like it or not and / or without appeal or exception. There is a difference between my neighbour breaking down my door out of concern for what might be going on inside my house and a policeman doing so. The one is government and the other is not. I don't see any justification for institutionalizing force and coercion, even privately.

Roman-Dutch common law, which we are privileged to have in SA -- albeit being eroded to the vanishing point -- deals with this sort of thing from a libertarian paradigm.It says, for instance, that you may assume implicit consent in some cases. You may assume, for instance, that the drowning babyand the unconscious accident victim want to be rescued. 

[Stephen vJ]

Further to the response below and our discussion at LibDin earlier, I would like to adjust my views somewhat. I think there are three ways of looking at it:

1. The utilitarian approach. This is the natural inclination for most of us i.e. less taxes are good for everyone. Under this heading, it could be argued (although I still dispute that), that some government can increase wellbeing. I now get how some coercion could lead to more liberty - thanks Leon for explaining this to me. In this argument I want maximum liberty and minimum government because everyone is better off that way and concede that some coercion could have that effect. Killing off some communist leaders will indeed be good for everyone and increase liberty.

2. The morality approach. Here, even if liberty were to make us all worse off, I would still be for it, because coercion is immoral. Outcome is irrelevant, because this is not a utilitarian argument. If you invaded my property to save my life, there could have been a utilitarian argument for your action, but not a moral one - at least not without conflict of values i.e. do you act and violate property or let someone die as a result of that inaction. In this argument I want maximum liberty and minimum government regardless of outcome, because it is moral. The country would be better of without some communist leaders, but killing them would be immoral.

3. The determinist / darwinist approach. I like liberty and have a natural inclination towards it. The outcome and morality of it is irrelevant. The argument is not logical or rational - I simply like liberty and prefer there to be no government. Others may be genetically inclined to want a bit of government, some a lot and some stacks. There is no justification or rationalization, this simply is as it is. I have a strong preference for liberty, but none at all for killing communists (or anyone else for that matter).

It seems to me that the last approach is the most correct one, given my current understanding. So anarchy is not the logical conclusion to draw from libertarianism, unless you are making an entirely moral argument, which I think I was trying to do. Any and all coercion is in my view immoral and not justifiable through utilitarian arguments, but I recognize that it is my genes speaking.

S.

Sent from an electronic device.

[Stephen vJ]

My earlier statement about Ludwig von Mises still stands, but now gets an interesting flavour. The slogan is tu ne cede malis, not tu ne cede detrimento or tu ne cede innaturale.

S.

Sent from an electronic device.

[Trevor Watkins]

On 4 June 2015 at 02:02, Stephen vJ <sjaar...@gmail.com> wrote:

Killing off some communist leaders will indeed be good for everyone and increase liberty.

I came across an interesting blog called "WaitButWhy". It has interesting sections, like some really good jokes, and social games to play over dinner. One game goes as follows: Imagine you have a box with a big red button, given to you by an alien. The alien explains that you can instantly kill any one person on earth simply by thinking about them as you press the red button. Who would you choose to kill?  

Interestingly, in the comments section, just about every class of person is suggested for death, from Barack Obama, to Mohamed El Baghdadi, to most bankers, to people who don't separate their garbage. That's why I oppose the death penalty, and killing commies.

[Martin van Staden]

I've always been a moralistic supporter of liberty (going by Stephen's definitions). The utilitarian approach has always bothered me, and I guess this is because I ordinarily dislike ad hocism. Even if economists unanimously agreed that a free market is effectively inferior to a centrally planned one, I'd favor the free market simply because there is no logical evidence to suggest that the collective or the State has any inherent right to tell me what I can and cannot do.

[Leon Louw (gmail)]

There are many problems with utilitarianism, libertarian or dirigiste. 

It's appeal is that it is to a substantial degree, Stephen, Darwinian. Almost everyone wants to know what works, specifically what works best for most or many. Libertarians all experience the need to argue for liberty on utilitarian grounds -- it produces more wealth, higher living standards, more justice etc. Only libertarians, and to a lesser extent liberals, like liberty per se. I think a preference for libertarianism is a mutation. I like to think it's a "higher" form of evolution.

Given that utilitarian arguments are the most effective and are intuitively appealing for most, "pure" utilitarianism, entails some serious problems, for instance that is can and does legitimise all sorts of rights violations in the name of the "common good". 

A reduction ad absurdam" example is gang rape. If the satisfaction of the rapists exceeds the trauma of the victim, utilitarianism favours the rape. Anything that entails more benefits than costs warrants utilitarian coercion. It seems therefore to me to be inherently non-libertarian. What makes libertarianism seem utilitarian is that liberty happens fortuitously to serve the general interest.

In other words, libertarianism wins on both counts, most of the time. 

The moral/ethical argument is what most libertarians prefer. It's problem is that morals and ethics are inherently subjective, notwithstanding valiant attempts by Objectivists and others to present seemingly objective arguments. I think coercion is (almost always) immoral, but accept that others are not required by some kind of cosmic logic to agree.

On 6 June 2015 at 20:28, Martin van Staden <super.w...@gmail.com> wrote:

I've always been a moralistic supporter of liberty (going by Stephen's definitions). The utilitarian approach has always bothered me, and I guess this is because I ordinarily dislike ad hocism. Even if economists unanimously agreed that a free market is effectively inferior to a centrally planned one, I'd favor the free market simply because there is no logical evidence to suggest that the collective or the State has any inherent right to tell me what I can and cannot do.

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[Stephen vJ]

A week ago I would have argued against your last sentence, but now I get that too. This group is some of the best education available on the planet. I can't believe it is free, private and unregulated. ;-)

S.

Sent from an electronic device.

[Gavin Weiman]

Hi Leon,

But isn’t there an intrinsic problem is valuing anything "per se”?. Does anything only have a meaning in some context. If a ‘value’ is something an actor acts to gain or keep’ doesn’t the actor have to have some known or unknown impulse that provides a context. A thing per se is contextless like ‘god’ the 'unknowable’ the authoritarian ‘because I say so’ 

IF you eliminate all or any contexts does the word ‘liberty’ actually mean anything at all other that perhaps a sound. Surely you are simply relying on some hidden context that you refuse to divulge.  Even if you say I like ‘liberty’ because it gives me a warm and fizzy feeling’ then that is a reasons and a utility in this concept?

Regards

Gavin