IRAQ: A TIME TO STAY?

[DRoshani]

There may well be a case for accelerating some aspects of the US
military withdrawal from Iraq. The present plan has an insurance
factor built in to the withdrawal schedule. It delays the start of
major further reductions until after the Iraqi national election in
early 2010, and then rushes them out before August. So far, things
have gone better in Iraq than some anticipated. If this continues, it
may well make sense to start reductions earlier. This would send a
clear signal to all Iraqis that the US really is leaving, it would put
less strain on the US forces in Iraq by carrying a slower and more
steady pace of withdrawals, and it would ease the overall strain on US
forces of fighting two prolonged major regional contingencies.
But, an exit is not an exit strategy. US policy has to look at other
considerations than simply when and how quickly it should remove its
troops. It has to consider what it can do to ensure a stable and
secure Iraq is left behind once its troops are gone. It has to ensure
that that US trainers and enablers offer Iraq continuing support; and
that the US helps Iraq acquire the capabilities it needs to defend
itself against any pressure from its neighbors.
The way the US phases down its forces also remains an important issue.
US troops are scarcely the answer to all of Iraq’s remaining problems
with internal security and political reconciliation. They do, however,
play a key role in damping down the tensions and potential clashes
between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds. They still play a key role in helping
Iraqi forces deal with Al Qa’ida in Iraq and other Sunni insurgent
movements – which are still all too active in areas like Ninewa and
Diyala. They help the Iraqi forces deal with the potential threat from
Shi’ite militias, the Special Groups, and the extremist elements
supported in part by Iran.
This may not make the remaining US presence popular the Iraqi people –
and polls show that the vast majority of Iraqi Arabs want all US
forces out as soon as possible – but it does make them a useful bridge
that helps buy time until the Iraqi security forces are more ready to
do the job.

Read more at http://csis.org/files/publication/090731_Iraq-MoreThanExit.pdf