Decisiontheory can be viewed as a theory of one person games,or a game of a single player against nature. The focus is onpreferences and the formation of beliefs. The most widely used form ofdecision theory argues that preferences among risky alternatives can bedescribed by the maximization of the expected value of a numerical utilityfunction, where utility may depend on a number of things, but insituations of interest to economists often depends on money income.Probability theory is heavily used in order to represent theuncertainty of outcomes, and Bayes Law is frequently used to model theway in which new information is used to revise beliefs. Decision theoryis often used in the form of decision analysis, which shows how best toacquire information before making a decision.
One way to describe a game is by listing the players (orindividuals) participating in the game, and for each player, listingthe alternative choices (called actions or strategies) available tothat player. In the case of a two-player game, the actions of the firstplayer form the rows, and the actions of the second player the columns,of a matrix. The entries in the matrix are two numbers representing theutility or payoff to the first and second player respectively. A veryfamous game is the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In this game the twoplayers are partners in a crime who have been captured by the police.Each suspect is placed in a separate cell, and offered the opportunityto confess to the crime. The game can be represented by the followingmatrix of payoffs
A second feature of this game, is that it is self-evident howan intelligent individual should behave. No matter what a suspectbelieves his partner is going to do, it is always best to confess. Ifthe partner in the other cell is not confessing, it is possible to get10 instead of 5. If the partner in the other cell is confessing, it ispossible to get 1 instead of -4. Yet the pursuit of individuallysensible behavior results in each player getting only 1 unit ofutility, much less than the 5 units each that they would get if neitherconfessed. This conflict between the pursuit of individual goals andthe common good is at the heart of many game theoretic problems.
A third feature of this game is that it changes in a verysignificant way if the game is repeated, or if the players willinteract with each other again in the future. Suppose for example thatafter this game is over, and the suspects either are freed or arereleased from jail they will commit another crime and the game will beplayed again. In this case in the first period the suspects may reasonthat they should not confess because if they do not their partner willnot confess in the second game. Strictly speaking, this conclusion isnot valid, since in the second game both suspects will confess nomatter what happened in the first game. However, repetition opens upthe possibility of being rewarded or punished in the future for currentbehavior, and game theorists have provided a number of theories toexplain the obvious intuition that if the game is repeated oftenenough, the suspects ought to cooperate.
The Pride Game is very different than the Prisoner'sDilemma game. Suppose that we are both proud. In the face of yourpride, if I simply chose not to confess I would lose face, and myutility would decline from 4 to 3.6. To confess would be even worse asyou would retaliate by confessing, and I would be humiliated as well,winding up with 0. In other words, if we are both proud, and we eachbelieve the other is proud, then we are each making the correct choice.Morever, as we are both correct, anything either of us learns willsimply confirm our already correct beliefs. This type of situation -where players play the best they can given their beliefs, and they havelearned all there is to learn about their opponents' play is called bygame theorists a Nash Equilibrium.
Nowsuppose that we become "better people." To give this precise meaningtake this to mean that we care more about each other, that is, we aremore altruistic, more generous. Specifically, let us imagine thatbecause I am more generous and care more about you, I place a valueboth on the utility I receive in the "selfish" game described above andon the utility received by you. Not being completely altruistic, Iplace twice as much weight on my own utility as I do on yours. So, forexample, if in the original game I get 3 units of utility, and you get6 units of utility, then in the new game in which I am an altruist, Iget a weighted average of my utility and your utility. I get 2/3 of the3 units of utility that belonged to me in the original "selfish" game,and 1/3 of the 6 units of utility that belonged to you in the "selfish"game. Overall I get 4 units of utility instead of 3. Because I havebecome a better more generous person, I am happy that you are getting 6units of utility, and so this raises my own utility from the selfishlevel of 3 to the higher level of 4. The new game with altruisticplayers is described by taking a weighted average of each player'sutility with that of his opponent, placing 2/3 weight on his ownutility and 1/3 weight on his opponent's. This gives the payoff matrix of the Altruistic Pride Game
What do we conclude? It is no longer anequilibrium for us both to be proud. Each of us in the face of theother's pride would wish to switch to not confessing. Of course it isalso not an equilibrium for us both to choose not to confess: each ofus would wish to switch to confessing. The only equilibrium is the boxmarked with two asterisks where we are both playing the best we cangiven the other player's play: it is where we both choose to confess. Sofar from making us better off, when we both become more altruist andmore caring about one another, instead of both getting a relativelyhigh utility of 4, the equilibrium is disrupted, and we wind up in asituation in which we both get a utility of only 1. Notice how we cangive a precise meaning to the "world being a better place." If we bothreceive a utility of 1 rather than both receiving a utility of 4, theworld is clearly a worse place.
Forthose of you who are interested in or already know more advanced gametheory, the Pride Game has only the one Nash equilibrium shown - it issolvable by iterated strict dominance. The Atruistic Pride Game, however, hasseveral mixed strategy equilibria. You can compute them using the fineopen source software program Gambitwritten by Richard McKelvey, Andrew McLennan and Theodore Turocy. Oneequilibrium involves randomizing between proud and confess, so is worsethan the proud-proud equilibrium of the Pride game. The other isstrictly mixed in that it randomizes between all three strategies. Thepayoffs to that equilibrium gives each player 2.31 - so while it isbetter than both players confessing for certain, it is still less goodthan the unique equilibrium of the Pride Game.
Expanding on Michael's idea, many compression utilities/formats support a "store" mode, where they don't actually do any compression. Most of those same utilities also support splitting into multiple archives. Combine the two, and you can split a file without wasting a bunch of time compressing it, especially if it's non-compressible data. I've used this technique myself to overcome the exact problem you're having.
Other programs move files in chunks of 600mb to 2gb and use a flag bit, then use multiple bitfields for the chunks, though all is seen as a single file; such is the case with adobe software, especially with video files. It segments the files, and creates a bitfield for each segment for video\audio that is read by the os as a single file. These files are simply wrappers, a folder of sorts that wraps around a set of images, or samples that are quickly cached into memory for playback. The DVD standard VOB is another great example that shows where this comes from and why. Its cut into chunks of quickly cached files for playback on DVD players. They use the old UDF1 or joliet format, which borrows from HFS, but uses mostly FAT capable lists. The file size limit is roughly 2gb, mainly for caching speeds of DVD player set-top-boxes. Most often it is in 1\10th to 1\5th of that limit, and multiplexed audio and video chunks are cached together very quickly, for playback.
The book is well organized. It starts out with an overview of the role-playing, the CoreStep system, and the world of Earthdawn. There's some good introductory fiction, To the Saddle Born. Then a dozen or so pages explaining some of the game concepts before delving into character creation and the various Talents, skills, spells, and equipment available. There are chapters on the nuances of magic and summoning, which you don't need to read to get started. There is the necessary chapter on Combat, and one on advancing your character. The last 30 pages or so go more into the fluff of the world, which I strongly recommend every player read, even though it's not necessary for the first game. The world building that went into Earthdawn has always been its selling point. Skipping it would be like eating a cupcake but not the frosting.
Fighter-types include Archers, Beastmasters, Cavalrymen, Warriors, Swordmasters, and Sky Raiders. The Spellcasters are Elementalists, Illusionists, Nethermancers (Spirits, Life and Death), or Wizards. Troubadours, Weaponsmiths, Air Sailors, Scouts, and Thieves round out the utility players. It's a wide range of options, and you can multi-discipline to mix and match - as long as you can justify your new vision to your GM. At mid-to-high levels, PCs have abilities far beyond what normal people can aspire to. There is always a bigger baddie, though. The Horrors that roamed the earth during the Scourge literally ate high-circle characters for breakfast, and they aren't all gone. Even the Great Dragons laid low during the Scourge.
Character advancement is organic. The players invest their Legend Points in whatever abilities, Attributes, or magical items they choose. As an aside, there are optional rules scattered throughout the book, mostly rules from previous editions. One I prefer is Using All Talents to advance. It is a little more complicated, but gives you more flexibility to invest in the abilities you get the most out of.
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