The Promise Chinese Drama 2019

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Tory Lattin

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Aug 3, 2024, 2:48:20 PM8/3/24

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Whereas in the early stages of the G20 scrutiny emphasized the delivery of collective benefits, the focus now has turned to the role of specific countries (and leaders) taking on the Presidency role concerning the Summit process.

When looked at more closely, though, the differences, not the similarities, between the present moment and earlier eras jump out. Not only did the nature of participation serve as a major break, but the catalyst for the new order was also a massive financial crisis rather than the turbulence of war. Unlike concert-like forums of earlier eras, the G20 possesses neither the image of allies/victors in war nor a sense of ideological uniformity or anti-revolutionary ethos. In terms of participation, most members of the G20 had no experience with the earlier institutional formats.

Unlike concert-like forums of earlier eras, the G20 possesses neither the image of allies/victors in war nor a sense of ideological uniformity or anti-revolutionary ethos. In terms of participation, most members of the G20 had no experience with the earlier institutional formats.

Moreover, unlike the stalled process of UNSC reform or other IOs, bringing the Global South was done without protracted debate. When the call came for the G20, notwithstanding some considerable ambivalence about the format, all the Emerging Powers not only took part but engaged in the preparation, especially in the case of Brazil, from its position as chair of the G20 Finance in 2008. As Guido Mantega, the then Brazilian Finance Minister (IMF 2008) indicated, these countries called for a new form of institutional improvisation:

Certainly, this buy-in by Brazil and other countries from the Global South was facilitated by the way that the G20 Finance had evolved as a problem-solving forum since its establishment in the late 1990s. As John Kirton argues, Brazil was initially a reluctant participant. It feared the new G20 might undermine the traditional United Nations-based multilateralism of the 'G192'" (Kirton 2011). Nonetheless, with the experience of the G20 Finance as a guide, Brazil was placed in a front-and-center position when the GFC hit. Not only could Brazil use its voice, but it could also act. Minister Mantega hosted the first emergency G20 ministerial meeting on October 11, 2008, in Washington, DC.

Furthermore, President Lula da Silva not only accepted President George W. Bush's invitation to the November 2008 G20, but sat at the side of Bush for the "family" photo-op. Indeed, notwithstanding a wide number of reservations about the G20, Lula was pleased to take credit as one of the prime creators of the G20. As Lula articulated this sense of shared ownership in 2023, before Brazil took on the presidential function in terms of the 2024 Summit: "I am one of the founder members of G20." In so doing, a signal was also made concerning the import of the G20 in demonstrating and promoting the importance of the multipolar world (NDTV 2023).

The accommodation attached to this approach, albeit still contingent on performance, represented a major departure not only from the older concert models going back to and beyond 1945 but also from the culture of the G7/8. From this perspective, comparing Brazil's relationship to the G20 and the G7/8 is significant. After all, President Lula da Silva had castigated his unequal role at the French-hosted Evian Summit in 2003: "What is the use of being invited for the dessert at the banquet of the powerful?" he asked, targeting the merely symbolic participation of emerging powers at the yearly gathering of the (then) G8. "We do not want to participate only to eat the dessert; we want to eat the main course, dessert, and then have coffee," he added, emphasizing emerging powers' claim to have a role in global decision-making processes (Wines 2007).

It is misleading to suggest, notwithstanding the culture of organizational equality that, in de facto terms, all members of the G20 held equal standing. As one former official put it: "The chairs of the G20 need to show a certain deference to the concerns of the most influential G20 members, the United States, the European Union, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and China" (Bradlow 2016, 143). That said, it became recognized that the host country taking on the Presidency (together with, to some extent, the other members of the Troika, encompassing the past host, the present host, and the future immediate host) must have the latitude to shape the agenda of Summits per national priorities.

[It] became recognized that the host country taking on the Presidency (together with, to some extent, the other members of the Troika, encompassing the past host, the present host, and the future immediate host) must have the latitude to shape the agenda of Summits per national priorities.

Accordingly, space opportunities within the context of the G20 were located over time by countries outside the traditional elite on several foundational models. One approach is associated with South Korea's leveraging the hosting of the G20 in November 2010 to shape some of its agenda (Cooper 2011). The Seoul Summit was not the only first non-Western Summit. It revealed a move away from the core agenda in the aftermath of the GFC, with the shift toward the development dimension of the G20 and global economic governance, as illustrated by the Seoul Consensus on Development. The Seoul Summit process also thickened the G20 process, including the notable adjustment concerning a formula for non-member participation, enabling the Summit host to invite up to five guests. At the same time, South Korea pushed some boundaries of non-state participation (Cooper 2013).

As epitomized by China's approach, the other model was far more nuanced. Internally, China made a significant distinction between civil society and the business community: downplaying the former and cultivating select strata of the latter. In this vein, building on the model pioneered by South Korea, the B (Business) 20 meeting held just before the Chinese 2016 Hangzhou Summit was unprecedented in scale. Externally, whereas South Korea prioritized the G20, China remained ambivalent about adopting a similar approach. China gave the G20 some considerable attention in recognition of the culture of equality. To illustrate this type of institutional buy-in, the original G20 Chinese Sherpa was the experienced Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, He Yafei (He 2015).

As two experienced G20 watchers have commented, it is misleading to suggest that the tests for hosting only relate to "substance" as opposed to "logistics and location features" (Chin & Dobson 2015, 164). Confirming this point, India has long been sensitive to its performance as a host to global Summits. Writing in 2019, Akshay Mathur, at the Indian think tank Gateway House, made a compelling case why the G20 should be viewed positively by a "rising" India in line with a more inclusionary global system: "The G20 is unique. Here, developing countries can display their political, economic, and intellectual leadership on a par with the most powerful countries. The G20's rotating Presidency ensures that no one country dominates the agenda" (Mathur 2019).

Even among the enthusiasts, though, there was an ingrained strong concern regarding procedural dynamics that India must step up in operational capacity to deliver as an effective host. Accordingly, considerable attention was paid to the need for infrastructure that meets G20 criteria: "Unlike the Olympics and more like Davos, this effort is focused on a small but powerful group which expects good airports, accommodation, conference facilities, and communications infrastructure all year round" (Mathur 2019).

Furthermore, beyond the physical tests, concerns came to the fore about a gap in human capital. At least by comparative standards, India continued to make do with a bureaucratic culture comparatively deficient in the context of the G20 process. For one thing, there has been a lack of coordination among the relevant (and understaffed) ministries. For another thing, the appointment of Sherpas has retained an ad hoc image. In combination, these weaknesses were said to put India at a protracted disadvantage to the performance of the West, and increasingly by China, and, it might be added, to middle powers such as South Korea (Cooper 2014).

On several counts, at first glance, Brazil is in an advantageous position over the relevant Global South peers in managing a high-stakes, high-drama Summit. The annual event places a high degree of value, particularly on the hosting leaders and various government officials. It is vital because those leaders and their governments host the organization and are responsible for delivering policy initiatives. Status can be enhanced or lost by the effectiveness, or not, of the leader's actions and policy determinations. The leaders' focus is salient for several reasons.

For one thing, the G20 at the leaders' level lacks some of the socialization process witnessed in the past. The G7 culture of political like-mindedness and meetings in smaller, often remote sites, allowed leader outlooks to converge on issues. The G20 is highly diverse geographically and in terms of their political backgrounds. Both of these trends highlight the role of leaders as the G20 goes forward (Cooper & Alexandroff 2019), even if many of the leaders around the table lack the experience or the expertise in dealing with collective problem-solving at the core of the G20's mandate.

President Lula da Silva possesses strong elements of charisma and experience that reinforce the image of the potential animation of a high-stakes, high-drama Summit. Facing massive domestic political and economic challenges at home, Lula has a great incentive (and capacity) to leverage the hosting function symbolically and instrumentally. The G20 serves as a primary means to enhance his personal status positioning (Brazil 2023a; 2023b). Equally, animated by a compelling sense of ambition, Lula has the opportunity to address key policy issues: exercising leadership and working to convince his counterparts of the value of the proposals over a Summit process that, by stretching out for a year, is both exceedingly long and visible by international standards.