Critique of Mises': The Principle of Methodological Individualism
Paul Wakfer
decades ago, because that writing is pertinent to some current events
and/or is highly worth repeating. To the latter I heartily agree, which
is not to say that I think it cannot be improved, whence the purpose of
the comment that I made at Mises.org to a reprint of part of Mises'
writing posted there under the subject title given above.
The full article is at: http://mises.org/daily/3409
And my full comment at:
http://blog.mises.org/9840/the-principle-of-methodological-individualism/#comment-536657
is also below.
I find it interesting, but highly disappointing, that my long detailed
comment never received a single response. But such has been the standard
fate so far of virtually all of my comments to the writings of "name"
libertarians (those who are highly read and respected by the majority,
including for some by me).
Part of the reason for the lack of comment to mine may be that my
comment got "lost" and was posted 3 days late. This is highly negative
at Mises.org since readers by then are working on new articles/posts and
generally ignoring additional comments to old ones.
---------------- Start of comment at mises.org ---------------------
Although this quoted excerpt of Mises' is a strong and important
statement about the basis and importance of methodological
individualism for any true understanding of human beings, it,
nevertheless, exhibits some fundamental flaws that make it far less
effective than it could otherwise be. I am not aware of anyone else
having pointed these out before, but if there are, then I would
welcome a reference to it.
> Praxeology deals with the actions of individual men. It is only in
> the further course of its inquiries that cognition of human cooperation
> is attained and social action is treated as a special case of the more
> universal category of human action as such.
While this is absolutely and importantly correct, unfortunately,
Mises' opening short axiomatic statement is greatly weakened by the
fact that Mises himself and all others with the Austrian school (as
far as I am aware) did not *develop and extend* praxeology into any
area *except* that "special case" relating to the interactions of
humans. The best known modern applications of methodological
individualism (but not really of praxeology) toward human behavior
is to be found in the writings of Ayn Rand and in the psychological
writings of Nathaniel Branden. More recently, and not yet discovered
by most, is my own more foundational application of praxeological
methodology towards individual human action (see my basis of that
development starting at: "Social Meta-Needs: A New Basis for Optimal
Interaction" http://selfsip.org/fundamentals/socialmetaneeds.html).
> This methodological individualism has been vehemently attacked by
> various metaphysical schools and disparaged as a nominalistic fallacy.
> The notion of an individual, say the critics, is an empty abstraction.
> Real man is necessarily always a member of a social whole. It is even
> impossible to imagine the existence of a man separated from the rest of
> mankind and not connected with society. Man as man is the product of a
> social evolution. His most eminent feature, reason, could only emerge
> within the framework of social mutuality. There is no thinking which
> does not depend on the concepts and notions of language. But speech is
> manifestly a social phenomenon. Man is always the member of a
> collective. As the whole is both logically and temporally prior to its
> parts or members, the study of the individual is posterior to the study
> of society. The only adequate method for the scientific treatment of
> human problems is the method of universalism or collectivism.
These kinds of hyperbole by Mises (frequently used) in attacking the
most extreme statements of his opposition are, unfortunately, flawed
by a kind of straw man approach. There are many intelligent critics
of free market economics who do not hold such extreme collectivist
notions. By taking such an approach, Mises fails to address (and
thereby misses any chance for his own additional insight and
development) any of the valid germs of dissatisfaction of highly
intelligent well-meaning individuals who have a sense (correctly)
that even if government interference were totally abolished there
would still be something "unjust" about some of the methods of
operation of the economic system that Mises (and all other
Austrians) maintains follows logically from praxeological thinking
and, furthermore, appears to maintain are the *optimal* methods of
human interaction (optimal by what definition, I do not know).
> Now the controversy whether the whole or its parts are logically
> prior is vain. Logically the notions of a whole and its parts are
> correlative. As logical concepts they are both apart from time.
Here Mises shows his apparent lack of understanding of logic itself!
The notion of coming *logically first* bears no relationship to
being prior in any time sense. It is merely related to the natural
hierarchy of levels of being, which can be thought of as being
described by the word/prefix "meta". Furthermore, by using the term
"parts" rather then "members" Mises confuses the logically different
situation where some existing thing can be considered to be composed
of parts (portions of the whole which at least have some similar
properties) that are also existents. Whereas, a collection or set of
individuals or members has none of the properties of its members
(which may or may not be themselves existents) most importantly
because the collective does not lie within the same meta-reality
level as does its members. See the beginning section of definitions
within http://selfsip.org/solutions/NSC.html and its annotation for
more details on this important point.
> No less inappropriate with regard to our problem is the reference to
> the antagonism of realism and nominalism, both these terms being
> understood in the meaning which medieval scholasticism attached to them.
> It is uncontested that in the sphere of human action social entities
> have real existence.
No! This is a fatally flawed statement that effectively supplies to
his opposition the basis by which they can ultimately ridicule and
dominate him. The error that Mises makes here is to apparently be
unaware of the fundamental logical difference in *level* between an
existent and its referent, a simple example being the difference
between a thing and its name or between a number and a numeral
(although this last is actually more complex because a number is
already not an existent, but rather a category of existents in
meta-reality level 1 - which places a numeral one higher still).
"Social entities" are profoundly *not* existents of reality. They
have no attributes of anything in reality, most certainly not any
attributes of their human members. Rather, social entities are a
subclass of "systems": Information that consists of a Category of
Material Existents plus a set of processes between the Members of
that Category, which Processes form InterRelationships between sets
of Attributes of the Members of the Category (ibid). (Note that all
capitalized words are technical terms explicitly defined in the
previously given referenced link.) "Social entities" are nothing
outside of the actions and interactions of their individual members
(as Mises states later in contradiction to the above).
> Nobody ventures to deny that nations, states, municipalities,
> parties, religious communities, are real factors determining the course
> of human events.
Here Mises confuses the effects of the multiple cooperative actions
of individuals with the logically impossible notion that entities in
a higher level meta-reality may have direct effects on entities in a
lower one. Higher level meta-realities must always be understood as
mere organizing tools for human thinking and never as holding real
existents with cause and effect relationships on the only true
reality (meta-reality zero in my philosophical system).
> Methodological individualism, far from contesting the significanceof
> such collective wholes,
But "collective wholes" *should* be contested, not merely for their
significance but for their very existence! Giving away this
fundamental point causes major inconsistencies right from the start
and is one of the primary reasons for Mises' ideas suffering from a
lack of acceptance by so many intelligent humans, sincerely and
forthrightly seeking a better society.
> considers it as one of its main tasks to describe and to analyze
> their becoming and their disappearing, their changing structures, and
> their operation. And it chooses the only method fitted to solve this
> problem satisfactorily.
This is simply false. Collective wholes are not any necessary part
of a complete and consistent methodological individualism.
Collective wholes do not "become, disappear, change their structures
and their operation". Only individual actions cause these changes
and not to any real existent but merely each to hir own mental
constructs which s/he refers to as such collective wholes with
various names.
> The hangman, not the state, executes a criminal. It is the meaning of
> those concerned that discerns in the hangman's action an action of the
> state.
Absolutely correct! if for no other reason than that there is no
such existing entity as "the state" that can pull the necessary
lever (or have *any* affect on reality, for that matter). Mises
again fails to see the essential need to go further and emphasize
more directly that such "discerning" is logically flawed, since "the
state" being merely a human construct, does not exist in directly
causal human reality, ie. on the same level of existence as do all
other things that can have a direct causal effect on humans, but
rather "exists" (if one wishes to use that word at all) in a higher
meta-reality of human thought.
> First we must realize that all actions are performed by individuals.
> A collective operates always through the intermediary of one or several
> individuals whose actions are related to the collective as the secondary
> source. It is the meaning which the acting individuals and all those who
> are touched by their action attribute to an action, that determines its
> character. It is the meaning that marks one action as the action of an
> individual and another action as the action of the state or of the
> municipality. The hangman, not the state, executes a criminal. It is the
> meaning of those concerned that discerns in the hangman's action an
> action of the state. A group of armed men occupies a place. It is the
> meaning of those concerned which imputes this occupation not to the
> officers and soldiers on the spot, but to their nation.
Once again Mises starts a paragraph very strongly and axiomatically,
but then immediately proceeds to compromise and destroy the very
axiom that he stated so clearly! A collective does not "operate(s)
always through the intermediary of one or several individuals";
rather, a collective does not *operate* at all. No collective can
emote, think or act in any manner as an individual human emotes,
thinks and acts. As Mises himself stated (and promptly then forgot),
"all actions are performed by individuals" - and it should be clear
that emoting and thinking are types (subcategories) of action.
> If we scrutinize the meaning of the various actions performed by
> individuals we must necessarily learn everything about the actions of
> collective wholes. For a social collective has no existence and reality
> outside of the individual members' actions.
Once again Mises confuses the clear, black and white logic involved
in any truly consistent application of methodological individualism.
Scrutinizing the actions of individuals will help one to determine
the total effects of many individuals acting together. However that
is not the same as any possible action of a "collective whole",
precisely because collections of humans do not exist as entities in
human reality (as Mises then states - "a social collective has no
existence and reality", but again compromises with the exception
"outside of the individual members' actions").
> The life of a collective is lived in the actions of the individuals
> constituting its body.
Now this is really bad! To even use the word "life" for a collective
is immediately compromising the position of strong methodological
individualism and giving heavy ammunition to his opponents.
Furthermore, in no manner are individual humans to be correctly
thought of as parts of the "body" of a collective! - not even as
much as ants are part of the "body" of the colony. Furthermore, if
humans really are to be thought of as parts of the body of society,
then those who want to direct parts of that body, of which there are
also other parts, are entirely correct in this desire just as I
would be correct in wanting to direct my digestive system to better
serve my brain.
> There is no social collective conceivable which is not operative in
> the actions of some individuals. The reality of a social integer
> consists in its directing and releasing definite actions on the part of
> individuals. Thus the way to a cognition of collective wholes is through
> an analysis of the individuals' actions.
This confuses the whole issue by logically "putting the cart before
the horse". Rather what needs to be done is to simply analyze the
sum of the effects of individuals, relegating the notion of any
collection of which they are members to its purely organizational
role in human thought. Any notion such as a "social integer" makes
things even worse by confounding two ideas (integer and social
interaction) which have no possible relationship to each other. As
for cognition (understanding) of "collective wholes", since these do
not exist in reality, this can only be done within the
organizational structure of human thought and description as a
meta-reality and any such understanding can only have effects within
that meta-reality. In particular, there is no possibility of
"collective wholes" being able to "direct and release definite
actions on the part of individuals". All that is possible is that
some individuals' actions may effect the direction and release of
the actions of other individuals.
> As a thinking and acting being, man emerges from his prehuman
> existence already as a social being. The evolution of reason, language,
> and cooperation is the outcome of the same process; they were
> inseparably and necessarily linked together.
This is a very confused and misleading way to look at evolution, as
if something called "man" was there in existence all the time and
slowly changed its characteristics over the eons of time. Instead,
it is imperative to correct thinking to both fully understand and
hold to the facts of reality, that all lifeforms are individual
entities with limited lifetimes, with only the *species germline* so
far continuing to exist and to evolve (in the technical Darwinian
sense) so that it is distinct within each new representative of it
and brings new characteristics (and loses some also) to that
representative not previously held by older ones now non-existent
(dead) or soon to be. Some of such genetically caused phenotypic
change has definitely been instrumental in enhanced reasoning,
language and likely as well, cooperative capabilities. However,
quite distinct from this Darwinian evolution is the alteration and
enhancement of reason, language and cooperation that has been
invented, created, discovered and learned by one generation, and
then passed on to the next - the ancestral wisdom which has resulted
in the accumulating capital assets of information, which most people
virtually ignore, not realizing that it is by far the largest
capital resource available today.
> But this process took place in individuals. It consisted in changes
> in the behavior of individuals. There is no other substance in which it
> occurred than the individuals. There is no substratum of society other
> than the actions of individuals.
Again the rhetoric is confusing. There are two separate parts of
what took place. First, each new individual was a new representative
of an evolving germline that expressed itself in hir with phenotypic
characteristics altered in some ways from previous representatives.
Second and very different, each new representative had the ability
to gain from the accumulated wisdom of hir ancestors, but also had
the phenotypically expressed ability to analyze and discover new
information, which s/he could then pass on to the next germline
representatives. Yes, no part of these effects were caused by
anything called society, they were all caused by the complex
combinatory effects of evolving germlines and the ability of
individuals to pass on information to later living humans (whether
germline descendants or not).
> That there are nations, states, and churches,
Once again, in reality such things do not exist (of course,
churches, as *buildings* certainly do). Rather they are mere
constructs of human thought, highly useful as a mental organizing tools.
> that there is social cooperation under the division of labor, becomes
> discernible only in the actions of certain individuals.
Exactly! And such social cooperation must be seen as nothing more
than the organized and ordered interactions of individuals.
> Nobody ever perceived a nation without perceiving its members.
I have news for Misesians (since Mises is no longer able to receive
my news) - "nobody ever perceived a nation" *period*. There is no
such entity in reality as a "nation" that is capable of being
*perceived* in any manner similar to which one perceives any
existent of reality. If an ET arrived on Earth and you said "look,
there is a nation" (or a corporation, for that matter), he would
strive to "see" it, would be baffled and then would begin to
seriously doubt your credibility.
> In this sense one may say that a social collective comes into being
> through the actions of individuals.
Of course one *can* say anything (and even "may" in a truly free
society), but actually stating any such thing would be a grave
philosophical flaw and would immediate compromise any defense of
methodological individualism.
> That does not mean that the individual is temporally antecedent. It
> merely means that definite actions of individuals constitute the
> collective.
Nonsense and horrible confusion! There are merely the total and
cumulative results of the actions of many individuals, nothing more.
> There is no need to argue whether a collective is the sum resulting
> from the addition of its elements or more,
It is not any such thing because its members are not a *part* of it,
but rather merely elements of a system, which system resides in a
higher level meta-reality, merely used by human minds for
organizational purposes. The sum resulting from the individual
actions of such elements of any system is simply another effect
within reality stronger than would be the effect from any one
individual.
> whether it is a being /sui generis/, and whether it is reasonable or
> not to speak of its will, plans, aims, and actions and to attribute to
> it a distinct "soul."
Definitely not any of these.
> Such pedantic talk is idle. A collective whole is a particular aspect
> of the actions of various individuals and as such a real thing
> determining the course of events.
Absolutely not! Such talk is not only not mere idle pedantry, but it
is *essential* to distinguish just exactly about which one is
dealing in reality. And to agree even that a "collective whole" is
"a real thing determining the course of events" is to so totally
compromise the approach of methodological individualism that I am
left to wonder why Mises retains so many followers and idolizers,
who appear, for whatever reasons, to have refrained from any
critical analysis of his writings.
> It is illusory to believe that it is possible to visualize collective
> wholes. They are never visible; their cognition is always the outcome of
> the understanding of the meaning which acting men attribute to their
> acts. We can see a crowd, i.e., a multitude of people. Whether this
> crowd is a mere gathering or a mass (in the sense in which this term is
> used in contemporary psychology) or an organized body or any other kind
> of social entity is a question which can only be answered by
> understanding the meaning which they themselves attach to their
> presence. And this meaning is always the meaning of individuals. Not our
> senses, but understanding, a mental process, makes us recognize social
> entities.
Well I must admit, Mises tried very hard here to reach some level of
consistency, but still he confusingly failed. Why could he not see
that if "collective wholes" cannot be seen or otherwise detected
directly by the human senses, as can all other existents of reality,
then they simply do not exist in reality? I think that this was
perhaps because of a weak and non-understanding background in
epistemology, symbolic logic and foundations of mathematics. And why
did Mises not see that it is not "the meaning which they themselves
attach to their presence" that constitutes anything real about a
group of people, but rather the results of the totality of their
actions? Meanings, intentions, and even choices have no effect on
reality, only actions do.
> Those who want to start the study of human action from the collective
> units encounter an insurmountable obstacle in the fact that an
> individual at the same time can belong and - with the exception of the
> most primitive tribesmen - really belongs to various collective
> entities.
Unfortunately as well as not understanding the logical basis of
members and collections, Mises shows little knowledge of
anthropology, since past representatives of the human germline have
always lived and operated within social groupings, in general; the
more primitive the more they did so, because of survival need if
nothing else.
> The problems raised by the multiplicity of coexisting social units
> and their mutual antagonisms can be solved only by methodological
> individualism.
This misstates the nature of the problems of current society, which
is *not* related to "the multiplicity of coexisting social units and
their mutual antagonisms" but rather to the multiplicity of
subjective desires of individual humans and the mistaken view of
most such humans that the satisfaction of these desires necessarily
involves conflict with other humans. Furthermore by speaking of
"social units", Mises fosters the groupist thinking of "us and them"
that methodological individualism seeks to dispel and to eliminate.
> The /Ego/ is the unity of the acting being. It is unquestionably
> given and cannot be dissolved or conjured away by any reasoning or
> quibbling.
Even more strongly and clearly, there is simply no other possible
form of human action except that by individuals. All strengthening
of such actions is merely the resultant effect of more than one
individual acting in the same direction.
> The /We/ is always the result of a summing up which puts together two
> or more /Egos/. If somebody says /I/, no further questioning is
> necessary in order to establish the meaning. The same is valid with
> regard to the /Thou/ and, provided the person in view is precisely
> indicated, with regard to the /He/. But if a man says /We/, further
> information is needed to denote who the Egos are who are comprised in
> this /We/. It is always single individuals who say /We/; even if they
> say it in chorus, it yet remains an utterance of single individuals.
These are highly significant observations of Mises. I said much the
same, but even more strongly, in my essay: "Collectivism in
Language: Its Effects on Valid Reasoning" at:
http://selfsip.org/fundamentals/we.html
> The /We/ cannot act otherwise than each of them acting on his own
> behalf.
And it is extremely important to realize that this implies the same
for thinking, emoting, desiring, etc, which are all types of
*action*, even if only internal to the mind itself.
> They can either all act together in accord, or one of them may act
> for them all. In the latter case the cooperation of the others consists
> in their bringing about the situation which makes one man's action
> effective for them too.
And fundamental to this is that there are clearly precise
instructions and limited permission given by the non-actors to the
one acting for them, otherwise s/he ceases to be the effective agent
in action of any of those who would not hirself take that exact same
action.
> Only in this sense does the officer of a social entity act for the
> whole; the individual members of the collective body either cause or
> allow a single man's action to concern them too.
The first part is again a major confusion. An officer of a society
does not act for the society as a whole (no such entity exists in
reality), but rather s/he is the agent in action of some members of
the society - those that agree with hir actions. Some may choose to
accept that the officer is acting in their behalf even when they do
not agree with hir specific actions, but that is their own problem
of inconsistency - it is not part of the nature of joint action
through a representative agent.
> The endeavors of psychology to dissolve the /Ego/ and to
> unmask it as an illusion are idle. The praxeological /Ego/ is beyond any
> doubts. No matter what a man was and what he may become later, in the
> very act of choosing and acting he is an /Ego/.
Again Mises makes exaggerated references, this time to a
"villainous" psychology, appearing to tar all of psychology and
psychologists with one brush. Even stronger than his last statement,
during any part of hir existence a human cannot act in any other
manner than solely as an Ego.
> From the /pluralis logicus/ (and from the merely ceremonial /pluralis
> majestaticus/) we must distinguish the /pluralis gloriosus/. If a
> Canadian who never tried skating says, "We are the world's foremost ice
> hockey players," or if an Italian boor proudly contends, "We are the
> world's most eminent painters," nobody is fooled. But with reference to
> political and economic problems the /pluralis gloriosus/ evolves into
> the /pluralis imperialis/ and as such plays a significant role in paving
> the way for the acceptance of doctrines determining international
> economic policies.
Mises is to be commended here by his rejection of the "/pluralis
gloriosus/" form. However, he appears to miss the fact that the
"/pluralis logicus/" form is, in fact, not logical at all (no
"combination of persons ... have a logical identity") unless there is
first a clear definition of exactly which individuals are to be
included in the "we", and secondly the "we" does not relate to any
action that only one person can possibly perform, such as thinking,
emoting and subjective value determination. And that the "/pluralis
gloriosus/" is more and more *not* being seen as foolish by everyone
even about non-political and economic matters, but instead is fully
accepted as meaningful. Together with another usage, the
"condescending we", used by so many writers and speakers to cast
their image as being at one with the readers/listeners in having all
their same foibles, these usages have pervasive negative effects on
the thinking and actions of many otherwise intelligent people in
current society. And then there is also the imperative replacement
form of we as in: "let's go do that", "we should send troops to
Iraq", "we must terminate the war on drugs", etc.
In summary, while I am the first to agree that Mises was a
significant thinker, writer and a very honorable man to whom we all
owe an enormous debt of gratitude, I also refuse to accept him as a
"saint" (or anyone else) whose works cannot and should not be
analyzed critically. For if one does not analyze critically and
learn to do better from such analysis, then one is bound to both
repeat the mistakes of the past and to be an easy mark for those
whose thinking is grossly and incorrectly opposed. Although I met
him once (unfortunately before I knew much economics or philosophy)
I cannot be sure, but I sincerely hope that were he alive today,
Mises would agree.
--Paul Wakfer
MoreLife for the rational - http://morelife.org
Reality based tools for more life in quantity and quality
The Self-Sovereign Individual Project - http://selfsip.org
Self-sovereignty, rational pursuit of optimal lifetime happiness,
individual responsibility, social preferencing & social contracting
François Rose
This is the first part of my reply (the original post is very lengthy
and the ideas displayed in it are a bit difficult to understand,
especially in a non native language).
Though it was difficult and took time, I've found that the reading was
really worth it.
I've used exemplifying in order to show if my understanding of these
concepts was correct or not.
> From: Paul Wakfer <p...@morelife.org>
> Mises.org often posts parts of Ludwig von Mises writings
<snip>
> The full article is at:http://mises.org/daily/3409
> And my full comment
> is also below.
<snip>
understand it:
when I want to understand WWII , I can't name all the persons involved
so I have to use or create and name groups (e.g. the Axis, the Allied,
the French collaborationnistes, the French resisters,...)
E.g.in history, entities are organizing tools for human thinking
Now you also claim that they are only that and that they don't have
real cause and effect relationships on reality.
>
> > Methodological individualism, far from contesting the significanceof
> > such collective wholes,
>
> But "collective wholes" *should* be contested, not merely for their
> significance but for their very existence!
>Giving away this
> fundamental point causes major inconsistencies right from the start
> and is one of the primary reasons for Mises' ideas suffering from a
> lack of acceptance by so many intelligent humans, sincerely and
> forthrightly seeking a better society.
>
> > considers it as one of its main tasks to describe and to analyze
> > their becoming and their disappearing, their changing structures, and
> > their operation. And it chooses the only method fitted to solve this
> > problem satisfactorily.
>
> This is simply false. Collective wholes are not any necessary part
> of a complete and consistent methodological individualism.
> Collective wholes do not "become, disappear, change their structures
> and their operation". Only individual actions cause these changes
> and not to any real existent but merely each to hir own mental
> constructs which s/he refers to as such collective wholes with
> various names.
we have used collective wholes as mental tools (in order to understand
or have a collective action ...) and we have given them the attribute
of something living, autonomous (BTW, you exactly deplore that,
below).
>
> > The hangman, not the state, executes a criminal. It is the meaning of
> > those concerned that discerns in the hangman's action an action of the
> > state.
>
> Absolutely correct! if for no other reason than that there is no
> such existing entity as "the state" that can pull the necessary
> lever (or have *any* affect on reality, for that matter). Mises
> again fails to see the essential need to go further and emphasize
> more directly that such "discerning" is logically flawed, since "the
> state" being merely a human construct, does not exist in directly
> causal human reality, ie. on the same level of existence as do all
> other things that can have a direct causal effect on humans, but
> rather "exists" (if one wishes to use that word at all) in a higher
> meta-reality of human thought.
another one hired and the criminal will be hunged. So behind the
hangman, there is a mental organization spread in some minds, there is
an organization of the society ( production, trade, services,
education,..) that consequences that the hangman will probably be
replaced if he quits.
So does the hangman kills the criminal? Yes, ultimately but at the end
of a process. This process is named "state" . You claim that the
"state" doesn't have an action by itself but it is merely the mental
constructs in all the persons.
What you say here is backup by revolutions: e.g. in France , the power
in 1789 were overthrown so this power didn't exist really; it only
existed because some people made it exists (it is problably awkwardly
expressed).
> > First we must realize that all actions are performed by individuals.
> > A collective operates always through the intermediary of one or several
> > individuals whose actions are related to the collective as the secondary
> > source. It is the meaning which the acting individuals and all those who
> > are touched by their action attribute to an action, that determines its
> > character. It is the meaning that marks one action as the action of an
> > individual and another action as the action of the state or of the
> > municipality. The hangman, not the state, executes a criminal. It is the
> > meaning of those concerned that discerns in the hangman's action an
> > action of the state. A group of armed men occupies a place. It is the
> > meaning of those concerned which imputes this occupation not to the
> > officers and soldiers on the spot, but to their nation.
policemen that rally to demonstrators. But these events are rare and
there is often a silent and non acting majority
they appear in the end (in what I snipped and didn't read yet).
>Furthermore, if
> humans really are to be thought of as parts of the body of society,
> then those who want to direct parts of that body, of which there are
> also other parts, are entirely correct in this desire just as I
> would be correct in wanting to direct my digestive system to better
> serve my brain.
>
> > There is no social collective conceivable which is not operative in
> > the actions of some individuals. The reality of a social integer
> > consists in its directing and releasing definite actions on the part of
> > individuals. Thus the way to a cognition of collective wholes is through
> > an analysis of the individuals' actions.
>
> This confuses the whole issue by logically "putting the cart before
> the horse".
>
> > But this process took place in individuals. It consisted in changes
> > in the behavior of individuals. There is no other substance in which it
> > occurred than the individuals. There is no substratum of society other
> > than the actions of individuals.
>
> Again the rhetoric is confusing. There are two separate parts of
> what took place. First, each new individual was a new representative
> of an evolving germline that expressed itself in hir with phenotypic
> characteristics altered in some ways from previous representatives.
> Second and very different, each new representative had the ability
> to gain from the accumulated wisdom of hir ancestors, but also had
> the phenotypically expressed ability to analyze and discover new
> information, which s/he could then pass on to the next germline
> representatives.
expressed or not is even more important.
>Yes, no part of these effects were caused by
> anything called society, they were all caused by the complex
> combinatory effects of evolving germlines and the ability of
> individuals to pass on information to later living humans (whether
> germline descendants or not).
>
> > That there are nations, states, and churches,
>
> Once again, in reality such things do not exist (of course,
> churches, as *buildings* certainly do). Rather they are mere
> constructs of human thought, highly useful as a mental organizing tools.
>
> > that there is social cooperation under the division of labor, becomes
> > discernible only in the actions of certain individuals.
>
> Exactly! And such social cooperation must be seen as nothing more
> than the organized and ordered interactions of individuals.
>
unions (of course, in this sentence, I'm still talking as if unions
were beings). It is merely the result of the lack of investment of the
french teachers in this kind of action and probably that they think
that unions are a less efficient tool than it was.
> > Nobody ever perceived a nation without perceiving its members.
>
> I have news for Misesians (since Mises is no longer able to receive
> my news) - "nobody ever perceived a nation" *period*.
(little joke)
And to agree even that a "collective whole" is
> "a real thing determining the course of events" is to so totally
> compromise the approach of methodological individualism that I am
> left to wonder why Mises retains so many followers and idolizers,
> who appear, for whatever reasons, to have refrained from any
> critical analysis of his writings.
>
François ROSE
> --Paul Wakfer
>
> MoreLife for the rational -http://morelife.org
> individual responsibility, social preferencing & social contracting
>
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Group "Libertarian Critique".
To post (approval and full identification required): send email to libertaria...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe: send email to libertarian-crit...@googlegroups.com
More options at: http://groups.google.com/group/libertarian-critique?hl=en
Paul Wakfer
> This is the first part of my reply (the original post is very lengthy
> and the ideas displayed in it are a bit difficult to understand,
> especially in a non native language).
> Though it was difficult and took time, I've found that the reading was
> really worth it.
> I've used exemplifying in order to show if my understanding of these
> concepts was correct or not.
I found your use of "exemplifying" to be interesting. I did not
initially think it to be correct (although I understood what you were
meaning), until I looked up "exemplify" in the dictionary and found that
its meaning ("to show or illustrate by example") was much broader than I
had realized. The dictionary contains no word "exemplifying", but that
does not mean that such a word is not totally reasonable as a logically
sound language extension. Thanks for using it.
/meta
categorizations (also called interchangeably "classifications") are
human constructs. In particular, not all those within such
categorizations are equivalent in thinking and in actions. There are as
many variants of such thinking and actions within each category as there
are individual people in that category, and some of these variants are
highly different from others within the same category. In fact, it is
often not clear for many individuals, into which category each should be
put. This is more or less difficult depending on the clarity of the
category definition given. For example it is pretty clear into which
sexual category, male or female, each human should be put, but even
there it is not totally clear for every human being.
> Now you also claim that they are only that and that they don't have
> real cause and effect relationships on reality.
have fully agreed with that statement, even though he sometimes
unwittingly contradicted it. My concepts of reality and successive
levels of meta-reality is again a human construct the purpose of which
is to help keep everything straight by organizing human constructs. This
is the only way that I can see of avoiding such logical paradoxes as
have been put forth by philosophers and are unavoidable in several areas
of mathematics as currently formulated.
>> > Methodological individualism, far from contesting the significanceof
>> > such collective wholes,
>>
>> But "collective wholes" *should* be contested, not merely for their
>> significance but for their very existence!
>>
> This is a huge change of point of view.
or otherwise sense "the French"? No. All that you can do is sense
individuals who are classified as French either by themselves or others.
>> Giving away this
>> fundamental point causes major inconsistencies right from the start
>> and is one of the primary reasons for Mises' ideas suffering from a
>> lack of acceptance by so many intelligent humans, sincerely and
>> forthrightly seeking a better society.
>>
>> > considers it as one of its main tasks to describe and to analyze
>> > their becoming and their disappearing, their changing structures, and
>> > their operation. And it chooses the only method fitted to solve this
>> > problem satisfactorily.
>>
>> This is simply false. Collective wholes are not any necessary part
>> of a complete and consistent methodological individualism.
>> Collective wholes do not "become, disappear, change their structures
>> and their operation". Only individual actions cause these changes
>> and not to any real existent but merely each to hir own mental
>> constructs which s/he refers to as such collective wholes with
>> various names.
>>
> Okay; I think I got your point:
> we have used collective wholes as mental tools (in order to understand
> or have a collective action ...) and we have given them the attribute
> of something living, autonomous (BTW, you exactly deplore that,
> below).
is if the individuals within them change their attributes yet still
maintain the attribute(s) which initially defined them as members of the
category. This has happened throughout history. For example a political
liberal today has social/political characteristics extremely different
from a liberal of 1850 (who were much closer to today's libertarians),
some of the characteristics being completely opposite.
>> > The hangman, not the state, executes a criminal. It is the meaning of
>> > those concerned that discerns in the hangman's action an action of the
>> > state.
>>
>> Absolutely correct! if for no other reason than that there is no
>> such existing entity as "the state" that can pull the necessary
>> lever (or have *any* affect on reality, for that matter). Mises
>> again fails to see the essential need to go further and emphasize
>> more directly that such "discerning" is logically flawed, since "the
>> state" being merely a human construct, does not exist in directly
>> causal human reality, ie. on the same level of existence as do all
>> other things that can have a direct causal effect on humans, but
>> rather "exists" (if one wishes to use that word at all) in a higher
>> meta-reality of human thought.
>>
> So who hang the criminal? If the hangman quit, there will mostly be
> another one hired and the criminal will be hunged.
refuse to take the job no matter how much the pay.
> So behind the
> hangman, there is a mental organization spread in some minds, there is
> an organization of the society ( production, trade, services,
> education,..) that consequences that the hangman will probably be
> replaced if he quits.
the effects of individual actions. If no one will provide the money to
pay the hangman, then it is unlikely that anyone will agree to act as a
hangman. Even more if no one will agree to act as an enforcer to force
the person about to be hanged to come to the hanging, then the hangman
will be impotent.
> So does the hangman kills the criminal? Yes, ultimately but at the end
> of a process.
by someone else, thereby having hir choices so altered that s/he is
convinced that if s/he does not act as hangman, s/he will hirself be killed.
> This process is named "state".
the NSC for definitions.
> You claim that the
> "state" doesn't have an action by itself but it is merely the mental
> constructs in all the persons.
not identical for all those thinking about it.
All actions related to the state are only those of individual members of
the state.
> What you say here is backup by revolutions: e.g. in France , the power
> in 1789 were overthrown so this power didn't exist really; it only
> existed because some people made it exists (it is problably awkwardly
> expressed).
individuals sanctioned his power and acted to effect his power. Just as
now the power of the state only exists because some people agree to be
enforcers of its laws, rules and regulations.
>> > First we must realize that all actions are performed by individuals.
>> > A collective operates always through the intermediary of one or several
>> > individuals whose actions are related to the collective as the secondary
>> > source. It is the meaning which the acting individuals and all those who
>> > are touched by their action attribute to an action, that determines its
>> > character. It is the meaning that marks one action as the action of an
>> > individual and another action as the action of the state or of the
>> > municipality. The hangman, not the state, executes a criminal. It is the
>> > meaning of those concerned that discerns in the hangman's action an
>> > action of the state. A group of armed men occupies a place. It is the
>> > meaning of those concerned which imputes this occupation not to the
>> > officers and soldiers on the spot, but to their nation.
>
> It is backup by mouvements like civil disobedience or soldiers/
> policemen that rally to demonstrators. But these events are rare and
> there is often a silent and non acting majority
that the harmful actions are always effected by a small minority.
of a body. The elements of a set are all individuals with simply a
certain common characteristic which defines them to be elements of the
set. Whereas the parts of a body are an integrated whole intimately
working together to make the body act as one entity which is greater and
different than any of its parts. For the first, take that collection of
all red things (with red adequately defined so that what is in or not in
the collection is totally clear (light frequencies would accomplish
that). For the second, take the human body with all its various parts.
These could be looked upon as members of the collection of human body
parts, but when integrated and connected together they are much more
than that. In fact, the attributes of the resultant human being
*emerges* precisely from that integrated organized connection of the parts.
convinced that I have many such writing gems, but it seems that very few
people ever read them let alone appreciate them as you have. The
Internet has become such a "crowded place" that I find it impossible to
get my work read except by insignificant numbers of people.
organizing tool for achievement of the coordinating and persuasive
interactions necessary to get its individual members to each effectively
act. In other cases, such an organizing tool has achieved the purposes
of the organizers, but IMO, this has generally been due to special
privileges being granted by governments.
>> > Nobody ever perceived a nation without perceiving its members.
>>
>> I have news for Misesians (since Mises is no longer able to receive
>> my news) - "nobody ever perceived a nation" *period*.
>
> Laugh. Thanks a lot for this message; maybe you'll have to air it
> (little joke)
up the definition of "perceive" ("to become aware of through the
senses"), since "a nation" is not an existent of reality, but only a
human meta-reality mental construct. To understand this better, perhaps
is will help to think of a non-human lifeform trying to detect "a
nation" by means of its senses. Even if it perceived all the members of
a nation, it would still not perceive "the nation" as anything separate
and distinct.
>> There is no
>> such entity in reality as a "nation" that is capable of being
>> *perceived* in any manner similar to which one perceives any
>> existent of reality. If an ET arrived on Earth and you said "look,
>> there is a nation" (or a corporation, for that matter), he would
>> strive to "see" it, would be baffled and then would begin to
>> seriously doubt your credibility.
--Paul
François Rose
Le 20/04/2010 14:57, F. Rose a écrit :
> Mises.org often posts parts of Ludwig von Mises writings
<snip>
> The full article is at:http://mises.org/daily/3409
> And my full comment
> at:http://blog.mises.org/9840/the-principle-of-methodological-individual...
> is also below.
<snip>
>
> > wholes. They are never visible; their cognition is always the outcome of
> > the understanding of the meaning which acting men attribute to their
> > acts. We can see a crowd, i.e., a multitude of people. Whether this
> > crowd is a mere gathering or a mass (in the sense in which this term is
> > used in contemporary psychology) or an organized body or any other kind
> > of social entity is a question which can only be answered by
> > understanding the meaning which they themselves attach to their
> > presence. And this meaning is always the meaning of individuals. Not our
> > senses, but understanding, a mental process, makes us recognize social
> > entities.
>
> Well I must admit, Mises tried very hard here to reach some level of
> consistency, but still he confusingly failed. Why could he not see
> that if "collective wholes" cannot be seen or otherwise detected
> directly by the human senses, as can all other existents of reality,
> then they simply do not exist in reality? I think that this was
> perhaps because of a weak and non-understanding background in
> epistemology, symbolic logic and foundations of mathematics. And why
> did Mises not see that it is not "the meaning which they themselves
> attach to their presence" that constitutes anything real about a
> group of people, but rather the results of the totality of their
> actions? Meanings, intentions, and even choices have no effect on
> reality, only actions do.
Anger can cause heart attack.
Thoughts can modify one's life: happiness is an emotion and it has
effects on reality, at least one's reality.
I remember I've read this on your site that the feeling of well being
is a marker of future survival
from http://morelife.org/lifequal/life_outlook/index.html in the
"Related links" page :
"Attitudes: Key to Health, Happiness & Longevity " leading to this
site http://www.attitudefactor.com/
(read my other remark below)
your reading of this article of Mises that we are talking about ?
>
> > The /We/ cannot act otherwise than each of them acting on his own
> > behalf.
>
> And it is extremely important to realize that this implies the same
> for thinking, emoting, desiring, etc, which are all types of
> *action*, even if only internal to the mind itself.
to the mind itself but have consequences on the body.
I'm thinking a lot about the mind-body connection
It is amazing the way a human being is built up.
For instance, neurons are the only cells that don't multiply (except
some neurons involved in memory, if I'm correct). So what is the point
here: is nature so stupid ? (to say it without personification, how
evolution acts here ?) the most precious cells in the body and they
can't be replaced ?
Recent searches show that the human system is even better than that:
neurons can be reprogrammed ; if they once were used to tactiles
tasks, they can be allocated to visual tasks. It is the "cortex pré
frontal" (in french) that seems to allocates the neurons and build the
structures in the other parts of the cortex.
Regarding the distinction between mind and body, I find it more and
more difficult since they seems to be deeply connected and
interrelated (through different systems: emotions connected to
hormons, muscles connected to hormons, neurons connected to muscles
and to hormons,.....).
I now think that childhood is a sort of calibration of the body by the
"cortex pré frontal" by multiple attempts and feedback loops; the
other parts of the brain helping and unburdening the "cortex pré
frontal" by serving as memories and coprocessing.
> > the /pluralis imperialis/ and as such plays a significant role in paving
> > the way for the acceptance of doctrines determining international
> > economic policies.
>
> Mises is to be commended here by his rejection of the "/pluralis
> gloriosus/" form. However, he appears to miss the fact that the
> "/pluralis logicus/" form is, in fact, not logical at all (no
> "combination of persons ... have a logical identity") unless there is
> first a clear definition of exactly which individuals are to be
> included in the "we", and secondly the "we" does not relate to any
> action that only one person can possibly perform, such as thinking,
> emoting and subjective value determination. And that the "/pluralis
> gloriosus/" is more and more *not* being seen as foolish by everyone
> even about non-political and economic matters, but instead is fully
> accepted as meaningful. Together with another usage, the
> "condescending we", used by so many writers and speakers to cast
> their image as being at one with the readers/listeners in having all
> their same foibles, these usages have pervasive negative effects on
> the thinking and actions of many otherwise intelligent people in
> current society.
> And then there is also the imperative replacement
> form of we as in: "let's go do that", "we should send troops to
> Iraq", "we must terminate the war on drugs", etc.
François Rose
>
> In summary, while I am the first to agree that Mises was a
> significant thinker, writer and a very honorable man to whom we all
> owe an enormous debt of gratitude, I also refuse to accept him as a
> "saint" (or anyone else) whose works cannot and should not be
> analyzed critically. For if one does not analyze critically and
> learn to do better from such analysis, then one is bound to both
> repeat the mistakes of the past and to be an easy mark for those
> whose thinking is grossly and incorrectly opposed. Although I met
> him once (unfortunately before I knew much economics or philosophy)
> I cannot be sure, but I sincerely hope that were he alive today,
> Mises would agree.
>
>
> MoreLife for the rational -http://morelife.org
> Reality based tools for more life in quantity and quality
> The Self-Sovereign Individual Project -http://selfsip.org
> Self-sovereignty, rational pursuit of optimal lifetime happiness,
> individual responsibility, social preferencing & social contracting
Paul Wakfer
and carefully analyzing what I write.
My own full analysis of my original remarks and François' critique of
them are below.
Francois Rose wrote:
> Reply part II
>
You are quite correct, but my use of "actions" above was meant to refer
only to Social InterActions, rather than to the Inward Actions of a
human individual which have effects on hirself only. I did not think
that I needed to be explicit about my narrow use of "actions", since
Mises was referring only to Social InterActions in his writing. If I
were to rewrite my last statement above I would perhaps change it to:
"Meanings, intentions, and even choices have no effects on other humans,
only actions do." With respect to this discussion it is important to
examine the definitions of Internal, External, Inward and Outward
Action/Event at: http://www.selfsip.org/solutions/NSC.html#freeman
Note that in my critique of Mises writing (that critique being a
response at an entry in the mises.org blog), I specifically and
intentionally refrained from using my fully consistent and totally
unambiguous set of definitions given in the NSC. I did so in order to
gain more readership, but the negative of that decision was the lack of
totally clarity that you are critiquing.
decades, and I have dabbled at reading parts of it, I do not think that
I ever read the particular section being reprinted before.
>> > The /We/ cannot act otherwise than each of them acting on his own
>> > behalf.
>>
>> And it is extremely important to realize that this implies the same
>> for thinking, emoting, desiring, etc, which are all types of
>> *action*, even if only internal to the mind itself.
>
> Contradicts above.
set of definitions. Again I was attempting to write something to be read
and appreciated by those who will not go to all the work of reading,
understanding and using my own clear and unambiguous definitions given
in the NSC. (I am starting to think that it is somewhat hopeless to take
this approach, but OTOH, if I do not then no one at all will likely ever
read what I write.)
> Moreover emoting, thinking is not totally internal
> to the mind itself but have consequences on the body.
anything to the contrary. I did not say that emotions could *not* have
effects on parts of the body other than the mind/brain. Rather I stated
that emotions are types of actions *even when* they merely affect the
mind/brain.
[I have deleted the next portion because it is off-topic on this forum.
However being a good topic of discussion, I ask Francois to repost it at
the Yahoo group Morelife.]
> Regarding the distinction between mind and body, I find it more and
> more difficult since they seems to be deeply connected and
> interrelated (through different systems: emotions connected to
> hormons, muscles connected to hormons, neurons connected to muscles
> and to hormons,.....).
body at all. I don't see is as "difficult". Any dichotomy simply does
not exist, mainly because the mind does not exist separately to the brain.
[snipped the rest needing no comment]
--Paul Wakfer
MoreLife for the rational - http://morelife.org