Peace, Breach of Peace, Revenge, Common Law
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Bob Hurt
Feb 26, 2011, 1:52:14 AM2/26/11
to lawmen
I have repeatedly seen this in the Florida Constitution:
Question: What action shall one take when a Conservator of the Peace breaches the peace under force of arms? Bailiffs have arms in court. They and the judge function as conservators of the peace. What happens when they conspire and work in concert to breach the peace.and FORCE litigants to accept that breach of peace without consequence?
Shall the people seek retribution against such a law-flouting judge and bailiff? If so, how? Through a blood feud?
And I dug further. Oliver Wendell Holmes explains that revenge formed the basis of the common law, like this:
Clearly vengeance such as in blood feuds comprised the basis of the common law, and societies continuously evolved such feuds to remove the bloody part so that courts of law could settle such disputes.
Fortunately all government employees everywhere in America swear oaths to support the Constitution. That means they become the enforcers of the Constitution's guarantees of the inalienable rights given to the people by God. The oath means that the people will not hire the public employees for public employment unless the applicants swear that oath.
What do you suppose people want to do when a public employee, like, say, a judge, refuses to perform that duty of enforcing the guarantees of rights, but instead becomes the central violator of those rights? Rights like these from Article I of the Florida Constitution:
Before you answer that consider the Florida Constitution's public officer's oath in Article II Section 5(b):
Do you see those words "and Government" in the above oath? Notice how it differs from the oath in the Constitution for the USA at Article VI Clause 3:
And in 4 USC 101:
The word and "Government" in the Florida public officer's oath above actually means "other government employees, particularly the "good old boys network" and the monied interests outside who who influence them."
How can a public servant support, protect, and defend BOTH the Constitution and Government at the same time? What if the Judge tells the bailiff to remove you from the courtroom when you have full right to stand there as a litigant and make your case? Should the bailiff say "No, Judge, I won't do that. This is his case and he has the right to stay here till the conclusion of this hearing. If you try that again I'll arrest you for BREACH OF THE PEACE."?
You know that will never happen. The bailiff decided to show loyalty to the judge (the "Government"), not to the constitution which guarantees due process in Article I Section 9 and access to the court in Article I Section 21.
Thus we see clearly that one cannot loyally serve both the Constitution and the Government at the same time. NOT EVER, unless others in Government obey the Constitution at all times, and you know they do not. And since the Florida Constitution requires this in its public officer oath which all judges allegedly swear, as do the Governor, Attorney General, CFO, Justices, State Attorneys, and Legislators, they can claim they only did their duty as they swore to when they strip you of your rights in court in violation of the protections of the Constitution.
So, now back to the question. When all else fails, we have only one final place to go to obtain justice in an adversarial dispute. By justice I mean relief from injurious behavior of others and remedy (such as damages) for the injury: We can go only to the Courts. If the Judges flout their oaths, the law, the rules, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Constitution, and refuse to give that justice, relief, and remedy which they owe a litigant, what shall the litigant do to curb that judicial abuse?
Appeals do not obtain VENGEANCE (the purpose of common law) against the offending judge. By that I mean they do not obtain justice, relief, and remedy for the injury the judge has done to the litigant. How shall the law and the society demand an exaction of justice from or the fruit of civilized vengeance from everyone BUT a judge? Why SHOULD society tolerate such flouting of propriety, common sense, and law from a judge? How shall society get justice when the judge refuses to give it?
Only one way exists: Excise the judge from government, and possibly from the planet. The judge has formed a one-man crooked government within a lawful government, and because he looks like a judge and behaves pompously like a judge, he runs that crooked one-man government under color of law. He appears legitimate when everyone who observes his behavior knows him as a crook. He has no more right to run around loose to pursue abusive, unlawful behavior than does a common street thug. And because he has betrayed the people's trust and does far more damage to the unwary and unsuspecting victim litigants in his court than does a street thug whom people can avoid, he deserves public scorn, enmity, and retribution all the more.
Unfortunately, no prosecutor will prosecute him, no bailiff will confront him, no legislature will impeach him, no judicial qualifications commission will censure him, no bar will disbar him. So obviously, the duty to excise him from government falls on the people, typically the ones he injures in association with his court. As we used to say about similar vermin (rattlesnakes) when I lived in Texas "Whoever's closest to it grab a stick and hit it."
The declaration of Independence made this point with crystal clarity by severing the colonies from their English overlords through physical force. They excised the criminal King George and his minions from the government of the colonies. Today the people could typically do such excision only by making sure the judge does not show up for work tomorrow, perhaps by making him an offer he could not refuse, as Vito Corleone or Carmine Sabatini might suggest.
Kenneth L. Smith expressed this principle succinctly in the draft of his petition for certiorari to the US Supreme Court in 2010:
Citizens, particularly litigants, ought to remind recalcitrant, oath-flouting, rule-breaking, law-violating judges of this reality from time to time. Plainly and simply, any public employee who violates his oath to support, protect, or defend the constitutions (meaning enforce the limits on government power and the guarantees of people's rights) BECOMES THEREBY AN ENEMY of the constitutions. And EVERYbody who encounters such an enemy has a constitutional duty to excise that enemy from government.
ONLY when the people make judges fear summary excision will judges stop behaving like enemies of the people and of the constitutions.
Consider me like the boy who blurted out that the king had no clothes on when everyone else pretended they saw the king fully clothed. I see blatant crookedness in our courts, by bailiffs and judges nearly every time I visit them and government and the media almost totally ignores it. It embarrasses me and I hate it. Please get off your butts and help me correct it. Remember this from the Florida Constitution of 1838, Article I:
This provision will remain forever true as it reminds people of the first rules of responsible liberty: vigilance and timely correction. With your fellow man, turn the other cheek. With government abuse, tolerance is a bad policy.
--
ARTICLE V SECTION 19. Judicial officers as conservators of the peace.--
All judicial officers in this state shall be conservators of the peace.
All judicial officers in this state shall be conservators of the peace.
History.--S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
I have wondered what it meant, so I dug a little into Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Edition (2004).CONSERVATOR OF THE PEACE
conservator of the peace.See PEACE OFFICER
PEACE OFFICER
peace officer.A civil officer (such as a sheriff or police officer) appointed to maintain public tranquility and order; esp., a person designated by public authority to keep the peace and arrest persons guilty or suspected of crime. • This term may also include a judge who hears criminal cases or another public official (such as a mayor) who may be statutorily designated as a peace officer for limited purposes. — Also termed officer of the peace; conservator of the peace. [Cases: Municipal Corporations 180(1).C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 450–452, 474–476, 497, 502, 505, 508, 534.]
PEACE
peace,n. A state of public tranquility; freedom from civil disturbance or hostility <breach of the peace>. See peace treaty under TREATY(1). —
peaceable,peaceful,adj. armed peace.A situation in which two or more nations, while at peace, are actually armed for possible or probable hostilities.
BREACH OF THE PEACE
breach of the peace.The criminal offense of creating a public disturbance or engaging in disorderly conduct, particularly by making an unnecessary or distracting noise. — Also termed breach of peace; disturbing the peace; disturbance of the peace; public disturbance. See disorderly conduct under CONDUCT. [Cases: Breach of the Peace 1–14. C.J.S. Breach of the Peace §§ 2–13; Domestic Abuse and Violence§§ 3, 6.]
“A breach of the peace takes place when either an assault is committed on an individual or public alarm and excitement is caused. Mere annoyance or insult is not enough: thus at common law a householder could not give a man into custody for violently and persistently ringing his door-bell. It is the particular duty of a magistrate or police officer to preserve the peace unbroken; hence if he has reasonable cause to believe that a breach of the peace is imminent he may be justified in committing an assault or effecting an arrest.” R.F.V. Heuston, Salmond on the Law of Torts 131 (17th ed. 1977).
“The beginning of our criminal justice ... was concerned very largely with the problem of keeping the peace. Because of this fact all early indictments included some such phrase as ‘against the peace of the King’; and until recently statutory provisions for simplification, indictments in this country were thought to be incomplete without some such conclusion as ‘against the peace and dignity of the state.’ As a result of this history all indictable offenses are sometimes regarded as deeds which violate the public peace, and hence in a loose sense the term ‘breach of the peace’ is regarded as a synonym for crime.” Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 477 (3d ed. 1982).
peace bond.A bond required by a court from a person who has breached or threatened to breach the peace. — Also termed bond to keep the peace. See BREACH OF THE PEACE. [Cases: Breach of The Peace 15.1, 22. C.J.S. Breach of the Peace §§ 14, 18, 21, 23–25; Domestic Abuse and Violence §§ 2–3.]
conservator of the peace.See PEACE OFFICER
PEACE OFFICER
peace officer.A civil officer (such as a sheriff or police officer) appointed to maintain public tranquility and order; esp., a person designated by public authority to keep the peace and arrest persons guilty or suspected of crime. • This term may also include a judge who hears criminal cases or another public official (such as a mayor) who may be statutorily designated as a peace officer for limited purposes. — Also termed officer of the peace; conservator of the peace. [Cases: Municipal Corporations 180(1).C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 450–452, 474–476, 497, 502, 505, 508, 534.]
PEACE
peace,n. A state of public tranquility; freedom from civil disturbance or hostility <breach of the peace>. See peace treaty under TREATY(1). —
peaceable,peaceful,adj. armed peace.A situation in which two or more nations, while at peace, are actually armed for possible or probable hostilities.
BREACH OF THE PEACE
breach of the peace.The criminal offense of creating a public disturbance or engaging in disorderly conduct, particularly by making an unnecessary or distracting noise. — Also termed breach of peace; disturbing the peace; disturbance of the peace; public disturbance. See disorderly conduct under CONDUCT. [Cases: Breach of the Peace 1–14. C.J.S. Breach of the Peace §§ 2–13; Domestic Abuse and Violence§§ 3, 6.]
“A breach of the peace takes place when either an assault is committed on an individual or public alarm and excitement is caused. Mere annoyance or insult is not enough: thus at common law a householder could not give a man into custody for violently and persistently ringing his door-bell. It is the particular duty of a magistrate or police officer to preserve the peace unbroken; hence if he has reasonable cause to believe that a breach of the peace is imminent he may be justified in committing an assault or effecting an arrest.” R.F.V. Heuston, Salmond on the Law of Torts 131 (17th ed. 1977).
“The beginning of our criminal justice ... was concerned very largely with the problem of keeping the peace. Because of this fact all early indictments included some such phrase as ‘against the peace of the King’; and until recently statutory provisions for simplification, indictments in this country were thought to be incomplete without some such conclusion as ‘against the peace and dignity of the state.’ As a result of this history all indictable offenses are sometimes regarded as deeds which violate the public peace, and hence in a loose sense the term ‘breach of the peace’ is regarded as a synonym for crime.” Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 477 (3d ed. 1982).
peace bond.A bond required by a court from a person who has breached or threatened to breach the peace. — Also termed bond to keep the peace. See BREACH OF THE PEACE. [Cases: Breach of The Peace 15.1, 22. C.J.S. Breach of the Peace §§ 14, 18, 21, 23–25; Domestic Abuse and Violence §§ 2–3.]
Question: What action shall one take when a Conservator of the Peace breaches the peace under force of arms? Bailiffs have arms in court. They and the judge function as conservators of the peace. What happens when they conspire and work in concert to breach the peace.and FORCE litigants to accept that breach of peace without consequence?
Shall the people seek retribution against such a law-flouting judge and bailiff? If so, how? Through a blood feud?
RETRIBUTION
retribution,n.1.Criminal law. Punishment imposed as repayment or revenge for the offense committed; requital. Cf. DETERRENCE; REHABILITATION(1). [Cases: Sentencing and Punishment 44.] 2. Something justly deserved; repayment; reward. — retributive,adj. — retribute,vb.
BLOOD FEUD
blood feud.A state of hostility between families in which one family seeks to avenge the killing of one of its members by killing a member of the other family. See VENDETTA.
“Anglo-Saxon polity preserved, even down to the Norman Conquest, many traces of a time when kinship was the strongest of all bonds. Such a stage of society, we hardly need add, is not confined to any one region of the world or any one race of men.... When it puts on the face of strife between hostile kindreds, it is shown in the war of tribal factions, and more specifically in the blood-feud. A man's kindred are his avengers; and, as it is their right and honour to avenge him, So it is their duty to make amends for his misdeeds, or else maintain his cause in fight. Step by step, as the power of the State waxes, the self-centred and self-helping autonomy of the kindred wanes. Private feud is controlled, regulated, put, one may say, into legal harness; the avenging and the protecting clan on the slain and the slayer are made pledges and auxiliaries of public justice.” 1
Frederick Pollock & Frederic
retribution,n.1.Criminal law. Punishment imposed as repayment or revenge for the offense committed; requital. Cf. DETERRENCE; REHABILITATION(1). [Cases: Sentencing and Punishment 44.] 2. Something justly deserved; repayment; reward. — retributive,adj. — retribute,vb.
BLOOD FEUD
blood feud.A state of hostility between families in which one family seeks to avenge the killing of one of its members by killing a member of the other family. See VENDETTA.
“Anglo-Saxon polity preserved, even down to the Norman Conquest, many traces of a time when kinship was the strongest of all bonds. Such a stage of society, we hardly need add, is not confined to any one region of the world or any one race of men.... When it puts on the face of strife between hostile kindreds, it is shown in the war of tribal factions, and more specifically in the blood-feud. A man's kindred are his avengers; and, as it is their right and honour to avenge him, So it is their duty to make amends for his misdeeds, or else maintain his cause in fight. Step by step, as the power of the State waxes, the self-centred and self-helping autonomy of the kindred wanes. Private feud is controlled, regulated, put, one may say, into legal harness; the avenging and the protecting clan on the slain and the slayer are made pledges and auxiliaries of public justice.” 1
Frederick Pollock & Frederic
And I dug further. Oliver Wendell Holmes explains that revenge formed the basis of the common law, like this:
"It is commonly known that the early forms of legal procedure were grounded in vengeance. Modern writers [3] have thought that the Roman law started from the blood feud, and all the authorities agree that the German law begun in that way. The feud led to the composition, at first optional, then compulsory, by which the feud was bought off. The gradual encroachment of the composition may be traced in the Anglo-Saxon laws, /1/ and the feud was pretty well broken up, though not extinguished, by the time of William the Conqueror. The killings and house-burnings of an earlier day became the appeals of mayhem and arson. The appeals de pace et plagis and of mayhem became, or rather were in substance, the action of trespass which is still familiar to lawyers. /2/ But as the compensation recovered in the appeal was the alternative of vengeance, we might expect to find its scope limited to the scope of vengeance. Vengeance imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion, however distorted by passion, that a wrong has been done. It can hardly go very far beyond the case of a harm intentionally inflicted: even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.grounded in vengeance. Modern writers [3] have thought that the Roman law started from the blood feud, and all the authorities agree that the German law begun in that way. The feud led to the
composition, at first optional, then compulsory, by which the feud was bought off. The gradual encroachment of the composition may be traced in the Anglo-Saxon laws, /1/ and the feud was pretty well broken up, though not extinguished, by the time of William the Conqueror. The killings and house-burnings of an earlier day became the appeals of mayhem and arson. The appeals de pace et plagis and of mayhem became, or rather were in substance, the action of trespass which is still familiar to lawyers. /2/ But as the compensation recovered in the appeal was the alternative of vengeance, we might expect to find its scope limited to the scope of vengeance. Vengeance imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion, however distorted by passion, that a wrong has been done. It can hardly go very far beyond the case of a harm intentionally inflicted: even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.grounded in vengeance. Modern writers [3] have thought that he Roman law started from the blood feud, and all the authorities agree that the German law begun in that way. The feud led to the composition, at first optional, then compulsory, by which the feud was bought off. The gradual encroachment of the composition may be traced in the Anglo-Saxon laws, /1/ and the feud was pretty well broken up, though not extinguished, by the time of William the Conqueror. The killings and house-burnings of an earlier day became the appeals of mayhem and arson. The appeals de pace et plagis and of mayhem became, or rather were in substance, the action of trespass which is still familiar to lawyers. /2/ But as the compensation recovered in the appeal was the alternative of vengeance, we might expect to find its scope limited to the scope of vengeance. Vengeance imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion, however distorted by passion, that a wrong has been done. It can hardly go very far beyond the case of a harm intentionally inflicted: even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked."
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, The Common Law, Lecture 1, page 2
composition, at first optional, then compulsory, by which the feud was bought off. The gradual encroachment of the composition may be traced in the Anglo-Saxon laws, /1/ and the feud was pretty well broken up, though not extinguished, by the time of William the Conqueror. The killings and house-burnings of an earlier day became the appeals of mayhem and arson. The appeals de pace et plagis and of mayhem became, or rather were in substance, the action of trespass which is still familiar to lawyers. /2/ But as the compensation recovered in the appeal was the alternative of vengeance, we might expect to find its scope limited to the scope of vengeance. Vengeance imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion, however distorted by passion, that a wrong has been done. It can hardly go very far beyond the case of a harm intentionally inflicted: even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.grounded in vengeance. Modern writers [3] have thought that he Roman law started from the blood feud, and all the authorities agree that the German law begun in that way. The feud led to the composition, at first optional, then compulsory, by which the feud was bought off. The gradual encroachment of the composition may be traced in the Anglo-Saxon laws, /1/ and the feud was pretty well broken up, though not extinguished, by the time of William the Conqueror. The killings and house-burnings of an earlier day became the appeals of mayhem and arson. The appeals de pace et plagis and of mayhem became, or rather were in substance, the action of trespass which is still familiar to lawyers. /2/ But as the compensation recovered in the appeal was the alternative of vengeance, we might expect to find its scope limited to the scope of vengeance. Vengeance imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion, however distorted by passion, that a wrong has been done. It can hardly go very far beyond the case of a harm intentionally inflicted: even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked."
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, The Common Law, Lecture 1, page 2
Clearly vengeance such as in blood feuds comprised the basis of the common law, and societies continuously evolved such feuds to remove the bloody part so that courts of law could settle such disputes.
Fortunately all government employees everywhere in America swear oaths to support the Constitution. That means they become the enforcers of the Constitution's guarantees of the inalienable rights given to the people by God. The oath means that the people will not hire the public employees for public employment unless the applicants swear that oath.
What do you suppose people want to do when a public employee, like, say, a judge, refuses to perform that duty of enforcing the guarantees of rights, but instead becomes the central violator of those rights? Rights like these from Article I of the Florida Constitution:
SECTION 9. Due process.—No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.
SECTION 12. Searches and seizures.—The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
SECTION 13. Habeas corpus.—The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost. It shall be returnable without delay, and shall never be suspended unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, suspension is essential to the public safety.
SECTION 16. Rights of accused and of victims.—
SECTION 12. Searches and seizures.—The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
SECTION 13. Habeas corpus.—The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost. It shall be returnable without delay, and shall never be suspended unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, suspension is essential to the public safety.
SECTION 16. Rights of accused and of victims.—
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand, be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and shall be furnished a copy of the charges, and shall have the right to have compulsory process for witnesses, to confront at trial adverse witnesses, to be heard in person, by counsel or both, and to have a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the county where the crime was committed. If the county is not known, the indictment or information may charge venue in two or more counties conjunctively and proof that the crime was committed in that area shall be sufficient; but before pleading the accused may elect in which of those counties the trial will take place. Venue for prosecution of crimes committed beyond the boundaries of the state shall be fixed by law.
(b) Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused.
SECTION 17. Excessive punishments.—Excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden. The death penalty is an authorized punishment for capital crimes designated by the legislature. The prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be construed in conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Any method of execution shall be allowed, unless prohibited by the United States Constitution. Methods of execution may be designated by the legislature, and a change in any method of execution may be applied retroactively. A sentence of death shall not be reduced on the basis that a method of execution is invalid. In any case in which an execution method is declared invalid, the death sentence shall remain in force until the sentence can be lawfully executed by any valid method. This section shall apply retroactively.
SECTION 17. Excessive punishments.—Excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden. The death penalty is an authorized punishment for capital crimes designated by the legislature. The prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be construed in conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Any method of execution shall be allowed, unless prohibited by the United States Constitution. Methods of execution may be designated by the legislature, and a change in any method of execution may be applied retroactively. A sentence of death shall not be reduced on the basis that a method of execution is invalid. In any case in which an execution method is declared invalid, the death sentence shall remain in force until the sentence can be lawfully executed by any valid method. This section shall apply retroactively.
SECTION 21. Access to courts.—The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
SECTION 22. Trial by jury.—The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed by law.
SECTION 23. Right of privacy.—Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law.
History.—Added, C.S. for H.J.R. 387, 1980; adopted 1980; Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.
SECTION 24. Access to public records and meetings.—
(a) Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf, except with respect to records exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made confidential by this Constitution. This section specifically includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and each agency or department created thereunder; counties, municipalities, and districts; and each constitutional officer, board, and commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Constitution.
(b) All meetings of any collegial public body of the executive branch of state government or of any collegial public body of a county, municipality, school district, or special district, at which official acts are to be taken or at which public business of such body is to be transacted or discussed, shall be open and noticed to the public and meetings of the legislature shall be open and noticed as provided in Article III, Section 4(e), except with respect to meetings exempted pursuant to this section or specifically closed by this Constitution.
(c) This section shall be self-executing. The legislature, however, may provide by general law passed by a two-thirds vote of each house for the exemption of records from the requirements of subsection (a) and the exemption of meetings from the requirements of subsection (b), provided that such law shall state with specificity the public necessity justifying the exemption and shall be no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of the law. The legislature shall enact laws governing the enforcement of this section, including the maintenance, control, destruction, disposal, and disposition of records made public by this section, except that each house of the legislature may adopt rules governing the enforcement of this section in relation to records of the legislative branch. Laws enacted pursuant to this subsection shall contain only exemptions from the requirements of subsections (a) or (b) and provisions governing the enforcement of this section, and shall relate to one subject.
(d) All laws that are in effect on July 1, 1993 that limit public access to records or meetings shall remain in force, and such laws apply to records of the legislative and judicial branches, until they are repealed. Rules of court that are in effect on the date of adoption of this section that limit access to records shall remain in effect until they are repealed.
(b) Each state and county officer, before entering upon the duties of the office, shall give bond as required by law, and shall swear or affirm:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States and of the State of Florida; that I am duly qualified to hold office under the Constitution of the state; and that I will well and faithfully perform the duties of (title of office) on which I am now about to enter. So help me God.”,
and thereafter shall devote personal attention to the duties of the office, and continue in office until a successor qualifies.
Do you see those words "and Government" in the above oath? Notice how it differs from the oath in the Constitution for the USA at Article VI Clause 3:
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.
And in 4 USC 101:
§ 101. Oath by members of legislatures and officers - Every member of a State legislature, and every executive and judicial officer of a State, shall, before he proceeds to execute the duties of his office, take an oath in the following form, to wit: “I, A B, do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States.”
The word and "Government" in the Florida public officer's oath above actually means "other government employees, particularly the "good old boys network" and the monied interests outside who who influence them."
How can a public servant support, protect, and defend BOTH the Constitution and Government at the same time? What if the Judge tells the bailiff to remove you from the courtroom when you have full right to stand there as a litigant and make your case? Should the bailiff say "No, Judge, I won't do that. This is his case and he has the right to stay here till the conclusion of this hearing. If you try that again I'll arrest you for BREACH OF THE PEACE."?
You know that will never happen. The bailiff decided to show loyalty to the judge (the "Government"), not to the constitution which guarantees due process in Article I Section 9 and access to the court in Article I Section 21.
Thus we see clearly that one cannot loyally serve both the Constitution and the Government at the same time. NOT EVER, unless others in Government obey the Constitution at all times, and you know they do not. And since the Florida Constitution requires this in its public officer oath which all judges allegedly swear, as do the Governor, Attorney General, CFO, Justices, State Attorneys, and Legislators, they can claim they only did their duty as they swore to when they strip you of your rights in court in violation of the protections of the Constitution.
So, now back to the question. When all else fails, we have only one final place to go to obtain justice in an adversarial dispute. By justice I mean relief from injurious behavior of others and remedy (such as damages) for the injury: We can go only to the Courts. If the Judges flout their oaths, the law, the rules, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Constitution, and refuse to give that justice, relief, and remedy which they owe a litigant, what shall the litigant do to curb that judicial abuse?
Appeals do not obtain VENGEANCE (the purpose of common law) against the offending judge. By that I mean they do not obtain justice, relief, and remedy for the injury the judge has done to the litigant. How shall the law and the society demand an exaction of justice from or the fruit of civilized vengeance from everyone BUT a judge? Why SHOULD society tolerate such flouting of propriety, common sense, and law from a judge? How shall society get justice when the judge refuses to give it?
Only one way exists: Excise the judge from government, and possibly from the planet. The judge has formed a one-man crooked government within a lawful government, and because he looks like a judge and behaves pompously like a judge, he runs that crooked one-man government under color of law. He appears legitimate when everyone who observes his behavior knows him as a crook. He has no more right to run around loose to pursue abusive, unlawful behavior than does a common street thug. And because he has betrayed the people's trust and does far more damage to the unwary and unsuspecting victim litigants in his court than does a street thug whom people can avoid, he deserves public scorn, enmity, and retribution all the more.
Unfortunately, no prosecutor will prosecute him, no bailiff will confront him, no legislature will impeach him, no judicial qualifications commission will censure him, no bar will disbar him. So obviously, the duty to excise him from government falls on the people, typically the ones he injures in association with his court. As we used to say about similar vermin (rattlesnakes) when I lived in Texas "Whoever's closest to it grab a stick and hit it."
The declaration of Independence made this point with crystal clarity by severing the colonies from their English overlords through physical force. They excised the criminal King George and his minions from the government of the colonies. Today the people could typically do such excision only by making sure the judge does not show up for work tomorrow, perhaps by making him an offer he could not refuse, as Vito Corleone or Carmine Sabatini might suggest.
Kenneth L. Smith expressed this principle succinctly in the draft of his petition for certiorari to the US Supreme Court in 2010:
"The default response to judicial tyranny is lethal force. Since the days of Cicero, the right to resort to violence in defense of our lives and liberties has been an integral part of black-letter law. As the Article III judicial power entitles judges to interpret the law -- as opposed to rewriting it on an ad hoc, ex post facto basis -- our judiciary has become, in the parlance of Judge Bork, a “band of outlaws.” Moreover, as the source of the harm is public officials, acting outside of the scope of their lawful authority, assassination of these outlaws would not be an act of rebellion per se but rather, in support and defense of "the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic." 8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (emphasis added).
"Thomas Jefferson observed that a constitution is supposed to provide remedies for all injuries accruing from unlawful invasions of rights, so people are never required to resort to rebellion in order to secure them. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 255 (1785) (Query 13). As the citizen has an absolute right to assassinate a tyrant, any public official who exercises tyrannical power over him -- including judges -- may lawfully be assassinated. And as assassination of a public official is undesirable, the law must be read as not bestowing tyrannical powers, providing remedies when an official abuses his or her lawful authority.
"It is an incorrigible and foundational principle of law that oppressed citizens have a right to assassinate a tyrant in defense of one’s lives and liberties. E.g., Mass. Const. Part I, Art. 1 (1780); see also, John of Salisbury, Policraticus, bk. iii, ch. 15 (1159); Magna Carta [1215], Ch. 61 (King personally liable for not only his tortious acts, but those of his servants). It logically follows that, if our judges have become tyrants, they may be assassinated. And as the
act would be in defense of the Constitution and our laws, it would not be so much of a legal right as a duty of citizenship. 8 C.F.R. § 337.1.
"The problem with the status quo is self-evident: If the Justices of this Court cannot be compelled to obey the law via the orderly mechanism of law, they are, by definition, dictators and tyrants. And, as a corollary, as former federal prosecutor Paul Butler asserts, lethal force may lawfully be used against judges who have appointed themselves our tyrants. Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 721 (2003) (invoking international law principle of "just war" to justify targeted assassinations of public officials, including federal judges).
"Again, we return to the wisdom of Thomas Jefferson: As assassination of officials is undesirable, the law must be read as not bestowing tyrannical powers, and providing remedies when an official abuses his or her lawful authority.
"It is logically impossible for a judicial system to deliver equal justice under law if judges are free to substitute the crooked cord of discretion for the golden mete-wand of the law. Therefore, error-correction is an unavoidable aspect of this Court’s duties. If it takes a thousand Justices to do the job right, it does, but there can be no substitute for doing it right."
"Thomas Jefferson observed that a constitution is supposed to provide remedies for all injuries accruing from unlawful invasions of rights, so people are never required to resort to rebellion in order to secure them. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 255 (1785) (Query 13). As the citizen has an absolute right to assassinate a tyrant, any public official who exercises tyrannical power over him -- including judges -- may lawfully be assassinated. And as assassination of a public official is undesirable, the law must be read as not bestowing tyrannical powers, providing remedies when an official abuses his or her lawful authority.
"It is an incorrigible and foundational principle of law that oppressed citizens have a right to assassinate a tyrant in defense of one’s lives and liberties. E.g., Mass. Const. Part I, Art. 1 (1780); see also, John of Salisbury, Policraticus, bk. iii, ch. 15 (1159); Magna Carta [1215], Ch. 61 (King personally liable for not only his tortious acts, but those of his servants). It logically follows that, if our judges have become tyrants, they may be assassinated. And as the
act would be in defense of the Constitution and our laws, it would not be so much of a legal right as a duty of citizenship. 8 C.F.R. § 337.1.
"The problem with the status quo is self-evident: If the Justices of this Court cannot be compelled to obey the law via the orderly mechanism of law, they are, by definition, dictators and tyrants. And, as a corollary, as former federal prosecutor Paul Butler asserts, lethal force may lawfully be used against judges who have appointed themselves our tyrants. Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 721 (2003) (invoking international law principle of "just war" to justify targeted assassinations of public officials, including federal judges).
"Again, we return to the wisdom of Thomas Jefferson: As assassination of officials is undesirable, the law must be read as not bestowing tyrannical powers, and providing remedies when an official abuses his or her lawful authority.
"It is logically impossible for a judicial system to deliver equal justice under law if judges are free to substitute the crooked cord of discretion for the golden mete-wand of the law. Therefore, error-correction is an unavoidable aspect of this Court’s duties. If it takes a thousand Justices to do the job right, it does, but there can be no substitute for doing it right."
Citizens, particularly litigants, ought to remind recalcitrant, oath-flouting, rule-breaking, law-violating judges of this reality from time to time. Plainly and simply, any public employee who violates his oath to support, protect, or defend the constitutions (meaning enforce the limits on government power and the guarantees of people's rights) BECOMES THEREBY AN ENEMY of the constitutions. And EVERYbody who encounters such an enemy has a constitutional duty to excise that enemy from government.
ONLY when the people make judges fear summary excision will judges stop behaving like enemies of the people and of the constitutions.
Consider me like the boy who blurted out that the king had no clothes on when everyone else pretended they saw the king fully clothed. I see blatant crookedness in our courts, by bailiffs and judges nearly every time I visit them and government and the media almost totally ignores it. It embarrasses me and I hate it. Please get off your butts and help me correct it. Remember this from the Florida Constitution of 1838, Article I:
Section 2. That all political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and established for their benefit; and, therefore, they have, at all times, an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter or abolish their form of government, in such manner as they may deem expedient.
This provision will remain forever true as it reminds people of the first rules of responsible liberty: vigilance and timely correction. With your fellow man, turn the other cheek. With government abuse, tolerance is a bad policy.
--
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