5/29 Lecture
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5/29 Lecture |
Army Corps of Engineers uniquely key—contaminated sediments and expertise
Palermo and Wilson 2000 (Michael R. Palermo, U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center and Joseph R. Wilson, Operations Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Corps Of Engineers Role In Contaminated Sediment Management And Remediation”, http://www.envirotools.msu.edu/factsheets/remediationofcs/ABA-USACERoleSedRem-wCR.PDF, Hemanth)
The Corps has aunique perspectiveon contaminated sedimentsandspecialized capabilitiesin planning, engineering, design and R&D related to the problem. Navigation has been a prime mission of the Corps for over 150 years, and the Corps is considered the nation's "dredging agency". The long-term involvement with this work has gained for the Corps a significant experience base in both dredging and various approaches to sediment management.Of particular significance is the technical knowledge the Corps has gained by field experience and extensive research concerning the scientific and engineering aspects of sediment management. With the advent of sediment cleanup needs, the Corps has played a lead role in applying the experience gained through its navigation dredging program to the problems associated with cleanup. The Corps has acted in the role of a supporting agency to EPA, NOAA, and others with primary missions of environmental protection. At the same time, the Corps has a vested interest in approaching these problems with a balanced consideration of environmental protection and economic realities. Unlike most clean-up projects, the Corps’ funds for managing sediments from navigation projects arelimited by congressional appropriations regardless of the contaminant status of the material. In a few unusual instances, the Corps has been named as a Primary Responsible Party (PRP). But the Corps is rarely a PRP since, in almost all instances where highly contaminated sediments are concerned and the site is declared a CERCLA or Superfund site, the Corps simply would defer dredging the project. In a couple of instances, the Corps has historically managed contaminated material from navigation channels and the sites were declared CERCLA/Superfund subsequent to the Corps performing the work.
Permutation do the counterplan
P3’s risk bankruptcy and public sector takeover – increases overall costs
Rall et al 10- Policy Specialist, NCSL Transportation Program (Jaime, "Public-Private Partnerships For Transportation A Toolkit for Legislatiors." National Conference of State Legislatures. October 2010. www.ncsl.org/documents/transportation/PPPTOOLKIT.pdf)
Risk of Bankruptcy or Default Some stakeholders express concern about how default by a private partner could affect the public sector, especially for longterm lease agreements. Recent examples of PPP bankruptcies in the United States include the Las Vegas Monorail, South Carolina’s Southern Connector and California’s South Bay Expressway (see Appendix G). Of special concern are agreements in which the public sector is at particular financial risk in case of bankruptcy—for example, if it has guaranteed the private partner’s loans 65 or is otherwise owed money at the time of default. 66 These issues generally are addressed through PPP contract provisions that transfer financial risk and define what happens to the asset should the private entity be unable to pay its debts or declare bankruptcy. In some cases, the facility reverts to the state, which can either take it over or re-lease it with another private operator. This may create additional, unexpected costs for the public sector, however. In other situations—such as the Chicago Skyway—the lenders first have an opportunity to remedy the default and either operate the facility or appoint a successor to do so. 67 If a private concessionaire should need to sell, get out of, or modify a contract during the lease term, final approval generally rests with the state. 68
Flyvbjerg is wrong – major methodological flaws
Osland and Strand, 10 – Institute of Transport Economics, Norway (Oddgeir and Arvid, “The Politics and Institutions of Project Approval - a Critical-Constructive Comment on the Theory of Strategic Misrepresentation”, European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research, March, http://www.ejtir.tbm.tudelft.nl/issues/2010_01/pdf/2010_01_06.pdf)//DH
The paragraph above includes several claims that Flyvbjerg does not have the necessary empirical data to verify. Firstly, he claims that it is not the best projects that are implemented, but the project that looks best on paper. Yet he has no data on alternative projects that was ruled out in the decision-making process. Secondly, he claims that the projects that look best on paper are those with the largest cost underestimates and benefit overestimates, other things being equal. We are not sure what ‘other things being equal’ means here, but it seems to be at odds with an argument Flyvbjerg has put forward elsewhere (Flyvbjerg 2007b, p. 582): costs and benefit estimates are not wrong by the same margin across projects, errors vary extensively and will affect the ranking of the projects. We do agree with the latter argument. However, this implies that to decide what project ‘looks best on paper’ has to be based on comparisons with the miscalculations in projects that were given lower priority. Again, Flyvbjerg has not made such analyses. Lastly, due to the same argument, we cannot see that he has any empirical support for his claim that the chosen projects are the ones that will encounter most problems during construction and operations. In other words, if the survival of the unfittest should be seen as a conclusion, data is needed both on the projects that won, the ones that lost, and the possibility of comparing them in terms of reference scenario for the latter. This has not been done in Flyvbjerg’s research. Therefore, the following conclusion also seems premature: One may add that many projects don’t proceed that probably should, had they not lost out to projects with “better” misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl 2002). Moreover, Flyvbjerg too quickly rejects the technological explanations on the basis that if these explanations are correct, wrong predictions should be more equally distributed, both leading to over- and underestimations. As Flyvbjerg himself points out, it is particularly rail forecasts that are inaccurate and biased (Flyvbjerg et al 2003:27, Flyvbjerg 2007 c), implying both underestimations of costs and overestimation of benefits. Road projects, on the other hand, often have higher benefits than estimated. To summarize, we do not find that Flyvbjerg’s quantitative data and research design supports his general conclusion that the technical and psychological explanations can be ruled out. However, Flyvbjerg has argued that he has empirical evidence from interviews that planners admit that they lie and misrepresent. This, he argues, is another reason for rejecting the psychological explanations. However, we cannot see how examples of actors admitting such misrepresentation should be sufficient support for the thesis that misrepresentation is the major explanation.