Fast Amp; Furious 7 (English) 2012 Full Movie In Hindi Free Download
Marcelo Eichel
Over the winter of 1916/17 I Anzac Corps, now consisting of four divisions, the 1st,2nd, 4th and 5th, languished in the mud of the old Somme battlefield, fighting the coldand trench foot more than the Germans, with whom they conducted informal truces.1 In thisstatic trench warfare, the light trench mortar was a popular weapon and many infantrybattalions formed additional unauthorised trench mortar batteries. 2
Fast amp; Furious 7 (English) 2012 full movie in hindi free download
Download Zip https://urlgoal.com/2yMexN
In November 1916 the 3rd Division arrived in France and moved into the line nearArmentieres, the "nursery" sector where the other four divisions had spent theirfirst weeks in France. This brought the total strength of the AIF in France on 31 January1917 to 117,681 including 481 nurses.3Meanwhile, a new division, the 6th Division, began forming in England in February 1917.
One new unit of note was the I Anzac Corps School, which was formed in France on 11November 1916. The school ran courses on subjects such as bombing, Lewis guns, trenchmortars and signalling. All corps and armies of the BEF had their own schools but theAustralian school was more influential than most because the corps always consisted of thesame divisions, allowing for a great deal of continuity and conformity of procedures, andbecause the corps commander, Lieutenant General Sir W. R. Birdwood, was also GOC AIF, andso was responsible for training and doctrine throughout the AIF.
Important tactical and organisational developments occurred in over the winter. Onemajor tactical and organisational change was in the organisation of the infantry. As wehave already seen, the original allocation of Lewis guns of four per battalion wasgradually increased to twelve at the end of July 1916.4This organisation, while fairly successful from a tactical point of view, had someadministrative drawbacks because the Lewis guns in the battalion section were administereddifferently to the others, and the LGO could not devote sufficient time to training Lewisgunners and providing technical advice when he had his own section to look after. InDecember, enough Lewis guns became available to give each infantry battalion sixteen gunsand BEF GHQ decided to allocate one to each platoon while still allowing for them to bepooled at company level if need be.
The platoon was now confirmed as the primary tactical unit. Bombing and scoutingplatoons were broken up so that each platoon now had a Lewis gun section, a bombingsection, a rifle grenade section and a scouting section. The platoon now contained all theweapons available to the infantry except the light trench mortar, and so could operateindependently. It therefore became the primary tactical unit instead of the company. Theinfantry battalion not only contained more firepower than ever before, it could bedispersed over a greater area, because control was delegated to its platoon leaders.5
A Lewis gun section consisted of nine fully trained Lewis gunners, although there wasonly one Lewis gun. The section leader was a sergeant or corporal. He allotted fields offire, arranged reliefs, and recorded ammunition expenditure and breakages. Any damage thatput the gun out of action had to be reported to the platoon commander. Each squad had agunner, the man who carried the gun into action and fired it. The gunner carried a satchelover his shoulder with a wallet containing the smaller spare parts inside. The diggersimprovised a sling for the Lewis gun from two rifle slings, which enabled the gun to befired on the move from the hip.
An assistant stuck close to the gunner, ready to replace the gunner if he was hit andhelping the gunner in any way possible with loading and breakages. The assistant carriedfour Lewis gun magazines, each of which contained 47 rounds. The spare parts of the Lewiswere so numerous that they were divided between the gunner and the assistant. Theassistant carried the spare barrel, cylinder, and piston rod with cleaning rods for bothbarrel and cylinder and both gunner and assistant carried oil. They were both equippedwith revolvers as a secondary weapon. In action, the assistant lay beside the gunnerbecause he was more likely to attract attention if he was continually running over to thegun. From this position, he could also provide the gunner with moral support and take overmore quickly if the gunner became a casualty.
The rest of the team were riflemen doubling as ammunition carriers, scouts andobservers. Each rifleman carried 50 rounds of rifle ammunition. One rifleman carried fourto eight Lewis gun magazines and maintained close touch with the gunner and assistant,ready to replace the assistant if either the assistant or the gunner became a casualty.Two were lightly loaded scouts, moving ahead of the gun, locating targets and observingfor the gun when necessary while the second scout could be used as a messenger when thegun was in position. The remaining three were ammunition carriers with six magazines each.The practice was for each man to have an even number of magazines since an evenlydistributed load is easier to carry. The handcarts originally issued to transport theLewis gun and its ammunition were found to be unsuitable and were replaced in January 1917by one General Service cart per company.6
Lewis gun magazines could not be carried in the standard rifle ammunition pouches,while the tin cases holding eight magazines in canvas carriers in which Lewis gunmagazines were delivered to the front line were good for preventing damage in transit buttoo awkward to carry into action. Various units developed or acquired different pouchesfor carrying the magazines in action and no standard pattern was insisted upon. A Canadianinvention, the Yukon pack, was widely used by carrying parties but was too conspicuous inbattle, leading to the loss of the carrier and most likely the ammunition as well if itcould not be recovered. The Lewis gun sections preferred smaller, more easily concealedpouches. All up the section carried 35 full Lewis gun magazines and 300 spare rounds each.7 If theLewis gun magazines ran out, each of the riflemen could contribute 10 or 20 rounds toreload some of the Lewis gun magazines.8
In addition to the Lewis guns, the number of Vickers machine guns per division wasincreased 16 to 64 with the addition of a fourth machine gun company, one assigneddirectly to division rather than brigade. The fourth company had the same establishment asthe three brigade machine gun companies, but was commanded by a major who was alsodesignated the Divisional Machine Gun Officer (DMGO). To assist him in performing theseduties, a captain was added to the establishment of the fourth company.9 Five newcompanies were formed in England in January 1917. The 21st and 22nd Machine gun Companiesjoined the 1st and 2nd Divisions respectively in March 1917 but the 23rd and 24th MachineGun Companies were reassigned to newly formed brigade of the 6th Division and, with the25th Machine Gun Company, did not move to France until September 1917. On arrival, eachwas inspected by its division commander, except for the 23rd, which was inspected by theBEF commander, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig himself.10The drift of control of the machine guns to higher headquarters, which had already seenresponsibility moved from battalion to brigade, now continued in favour of division.Already, however, a position of Corps Machine Gun Officer (CMGO) had been created andtraining and coordination functions relating to machine guns had moved to corps control.11
The reasons behind the control of medium machine guns by higher echelons were tactical,as the weight required them to set up in advance and the new barrage tactics involved themassing of large numbers of machine guns so division and sometimes corps control wasrequired. Increasingly, the division was becoming its infantry plus spare parts. Divisionsat the front would be augmented by corps. But corps had few units to give, so it obtainedresources like additional artillery, engineers and machine guns by stripping the divisionsnot in the line. With four divisions, two would normally be in the line and two inreserve.
Another organisational change was the reorganisation of the field artillery from fourto six guns per battery to economise on brigade and battery commanders. Each divisionwould now have two brigades of 18 guns and 6 howitzers. The number of field artillerybrigades in the AIF was thereby reduced from 20 to 13 and field batteries from 80 to 52.The divisions were now allocated two field artillery brigades each, each with three 18pounder batteries and one 4.5 inch howitzer battery. Three brigades, the 3rd, 6th and12th, were designated "Army" brigades and placed under I Anzac Corps control.These units were supplied with their own mechanical transport, the 3rd, 6th and 12th ParkSections. The reorganisation was tricky because brigades were still in the line when itoccurred.12
The major tactical change however concerned counterbattery fire. The idea ofcounterbattery fire had been in disfavour before the war because experiments had shownthat it required a mountain of ammunition to destroy an enemy field gun. However, shortlybefore the war, a French meme appeared that held that this was unnecessary. Rather thanseeking physical destruction of the enemy artillery, it was mooted that simply preventingthe enemy artillery from firing, that is preventing acquisition and thereby taking it outof the battle, would be worthwhile. This was logical given that so much of the enemy'sfirepower came from artillery. It also turned out to be much easier to do, since a directhit was no longer required. The French term for this was taken directly into English:neutralisation.13 Inartillery parlance, guns are suppressed if they stop firing; they are neutralised if theyremain that way for more than a short period of time after the fire upon them lifts.14
At Gallipoli, when the Olive Grove guns opened up, the artillery had serious problemswith all four parts of our tactical model. They could not locate the guns, communicationbetween different posts was poor, the guns were out of range, making acquisitionimpossible, and shrapnel could not destroy them. These problems were only partially solvedin 1916 and persisted into 1917, but by that stage solutions to them all were at hand.
7fc3f7cf58