Revealing your proof sources not necessary when criticizing government
Bob Hurt
Revealing your proof sources not necessary when criticizing government. See below.
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Bob Hurt
2460 Persian Drive #70
Clearwater, FL 33763
+1 (727) 669-5511
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"Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even
books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted
groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to
criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all. The
obnoxious press licensing law of England, which
was also enforced on the Colonies was due in part to the knowledge that
exposure of the names of printers, writers and distributors would lessen the
circulation of literature critical of the government. The old seditious libel cases in England show the lengths to
which government had to go to find out who was responsible for books that were
obnoxious to the rulers. John Lilburne was
whipped, pilloried and fined for refusing to answer questions designed to get
evidence to convict him or someone else for the secret distribution of books in
England. Two Puritan Ministers, John Penry and
John Udal, were sentenced to death on charges that they were responsible for
writing, printing or publishing books. 6 Before the Revolutionary War colonial
patriots frequently had to conceal their authorship or distribution of
literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by
English-controlled courts. Along about that time the Letters of Junius were
written and the identity of their author is unknown to this day. 7 Even the Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of
our Constitution, were published under fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has
sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes. 362 U.S. 60,
65
We have recently had occasion to hold in two cases that there are times and
circumstances when States may not compel members of groups engaged in the
dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified. Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 ; N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 . The reason for those
holdings was that identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly
peaceful discussions of public matters of importance. This broad Los Angeles
ordinance is subject to the same infirmity. We hold that it, like the Griffin,
Georgia, ordinance, is void on its face." Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960)
Like freedom of speech and a free press, the right of peaceable assembly was
considered by the Framers of our Constitution to lie at the foundation of a
government [361 U.S. 516, 523] based upon the consent of an
informed citizenry - a government dedicated to the establishment of justice and
the preservation of liberty. U.S. Const., Amend. I. And it is now beyond
dispute that freedom of association for the
purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from invasion by the States. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 364 ; N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 .
"If petitioner's rank-and-file members are constitutionally entitled to withhold their connection with the Association despite the production order, it is manifest that this right is properly assertable by the Association. To require that it be claimed by the members themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion. Petitioner is the appropriate party to assert these rights, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical… In so concluding, we reject respondent's argument that the Association lacks standing to assert here constitutional rights pertaining to the members, who are not of course parties to the litigation." NAACP, 357 U.S. 449, 460.
Freedoms such as these are protected not only against
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle
governmental interference. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 ;
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 ; American Communications Assn. v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 402 ; N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, supra; Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 . "It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of
affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] effective . . .
restraint on freedom of association. . . . This Court has recognized the vital
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations. .
. . Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a
group espouses dissident beliefs." N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357
U.S., at 462 .
"On this record it sufficiently appears that compulsory disclosure of the
membership lists of the local branches of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People would work a significant
interference with the freedom of association of their members. 9 There was [361
U.S. 516, 524] substantial uncontroverted evidence that public
identification of persons in the community as members of the organizations had
been followed by harassment and threats of bodily harm. There was also evidence
that fear of community hostility and economic reprisals that would follow
public disclosure of the membership lists had discouraged new members from
joining the organizations and induced former members to withdraw. This
repressive effect, while in part the result of private attitudes and pressures,
was brought to bear only after the exercise of governmental power had
threatened to force disclosure of the members' names. N. A. A. C. P. v.
Alabama, 357 U.S., at 463 . Thus, the threat of substantial government
encroachment upon important and traditional aspects of individual freedom is
neither speculative nor remote. Decision in this case must finally turn,
therefore, on whether the cities as instrumentalities of the State have
demonstrated so cogent an interest in obtaining and making public the
membership lists of these organizations as to justify the substantial
abridgment of associational freedom which such disclosures will effect. Where
there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling. N. A.
A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 . See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 ; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569, 574 ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 . Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516 (1960)
"A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth
of all his factual assertions leads to a comparable 'self-censorship. '...Under
such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing
their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in
fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the
expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which 'steer far
wider of the unlawful zone.' Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S., at 526 . The
rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is
inconsistent with the First Amendment...
[emphasis added] New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279
(1964).
