Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
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Christoph Kuzmics
Dec 9, 2023, 4:08:43 AM12/9/23
to Learning Evolution and Games Forum
Dear LEG community,
Yuval Heller and I just published our paper "Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values" at Games and Economic Behavior.
For a limited time (Elsevier tells us) you can download the paper for free at
https://authors.elsevier.com/c/1i9lG3CcBwdcgG
Abstract: An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the coordinated outcomes. The set of communication-proof equilibria is a small and relatively homogeneous subset of the set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria. Under a communication-proof equilibrium, players never miscoordinate, play their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and communicate only the ordinal part of their preferences. Moreover, such equilibria are robust to changes in players' beliefs and interim Pareto efficient.
Yuval Heller and I just published our paper "Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values" at Games and Economic Behavior.
For a limited time (Elsevier tells us) you can download the paper for free at
https://authors.elsevier.com/c/1i9lG3CcBwdcgG
Abstract: An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the coordinated outcomes. The set of communication-proof equilibria is a small and relatively homogeneous subset of the set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria. Under a communication-proof equilibrium, players never miscoordinate, play their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and communicate only the ordinal part of their preferences. Moreover, such equilibria are robust to changes in players' beliefs and interim Pareto efficient.
Best wishes,
Christoph
YANNICK VIOSSAT
Dec 11, 2023, 12:04:45 PM12/11/23
to Learning Evolution and Games Forum
Dear LEG-community, this post-doc might be of interest to some of you (this was forwarded to me, I have no special information).
Yannick Viossat
**************
The call for a postdoc position of the duration of 18 months starting on 01.03.2024 at the University of Milano-Bicocca on the topic "Evolutionary games and their applications to the study of socio-economic phenomena" (scientific supervisor: Prof. Marina Pireddu) is available here:
https://www.unimib.it/ateneo/gare-e-concorsi/cod-23a281
Deadline for applications: 21 December 2023 at 12 am (Italian time).
Please feel free to forward this message to potentially interested candidates.
Best regards,
Marina Pireddu
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